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ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates how development justice can be realized through an international
accountability praxis that is grounded on the core principles of the United Nations Declaration on the Right
to Development, one that recognizes the imperative of direct and distinct accountability of the World Bank
and the IMF for their development practices. Empirically, amid the intensification of human rights
deprivations and mounting development injustices in the Global South, the dominant development praxis
has been typified by the marked absence of direct and distinct accountability of international financial
institutions. The normative frameworks of international accountability in the realm of development are
institutionally weak and assume a statist outlook, delegitimizing any attempt to locate the causes of
inegalitarian development outcomes in the character of the global development policy system. And yet, the
global policy system has a significantly determinative, manipulating and subordinating character on the
national development outcomes. This dissertation discerns that through legal doctrines and traditions that
it constructs and reconstructs, international law tends to sanction, rationalize and legitimize accountability
avoidance, disconnection, and obstruction, particularly when international financial institutions are the
objects of censure in development policymaking and practice. It is this quality and architecture that render
the functionalities of extant accountability regimes unsuitable and ill-adapted to aid the securement of the
kind of development justice foreseen by the right to development norm. Simply, contemporary regimes
cannot assure the protection of people in the Global South against harms causally linked to the
interventions of the World Bank and IMF. Responding to this feature, this dissertation proposes that
development accountability thought, and practice must be contextually-aware and sensitive to the rights in
question. Thus, it resorts to the core element of the right to development to “participate in, and contribute
to,” development to propose what I call participatory accountability from below in international law.
Participatory accountability offers the most pragmatic approach, premises the imperative of direct and
distinct accountability of international financial institutions, recognizes Third World agency, autonomy and
resistance in development practices, and adds into the repertoire of international law tools with which the
Third World can confront development injustices.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTORY NOTE AND OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION
1. INTRODUCTION
The primary aim of this dissertation is to offer a contribution to the resolution of the question of
how development justice can be realized through an international accountability praxis that is, for
the most part, grounded on the core principles of the United Nations Declaration on the Right to
Development (the Declaration).1 I intend to describe and critically analyze the ways in which
development justice can be actualized through an international mechanism that recognizes the
imperative of ensuring the direct and distinct accountability of international financial institutions
(IFIs) for their development practices. I rely on the Declaration as the (underpinning) normative
framework for development justice and one of the instruments guiding the implementation and
realization of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).2
The specific question of accountability for the realization of development justice has not
received any incisive and sustained attention in legal scholarship, as is fully attempted in this
dissertation. It requires a broader consideration from a right to development (RTD) perspective.
Noticeably, there are some earnest debates and policy commitments on mainstreaming the RTD
in the implementation of the SDGs Agenda.3 However, given their wide scope of
“implementation”, they do not sufficiently focus on the narrow question of the accountability of
IFIs as a mechanism for the realization of development justice. They cannot therefore suffice. The
1

See Declaration on the Right to Development, GA Res 41/28, UNGAOR, 41st Sess, Supp No 53, UN Doc
A/RES/41/128 (1986) (the Declaration).
2
For the idea that SDGs elevates and provide a platform for the operationalization of the RTD in development
policymaking, see Mihir Kanade, “The Right to Development and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, in
Mihir Kanade and Shyami Puvimanasinghe eds, Operationalizing the Right to Development for Implementation of the
Sustainable Development Goals, E-learning Module (OHCHR, UPEACE, and UNU-IIGH, 2018) online:
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/SR/AddisAbaba/MihirKanade.pdf >.
3
The policy commitments and debates are mostly at the UN level. They include the zero draft of a legally binding
instrument on the right to development that has been prepared by the Working Group on the Right to Development
and which is the basis for the ongoing negotiations at the UN Human Rights Council for a draft convention, hopefully
to be adopted soon. See Draft Convention on the Right to Development, with commentaries
A/HRC/WG.2/21/2/Add.1. Other recent developments include the United Nations Human Rights Council resolution
33/14, adopted on 29 September 2016 appointing the Special Rapporteur on the right to development to contribute to
“the promotion, protection and fulfilment of the right to development in the context of the implementation of the 2030
Agenda.” The other new development is the establishment of a UN Expert Mechanism on the RTD by the Human
Rights Council including the recent appointments made to that mechanism. The role of the experts would be to
“provide the Council with thematic expertise on the right to development in searching for, identifying and sharing best
practices with Member States and to promote the implementation of the right to development worldwide.” See
Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on 27 September 2019 A/HRC/RES/42/23.

1

lack of conceptual clarity or a focused attention on the development justice accountability question
requires rethinking in theory and practice. This dissertation makes that contribution, the first to do
so.
From an interdisciplinary perspective, I assess an unexplored and less understood problem
in international law: how the somewhat hybridized principles of human rights and development,
as they are enshrined in the Declaration’s framework, can be applied to shape the redress and
amelioration of the accountability deficits and dysfunctions attendant to the interventions of IFIs
in development policymaking and practice.4 I investigate the most suitable and effective ways for
holding IFIs accountable to the extent that they create certain barriers to the realization of the RTD.
These barriers are presented by the rules, policies, processes and institutional arrangements for the
governance of international economic activities.
Within the larger corpus of human rights norms, the RTD stands out, to a significant degree,
as both sui generis and a counter-hegemonic norm.5 This is evidenced, at least in part, in its
provenance in the geopolitical struggle for development justice, a feature reflected in its espousal
of a radical cosmopolitan vision of a fair, just, and equitable international order.6 As an integral
part of the human rights corpus, the Declaration integrates concepts of development with human
rights ideologies and values. It seeks to ground and rest the value of global redistributive justice
on this normative foundation, which it extends to international decision-making at the level of
international economic governance.7 As interestingly, grounded on, and normatively linked to,

4

The core attributes of the RTD norm are participation based on human rights, human-centred development, and
social justice and equity. See Report of the High-level Taskforce on the Implementation of the Right to Development
on its sixth session A/HRC/15/WG.2/TF/2/Add.2 14-22 January 2010 at 9 [Hereinafter HLTF Report].
5
Margot E Salomon, “Legal Cosmopolitanism and the Normative Contribution of the Right to Development” in
Stephen P Marks ed., Implementing the Right to Development: The Role of International Law (Geneva: Friedrich
Herbert Stiftung, 2008) at 22 [Salomon, “Legal Cosmopolitanism”]; Bonny Ibhawoh, “The Right to Development:
The Politics and Polemics of Power and Resistance” (2011) 33 Hum Rts Q 76 at 78.
6
Salomon, “Legal Cosmopolitanism” ibid at 26.
7
The Declaration mandates, in its various provisions, the international community to eliminate obstacles to
development and promote a new international economic order favourable to the realization of the RTD. See e.g Margot
E Salomon, “Towards a Just Institutional Order: A Commentary on the First Session of the UN Taskforce on the Right
to Development” (2005) 23:3 Netherlands Q Hum Rts 409 at 412. The central role of the state and the international
community in eliminating barriers to the national and international development, which extends to the realm of
international financial institutions and international arrangements is reiterated in most of the Declaration’s articles.
Article 2(2) of the Declaration places a duty on all persons, including all organs of society, to promote development;
Article 3(1) stipulates states’ duties to create national and international conditions favourable to the realization of the
right to development; Article 3(3) mandates their cooperation in ensuring development and elimination of obstacles
to development and the creation of a new international economic order; Article 4(1) refers to individual and collective
duties of states to formulate enabling policies conducive to realization of development; Article 4(2) recognizes the
central role of cooperation in complementing efforts of developing countries in development initiatives while Article

2

human rights instruments, chief among them the Declaration on the RTD, the SDGs explicitly
articulate bold policy objectives designed to render a more people-centric and rights-based notion
of development.8
I critically examine the adequacy and effectiveness of three regimes of accountability: the
law of international responsibility;9 the mechanisms of accountability such as the SDGs policy
schema of follow-up and review of progress; and the internal institutional accountability of IFIs.10
I interrogate as well the adaptability of these regimes for ensuring the direct and distinct
accountability of IFIs in their interventions in international development policymaking and
practice and in economic and financial governance.
I examine this accountability question as it relates to the development interventions of the
World Bank (the Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (the IMF or the Fund) in the provision
of “global public goods.”11 In the context of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, the two
global public goods are development financing and financial stabilization operations.12 I examine
how the Bank and the Fund can be held accountable for the roles they perform that directly impact
the alleviation of poverty and inequality, the implementation of the RTD, and the global
partnerships for sustainable development.
10 requires states while acting nationally and internationally to take “steps to ensure the full exercise and progressive
enhancement of the right through the formulation, adoption and implementation of policy, legislative and other
measures”. See also United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ed, Realizing the Right to
Development: Essays in Commemoration of 25 Years of the United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development
(New York/Geneva: United Nations, 2013) at 10, 13 [OHCHR, Realizing the Right to Development].
8
United Nations General Assembly, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
Resolution A/RES/70/1 adopted by the General Assembly on 27 September 2015. See reference to the bold ambition
to fulfil human rights for all in the Preamble and paragraphs, 8, 10, 19, 20, and 35 [United Nations, Transforming Our
World].
9
These are: Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries (United
Nations, 2001) adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and submitted to the
General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session, annex to General Assembly
resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001 and corrected by document A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4.
; and Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted
by the International Law Commission at its sixty-third session, in 2011 (A/66/10, para. 87), welcomed by the United
Nations General Assembly in resolution 66/100 of 9 December 2011.
10
Such as the Inspection Panels and the Independent Evaluation Office of the Bank and the IMF respectively.
11
Joseph E Stiglitz, “International Financial Institutions and the Provision of International Public Goods” (1998) 3:2
European Investment Bank Papers 116 at 117 and Michel Camdessus, “International Financial and Monetary Stability:
A Global Public Good?” in Peter B Kenen and Alexander K Swobada, Reforming the International Monetary and
Financial System (IMF, 2000) at 9. For usage of the term in the context of international cooperation, see Inge Kaul,
Isabelle Grunberg & Marc A Stern eds, Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21 st Century (New
York: UNDP & Oxford University Press, 1999) [hereinafter Kaul et al, Global Public Goods].
12
For the argument that the roles that the IMF perform constitute global public goods, see Annamaria Viterbo,
International Economic Law and Monetary Measures: Limitations to States’ Sovereignty and Dispute Settlement
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012).
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Both the Bank and the IMF, in collaboration, play crucial roles in the global economy. They
are meant to support developing countries’ efforts to address those trade, investment, and financerelated policies deemed to be engines of growth, innovation, shared prosperity, as well as vehicles
for tackling the pandemic of poverty. They are also meant to help developing countries solve debt
vulnerabilities and formulate measures designed to catalyze job creation and productivity as
crucial engines for the realization of SDGs.13 In this regard, the IMF’s mandate relates to the
totality of the SDGs agenda.14 In the Bank’s own view, its role in financing development is a
pivotal hinge for the viability of all dimensions of sustainability, including eradicating extreme
poverty and boosting shared prosperity.15

2. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS
2.1 Accountability
I deploy the concept of accountability in a broad and meta-juristic sense. Drawing from a wide
variety of authoritative sources and utilizing various disciplinary prisms, I adopt a conception of
accountability that goes beyond, while remaining inclusive of, legal accountability. This eclectic
conception encompasses the following: legal and extra-legal accountability, judicial and nonjudicial accountability, and the modes of accountability in use in public administration,
governance, politics, law, and development practices. Guided by the most related academic work
on this theme, I proceed from the premise that accountability consists of three elements:
responsibility, answerability and enforceability.16 Incorporating this tripartite typology, I define
accountability as the process by which those who have responsibility to undertake certain
World Bank, “Our Mission Is More Urgent Than Ever” online:
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2019/04/13/our-mission-is-more-urgent-than-ever>.
14
Section 1 of Article IV of Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, adopted at the United Nations
Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 22, 1944, amended effective January 26,
2016 by the modifications approved by the Board of Governors in Resolution No. 66-2, adopted December 15, 2010.
15
Development Committee, “Update: The Forward Look and IBRD-IFC Capital Package Implementation” April 2019
online: <https://www.devcommittee.org/sites/www.devcommittee.org/files/download/Documents/2019-04/DC20190003-PIBRDIFC%20capital%20package%204-13.pdf>.
16
I have benefited enormously in this conceptualization of accountability from the recent work of the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights & Center for Economic and Social Rights, Who Will Be Accountable? Human
Rights and the Post-2015 Development Agenda (New York/Geneva: United Nations, 2013) at 10 [OHCHR & CESR,
Who Will Be Accountable?]. These three elements first appeared in the writings of Peter Newell & Shaula Bellour,
Mapping Accountability: Origins, Context and Implications for Development (Brighton: Institute of Development
Studies, 2002) and Andreas Schedler, “Conceptualizing Accountability” in Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond & Marc
Plattner, The Self-restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1999) at 14.
13

4

obligations defined by specific performance standards can be held answerable for the
implementation of those standards and are subject to the enforcement of sanctions where a
violation has occurred. A violation or breach, I surmise, can consist of rules, structures, processes,
or practices that may be incompatible with the paramount universal norms.
Conceptually, I assume that both the answerability and enforceability flow from the fact of
the assignment of responsibility to actors and the specification of performance criteria. The
answerability of actors deemed responsible can be engaged ex-ante either at the policymaking
level or in the course of decision-making, while enforcement in the form of sanctions may be
imposed ex-post upon outcomes so as to remedy rights infringement.17 Hence, answerability is the
requirement imposed on “public officials and institutions to provide reasoned justifications for
their actions and decisions to those they affect.”18 Answerability thus seems to require processbased accountability involving other such rights as participation, scrutiny of actions, and the
provision of both explanations and information, all of which seek to achieve institutional
responsiveness, transparency at the decision-making level. Enforceability is defined as the
institutional modalities “that monitor the degree to which public officials and institutions comply
with established standards, impose sanctions on officials who do not comply, and ensure that
appropriate corrective and remedial action is taken when required.”19 This triadic typology of
accountability (responsibility, answerability and enforceability) is human rights’ greatest
contribution to the conceptualization of accountability in the field of development.20

2.2

Counter-hegemony

My concept of counter-hegemony counter-poses the Gramscian notion of hegemony as a
cultivation of “popular consent” by the dominant social group. Gramsci’s notion of hegemony

17

Compare, for example, Willem Van Genugten, The World Bank Group, the IMF and Human Rights: A
Contextualized Way Forward (Cambridge; Antwerp; Portland: Intersentia Publishers, 2015) at 41, 43 [Genugten, Way
Forward] and Anne Marie Goetz & Rob Jenkins, Reinventing Accountability: Making Democracy Work for Human
Development (New York: Palgrave Macmillan; 2005) at 17[hereinafter Goetz and Jenkins, Reinventing
Accountability] at 12.
18
Rob Jenkins & Ann Marie Goetz, “Accounts and Accountability: Theoretical Implications of the Right to
Information in India” (1999) 20:3 Third World Q at 606.
19
OHCHR & CESR, Who Will Be Accountable? supra note 16; Schedler, supra note 16 at 15, 26. Sanctions may be
punitive or non-punitive and may take the form of public censure, media censure, naming and shaming, pushing public
authority to vacate office. See also Ruth W Grant & Robert O Keohane, “Accountability and Abuses of Power in
World Politics” (2005) 99:1 Am Pol Sc Rev at 29.
20
OHCHR and SERI, Who Will be Accountable, supra note 16 at 11.
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denotes a phenomenon in which a dominant social group achieves control or “domination” by
inducing others to submit to and accept as normal and universal the superior group’s perspectives,
practices and institutions without the threat of physical coercion.21 In this respect, I draw on the
work of Rajagopal, himself relying on Gramsci’s work, who holds that hegemony implies the
“production, reproduction and mobilization of popular consent [by] any dominant group.” 22 As a
part of his broad discussion of social movements praxis as a form of Third World resistance in
international law, Rajagopal’s conceptualization of mass mobilization from below as a power of
resistance against hegemony is innovative. Rajagopal grasps, and consequently demonstrates,
counter-hegemony as constituted by the “alternative visions” and other “valid ways” of describing
the universe, contrary to the political, social, and economic constructions of the dominant classes.23
I use counter-hegemony, therefore, as an analytical category to refer to how the substance, ethos,
and theory of the RTD furnishes alternative visions, perceptions, and ideations in contesting and
challenging the dominant (global) social group’s ways of conceiving of and legitimating the world
of human rights and development.

2.3

Development justice

Development justice refers to an understanding of justice that entails the fairness and equity in the
rules, processes, institutional setup, and outcomes of development. Development justice seeks to
apply the basic principles of fairness and equity to the injustices immanent in the realm of
development entrepreneurship. I adopt Khan’s approach to the theme of development justice,
specifically her examination of global policies and their distributive outcomes in the context of the
implementation of the SDGs agenda. According to her, the term development justice refers to an
alternative model of development concerned with achieving diverse goals, among them the global
redistribution (of power, wealth, income, resources, and opportunities) and social and economic
justice and equity.24 Guided by Khan’s work, I adopt a definition of development justice to refer

This is an interpretation of the Gramscian concept of hegemony by Douglas Litowitz, “Gramsci, Hegemony, and
the Law” (2000) BYU L Rev 515 at 518 citing Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds, Selection from the Prison
Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (1971) at 57-58.
22
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World
Resistance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 18 [Rajagopal, International Law from Below].
23
Ibid at 10-11. See further Balakrishnan Rajagopal, “Counter-Hegemonic International Law: Rethinking Human
Rights and Development as a Third World Strategy” (2006) 27:5 Third World Q 767-783.
24
See Tessa Khan, Delivering Development Justice? Financing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development No.
10 (UN Women, 2016) at 1.
21
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to a category of justice that deploys a structural and distributive understanding of phenomena.25 A
structural approach appropriates rules, policies, structures, and processes of development into the
understanding of the engenderment of incidences of human rights deprivations (in this case poverty
and inequality especially).26 A distributive understanding also deploys a structural approach. It
looks into how “institutional schemes” allocate the benefits and harms of development.27
I examine the accountability question from a development justice perspective. Looked at from
an accountability perspective, development justice is concerned with the responsibility,
answerability, and sanctionability of actors for distributive injustices linked to the structures,
processes, rules, policies, and operations of the global policy system.28 Here, development justice
is conceived of as an ideal that explicitly embraces the RTD’s emancipatory and egalitarian vision
of human-centred development, social justice and equity, and participatory development.
Holistically, these are further linked to SDG1— ending poverty in all its forms; SDG10— reducing
inequality within and between nations; and SDG17— strengthening the means of implementation
and revitalizing global partnerships to achieve these goals.29

2.4

Development injustice

The term “development injustice” refers to socio-economic conditions, inequities, experiences,
afflictions, abuses, subjugation, and deprivations that are contingent on the global development
policy system. More often, these manifest in outcomes of extreme poverty and the endurance of

25

See also Loretta Capeheart and Reagan Milovanovi, Social Justice: Theory, Issues and Movements (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2007) at 2.
26
Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reform, 2nd ed (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2008) at 70, 175 [Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights]. But see generally chapters 1,2 and 4 and
Thomas Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty” (1992) 103:1 Ethics.
27
Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, ibid at 176.
28
For a good view of the structural linkage between poverty and underdevelopment as human rights violations in the
context of global arrangements, see Margot E Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights: World Poverty and
the Development of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 113 [Salomon, Global
Responsibility for Human Rights]. See also Margot E Salomon, Arne Tostensen & Wouter Vandenhole eds, Casting
the Net Wider: Human Rights, Development and New Duty-Bearers (Antwerp; Oxford: Intersentia, 2007) at 14
(Hereinafter Salomon et al, Casting the Net Wider).
29
In reflecting and clarifying the scope and relevance of his mandate, the Special Rapporteur maintains that the RTD
is important given that it “addresses systemic and structural issues and root causes of poverty, inequality and conflict.
Its effective implementation will help to reduce poverty and inequality, prevent conflict and promote progress, leaving
no one behind, so that all individuals and peoples may live with freedom, equality and dignity and enjoy lasting peace.”
Saad Alfaragi, “United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Development: An Introduction to the Mandate”
(United Nations: Geneva, 2017) at 5.
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unjustifiable inequalities.30 Similarly, the persistence of external structural relationships that are
characterized by great disadvantages and asymmetries also constitute development injustices.
Logically therefore, in this dissertation, the term “development injustice” denotes the institutional
practices, processes, and outcomes constituting violations of the RTD that are linked to the
development interventions of the World Bank and the IMF. I charge that development injustices
are distributive outcomes shaped by global parochial objectives and institutional arrangements
deliberately fashioned to subjugate Third World peoples and render them incapable of exercising
autonomy and capabilities in self-determined development.31

2.5

Global public goods

“Global public goods” is a technical expression that has been modified from development
economics and customized to refer to those standards, rules, policies, outcomes, goals or “…issues
that are broadly conceived as important to the international community, that for the most part
cannot or will not be adequately addressed by individual countries acting alone, and that are
defined through a broad international consensus or a legitimate process of decision-making.”32
This concept has been instrumental to IFIs’ understanding, justification, and rationalization of their
interventions in the global economy and the development realm. The allocative role of
development financing and financial and monetary stabilization is one aspect of IFIs’ provision of
global public goods.

2.6

Intermingle effect

The concept of intermingle effect presupposes that there is always an entanglement and interaction
of global rules, policies, institutions, and norms with the policy infrastructure and institutions of

30

For the idea that poverty is a structural injustice, see for example Carol Chi Ngang & Serges Djoyou Kamga,
“Poverty Eradication Through Global Partnerships and the Question of the Right to Development Under International
Law” (2017) 47:3 Africa Insight.
31
I rely on the conceptualizations of Thomas Pogge, “World Poverty and Human Rights” (2005) 19:1 Ethics and
International Affairs at 3 and Margot E Salomon, “International Economic Governance and Human Rights
Accountability” LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Paper No 9/2007 online: <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24622/>.
32
International Task Force on Global Public Goods, Meeting Global Challenges: International Cooperation in the
National Interest, Final Report (Stockholm: Erlanders Infologistics Väst AB, 2006) at 13. For its academic debut in
international development cooperation, see Kaul et al, Global Public Goods, supra note 13; Inge Kaul ed, Providing
Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). For a critique
of the concept as imprecise and rhetorical, see David Long and Frances Woolley, “Critique of a UN Discourse” (2009)
15:1 Global Governance 107-122.
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nation-states as well as other national factors. It is in the complex interface and entanglement of
various factors that an admixture of foreseeable and unforeseeable, and avoidable and unavoidable,
outcomes to human development are produced and sustained. I argue later in this dissertation that
the intermingle effect complicates accountability in several important respects: it makes it difficult
to identify the breach of primary obligations (wrongfulness), trace the chain of causation, discern
the identity of responsible actors, and estimate harms or attribute conduct to a given actor.33

2.7

Structural contingency dynamic

The “structural contingency” of development is a dynamic which shows that the intricate
intermingling of policy and the interplay of different mediating factors happen in circumstances in
which the global forces are more decisive, manipulative, and determinative of national outcomes
than the domestic ones. It is a dynamic that locates the main causes of poverty and inequality
within and between states in the unfair and unjust global policy system and models of development.
It emphasizes that supranational actors less visibly take on more determinative roles in the
perpetuation of development injustices and the violation of human rights.

2.8

Third World

Following scholars such as Rajagopal, Mickelson, Okafor and Baxi, I define the Third World not
as geographies or nations per se but as a people and states defined by common and shared
experiences of subjugation and marginalization in the international institutional order.34 The term
Third World is a contingent category. It is not absolute in its expression or invocation of certain
meanings. It has been understood differently in the ideological, geopolitical, historical and
representational senses.35 As an analytical category, it expresses “the existence of a group of states
and populations that have tended to self-identify as such—coalescing around a historical and

33

This is an analogization taken directly from Thomas Pogge, Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes
What to the Very Poor (UNESCO; Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 17 [Hereinafter Pogge,
Freedom From Poverty].
34
Obiora Chinedu Okafor, “Newness, Imperialism, International Legal Reform in Our Time: A TWAIL Perspective”
(2005) 43:1 &2 Osgoode Hall L J at 174 [Okafor, “Newness”]. See also Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César A.
Rodríguez-Garavito eds., Law and Globalization From Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality (Cambridge; New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 14.
35
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, “Locating the Third World in Cultural Geography” (1999) 15:1/2Third World Legal
Studies 1. See also Karin Mickelson, “Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal Discourse”
(1998) 16 Wis Intl L J 353.
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continuing experience of subordination at the global level that they feel they share.”36 The
emphasis is on the sense of a shared experience of subordination, subjugation, and marginalization
of these states and peoples in the unjust global institutional system.37 For example, because of a
similar historical experience of subordination, in most diplomatic circles, China still self-identifies
(geopolitically) as Third World despite its economic power and prowess. This self-identity
captures how Baxi has defined the Third World as “geographies of injustices.”38 Therefore, the
ideological underpinning of Third World challenges the modernist notion of progress, focuses on
the hegemonic usages of power as an exercise of subjugation, and the history of colonialism and
imperialism, even in their current iterations, that have been key to the production of such
injustices.39 I use the term Global South within the same meaning as Third World.

3. DELIMITATION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
3.1 The Impetus for Development Justice
In both older and contemporary contexts of the “development encounter,”40 Bretton Woods
institutions have enjoyed tremendous influence in our increasingly networked global system. Their
dominance in this realm has been enabled by the technical assistance, surveillance, advisory
facilities, and lending that they extend or practice.41 The assumption of these roles by IFIs in

Okafor, supra note 34 “Newness” at 174.
As Prasad conceives it, Third World refers to those “galvanized by the mass movements and by the failures of
capitalist mal-development.” Vijay Prasad, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South (Brooklyn:
Verso, 2012) at 1.
38
Upendra Baxi, “Operation Enduring Freedom: Toward a New International Law and Order?” in Antony Anghie et
al eds, The Third World and International Order: Law, Politics and Globalization (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003)
at 46.
39
Rajagopal, “Cultural Geography” supra note 35 at 2-3.
40
As a concept crafted by Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), development encounter describes the processes through which
international law, human rights law, and a wide range of international endeavours interacted, at times in conflictual
terms, with models of development that were advanced by the North. The contestations and antagonisms were often
pitying the geo-political constituencies of the North and the Third World. In particular, the focus was on the pervasive
global policy system and structures determining the production, distribution, and sharing of the benefits of
development. Development models have been fairly critiqued by discourses of modernity, post-modernism, postdevelopment. See also Balakrishnan Rajagopal, “International Law and the Development Encounter: Violence and
Resistance at the Margins” (1999) 93 ASIL Proceedings 16 [Rajagopal, “Violence and Resistance at the Margins”].
41
The massive influence of international financial institutions come through proffered development policies
coincidental to development financing and concessional and non-concessional lending. These are too often coupled
with research, advisory, technical assistance, advocacy, standard- and norm-setting, and rulemaking. Some of the areas
where they are instrumental include sustainable debt management, debt restructuring, public borrowing, public
spending, fiscal prudence, national and international financial fragility, and financial sector regulation. This list is just
illustrative, though not exhaustive.
36
37
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international economic policymaking has always complicated the asymmetrical structure and
outlook of the global policy system.42As a result, the Global North–dominated IFIs have always
amassed and maintained relative dominance over the economies of most developing countries that
seek from them financial bailout during periods of economic strain.43
The domination by IFIs is highlighted by several factors. One is the significantly
manipulative, subordinating, and determinative character of the global development policy
system.44 Another factor is the technocratic production of knowledge as a different form of control
in development practice.45 There is also the participatory development deficits.46 The last is
economic rationalism by which IFIs’ disavow rights normativity as irrelevant to their domains of
practice.47 By their refusal to accept rights obligations as binding on them, at the altar of economic
rationalism, IFIs enjoy a wide leverage to proliferate economic standards for the implementation
of development without any obligation to accommodate countervailing values in the increasingly
proliferating regimes of regulation.

42

This appears in the Report of the Secretary General E/CN.4/1334) of 21 February 1979 as reproduced in OHCHR
Realizing the Right to Development, supra note 7 at 9 [OHCHR, Realizing the Right to Development]:
The global development process faces many obstacles which are of a largely transnational character. In the
economic sphere, these obstacles include continuing patterns of domination and dependency, unequal trade
relations, and restrictions from external sources on the right of every nation to exercise full sovereignty over
its national wealth. Thus, underdevelopment has been said to be the consequence of plunging a society and
its economy into a world whose structures condemn them to a subordinate status and stagnation or internal
imbalance.
See also Goetz and Jenkins, Reinventing Accountability, supra note 17 at 17.
43
Margot E Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights, supra note 28 at 40; Isabella D Bunn, The Right to
Development and International Economic Law: Legal and Moral Dimensions (Oxford; Portland: Hart Publications,
2012) at 174 [Bunn, Legal and Moral Dimensions]; Anne Orford, “Globalization and the Right to Development” in
Philip Alston ed, People’s Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 146.
44
See Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, supra note 26 at 39.
45
Post-development scholarship emphasizes that development is a regime of control and technocratic exercise of
control through “apparatuses of knowledge and power” that constructs the Third World and development to
correspond to parochial interests of the modernist development models. See Escobar, Encountering Development
supra note 40 at 23-24; 159; John Harald Sande Lie, Developmentality: An Ethnography of the World Bank-Uganda
Partnership (Bergham Books, 2015) [Sande Lie, Developmentality].
46
Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, supra note 26 at 122. For recent claims for reforms based on voice and
participation, there is a bulging scholarship in development studies. See, for example, Jakob Vestergaard & Robert H
Wade, “Still in the Woods: Gridlock in the IMF and the World Bank Puts Multilateralism at Risk” (2015) 6 Global
Policy.
47
Galit Sarfaty, “Measuring Justice: Internal Conflict over the World Bank’s Empirical Approach to Human Rights”
in Kamari Clarke & Mark Goodale eds., Mirrors of Justice: Law and Power in the Post-Cold War Era (Cambridge
University Press, 2009). For analysis regarding the institutional culture of vacillation towards human rights, see Galit
Sarfaty, Values in Translation: Human Rights and the Culture of the World Bank (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2012) Galit Sarfaty, “Why Culture Matters in International Institutions: The Marginality of Human Rights at the World
Bank (2009) 103 AJIL 647.
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All of these factors, in one way or another, prominently feature in the account of how
development injustices are produced and sustained by technocratic and predatory development
practices.48 The reason is that the roles IFIs perform, the control they exert, and the supranational
measures they recommend invariably shape national contexts, including the manipulation of
development outcomes. Without a doubt, the regulatory and allocative roles of development
institutions and the control they exert have some liberating and deleterious potential. Potentially,
the attainment or non-attainment of development priorities by weak states thus is structurally
hinged on the global policy system.49 These measures also impact the realization of the RTD as
the rights of individuals and peoples to a favourable national and international order for the
attainment of a just, equitable, participatory, and human-centred development respectful of all
human rights.50
Indeed, in empirical terms, a great number of development policies have proven to be
human rights retrogressive.51 They are human rights retrogressive because they are predicated on
a different vision of development—namely, the neoliberal creed; an economic rationalism that has
historically been blamed for the human suffering in the Global South.52
A true spectre of how the ascendancy of the neoliberal development creed has historically
subverted the development aspirations of a majority of people living in the Global South cannot
be lost to us.53 A daunting amount of literature documents the fact that development practice, even

Margot Salomon, “Legal Cosmopolitanism”, supra note 5 at 22; M Rodwan Abouharb & David Cingranelli, Human
Rights and Structural Adjustments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 4 [Abouharb & Cingranelli].
49
See also OHCHR & CESR, Who Will Be Accountable? supra note 16 (that fulfilment of states’ rights mandate is
structured and strained by the global political economy at 28).
50
See HLTF Report, supra note 4 at 9.
51
Abouharb Cingraneli, supra note 48. For further take, see Joe Oloka Onyango, “Beyond the Rhetoric:
Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and Social Rights in Africa” (1995) 26 Cal W Int’l LJ 20-29.
52
Ali Burak Güven, “Whither the Post-Washington Consensus? International Financial Institutions and Development
Policy Before and After the Crisis” (2018) 25:3 Rev of Intl Pol Economy (argues that “the perceived shift from
Washington Consensus to Post-Washington Consensus was “not a paradigm shift but a paradigm expansion within
mainstream wisdom” at 394).
53
Report of the Independent Expert on the Effects of Structural Adjustment Policies on the Full Enjoyment of Human
Rights, Commission on Human Rights, 55th Session Provisional Agenda Item 10, para 28, E/CN.4/1999/50 (1999). It
observed at 49 that:
…literature points to the conclusion that, while there are significant gains to be derived from liberalization
as a result of structural adjustment programmes, such reforms do not provide the best outcome for all. The
experience of the last 20 years in Africa and Latin America shows that structural adjustment policies are not
consistent with long-term development needs of developing countries. The evidence challenges the assertion
by the World Bank and the IMF that SAPs alleviate poverty and strengthen democracy. Instead, SAPs have
been guided by laissez-faire market principles that privilege efficiency, productivity and groups engaged in
export and international trade at the expense of civil liberty and self-government.
48
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in its current (post-Washington) models, continue to wreak structural injustices on communities
of the Global South.54 Development injustices continue to escalate in defiance of the deepening
awareness that development must be “normatively based on” and “operationally directed to”55 the
realization of individual freedoms and human capabilities. More often, these manifest in
distributional outcomes of extreme poverty, the endurance of inequalities, and the persistence of
external relationships that are characterized by power asymmetries, paternalism, and undemocratic
policymaking. This history of development entrepreneurship is a history affirming the direct
implication of IFIs in these perversions.
Empirically, development injustices that have been associated with the logic of the market
are wide ranging: breeding inequalities, plunging large segments of society into extreme material
deprivation,56 and emasculating the “values of humane development.”57 But the true extent of these
maladies is at times grossly under-acknowledged, therefore misrepresented, in empirical terms.
Extreme poverty, in its various forms and manifestations, remains endemic in the Global South,
amid sustained fiscal efforts to boost growth and make development sustainable. 58 Debt distress
and vulnerability in the Global South continues to surge unabated, thus undermining states’
resource capacities to satisfy social justice obligations incumbent upon them.59 Inequality, in its
various structures and forms, within and between countries, remains on an upward trend.60 In the
See further, World Bank, World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development (Washington, DC: World
Bank/Oxford University Press, 2006) at 16; United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report
2005: International Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005) at 36-37.
54
Ngang & Kamga, supra note 30; Jason Hickel, “The True Extent of Global Poverty and Hunger: Questioning the
Good News Narrative of the Millennium Development Goals” (2016) Third World Q; See also World Inequality
Report 2018 by World Inequality Lab, 2017 suggesting that income inequalities has been on the rise within countries
since the 1980s. Online: <https://wir2018.wid.world/files/download/wir2018-summary-english.pdf>.
55
OHCHR, Human Rights and Poverty Reduction: A Conceptual Framework (New York and Geneva, United Nations,
2004) section 2.
56
Koen De Feyter, Human Rights: Social Justice in the Age of the Market (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2008) at 13.
57
Upendra Baxi, Human Rights in a Posthuman World: Critical Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)
at 155 [Baxi, Human Rights in a Posthuman World]; Joseph E Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York:
W.W Norton & Co., 2002) at 16-17; Salomon et al, Casting the Net Wider, supra note 28 at 10.
58
Hickel, supra note 54.
59
IMF, “Macroeconomic Developments and Prospects in Low-Income Developing Countries” (22 March 2018),
online:
<https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2018/03/22/pp021518macroeconomicdevelopments-and-prospects-in-lidcs>; IDA, “Debt Vulnerabilities in Poor Countries” (4 October 2018), online:
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/896041540087366658/pdf/debt-vulnerabilities-in-ida-countries10042018-636756697620872725.pdf>.
60
Thomas Picketty, Capital in the 21st Century (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2014) at 242, 430, critically analyzes the
various kinds of wealth inequalities: first, income inequality, which constitutes two prongs of inequality of income
from labour (wage earnings) and inequality of income from capital. Capital is itself a function of ownership of
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face of these growing maladies, international cooperation for development and global partnerships
—embedded in the SDG policy framework, and expected to mobilize public and private resources,
ameliorate structural barriers and enhance states’ capacities for tackling development perversions
—remains glib and state-centric.
The fact that even the UN admits that the “existing global economic and social governance
structures are woefully inadequate” to confront challenges of sustainable development gives
impetus to the quest for development justice.61 Said differently, the push to realize development
justice arises due to the intensification of human rights deprivations and escalating development
injustices posed by the hegemonization of development policy practice.

3.2

The Imperative of Accountability for Development (In)justice

Meanwhile, the mounting injustices of development have unleashed profound social upheavals
and political polarization across the globe. We continue to witness, within national boundaries, the
masses questioning the fundaments of the global economy.62 As they question the prevailing
economic models, they also assail the often imperialist logic of “governance through
development.”63 These realities have meant, as well, that in order to secure their rights and
capabilities, many vulnerable people (especially in the Third World) whose states are so weak that
they cannot secure any protection against these structural challenges, now make more robust
claims of direct and distinct accountability of IFIs in development decision-making.64

property, rents, dividends, interest, profits, royalties. There is also global inequality, to which Pickety devotes an
elaborate analysis. For details on the rise on global wealth inequality, see ibid at 433-439. Picketty empiricizes that
by 2014 the wealthiest one percent owned fifty percent of the total aggregated global wealth, and that the huge
disparities and material hierarchies are rooted in international inequalities. Ibid at 438. He goes on to weave the linkage
between the rise of inequality and the renewed search for poverty alleviations: “Today, in the second decade of the
twenty-first century, inequalities of wealth that had supposedly disappeared are close to regaining or even surpassing
their historical highs. The new global economy has brought with it both immense hopes (such as the eradication of
poverty) and equally immense inequalities…” Ibid at 471.
61
United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change (New York, United Nations, 2004) at para 56.
62
The IMF admits that excessive inequality has the potential to cause erosion of “social cohesion,” increase “political
polarization” and “lower economic growth.” IMF, Fiscal Monitor: Tackling Inequality (Washington: IMF Publication
Services, October 2017) at 1.
63
Celine Tan, Governance through Development: Poverty Reduction Strategies, International Law and the
Disciplining of Third World States (Oxford; New York, Routledge, 2011) at 2.
64
See Daniel D Bradlow, “The World Commission on Dams’ Contribution to the Broader Debate on Development
Decision-Making” (2001) 16:16 Am Uni Intl L Rev 1531 at 1535. A good example is Sudan, which on 11 April 2019
witnessed her long-term dictator Omar el Bashir toppled in a civilian-led revolution. This culmination arose from
protests against economic constraints, dictated particularly by IMF interventions and austerity measures such as
elimination of food subsidies and liberalization that had been pursued by the government since 2013. During the
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The demand for greater and more effective direct and distinct accountability of IFIs arises
and gathers steam in response to the lack of effective accountability mechanisms and institutions
that can constrain their dominant roles in the perversions and violence of the global development
enterprise.65 This fact is also the reason more attention needs to be directed to the imperative of
instituting much greater accountability for IFIs, toward the greater realization of development
justice.
This dissertation discerns, in part, that the scale of development injustices continues to
escalate, unabated and unmitigated—despite deliberate global efforts to mainstream accountability
as a paramount standard in the implementation of the RTD and SDGs.66 What makes the
persistence of the development justice accountability deficit more acute is the characteristic feature
of accountability avoidance, disconnection, and obstruction in international law and politics of
development, particularly in relation to the praxis of IFIs. That is to say that, international law
rationalizes and legitimizes accountability avoidance, disconnection, and obstruction, particularly
when IFIs are the objects of censure in development policymaking and practice.67 I contend that
international law doctrines tend to embody strong statist versions of accountability that cannot
secure the direct and distinct accountability of IFIs.
One explanation for this feature, I argue in this dissertation, is that because international
law is not hewn out of, nor grounded in, the diverse contexts, experiences, or thoughts of different

civilian protests, people have continued to demand an end to corruption and status quo authoritarian rule and return to
democracy. See “What is Behind the Economic and Political Crisis in Sudan” online
<https://africasacountry.com/2018/03/current-sudan-crisis>.
Goetz and Jenkins, Reinventing Accountability, supra note 17 at 43 concede that the increasing demand for
accountability is a new relationship however, “What is new,” they argue, “is that the actions of these state and nonstate agents are now increasingly scrutinized in terms of their impacts on the opportunities for poor people to realize
substantive freedoms, and that the conventional mechanisms through which these and other actors account for their
actions—via state-run oversight mechanisms—are seen as insufficient to produce pro-poor outcomes.” It is this
scenario that leads to citizens piling pressure and demanding accountability of the government in development
decision-making in light of the externally dictated structural reform measures.
65
For a comprehensive account of the perversions and scale of violence unleashed by development enterprise, see
Rajagopal, “Violence and Resistance at the Margins” supra note 40. For a recent historical account of how this form
of hegemony raises serious accountability questions, see Jason Hickel, The Divide: Global Inequality from Conquest
to Free Markets (New York: WW Norton and Company, 2018) at 147, 154-157; Goetz & Jenkins Reinventing
Accountability, supra note 17 at 17 above remark that globalization and its interdependence is responsible for the
proliferation of the accountability agenda.
66
For the idea that accountability is a critical cog in the implementation of the post-2015 development agenda, see
OHCHR & CESR, Who Will Be Accountable, supra note 16; United Nations, The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending
Poverty, Transforming All Lives and Protecting the Planet, Synthesis Report of the Secretary-General On the Post2015 Agenda (New York: United Nations, 2014) para 147.
67
Chapters 4,5 & 6.
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societies, it is “utopian” and “incomplete”.68 In its element, it embodies rigid, linear, and
monocultural doctrines that are ill-adapted to contemporary complex challenges. It is on this
account that even the most cosmopolitan deployments of rights praxis that have emanated from
the Third World aiming to challenge international economic governance, end poverty, reduce
material inequalities, and eliminate structural barriers to development have not been able to temper
the hegemonization of development discourse. Such efforts have also failed to stem the
corresponding avoidance and evasion of accountability by IFIs. I observe that this anachronism of
international law has been carried forward, unabashedly, into the implementation of the SDGs
agenda.
The six chapters of this dissertation engage the hypothesis that the avoidance,
disconnection, and obstruction of the accountability of international institutions (especially IFIs)
has not, however, been absolute. It is the hypothesis of this dissertation that what we are dealing
with is a highly qualified accountability system; one that is sanctioned, rationalized, and
legitimized through historically preconceived legal precepts, doctrines, idioms, traditions, and
conventions that international law constructs and reconstructs. The due diligence principle, the law
of responsibility, political prohibition doctrine, and the rationality of global public goods, appear
to be some of the conceptual tools that have been so pivotal to facilitating the way international
law constructs a qualified accountability system. It is also hypothesized that all these idioms and
doctrines have come to be clothed with a large measure of acceptance and supposed universality
in international law. This level of universality has been conferred, notwithstanding that the
proclamation of their universality is done in a way that is too often oblivious of the experiences of
different peoples of the world.
It is likely that the qualification of the accountability of IFIs is part of the legacy of the
hegemonization of development and sustenance of relations of domination and subjugation.69 It is
also likely that their purported universality is the very mechanism through which international law
masks the disturbing accountability depleting quality of the dominant development praxis.
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The dissertation also examines the hypothesis that it is with the aid of such doctrines that
the international law of development tends to formulate discourses that delegitimize any attempt
to locate the causes of inegalitarian development outcomes in the character of the global
development policy system. The hypothesis here is that this process of delegitimization proceeds
through shifting the responsibility for such injustice almost completely to the agency of the (Third
World) state.70 In the classical international law discourse of accountability, it is only the state that
can be held accountable for human rights violations related to development pursuits.71
International law has constructed a normative framework and practice whereby poor and indebted
countries, in desperate need of financial assistance, tend to be more accountable to supranational
development institutions than to their own citizens.72 This occurs mainly when they are forced to
accept and implement policies and policy conditionalities prescribed by supranational institutions,
such as IFIs.73 No matter the multifaceted nature of the causes, and the multidimensionality of the
harms at issue, in the development realm, the traditional human rights doctrinal position applies.
The position is that the onus is on the state to “protect, respect and fulfil” human rights
obligations.74 This is now shifting a little, albeit still unsatisfactorily, with the adoption of bodies
of norms like the United Nations Guidelines on Business and Human Rights75 and the draft
Convention on the Right to Development.76

Sundhya Pahuja, “Global Poverty and the Politics of Good Intentions” in Ruth Buchanan and Peer Zumbansen eds,
Law in Transition: Human Rights, Development and Transitional Justice (Oxford; Portland: Hart Publishing, 2014)
at 32, 37-38.
71
Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 9-10.
72
For this view, see also Margot E Salomon, “Of Austerity, Human Rights and International Institutions” (2015)21:4
European L J 521 at 535.
Daniel Bradlow, “The Reform of the Governance of the IFIs A Critical Assessment” in Hassane Cissé, Daniel D
Bradlow & Benedict Kingsbury eds, The World Bank Legal Review: International Financial Institutions and Global
Legal Governance Vol. 3 (Washington, D.C: World Bank, 2012) at 39:
Today, the major IFIs, de facto, are important actors in the policymaking processes of many of the member
states that rely on their financial services. The IFIs have become more sensitive to the interests of those
member states that use their financial services and are gaining international power and influence while
remaining subject to the influence of the IFI’s richer and more powerful member states.
74
Henry Shue, Basic Rights, Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton; New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1996); Centre for Human Rights, Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right (New York: United
Nations, 1989); Asbjorn Eide, “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights As Human Rights” in Asbjorn Eide, Catarina
Krause & Allan Rosas eds Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook 2nd Rev ed, (Dordrecht; Boston: M.
Nijhoff Publishers, 1995) at 21-40.
75
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework (United Nations: New York and Geneva, 2011) HR/PUB/11/04.
76
See supra note 3.
70

17

It is a classic feature of human rights accountability praxis that the breach of the “protect,
respect, and fulfil” obligations constitutes internationally wrongful conduct and triggers the
application of state responsibility principles. Such a statist outlook on human rights accountability
praxis is a derivative norm of a classical international law preoccupied with creating norms of
behaviour and mechanisms of accountability solely for states on the basis of a traditional
understanding of state responsibility.77 This feature is one that facilitates accountability avoidance,
disconnection, and obstruction for non-state actors. Its corollary effect is that, though supranational
actors have visibly taken up dominant roles in driving the global policy agenda, accompanied by
the production of development injustice, they remain, paradoxically, unduly distant from being
held accountable when such injustices occur.78 Such violations, however arising or caused, are
then attributed, for the most part, to national rather than international regimes, institutions, and
practices.79 In other words, the “international causes of poverty are not on the table in the
development story” and attempts “to locate responsibility for global poverty at the global level do
not have any bite.”80
At the pinnacle of this state-centric proclivity of international law is responsibility
avoidance and accountability obstruction and disconnections on the part of IFIs. Thus, actors who
generate policies that are more decisive and determinative of the structural conditions within states
and that are more causative of development injustices are insulated from accountability. They are
insulated from accountability at the primary decision-making stages. They are unaccountable to
states—the parties with decision-making responsibility in development planning. They are
immunized from accountability to the people affected or to any machineries of state accountability.
What further intensely accentuates the development accountability deficit and complicates
the search for development justice is what I have referred to, earlier in this chapter, as the
intermingle effect. The intermingle effect makes it impossible to identify conduct that constitutes
wrongfulness; it renders uncertain attempts to trace the chain of causation; it makes it hard to
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discern the identity of responsible actors; it makes it difficult to estimate harms or attribute conduct
to a given actor.81 Thus, these indiscernibilities and indeterminacies call into question the
traditional accountability mechanisms known to international law.
Further impediments, though not legally insurmountable,82 emanate from the legal precepts
of jurisdiction and procedural immunity of international organizations.83 Thus, it is because of
such preconceived doctrines of international law that IFIs are assured of invisibility and a
convenient unaccountability distance. The question of immunity and jurisdiction are however
beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Furthermore, the available internal mechanisms of accountability within the relevant IFIs
that entertain (marginal) citizen participation and claims of redress are fraught. They are inward
looking, largely oblivious of the development–human rights interface, and all-too often neglect
policing or enforcing compliance with universal norms and standards.84 This dissertation will
engage with the hypothesis that the Inspection Panels and the Independent Evaluation Office that
emerged out of the perceived political necessity to “deradicalize” the Third World are, at most,
qualified and ineffective schemes of accountability.85 The praxis of the World Bank’s Inspection
Panel, for instance, reveals instances of the avoidance and obstruction of accountability whenever
the interventions in the global economy by IFIs are challenged.86 An associated hypothesis is that
they also miss a crucial understanding of how development injustices are produced, perpetuated,
and sustained by the global policy system and multiple interacting regimes (i.e., the intermingle
effect).87
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Lastly, the regime of “follow-up and review of progress” of implementation so prevalent
and dominant in the sustainable development field typifies the marked absence of significantly
direct and distinct accountability of IFIs. Their replication of the problematic state-centred model
leaves little doubt that there is no real intention among the dominant founders and operators of the
system to cure the perverse accountability deficits in the development field.
Significantly, this dissertation understands that fundamental problems with the design of
most contemporary (human rights) accountability practices tend to be explainable within the
frameworks of two contrasting paradigms: interactional and institutional approaches to
violations.88 These flaws in the fundamental architecture render the functionalities of extant
accountability regimes unsuitable and ill-adapted to the vindication of development injustices.
Pogge adeptly discerns a deference in practice to an interactional tradition over an institutional
approach to responsibility assignment for distributive injustices.89 The interactional approach is a
linear approach that assesses conduct and their outcomes (i.e., secondary violations and their
causation attributable to identifiable actors).90 The interactional paradigm is the standard approach
in human rights accountability practices. An institutional assessment, to the contrary, avoids the
clear-cut, state-focused approach to causality, wrongfulness and attribution of conduct deployed
within extant accountability regimes. This tradition looks to the primary multiple causal elements
embedded in the globalized institutional framework.91 It assesses structural violations wedded to
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the global policy system, consisting mainly of rules, policies, and processes that engender
deprivations.92
The institutional approach goes further to expose how the global policy system sanctions
massive development injustices in elusive ways not grasped by conventional human rights
approaches. It focuses on locating causal chains of harms in the global policy system and not
simply attributing those causes to the agency of the state. It appreciates that supranational factors
invisibly take on significantly more determinative, manipulative, and subordinating roles in the
creation of national and international conditions that perpetuate development injustices. Locating
and attributing “causalities” for harms in global institutional schemes has yet to be as fully grasped
as it ought to be in the development field, or by the statist international law of responsibility (the
doctrinal anchor of international legal accountability). It is not also grasped, as nearly enough by
the SDG policy schema or the international development discourse of mutual accountability, both
of which tend to overly focus on state accountability, and not institutional accountability at the
global level. Furthermore, the internal accountability mechanisms of IFIs (such as the Inspection
Panels and the Independent Evaluation Office of the Bank and IMF respectively), in their current
formulation, are deficient tools for protecting against harms linked to the global policy system.
Yet, there has not been a significant level of sustained scholarship assessing the question
of materializing development justice through the sufficiently enhanced accountability of IFIs.
There has not been any incisive study explaining as fully as is attempted here the ways hegemonic
international law and development are implicated in the embedment of accountability dysfunctions
and deficits in the arena of international development praxis. The accountability avoidance/evasion
dimension of the hegemonization of development interventions has not drawn sufficient attention
in theory or practice. Rather, international legal accountability practice tends to be too accustomed
to human rights claims of justice and are rarely specifically focused on development justice per
se. But the radical emancipatory and egalitarian vision that the UN Declaration on the Right to
Development infuses into development praxis has made attempts to alter this flawed tradition. It
permits claims of justice seeking the redress of abuses that are produced to a significant degree by
the global policy system to be invoked in international human rights law.
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4. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
Thus, throughout this dissertation I am guided by the following main research question: How can
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund be much more effectively held accountable
for their interventions in the global economy, and for development outcomes linked to such
interventions, that tend to impede significantly the realization of the right to development of people
in the Global South?
In addition to the main question, I seek to answer a series of other related and supplemental
questions: How can development justice be realized, in much greater measure, through an
international mechanism that recognizes the imperative of direct and distinct accountability of IFIs
in development practices? What is the relevance and to what extent can the RTD shape the
conceptualization of a normative accountability framework suitable for effectively governing the
global development praxis of the IFIs? Are extant accountability mechanisms adequate and
suitable to the protection of the peoples of the Global South against the institutional practices and
rights violations linked to the development interventions of IFIs? Which of the three dimensions
of accountability (responsibility, answerability, and enforceability) is best suited to the realization
of development justice and why?

5. EXPLORING TWO THESES
I explore one basic claim and a series of interrelated contentions. The main claim in this
dissertation is that international law and development praxis do sanction and legitimize the
avoidance of, disconnection from, and obstruction of, the direct and distinct accountability of IFIs
for their interventions in the global economy and the development realm. The dissertation therefore
draws the conclusion that accountability regimes that have been mostly “Western-derived”
(constituted by certain explicit and implicit rules, norms, procedures, institutions, and practices)
are ill-suited to aid the securement of the kind of development justice foreseen by the RTD norm.
They cannot sufficiently assure the protection of people in the Global South against harms and
rights violations causally linked to the interventions and development practices of the World Bank
and IMF. It is my argument that the fundamental premises of extant human rights accountability
regimes are shaky and questionable for the actualization of development justice. Conceptually
bounded doctrines and practices of accountability that Liberal and positivist international law has
so far produced and normalized seem inadequate and ill-adapted to securing development justice.
22

I argue that indeed some core doctrines constructed and reconstructed by international law do not
address the development accountability quandary.
Ultimately, having noted the anachronism, incompleteness, restrictiveness, and
minimalism of international law entrenched in the various iterations of accountability praxis, I
develop the central thesis of this dissertation that to realize development justice, development
accountability thought and practice must be contextually-aware and sensitive to the rights in
question. Context-awareness implies, accordingly, that a robust appreciation of the nature and
workings of the technocratic global policy system and how it produces development injustices
ought to be had.
And just to reiterate, in developing the second thesis of this dissertation, more specifically,
I discern the conservatism of international law insofar as it constructs and reconstructs flawed and
deficient doctrines and praxes of accountability in development practice. I am particularly aware
of the fundamental failings of the internal accountability practices of IFIs. Similarly, this
dissertation recognizes the internal contradictions of statist accountability structures founded on
the doctrine of state responsibility. I am cognisant of their all-too-familiar failures to prevent or
mitigate harms of global development policy practice.93 As a result, I resort to the core element of
the RTD to “participate in, and contribute to,” development.94 This qualitative property espouses
a solidaristic and cosmopolitan conception of legality. It is capable of being relied upon by those
facing exclusion to clamour for development justice. I break ranks with conventional international
law thinking to propose what I call participatory accountability from below in international law. I
propose that participatory accountability brings forth a sense of justice from below. Participatory
accountability is the next best thing to do, in the face of frailties of contemporary accountability
mechanisms. It promises far greater potential of “firming up”95 the backbone of the RTD regime.
It adds into the repertoire of tools with which the Third World can confront development injustices.
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6. LITERATURE REVIEW
A vast and inexhaustible amount of standard international law scholarship has explored the
question of the human rights accountability of IFIs.96 However, the development justice dimension
introduced by the RTD has not been pursued to any significant extent. A narrow aperture, which
brings into view the distributive and structural understanding of violations, refreshes a human
rights accountability scholarship that often neglects structural issues.97
The development justice question is often portrayed in simplistic, and often misleading,
ways as human rights accountability of IFIs. We need a more comprehensive treatment of the overproliferated, but often misunderstood, question of the accountability of IFIs from a development
justice perspective. Looking at the development accountability question from the prism of
development justice is theoretically different and certainly conceptually narrower than the human
rights accountability approach. The development justice take transcends the bland human rights
accountability approach. Unlike the human rights approaches, which work from within the
contours of international law, a development justice perspective provides a better way to
interrogate the suitability of the fundamental premises of Westphalian international law to the
structural violations that are engendered by institutional development models. This crucial insight
is not adequately theorized in conventional human rights or the RTD scholarship.98
Following Pogge’s broad distinction between an interactional and an institutional
approach to violations, human rights accountability practices may be said to be accustomed to
interactional forms of violations and ignore institutional violations innate to the global structural
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arrangements.99 In the law of responsibility for example, an interactional approach focuses on
overt, ex-post forms of breaches constituting wrongfulness.100 An interactional perspective focuses
on wrongfulness of conduct. That is, human rights accountability theories only focus on outcomes
of violations. A development justice perspective, however, goes further to appreciate the
institutional context of those violations, which it treats as questions warranting accountability.101
Accordingly, conventional human rights approaches tend to follow linear approaches to the
accountability question.102 On the other hand, the development justice perspective, which relies on
the institutional approach, avoids the clear-cut approach to accountability deployed within the law
of responsibility. It goes beyond conduct or outcomes of breach and looks to the primary causal
elements that are linked to the globalized institutional framework.103 Development justice brings
into perspective rules, policies, norms, and structures as elements that ought to be subjected to the
determination of breach. The RTD critique introduces this perspective.
Although several human rights studies exploring the legal dimensions of the RTD have
examined the structural violations—such as discrimination, inequities, and inequality—of the
international development system, clear perspectives on the imperative of accountability as a tool
for the actualization of development justice is lacking.104 The literature that examines the
determinative and subordinating character of the allocative and regulatory measures of
supranational institutions do not grasp how these dynamics impact traditional accountability
praxis.105 The decline of state regulatory autonomy has been recognized even by global justice
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theories, but without introspection on the question of direct and distinct accountability of
supranational actors.106
The sustainable development agenda—as a specific policy issue that affirms the link
between human rights and development, together with the delimited question of development
justice—gives due attention to the phenomenon as a distinct field of inquiry for both the human
rights and development scholarship. No standard account in the sustainable development agenda
scholarship has given detailed attention to the imperative of accountability in the realization of
development justice. Even then, the inquiry on direct and distinct accountability of IFIs is missing.
Similarly, standard critiques of the internal institutional accountability praxis of the Bank and IMF
miss the crucial insight of institutionally sanctioned violations.107 In the same vein, scholarship
chronicling deep-seated structural violations and distributive injustices that inhere in global
development practices (what may be said to be the development justice scholarship) has not
addressed exhaustively and specifically, the question of direct and distinct accountability of IFIs.
In theorizing development justice, scholars have failed to capture the accountability deficit or
conduct a comprehensive analysis of accountability relationships or politics in development policy
practice. Among the works limited in this way are some law and development scholarship (Baxi,108
Pahuja,109 Shivji,110 Rist111), dependency theories112 or their apologists,113 and post-development
scholarship.114 While structural injustice does feature in this strand of research, accountability
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seldom takes centre stage in their inquiries. This is no sustained attention to the question of
development justice accountability. This illustrates that more work needs to be done to improve
their conceptual content and deepen our understanding of accountability for development justice.
This dissertation fills that gap.
All too often, the global debate on the accountability of IFIs comes down to a few
imaginative—and certainly robust—claims that do not accurately capture the complexity of
development justice. They fail to demonstrate how to realize it through the imperative of
accountability. They discuss how an unbridled trend that accompanies globalization has
enormously redefined the normative architecture of the Westphalian international order.115 Their
discussions of the development justice question are limited to the coercive arrangements, policies,
and decisions that accompany the discharge of development and macro-economic stabilization
capital to states in need.116 The assumption is that non-state actors exact considerable challenges
to the normative structure of a statist international system.117 It is claimed that they present new
sources of threats at a time when state-based institutions, rules, and norms of accountability have
not been adjusted to confront the unprecedented dispersal of power to global institutions.118 Others
explain that the market creed filters into the domains of the state, culminating in the diminution of
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both its protective role and its democratic accountability to its people, consequently leaving a state
that is accountable only to IFIs.119
Quite clearly, these discourses pay only scant attention to three key aspects of neoliberal
globalization that have catalyzed a fierce sense of urgency for accountability in development
practices. The first of those aspects is the degree to which the global economic policy system is an
overweening obstruction of accountability.120 The second aspect that requires interrogation is the
hypothesis that development is a technocratic practice structured by knowledge technologies
woven into the market episteme.121 And the third aspect of neoliberal globalization that requires
sustained attention are the “conflicting rationalities”,122 or value disjunctures, that arise from
“clashes of rationalities” in competing objectives pursued in different policy domains.”123 These
are clear dynamics that exert new and subtle forms of control and power that require scholars
rethink accountability politics in development cooperation and the provision of global public
goods.124
There is also what I call the “responsibilization” literature dealing with the contested
normative status of rights obligations for IFIs. The focus of this scholarship was narrow and limited
only to the responsibility dimension of accountability,125 and it overlooked the concept of
This view has been held by Obiora Chinedu Okafor “Assessing Baxi’s Thesis on an Emergent Trade-Related
Market-Friendly Human Rights Paradigm: Recent Evidence from Nigerian Labour-led Struggles” Law, Social Justice
& Global Development (An Electronic Law Journal).
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accountability as both a broader subject and one that is distinct from the traditional international
law concept of “responsibility.”126 “Responsibilization” scholars were drawn to critiquing overly
state-centred human rights law for its austere trait of delegitimizing rights “responsibility” of the
non-state.127 This scholarship therefore generated various perspectives for expanding rights
normativity into the private realm. One perspective is that the UN Charter obligations take
precedence and supersede any contravening obligations in any other treaties that states have
entered into.128

traditional conception of rights as instrumental protection against the state.” For this view, see also Jack Donnelly, “In
Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right to Development” (1985) 15 California Western
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Debates about the implementation of the RTD remain fixated on corresponding national
and international obligations, even where it is assumed that attention is being given to
accountability.129 In this dissertation, I step back to emphasize that the accountability quandary for
development justice cannot only be understood, unproblematically, in such a legalistic manner. I
propose to work from perspectives not limited to the legal sphere. I adopt an interdisciplinarity
that reveals often-neglected aspects that are crucial for resolving accountability dysfunctions as a
development justice question.130
The conversation around Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) has mostly dealt with the extraterritoriality question, that is, the scope
of human rights obligations of states beyond borders in development. Two aspects of this
“responsibility approach” so far discussed are the individual responsibility of the state and the
collective responsibility of states as members of multilateral/international organizations. The
dominant question raised is: what legal principles apply in ascertaining the direct responsibility of
international organizations for their conduct or actions or those of their organs.131 There is also
some marginal discussion of the direct and distinct human rights obligations of international
organizations as autonomous legal entities.132 In these discussions, however, some of the debates
favour derivative accountability.133 But perspectives proposing indirect accountability of
international organizations through the state, it is argued, lose sight of autonomy, personality, and
“distinct will” of international organizations134 given that international organizations are
independent actors that can be susceptible to accountability.135
The most recent scholarship is De Schutter, “A Fresh Start”, supra note 125.
Like Young, to address a practical question: “How ought moral agents, whether individual or institutional,
conceptualize their responsibilities in relation to global injustice?” Iris Marion Young, “Responsibility and Global
Justice: A Social Connection Model’, (2006) 23:1 Social Phil and Pol 102. This is both a political and international
law question that cannot be relegated solely to the domain of law, the discipline of development must also contribute
perspectives to this quandary.
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Scholarship on Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations
(DARIO), on the other hand, has not interrogated the way those rules and precepts can be adapted
to the realization of development justice.136 This line of inquiry has followed a strict textual
interpretation of a range of legal rules applicable to DARIO. Scholarship has pored over the
challenges of collective decision-making to disaggregation of conduct and the difficulties of
determining, with any certainty, who is “in control” or the party to which conduct is to be
attributed.137 There is a further dilemma of discerning causation in the intertwined actions of
actors; that is, how to establish “a sufficient causal link between an activity of an international
financial institution and its [Member State] and a specific human rights violation, in order to hold
an actor responsible.”138 Notably, this body of scholarship has critiqued the law of state
responsibility from a doctrinal or textual standpoint. It has not, however, engaged with other
disciplinary perspectives on the appropriateness of relying on doctrines and positivist law to
deliver development justice. And it has not offered a resolution to the “paradox of many hands” or
what this dissertation calls the intermingle effect that defies the law of responsibility in several
respects.
This scholarship has not unmasked the conceptual defects inherent in the formalistic and
doctrinal study and critiques of the law of responsibility. First, whereas scholars taking doctrinal
approach have exposed defects in the conceptual formulation of various legal precepts of the
ARSIWA and DARIO regimes, they have omitted from their linear analyses institutionally
sanctioned violations and have not given a proper account of the intermingle effect. They also have
Portland: Intersentia, 2010) at 37; Ramses A Wessel, “International Governmental Organizations as Non-state Actors”
in Math Noortmann, August Reinisch & Cedric Ryngaert, eds, Non-State Actors in International Law (Oxford and
Portland: Hart Publishing Ltd, 2015) at 200.
136
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not adequately considered what cosmopolitans call the “cooperating causes” of the global
economy that engender accountability disconnections.139 The scholarship on the RTD as a counterhegemonic discourse and a sui generis right makes this new contribution through its appreciation
of the global policy system as a hindrance to and derogation from human rights normative
standards. It offers this as the first point of entry into the inquiry of the development justice
accountability project. None of the aforementioned literature has grasped this insight.
Secondly, whereas academic studies of ARSIWA and DARIO have taken up the traditional
black letter international law analysis as signalled by the leading works of James Crawford, among
others,140 in this dissertation I employ Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) in
the deconstruction of the Western doctrines of state responsibility and other regimes and traits of
accountability that it has since constructed and naturalized.141 In this research, while
acknowledging that the RTD perspective adds a fresh layer of critique, I intend to go further by
enlisting TWAIL’s core creed, which Okafor has designated as a brand of “intellectual … struggle
to expose, reform, or even retrench those features of the international system that help create or
maintain the generally unequal, unfair, or unjust global order.”142 I intend to use these properties
to “understand how international law’s imperial history affects structures and understandings of
contemporary international institutions.”143 One aim of this inquiry is to understand what dynamics
and logics enable international institutions to continue perpetuating imperialist and hegemonic
development as they avoid and stay disconnected from accountability in international law. Could
such a dynamic entail the logic of capitalist accumulation as the context within which international
law principles enable imperialism, both in a historical sense and in the contemporary context of
international institutions’ hegemony?144 Such a crucial aperture is essential in assessing not just
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the historiography, but also how the logics of power and interests structured the substance of the
law of responsibility as it has developed over the years.
I note that the International Law Commission’s debates that preceded the formulation of
ARSIWA and DARIO, and indeed some other historical accounts of customary international law
by Galindo and Yip, lack the sensitivity to Third World contributions and actual experiences to
the development of the law of international responsibility.145 A TWAIL critique of ARSIWA and
DARIO will be a major contribution of my study, something that mainstream international law
literature has not done before.

7. THE ORIGINALITY OF THE DISSERTATION AND MY CONTRIBUTION
In this dissertation, I intend to make two contributions, the first theoretical and the second policy
oriented. I am arguing for a form of development accountability that is grounded, for the most part
in the RTD norms as the precondition for the realization of development justice for almost all those
in the periphery. I take a development justice perspective, which assumes an institutional approach
to the accountability question, as opposed to a traditional human rights perspective that is often
interactional. My objective is to construct a theoretical understanding of development justice in
the framework of the RTD and sustainable development scholarship. This is a narrower and more
focused contribution to the question of accountability than that offered by human rights
accountability scholarship. In distinguishing itself from human rights accountability theories, a
development justice perspective focuses on the structural constraints implicated in the perpetuation
and sustenance of poverty and inequality within a global development framework.146
The particular development justice perspective that this dissertation recommends addresses
some basic assumptions of the conventional accountability discourse. It seeks to unearth the flaws
and discrepancies that are invisible to standard narratives of interactional accountability. By its
characteristic distributive understanding of phenomena, development justice emphasizes an
institutional approach to accountability.147 Unlike legalistic and interactional human rights theories
George Rodrigo Bandeira Galindo & Ce´sar Yip, “Customary International Law and the Third World: Do Not Step
on the Grass” (2017) 16:2 Chinese J of Intl L 252.
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of accountability that examine only causalities and outcomes of rights violations, a development
justice lens focuses on the narrower issue of structural injustices.148 A structural understanding of
injustice allows for deeper insights into and analyses of the fundamental causes, contexts, and
consequences of violations. Human rights approaches fall far too short of this endeavour. Further,
development justice enlarges the conceptualization of accountability beyond the linear and
restrictive understandings constructed by international law and liberal rights theory. It is for this
reason that I break ranks with conventional international law thinking to propose participatory
accountability from below. This model, I argue, can be relied upon to contest and seek revocation
or alteration of rationalities with which global institutions construct and reconstruct development
paradigms.
I theorize the question of direct and distinct accountability for structural injustice in
development, taking human rights as the main point of entry while development justice remains
the principal lens.149 In doing so, I draw from theoretical perspectives outside the domain of
international law and human rights. One such perspective is social movements praxis which
grounds a theory of participatory accountability from below. A theory of participatory
accountability from below introduces a cosmopolitan conception of justice into our understanding
of direct and distinct accountability of IFIs for structural injustice. Narrower in scope and distinct
from human rights accountability, development justice accountability thus offers a fresh
theoretical and scholarly perspective. I set out to synthesize how an interdisciplinary lens
(borrowing from theories of development and social movements as well as post-development
scholarship) promises to recover invisible theoretical elements not neatly explained by
international law scholarship. Pogge’s institutional cosmopolitanism, a political philosophical
account of global responsibility for poverty is an interdisciplinary theory that I weave and test
against assumptions and theories of accountability dominant in international law.150
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In breaking ranks (in great measure) with conventional international law thinking, which
understands accountability narrowly as the ex-post attribution of responsibility and the
enforcement of sanctions for breach of obligations, this dissertation critically conceptualizes and
then commends the theory of participatory accountability from below. My contribution alters the
way in which the imperative of direct and distinct accountability for global distributive injustices
should be understood. The participatory accountability from below that I propose is an ex-ante
form of accountability that mimics the answerability prong of accountability. In both domestic law
and in the international arena, some form of answerability in decision-making (as a necessary
component of participatory accountability) do exist.151 This happens where actors, be they
international or public institutions, are made to explain, justify and communicate the decisions
they have taken either to the people, parliament or some other oversight authority.152 In some way,
this practice may bring a sense of direct and distinct accountability of actors or institutions that are
impelled to explain, justify and communicate their decisions to the public. This form of
accountability may exist either as a matter of political or democratic practice, or as administrative
procedures in decision-making.153 Notwithstanding its potential to instill direct and distinct
accountability of institutions in development, research has seldom explained the normative
potential of this form of accountability to tackle structural and distributive injustice. This
dissertation investigates how participatory accountability from below can accomplish this
potential. It deploys an institutional account of violations that radically departs from international
legal accountability theories and other mechanisms that largely deploy interactional approaches.
Not within the mainstream international legal thought and practice has the insight about structural
violations and the imperative of distributive justice permeated the discourse on IFIs accountability
in development policymaking and practice. By advancing this new theory of participatory
accountability from below, this dissertation expands our knowledge about what is known about
the answerability dimension of accountability. While the responsibility and enforceability prongs
of accountability have been overtheorized, I advance a new debate on the answerability aspect.
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As a policy contribution, this dissertation is a response to a pertinent call made during the
commemoration of twenty-five years of existence of the RTD. While chronicling the progress
made in the implementation of the RTD in international law, Obiora Okafor, the then Chairperson
of the UN Human Rights Advisory Council, called attention to the necessity of addressing the
accountability of non-state actors as part of the post-2015 development agenda.154 Okafor called
for policymakers, scholars, and human rights advocates to firm up the backbone of the RTD by
focusing on the issue of accountability. Sadly, since then even policy gurus, including the Special
Rapporteur on the RTD, Saad Alfarargi, have not pursued this call. Recent policy discussion by
De Schutter is one of the few examples of a systematic response to this call in the RTD scholarship.
However, by restricting himself to a human rights responsibility approach, De Schutter’s work
also tended to miss, to a significant extent, the development justice perspective which brings into
view the structural contexts of violations as crucial considerations for a much broader
understanding of the concept of responsibility.155

8. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
The recourse to theory in this dissertation stems from the necessity of finding an intellectual,
political, or conceptual tool with which to study, observe, analyze, explain, or think about
international law, and the phenomena and realities that shape it, in a systematic manner. 156 In
pursuing the question of the international accountability of IFIs as development actors, I employ
institutional cosmopolitanism. This theoretical perspective allows me to investigate and
understand both the global impediments to the much fuller realization of development justice and
the human rights implications within broader structures of power, a theme that the RTD discourse
vehemently enunciates. I am also relying on TWAIL’s methods, techniques, and sensibilities to
analyze the practices, doctrines, norms, and concepts of international law. As I do so, I am not
unaware that TWAIL can be a theory, method, and an approach or school of thought in the study
of international law.157
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8.1

Institutional Cosmopolitanism

Thomas Pogge has formulated an institutional cosmopolitan approach to understanding human
rights deficits or engendered deprivations by the global institutional order.158 Cosmopolitanism is
an ideology that holds that humanity, through political, economic, and social relationships, is
joined together based on shared moral norms. Pogge uses institutional cosmopolitanism, a variant
of moral philosophy that pays attention to the international institutional arrangements and
attendant baseline rules and practices that condition human relations. Institutional
cosmopolitanism specifies the assignment of human rights responsibilities within that institutional
order for actions that render others more vulnerable to domination and coercion.159 Institutional
cosmopolitanism characteristically conceptualizes the globalized order and policy system as a site
in which human rights norms generate moral demands and constraints on collective and individual
acts of persons who stand in relation to each other in a structural and institutional system.160
According to this moral theory, human rights norms need to be viewed as moral constraints or
ethical expectations on all persons, “human conduct, practices and institutions,”161 including the
state and the non-state institutions that may engage in actions harmful to the human person.162 This
claim leads to a narrowing of the language of human rights in the interest of the recipient: a
conferment of ability to demand protection from threats to their well-being.
For Pogge, the language of human rights protects not only against official violations but
official “disrespect” more broadly, and it does so not only from “those whose violations of a
relevant right would count as human-rights violations, but also those in whose names those
officials are acting.163 This conception has two elements. It addresses the violator and those to
whom the benefits of the violation accrues.164 Thus, rights are construed to impose “the negative
Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, supra note 26 at 70,175, chapters 1, 2 and 4; Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism
and Sovereignty” supra note 26.
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duty not to harm” in accord with libertarians’ characterization of rights as negative
qualifications.165 In Pogge’s view, the concrete difference between libertarian/liberal and
cosmopolitan approaches is that the negative sanction to do no harm is directed not only against
the state, it is imposed against any social agents and institutions that may enact “a coercive
institutional order” that harms persons.166 In Pogge’s conciliatory view, the salutary value of an
institutionalist approach is its ability to conceive rights anew, without necessarily disturbing the
central tenets of classical liberalism.167 That is, an institutionalist understanding of human rights
does not alter the dominant anti-state posture of rights but merely seeks to recalibrate it, in a sense
retooling the theory with the fresh insight that rights are moral constraints and qualifications on
social institutions or organizations, including sovereign and non-sovereign repositories of power
that are vested with the capacity to harm or create adverse arrangements that harm persons and
human wellbeing.168
Institutional cosmopolitanism’s central proposition seems to shift the ideology of rights
and rights jurisprudence beyond a positivist conception of rights as demarcations of power to rights
as moral constraints or demands on social institutions or arrangements.169 An institutional
conception of human rights “postulates certain fundamental principles of social justice” invariably
applicable to “institutional schemes.”170 In effect, this institutional understanding broadens the
ambit of human rights normative values, even carrying their moral persuasion into constraining
the global institutional order, comprised of states, institutions, and the global economic system of
laws, rights, and markets.171
The true intellectual tradition of an institutional cosmopolitan outlook is that it presupposes
that “duties would correspond roughly to how well an institution would appear to fit into a global
institutional scheme that actually would fulfil cosmopolitan aims for rights promotion and
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protections and related global moral goods.”172 Pogge’s cosmopolitan view rests substantially on
the variability or heterogenous explanatory interpretation, seeing the proposition of rights as
negative qualifications (austerity of liberalism) as irrelevant to the discipline and utility of rights.
Above all, he goes against a rigid positivist theory of law. The RTD has to be construed as drawing
from, or at least assuming some of the precepts of, this intellectual foundation.
I am of the view that the cosmopolitan approach answers and discounts some of the
mainstream scholarship that proceeded from puritanical positivist standpoints and rationalized
their contentions within those constructs. These black letter international law scholars tended to
critique the idea of a RTD, à la Donnelly, as a “conceptual obfuscation” of human rights theory,
based on individualist understanding of rights. In any event, the philosophical foundations of rights
cannot be reduced to one account, it must be pluralized. Insofar as it offers a pluralized vision of
the universal rights paradigm, thereby expanding human rights theory beyond the juridico-centric
models of positivism, institutional cosmopolitanism provides a philosophical basis for the idea of
development as a right and the corresponding development justice that it enunciates. That is, an
institutional cosmopolitan approach allows us to map the rationale for a collectively shared
responsibility for institutional justice that transcends national borders. It does this based on the
view that the creation and sustenance of global institutional schemes happen at the instance and
agency of powerful governments through supranational institutions that they control. There is thus
an imperative for constraining their conduct by the fundaments and core values of the global
community.
Institutional cosmopolitanism is also suitable for theorizing the development
accountability deficit phenomenon in a number of respects. It is so, first, in relation to the question
of power in the global political economy, power being a primary element for the demand of
answerability or sanctionability of agents. From an institutionalist lens, the RTD, otherwise
regarded as a composite of and a precondition for the exercise of all other rights, would not be
fixated on the state as the sole repository of power to be constrained by a normative or regulatory
system but rather on power as a by-product of “social systems” with coercive or productive
potentials.173 Non-coercive agents encompass those vested with a capacity to help in the realization
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of the right’s stated objectives.174 As such, the global structural arrangements and the actors who
have created it constitute the social systems capable of harming persons “near and far,” and ought
therefore to be constrained by rights as moral demands.175 The standard of the demand is a negative
one, restraining all actors not to harm or create development models that harm others. 176 In other
words, from an institutional cosmopolitan standpoint, power exists within and without state
structures, above and below state institutions. Power is in the overt and covert unbalanced
institutional arrangements as exemplified by paternalistic models of development such as
structural adjustments, foreign direct investment, structural conditionalities, or other unobtrusive
paradigms of development that create and perpetuate inequalities and exact harm on the global
poor.
Second, institutional cosmopolitanism is also suitable for understanding how institutional
constraints inhibit the fulfilment and realization of the RTD or what is often referred to as a rightsbased global order or what this dissertation terms development justice. Institutional
cosmopolitanism holds that the under-fulfilment of all human rights on the global stage is an
international redistributive justice concern.177 Its preoccupation is that there be a justifiable global
institutional framework in which all rights of individuals are viably protected and the objects of
rights, human flourishing or human well-being, is realized globally.
Third, likewise, from the RTD perspective, institutional cosmopolitanism address how a
series of relations and structures of the global economy engender and sustain levels of poverty and
vulnerability experienced by the global poor.178 This is what gives rise to a concern with the plight
of strangers abroad. From a cosmopolitan perspective, it has been emphasized that material factors
influencing and determining the plight of all of humanity, such as inequality between and within
states, are increasingly of international scope, consisting of supranational forces.179 On this
consensus, cosmopolitans are always intrigued by the degree to which the contemporary global
economic arrangements promote or undermine human flourishing as well as redistributive
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egalitarianism.180 Their specific concern is with the question of where and with whom the blame
(causality and attribution) lies for the underachievement of human rights, a dilemma that evokes
great difficulty for international law. This is particularly in relation to ascribing responsibility in
the context of interdependence, where actions of actors intermingle and intermesh. These very
questions, and more, are also the enunciated focus of the RTD regime.
It may seem, then, that the richness of institutional cosmopolitanism, like other approaches,
does not advance a completely new rights theory but merely proposes an internal variegation (by
proposing additional duty bearers, such as international development institutions) from a moral
optic, “without losing the commonality of the agreed principle.”181

8.2

Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL)

Okafor argues that, as a theory, TWAIL provides “a predictive, logical and testable” mechanism
for analyzing and studying objective reality.182 Okafor conceptualizes TWAIL as a theory, a
method, and an approach to international law that augments other theories and methods of studying
international law. As a system of ideas, a tool for studying international law, and body of
scholarship, TWAIL relies on a number of “techniques and sensibilities,” including: paying more
attention to the Third World’s actual experiences in a variety of sites where international law,
norms, doctrines, and institutions operate; rejecting the notion of differentness and otherness by
insisting on formal equality of all of humanity; tracing continuities of injustices and subordination
in the ruptures of history; disavowing the purported “universalism” that masks Western motives
for exploitation and domination; and writing “epistemic and ideational resistance” against
hegemonic forces.183
In this dissertation, I deploy two of TWAIL’s sensibilities and techniques. First, I chronicle
and historicize the global experiences of the Third World in my analysis of international law. 184
Second, I disavow the rather glib universalist tendency of much of international law by positing
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a counter-hegemonic critique of dominant approaches of international law,185 including detesting
the subordinating character of international financial and economic governance.186
In terms of historical awareness, I document a wide gamut of experiences from within the
geopolitical realities of the Global South’s interactions with, and within, international law. I draw
from these lived experiences in the development encounter to discount the purported
universalization and generalization of regimes of accountability.187 The wide ranging experiences
I document include the experiential difficulties in the enforcement of socio-economic rights, Third
World resistance to IFIs’ development projects, Uganda’s conformity to the rationalities of
knowledge as a technology of governance from a distance, IFIs’ usurpation of economic policy
space and control in countries such as Greece and Nigeria, and Third World national and
transnational social movements’ praxes of resistance to global and national development
institutions. I have mapped these experiences into the evaluation of IFIs’ accountability praxis in
international development. In this regard, I assess the doctrines of law and relevant institutions of
accountability for the realization of the RTD. Through this exercise, I have probed the extent to
which international law doctrines have been influenced or drawn from Third World peoples’ lived
realities.
With regard to TWAIL’s skeptical stances to, and contingent distrust of, universal
international law doctrines, I set out to examine the extent to which some doctrines or values—
such as state responsibility, sovereignty, due diligence, or global public goods, among other
precepts—can be relied upon to achieve justice, fairness, and equity in the international order; or
whether they conceal the Western-dominated view of international law that facilitates the
hegemonization of development and the eclipses and displacements of the accountability of IFIs.188
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Guided by TWAIL’s techniques and sensibilities, particularly the work of Rajagopal, I
propose what I call participatory accountability from below in international law.189 Embodying
what Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito refer to as “subaltern cosmopolitan legality,”190 this model
has the potential to exalt the agency and autonomy of the people in development; it can mobilize
the masses in the articulation and struggle for responsive development, and is capable of creating
localized terrains for counter-hegemonic engagement with global institutions.191 It departs
fundamentally from international law’s Liberal proclivities. It advances the aims of accountability
far beyond remedy, prevention, and mitigation to include responsiveness, transparency, and selfimprovement of the very institutions sought to account. The dissertation commends the theory of
participatory accountability from below in international law; a model operationalizable through
process-based answerability at the policymaking stages. The main tenet of the answerability
dimension of accountability, among others, is its reliance (outside the domain of international law)
on counter-hegemonic knowledges of the people to contest and seek the revocation of rationalities
with which global institutions construct and reconstruct development paradigms.
On the whole, the paramount reason for the deviation from the Western Liberal models is
informed by TWAIL’s sensibility of rooting new visions of legality and futures in the “historical,
civilizational, developmental and cultural struggles” of the Third World.192 I recognize that if we
are to reconfigure a viable model of accountability that can, at least, assure “modest harvest” in
the actualization of development justice, it must take account of Third World experiences and lived
realities.
This dissertation recognizes that TWAIL and institutional cosmopolitanism have some
conceptual convergences and departures. They work together and supplement each other in certain
instances, but also have some tensions and may be conflictual at times. Both offer heterogenous
explanatory interpretations of rights, in critique of the orthodoxy and rigidities of Liberalism.
Institutional cosmopolitan understanding broadens the ambit of human rights normative values,
carrying their moral persuasion into constraining the global economic system. In the same way
that cosmopolitans conceive of rights as moral demands by discounting the excessive
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individualization of rights talk and deification of the state in human rights discourse of justice,
TWAILers also take similar stance.
Both offer a political economy critique of global institutional schemes of arrangements,
norms, practices and baseline rules that condition relations of domination, inequality, subjugation
and suffering. In this regard, they are united in their dialectical challenge to the hegemonic
paradigms of the international system in that whereas TWAIL focuses on the imperialist and
exclusionary character of positivist international law, institutional cosmopolitanism focuses on the
institutionally sanctioned injustices of such a system and how it produces and reproduces the
inequities that harm the global poor. They are both disenchanted by the global institutional order
which they deem as being exploitative, oppressive, unfair and antithetical to the Third World plight
and conditions. They both offer unapologetic oppositional stances to international economic order.
One of their divergence is that while TWAIL distrusts the universalist rationalization of
human rights discourse of justice, institutional cosmopolitans endorse the universalist claims of
the human rights paradigm, reconceiving rights from a moral perspective, on the understanding
that universal human rights ethos places constraints on all social agents and should be the basis of
international justice.193

8.3

Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical discourse analysis is an analytical research tool that examines how language (in its written,
spoken, or image forms) acts not only as an expression of thought but as a practice that orders and
shapes social relations.194 It also implies an approach that examines the material roles of language
in the functioning of hegemony and power within social institutions.195 According to Weiss and
Wodak, critical discourse analysis is “fundamentally interested in analysing opaque as well as
transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested
in the language.”196 For those who rely on this methodology, their focus is principally on the role
of ideology and mobilization of “meaning” in the production and maintenance of relations of
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domination and social inequality.197 Critical discourse analysis tries to understand complex social
phenomena as discursive constructions.198 Chief in their inquiry is relations of domination
manifested in the broader contexts of power and power abuse, including the role of discourse in
the production of inequality in social relations.199 Fairlough notes that its concern is with the “effect
of power relations and inequalities in producing social wrongs.”200
Apart from assessing the role of discourse in the functioning of hegemony and power
relations, critical discourse analysis also explores the constitutive sensibility of language. That is,
it investigates how language is deployed to shape peoples’ interpretations of their own behavior,
interests, positionality, or identities. In this regard, discourse often tends to be conceived not as
“language per se, but [as] a system that under-girds the language as well as the values and beliefs
hidden in language, including the ways such beliefs construct subject positions for people.”201 This
conceptualization of discourse as constitutive of reality emphasizes that discourse as a practice
shapes social relations, with its own conditioning rules and parameters.202
This dissertation interrogates, in the main, ways in which certain legal doctrines are
deployed to facilitate IFIs’ avoidance of, disconnection from, and obstruction of direct and distinct
accountability as part of the legacy of the hegemonization of development and international law’s
creation of subject peoples. I examine the way accountability dysfunctions and deficits in the realm
of development is a phenomenon constructed by international law’s discursive practices. I assess
how the reliance on parochial language and idioms of law are subtly used to misrepresent and mask
accountability avoidance for global development institutions. Typical to critical discourse analysis,
I also analyze how the invocation and discursivity of particular policy discourses in development
produce relations of domination, subjugation, and inequality. I illustrate how the deployment of
these discourses undergirds the perpetuation of certain parochial interests and projects in the realm
of development. In particular, I examine how the discourse of accountability in both the
implementation of the sustainable development agenda and in the understanding of global
development institutions relies on “constructed meanings” that enables the perversions of
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development to continue unabated even as these meanings delegitimate the imperatives of
development justice.203
I also investigate how the phenomenon of the accountability avoidance, disconnection, and
obstruction by IFIs is discursively constructed (formulated, articulated, rationalized, and
legitimized) by international law languages, vocabularies, doctrines, and precepts. I examine the
way language is deployed to construct these doctrines as devices for domination, hierarchization,
and legitimization of power.204 This dissertation describes and analyzes in detail the deployment
of the political prohibition doctrine, the dominant application of the state responsibility doctrine,
precepts of shared responsibility, the notion of collective duties of state, the due diligence rule, the
rationality of global public goods, and so forth.
Lastly, it is the nature of critical discourse analysis to insist on interdisciplinary research.205
Critical discourse analysis “emphasizes the need for interdisciplinary work in order to gain a
proper understanding of how language functions in constituting and transmitting knowledge, in
organizing social institutions or in exercising power.”206 In this dissertation, I put purely doctrinal
methods into conversation with perspectives drawn from other academic fields, as is typical of
legal-interdisciplinary research.207 The interdisciplinary discourse that I explore draws
perspectives from socio-legal scholarship, international relations, political theories, law and
development, and development on wide-ranging themes related to the development justice
accountability question.
Interdisciplinary discourse analysis has the enormous potential to enrich the study of
international law and norms (doctrinal analysis) with new perspectives drawn from outside the
technical confines of law. This cross-fertilization entails a “borrowing” that injects different
thought traditions “useful in creating spaces in which the constraints of what has become orthodox
international legal thinking [can be] consciously cast off in pursuit of new kinds of thinking, more
suitable for the rapidly transforming social and political landscape.”208 Interdisciplinary
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interventions foster a better understanding of the contemporary, complex, and new phenomena
that arise and challenge the theory and practice of law.209
Moreover, the interdisciplinarity of this project seeks to identify competing, contrasting, and
complementary claims in the scholarship to determine which of those claims may withstand
intellectual rigour and be the foundation for making logical, coherent, and tenable normative
propositions.
Data used in this study were derived from both primary and secondary material, including
academic writing, other publications, UN reports, international court decisions in law reports and
websites. In analyzing these materials, I tracked and labelled opinions of experts, states, NGOs,
multinational corporations, and international organizations on the question of accountability in
human rights and development practices. The information so gleaned was clustered along themes
as I have arranged in the various chapters and further clarified in the separate sections and
subsections of every chapter. I was able to interrogate dominant claims, especially doctrinal legal
claims in mainstream international legal scholarship, judicial pronouncements, academic thoughts,
policy discourses, and emerging practices. I contrasted, assessed, and merged these sets of data
against other disciplinary perspectives and theories to come up with the central claims, arguments,
and conclusions of this dissertation.210

9. THE ROADMAP
Chapter one is the introduction and presents an overview of the whole dissertation. Chapter two
examines the political dimensions of the development encounter. It sets out to demonstrate that
throughout the history of the Third World struggles, the RTD discourse has been the most assertive
and enduring front of counter-hegemony in international politics and relations, courtesy of the
discursive spaces, often diametrically opposed, that the development agenda catalyzed in the
postwar period. It articulates how the RTD discourse reframed and appropriated as human rights
causes the explicit political economy questions, such as unjust economic arrangements or
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questions of equity. It gives an account of how this discourse culminated into what this dissertation
notes to be a sui generis and counter-hegemonic norm. It demonstrates that the RTD norm has a
different genealogy and is itself an embodiment of radically reconceptualized doctrines of
international law. It also depicts ways in which the RTD constitutes an alternative understanding
of development, posing a challenge to the understanding of development as modernization—an
important consideration in the search for an effective accountability regime. This chapter is key to
advancing the argument that the RTD is a radical departure from orthodox understandings of
international human rights law. On this basis, therefore, the premises of contemporary
accountability praxis ought to be rethought. This chapter presages the central thesis of this
dissertation laid out in chapter six.
Chapter three maps the extent to which the evolving conception and practice of
development as interlinked with human rights continue to alter the global development agenda and
spur disparate accountability discourses at the theoretical and policy levels. It traces how the RTD
discourse has been a central feature of the conceptualization and praxis of human rights as
interlinked and interconnected with development objectives. The accountability debates
highlighted by the human rights dimension of the development encounter include the intellectual
notion of a human rights approach to development as a discourse of accountability; the policy
debates of human rights responsibility in development; and the SDGs policy schema of follow-up
and review. The main contribution of this chapter is to support the thesis of this dissertation that
typifying development policy practice is the marked absence of the direct and distinct
accountability of IFIs in their interventions in the global economy and in the development arena.
This conclusion regarding the absence of institutional accountability derives from a critical
examination of how international law locates the responsibility for consequential development
injustices in the agency of the developing state. The localization of accountability at the national
level is so pronounced in the SDGs implementation endeavour that one is in no doubt that the very
conception of accountability is state-based and state-focused.
In chapter four, I discuss the way the Bank and the Fund understand accountability praxis
in relation to their core functions of the provision of global public goods. I demonstrate how the
development justice accountability dysfunctions and deficits reflect a constructed reality that is
constantly rationalized and legitimized by formal international law discourses and the very practice
of development. This chapter carries forth the arguments from the previous chapter about the
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evolving conception and practice of development that is marked by mandate expansion for Bretton
Woods institutions amid the escalating accountability avoidance, disconnection and obstruction.
In chapter five, I critically examine and critique the formative principles of accountability
that DARIO reproduces from ARSIWA, the supposed norms and rules that it anchors as the
precepts governing the direct and distinct legal accountability of international organizations. It is
here where I expand on Pogge’s insights on institutional cosmopolitanism to assess whether
international law discourses have been integral to the way we ought to understand the imperative
of accountability for development justice. My contention is that the law of international
responsibility as the dominant frame of reference for accountability is ill-suited to guaranteeing
the direct and distinct accountability of IFIs both in their interventions in the global economy and
for the adverse outcomes that constitute a derogation from the RTD norm. In other words, the law
of responsibility is ill-adapted to address the distributive harms and effects of the global policy
system. It is my further claim that by its responsibility-for-wrongfulness approach (fixated on
breach and excessively focused on conduct and not effects), the regimes of the law of responsibility
omit the necessary insight of the institutionally sanctioned violations. Conceived as a regime for
ex-post redress of breach of international obligations, it does not look to the compatibility of
structures and processes of development with desired distributive outcomes. Simply, DARIO is
grossly inadequate for vindication of structural injustices.
In chapter six, where I elaborate my thesis, I make the case for firming up the backbone of
the RTD norm in the realization of development justice. Toward this cardinal objective, I propose
that for accountability politics and practice of rights with operational linkage to development, such
as the RTD, to be effectively deployed to materialize development justice, a robust appreciation
of the normative distinctiveness of the right ought to be had. This entails a consciousness that the
practice must be contextually aware and sensitive to the nature and normative character of the
RTD. It is in chapter six where I offer a compelling case of how the counter-hegemonic persona
plays out, demonstrating further that the RTD imaginary reveals the severe conceptual limitations
of Westphalian international law and its doctrines of accountability. I argue in chapter six that
accountability for actualizing development justice must be sufficiently sensitive to the nature and
peculiarities of the undergirding norm (or the right in question). This insight is drawn from
TWAIL’s sensibilities and techniques. As well, it relies on the institutional cosmopolitan critique
on the responsibility allocation, the premises from which I proceed to propound the answerability
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prong of accountability by proposing participation from below as accountability in international
law. I build on the RTD’s cosmopolitan ethos to make this proposition. I argue that this core
property espouses a solidaristic and cosmopolitan understanding of legality that can be relied upon
by the people facing the cruel dynamics of marginalization to clamour for development justice. I
propose that this as a pragmatic approach that can supplement extant accountability regimes. The
last chapter contains the general concluding remarks of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT AS A COUNTER-HEGEMONIC DISCOURSE
1. INTRODUCTION
Without any doubt, the move to mainstream human rights into the then prevailing modernist
development discourse owes its origins to postcolonial Third World counter-hegemonic forays
into the development field. The RTD has been a central feature of Third World counter-discourses
that sought to affirm the operational linkage of development to human rights objectives (at least
as they imagined these). It is this imagination that conferred on the RTD a counter-hegemonic
character in international law. In this chapter, I show that the RTD is a type of right that has a
distinctive normative character from almost all other recognized rights; in terms of its non-Western
genesis, substance, persona, vision of accountability, and obligations imposed. There is therefore
a need, I argue, to take account of this special normative character of the RTD norm in the
international development discourse of accountability. I demonstrate that the RTD was born
outside the Liberal tradition of constraining sovereignty, and that it is not exclusively concerned
with the welfarist ethic of the provision of minimum needs. It is in the light of this that this chapter
defends a reading of the RTD norm as a counter-hegemonic discourse. Accordingly, therefore, its
accountability praxis, particularly in relation to the securement of development justice in
international development ought to be rethought. I elaborate this argument in chapter six.
The main argument of this chapter is that the RTD’s counter-hegemonic nature has
considerably shaped its sui generis normative character, and that this ought to be considered much
more in formulating and rethinking accountability for the implementation or violation of
development justice. The discussion in this chapter therefore sets the stage for one of the
overarching claims I make in this dissertation that the thought/practice on development
accountability must be aware of the contexts of violation, and sensitive to, the RTD normative
distinctiveness. I tease out the counter-hegemonic character of the RTD in two dimensions: the sui
generis character that demonstrates its distinctiveness from all other rights. Secondly, through a
concept that I call “the structural contingency dynamic”, I argue that the nature and workings of
the technocratic global policy system constitute the context of violation of the RTD. The global
policy system is intricately implicated in the production of development injustices which must be
accounted for in development thought and practice. In chapter six, I elaborate on these two
important factors as the important considerations that determine the effectiveness and efficacy of
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accountability praxis. I argue, in part, that any assessment of the accountability of actors must
take account of these two important factors. This realization is important and indispensable to a
complete and proper grasp of the type of accountability measures that can adequately secure the
objectives of the RTD, which espouses a different conception of justice in the international
development scheme of arrangement. This chapter also sets the stage for the imagination of
alternative practices of justice regarding the international development agenda and development
praxis—a radically different vision of the future of human rights.
This chapter investigates how the normative and ideological underpinnings of the
Declaration on the RTD emerged out of the deployment of human rights and development
discourses in the clamour for development justice as well as the geopolitical struggles for equity
in the international political economy. And so, it will be argued that any attempt to understand the
RTD norm must revisit the postcolonial social context that has shaped and given it the distinctive
posture and persona it currently bears. I locate the RTD’s radical imaginary in sites where it upsets
and dissents from the fundamental assumptions of both development and international law with
alternative visions of reality and counter-imaginations of the social universe.1
This chapter proceeds as follows: In the section that follows the present one, I
conceptualize the notion of counter-hegemony that undergirds my argument in this chapter. In
section three, I then discuss the non-liberal foundation of the RTD norm. I show that in the
decolonization era a Third World (especially African) driven international redistributive agenda
catalysed the entry of human rights discourse into the development terrain, resulting in the
development justice question as it is articulated in the Declaration on the RTD. The clamour for
development justice was substantially anchored in the RTD discourse, which framed explicit
global political reform questions (participation, democracy, representation, and inclusion). In
addition, that very struggle formulated issues of equity and redistribution as human rights
concerns. It is in this way that the RTD constitutes a radical reconceptualization of the Western

1

The chasm between human rights and development and their failure to capture the immiseration of the Third World
is highlighted by Shivji’s argument that the “the liberal theory ruled out of court any link between individual rights
and economic justice, while development theory was prepared to sacrifice individual rights in the pursuit of economic
justice.” Issa G Shivji, “Constructing a New Rights Regime: Promises, Prospects and Problems” (1999) 8:2 Social
and Legal Studies 253 at 260.
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understanding of universal human rights and departs from its liberal and welfarist rights
counterparts.2
In section four, I critically assess how this reimagination of human rights has originated a
sui generis genre of rights that questions the fundamental assumptions of international law and
development. Accordingly, I continue the argument that the evolution, legalization, and
normativization of the notion of a peoples’ right to development in international law has produced
a distinctive character in the RTD norm. This appears in the way the hybridization of core
conceptions of development and human rights has conferred on the RTD a pedigree, nature, and
persona that radically departs from conventional rights paradigms. I delve into the RTD’s sui
generis identity, which appears markedly in its compositeness, hybridity, credo, vision, object, and
conceptual formulation. I contend that these must bear upon the critique of the suitability,
adequacy, and adaptability of standardized accountability models that seek the realization of
development justice.
In section five, I make the case for what I call the structural contingency dynamic, which the
RTD norm and practice reveals more clearly. This complex phenomenon describes the ways in
which supranational actors take on more determinative and manipulative roles in the perpetuation
of development injustices in ways that are too often invisible or invisibilized. The structural
contingency dynamic renders it possible to explain accountability eclipses and displacements at
the global level but also to locate the causes and responsibility for poverty and inequalities in the
global economic and political systems.3

See for example, Jack Donnelly, “In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right to
Development” (1985) 15 Cal West Intl L; Yash Ghai and Y K Yao, “Whose Human Right to Development” Human
Rights Unit Occasional Paper (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1989) at 5,6, 12 For a contrary opinion, see Philip Alston,
“The Shortcomings of a Garfield the Cat Approach to the Right to Development” (1985) 15 Cal W Intl L J 510 at 512.
He defined the Declaration’s redistributive pedigree and ancestry as a “mobilizing power” towards a cherished agenda
of development. He would dismiss Donnelly’s positivist leanings and rationalizations, discounting his unbridled
positivist rigidity on grounds that it overlooked “the sense of outrage” that developing countries’ peoples needed to
consolidate towards this cause. Offering a cosmopolitan conception of rights and shrewdly re-interpreting international
doctrines, was, for these proponents, one way of deepening the awareness that some rights have a different historical
emergence and seek to ordain a favourable international order.
3
I rely on Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reform, 2nd ed,
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008) at 39 [Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights] to expound the argument throughout
this dissertation that accountability relationships ought to recognize causalities for injustices in supranational realms.
2
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2. CONCEPTUALIZING COUNTER-HEGEMONY
As I argued in the previous chapter, the concept of counter-hegemony is used here to mean that
the substance, theory, and practice of the RTD presents alternative visions, perceptions, and
ideation in contesting and challenging the dominant (global) social group’s ways of conceiving
and legitimating the international economic order. In over thirty years, the RTD discourse has
relied on a range of strategies and methods to present “alternative visions” and other “valid ways”
of describing the universe, contrary to the political, social, and economic constructions of the
dominant global classes and societies.
RTD’s counter-hegemonic imagination has been demonstrated in various fora, such as
multilateral institutions, where ideas, views, and positions are exchanged, and voting takes place.
To borrow from Nancy Fraser’s conception, I see the RTD as a mode of discourse that availed
itself of “parallel discursive arenas” for the oppressed to “invent and circulate counter-discourses,
which in turn permitted them to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests,
and needs.”4 Indeed, contemporary accounts see the RTD norm in this very light. Baxi opines that
the cosmopolitan character of the RTD tends to be viewed as an “irritating moral nuisance” to
Western mercantilist ideologies of development.5 Salomon argues that the right “typifies a
cosmopolitan ethos that reveals its most distinctive and vital component” and that “the ideas of
equity that animate the right to development are heretical to those with power and advantage since
it proposes in the language of human rights modifications of the very system that provides for their
dominance.”6 And Ibhawoh has argued that the RTD’s project in international law is to serve as
“a language of resistance” and oppositional power against the “inequities of the global political
economy.”7
As will become clear, RTD exponents and adherents have organized and fostered a resistance
and struggle that has relied on alternative knowledges, strategies, and visions seeking to alter, on
the global stage, the conventions, relations, and practices of domination associated with the

Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy”
(1990) 25/26 Social Text 67.
5
Upendra Baxi, Human Rights in a Posthuman World: Critical Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at
130, 133 [Baxi, Human Rights in a Posthuman World].
6
Margot E Salomon, “Legal Cosmopolitanism and the Normative Contribution of the Right to Development” in
Stephen P Marks ed., Implementing the Right to Development: The Role of International Law (Geneva: Friedrich
Herbert Stiftung, 2008) at 22, 26 [Salomon, “Legal Cosmopolitanism”].
7
Bonny Ibhawoh, “The Right to Development: The Politics and Polemics of Power and Resistance” (2011) 33 Hum
Rts Q 76 at 78.
4
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expansion and constant refocusing of the development enterprise. Most of those conventions,
relations and practices are thought to be grounded in hegemonic international law.8 It is this quality
that produced the non-Western origins of the RTD, which later made it into a right of distinctive
normative character in the human rights corpus. This very quality also enforces the dynamic of
“structural contingency” of development that it extends into our contemporary understanding of
the redress and amelioration of accountability deficits in development praxis.

3. THE NON-WESTERN GENEALOGY OF THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
In this section, I set out to demonstrate that the RTD has a non-Western genesis and heritage that
questions, to some extent, the mainstream theoretical and philosophical rationalizations on which
the universal human rights paradigm is understood.9 These deviations appear in the RTD’s
provenance in the struggle against injustice, the inspiration by the Bandung ethic of global
equality, the politicization of Third World developmentalism, in the questioning of the
fundamental assumptions of development, and its interrogation of the governance frameworks of
IFIs.

3.1

Provenance in the Third World Struggle Against Structural Injustice

The history of the RTD is that of the deployment of international law discourses of “human rights
law” and “development” in the quest for development justice; an expectation that structures, rules,
and policies of development shall be compatible with the ends of equity, social justice, human
well-being, and participation.10 The deployment of human rights and development into the quest

Some of the literature on hegemonic international law include: Detlev F Vagts, “Hegemonic International Law”
(2001) 95 Am J of Intl L 843; Jose´ E Alvarez, “Hegemonic International Law Revisited” (2003) 97:4 Am J Intl L;
Nico Krisch, “International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal
Order” (2005) 16:3 EJIL 369. Major characteristics of hegemonic international law include: “patron-client
relationships”; “indeterminate rules” advantaging the hegemon; and magnification of authority at the level of
international organizations.
9
It may be said that the RTD has tended to be viewed, for the most part, as a norm which “breaks with the classical
assumptions of international human rights law, which is rooted in the protection of individuals against abuse by their
own state.” See Margot E Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights: World Poverty and the Development of
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 6 [Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights].
10
This history has been revisited by none other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
admission, upon the commemoration of thirty years since the Declaration was adopted, that the right “demanded equal
opportunities, and the equitable distribution of economic resources; [better] governance of the international economic
framework [and] re-defined development as far deeper, broader and more complex than the narrow, growth-and-profit
8
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for a much more just international order reflects what Falk calls “look[ing] at the human rights
models from the standpoint of the historically oppressed groups as the foundational imperative of
a counter-hegemonic human rights movement.”11
As historical and international law accounts show, the development’s turn to human rights
in the decolonization period focused on the alleviation of poverty, the reduction of inequalities
between and within nations, and the elimination of structural barriers to development. As the
Tehran Proclamation of 1968 emphasized, the challenges to making these accomplishments were
presented by the nature of existing international law and international institutions.12 The discourse
about structural impediments to the realization of the socio-economic aspirations of the Third
World had earlier been shared by nationalists such as Leopold Senghor, the then Senegalese
President in his book on African socialism.13
What is common about these accounts is that they emphasize how the deep-seated
structural inequities of the international economic order precipitated the entry of human rights into
development discourse leading to the adoption of the Declaration.14 When in 1977 the Social and
Economic Council endorsed a report of the then Human Rights Commission instructing the UN
Secretary General to conduct a primary study on the RTD, the main focus was on its international
dimension “taking into account the requirements of the New International Economic Order and
the fundamental human needs.”15 No doubt therefore that the 1979 Secretary General’s Report on
this question viewed the notion of a right to development largely as “a new conception of the
redistribution of power and decision-making and sharing of the world’s resources based on

focus of previous decades.” Statement of the High Commissioner for Human Rights at the commemoration of thirty
years of the existence of the right to development:
Online: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/Pages/AnniversaryMessage.aspx>.
11
Richard Falk, “The Power of Rights and the Rights of Power: What Future for Human Rights?” (2008) 1:1-2 Ethics
& Global Politics 81 at 91.
12
It was the Tehran Proclamation that made explicit reference to structural inequality as a human rights concern. See
Proclamation of Tehran, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran, 22 April to 13 May
1968, UN Doc. A/CONF.32/41 (1968), para 12 where it was stated that “[t]he widening gap between the economically
developed and developing countries impedes the realization of human rights in the international community.”
13
Léopold Sédar Senghor, On African Socialism, translated by Mercer Cook (New York, 1964) at 133. He argued that
“The social problem today is less a class struggle within a nation, than a global struggle ‘between the ‘have’ nations…
and the proletarian nations … and we are one of.. those ‘have-not’ nation”.
14
Peter Uvin, “From the Right to Development to the Rights-based Approach: How ‘human Rights’ Entered
Development” (2007) 17:4-5 Development in Practice 597.
15
Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Thirty-Third Session, 62 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No.6) U.N. Doc.
E/5927 (7 February- 11 March 1977) para 41 and Resolution 4 (XXXII) para 4.
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needs”.16 As another UN Report affirmed in 1990, their concern was with the economic and
political asymmetries of power, which tended to favour the North.17
Alston and Robinson who have reflected on this history are categorical that it is the RTD
discourse that instigated the entry of human rights agenda into the international development arena.
This began from as early as the 1968 World Conference on Human Rights in Tehran when the
RTD discourse came to “broaden the focus of international human rights debates to include a range
of economic and other issues which had previously been considered to lie squarely and exclusively
within the domain of the national and international development agencies.”18 Such “a structural
phase”19 of the human rights corpus was unusual. It was unusual because until the emergence of
the idea of a peoples’ right to development, the specific kinds of human rights values that
dominated the global discourse had not been concerned with global structural disadvantage and
deprivation.20 The rigid notions and dogmas of (largely Western-centric) human rights could not
“address policy quandaries surrounding a host of problems that spill over national borders.”21
Before the structural phase had been inaugurated by the RTD discourse, human rights had never
envisioned global structural reordering with the purpose of rebalancing and making inclusive,
participatory, and just the international institutional system.22
16

Report Report of the Secretary General (E/CN.4/1334) of 21 February 1979 para 74.
Global Consultation on the Right to Development, E/CN.4/1990/9/Rev.1, 26 Sep 1990 [Global Consultation Report]
para 167-168 observed that “the concentration of economic and political power in the most industrialized countries”
stymies development. It is perpetuated by the non- democratic decision-making processes of international economic,
financial and trade institutions”.
18
See Philip Alston & Mary Robinson, “The Challenges of Ensuring the Mutuality of Human Rights and Development
Endeavours” in Philip Alston & Mary Robinson eds, Human Rights and Development: Towards Mutual
Reinforcement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 1.
19
Philip Alston, “Development and the Rule of Law: Prevention Versus Cure as a Human Rights Strategy”
International Commission of Jurists Conference on Development and the Rule of Law, The Hague, 27 April- 1 May
1981 at 9 [Alston, “Prevention or Cure”].
20
Samuel Moyn, Not Enough: Human Rights in An Unequal World (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press
of Harvard University Press, 2018) at 176 [Moyn, Not Enough]. (“with their moral focus on a floor of sufficient
protection in a globalizing economy, human rights did nothing to interfere with the obliteration of any ceiling on
distributive inequality. Deprived of the ambiance of national welfare, human rights emerged in a neoliberal age as
weak tools to aim at sufficient provision alone.”) Also see Samuel Moyn, “A Powerless Companion: Human Rights
in the Age of Neoliberalism” (2014) 77:4 Law and Contemporary Problems 147 [Moyn, “A Powerless Companion”]
(he argues that “while human rights have been preoccupied with providing basic minimum conditions of life, they
have not responded to neoliberalism’s obliteration of the ceiling on inequality” at 149). But see Margot Salomon,
“Why Should it Matter that Others Have More? Poverty, Inequality and the Potential of International Human Rights
Law’, (2011) 37 Rev of Intl Studies at 2144 [Salomon, “Why it Matters that Others Have More”].
21
Steven Vertoc and Robin Cohen eds, “Introduction” in eds Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context and
Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press) at 11.
22
It is a revisionism that was widely embraced by those postcolonial agitators who sought to correct the imbalances
embedded in the colonial and imperial international structures, through law and politics. In fact, the true motivation
for bestowing a juridical status of a RTD was to eliminate structural barriers; which were seen as constituted by the
17
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What marked the RTD’s departure from convention, both in its ideological and political
foundations, at least in the human rights realm, was its shrewd reintroduction of the controversial
New International Economic Order (NIEO) rationales that sought to dismantle the economic
structures of exploitation and domination, eliminate disparities, windup neo-colonialism in the
interest of total emancipation and the common interest and equality of developing countries.23
Without the RTD being introduced, these geopolitical issues, as virtuous as they were, should have
been confined to the political realm. But they found articulation in Third World advocacy for a
new international law of development that would preside over international economic
governance.24 This affirmed the RTD as a norm of a different moral and political persuasion and
genealogy.
When Doudou Thiam first expressed the idea of a RTD in 196725 and then Keba M’Baye
followed in 1972, the landscape was already prepared, the seeds were already sown and the mood
was already rife for disenchanting international law with this new and non-Western idea that
emphasized the deployment of rights ideologies in the realms of geopolitical struggles.26 Thiam’s
and M’Baye’s propositions signalled that there would emerge a new right of a different ancestry,

allocative and regulatory functions of international financial institutions. Such barriers consisted in the international
architectural inequities (“dependency, biases in the system and management of international trade”). See Salomon,
“Towards a Just Institutional Order: A Commentary on the First Session of the UN Task Force on the Right to
Development” (2005) 23:3Netherlands Q of Hum Rts 409 at 414.
23
Fatsah Ouguergouz, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for Human
Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003) at 298. For one of the
critiques of NIEO see William L Scully, ‘‘The Brandt Commission: Deluding the Third World’’ (30 April 1982). He
decried ‘‘international redistributive schemes’’ as presenting” a degree of coercion, the abrogation of sovereignty, and
the denial that man has a fundamental right to the fruits of his labor.” Online
<http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/1982/pdf/bg182.pdf>.
24
F V Garcia-Amador, The Emerging International Law of Development: A New Dimension of International
Economic Law (New York; London; Rome: Ocean Publications, 1990) at 36; James Thuo Gathii, “Third World
Approaches to International Economic Governance” in Richard Falk, Balakrishnan Rajagopal & Jacqueline Stevens
eds, International Law and the Third World: Reshaping Justice (New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2008) at 258. It is
during this time that decolonized countries’ resistance politics, which later crystallized into the clamour for
development (the RTD movement), peaked and embraced the egalitarian ethic of global equality and equity as their
mantra and vision, as demonstrated by the Bandung’s anti-imperial, anticolonial, and antiracial campaign momentum.
This particular ethic was largely driven by the political desire to reverse imbalances deeply embedded in the
international economic relations and systems, imbalances which perpetuated unfair distribution of the benefits and
costs of the international economic order.
25
Cited in Daniel J Whelan, “Conflicting Human Rights and Economic Justice-A Genealogy of the Right to
Development” in Melissa Labonte & Kurt Mills, Human Rights and Justice: Philosophical, Economic, and Social
Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2018) at 59.
26
Keba M’Baye, Le droit au development comme un droit de l’ehomme REVUE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME
(1972) 505; M’Baye (paper delivered at UNESCO Meeting of Experts on Human Rights, Human Needs and the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order, in Paris, (June 19-23, 1978)), reprinted in UNESCO Doc. SS78/CONF.630/8 at 1 all as cited in Donnelly, “In Search of the Unicorn”, supra note2.
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one that would centralize a host of claims against structural injustice. These claims, rooted in a
disenchantment with the global economic order that fostered postcolonial forms of exploitation
included: seeking economic sovereignty, challenging hegemony, aspiring to redistributive equity,
global restructuring, and envisaging a new international law of development, among others27 There
was also the equality ethic as one of the geopolitical issues that prompted the search for a RTD.
This had particularly been invoked in the 1967 G77 conference in Algiers by a Senegalese jurist
Doudou Thiam.28
It is for the struggle against structural injustice that proponents feared that the RTD idea
would disturb convention. While proposing the idea, and consequently a new vocabulary in the
international law lexicon, M’Baye is reported to have acknowledged, in 1972, that doing so
involved some measure of “temerity.”29 Later, in 1978, after the right had percolated through the
United Nations human rights systems, he is quoted as remarking that the idea was “somewhat
venturesome.”30 Such fears emanated from, and were coincidental to, the reinvigoration of the
RTD discourse “as a law which contained the seeds of a new international economic order.”31
It is by taking this posture that M’Baye’s and Thiam’s entrepreneurial ideas pointed more
to the way a people’s right to development significantly deviates from convention. For one, in their
respective speeches, as norm entrepreneurs, they direct attention, for the first time in the history of

27

Of late there is a resurgence of scholarship on NIEO. The different goals and objectives of NIEO have recently been
revisited by authors at Harvard and the London School Economics whose recent review enumerates the following as
NIEO’s core though disparate agenda. They see NIEO as, among other things, “a critique of legal formalism”; “the
genealogical starting point for ‘the right to development’”; “an extension of the principle of sovereignty from the
political to the economic realm”; “an incrementalist approach to reforming global economic and political power
arrangements”; “‘completing’ decolonization”; “a call for global redistribution—including financial, resource, and
technology transfer—from rich to poor countries”; “a radical challenge to the historic hegemony of the North Atlantic
industrial core.” See Nils Gilman, “The New International Economic Order: A Reintroduction” (2015) 6:1 Humanity:
An International J of Hum Rts, Humanitarianism and Development at 2.
28
“What is our task? We must lay the foundations for a new world society; we must bring about a new revolution; we
must tear down all the practices, institutions and rules on which international economic relations are based, in so far
as these practices, institutions and rules sanction injustice and exploitation and maintain the unjustified domination of
a minority over the majority of men. Not only must we reaffirm our right to development, but we must also take the
steps which will enable this right to become a reality. We must build a new system, based not only on the theoretical
affirmation of the sacred rights of peoples and nations but on the actual enjoyment of these rights. The right of peoples
to self-determination, the sovereign equality of peoples, international solidarity—all these will remain empty words,
and, forgive me for saying so, hypocritical words, until relations between nations are viewed in the light of economic
and social facts.” Cited in Whelan, supra note 25 at 59.
29
As quoted in Donnelly, “In Search of the Unicorn”, supra note 2 at 474.
30
Ibid.
31
Mohammed Bedjaoui, “The Right to Development” in Mohammed Bedjaoui, ed, International Law: Achievements
and Prospects (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff and UNESCO, 1991) 1177 at 1179 [Bedjaoui, “The
Right to Development”]; Donnelly, “In Search of the Unicorn”, supra note 2 at 482.
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the dominant Liberal version of human rights, that underdevelopment, brought about by an unjust
and inequitable international order, is a human rights issue. The second key point is that they
presented a new perspective of a post-coloniality bent on forging other ways of being and doing
based on a new norm that they anticipated. It is for these two reasons that the emergent norm was
being seen in light of its general (troubling) tendency as “a device to obtain concessions” in the
global economic restructuring or even that global restructuring was seen as the avenue for realizing
human rights.32 This is something that was then unique in the human rights discourses of justice.
The third point of significance in Mbaye’s and Thiam’s ideational entrepreneurship is that
their persuasion brought forth their own diverse imagination of alternative practices of justice
regarding the international development agenda and development praxis—a radically different
vision of the future of human rights. Such an entrepreneurship cemented a new conception that
focused on development justice by what they imagined to be a completed postcolonial search for
an equitable international order. M’Baye’s greatest input was to cement the ideal of development
as a right as “a new conception of the redistribution of power and decision-making and the sharing
of the world’s resources based on needs.”33 This kind of framing of development justice in human
rights terms was before then unknown and could even be regarded a heretical international human
rights discourse of justice.34 As it would later emerge, such unusual linking of human rights with
structural issues was certainly bound to spark dogged diplomatic opposition, and therefore imperil
the RTD’s future cascade. True to M’Baye’s fears, over the years, the right’s proselytism would
face immense prejudicial preconceptions, based on a misunderstanding of its pedigree and object,
most of which it has yet to overcome.35 Quite clearly, therefore, it is in bestowing juridical stature
on a new norm to address structural disadvantage that seems to significantly depart and even
question the doctrinaire and conservative rights orthodoxies.36
Donnelly, “In Search of the Unicorn”, supra note 2 at 504.
Report Report of the Secretary General (E/CN.4/1334) of 21 February 1979 para 74.
34
Salomon, “Legal Cosmopolitanism”, supra note 6 at 22, 26.
35
Report of the Working Group on the Right to Development on its Nineteenth Session 23 to 26 April 2018,
A/HRC/39/56. (As a matter of fact, as the Working Group reports in 2018: “Divergent views in the understanding of
the right to development [remains] with the European Union which maintains that “it was not in favour of the
elaboration of an international standard of a binding nature”)
36
Stephen Marks & Rajeev Malhotra, “The Future of the Right to Development” at 3 observe thus:
However, by the time the drafting got started in 1981, Ronald Reagan was in the White House and Margaret
Thatcher was in 10 Downing Street, heralding a strong shift to the right in domestic and international
affairs.…Thus from the beginning the North American and European delegations resisted using the human
rights institutions to restrain the dominant economic powers in the global economy and especially to impose
any legal obligations, which NAM countries favoured. This tension continues today.
32
33
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3.2

Inspiration by the Bandung Ethic of Equality

The emergence of the RTD as a human right of a different pedigree and ancestry and as instance
of the radical reimagination of international law and development is traceable to the Bandung
Conference of April 1955 and a host of other subsequent discussions and alignments, including
the Non-Alligned Movement, the NIEO,37 the NIEO’s Program of Action,38 the Second
Development Decade, and the Brandt Commission39 among others.40
The Bandung Conference also known as the Asian-African Conference was attended by 29
African and Asian countries including Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, China, Cyprus, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal,
Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, the Vietnam Democratic
Republic of Vietnam, the State of Vietnam, and Yemen. Among the leaders in attendance were
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (India), Prime Minister Mohammed Ali of Pakistan, Prime
Minister U nu of Myanmar, Sir John Kotelawala of Sri Lanka, and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt,
Prime Minister Zhou Enlai of China. Indonesian President Achmed Sukarno described the
conference as the “first intercontinental conference of coloured peoples in the history of
mankind.”41
Lined up for debate were issues grouped as economic cooperation, cultural cooperation,
human rights and self-determination, problems of dependent peoples, and promotion of world

online <https://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/134/2018/06/Marks-Malhotra-The-Futureof-the-Right-to-Development-2017.pdf>.
37
In its preambular section, it declared that it shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, making it
possible to redress the widening gap between the developing and developed countries and ensure steadily accelerating
economic development.”
38
Called on the international community to “assist” developing countries facing “severe economic imbalance” in their
relations with developed countries and to mitigate their “current economic difficulties.”
39
Named after Willy Brandt, a former socialist German Chancellor who was appointed with other experts to the
inquiry by MacNamara, the then World Bank President, to investigate the misadventures of development as growth
of the First Development Decade which sought “accelerat[ing] progress towards self-sustaining growth of the
economy” and to make “substantial increase in the rate of growth.” See Vijay Prashad, The Poorer Nations: A Possible
History of the Global South (Brooklyn: Verso, 2012) at 15 notes the sad irony is that the World Bank sanctioned the
report, noted its blistering critical recommendations, but ironically both the IMF and the Bank ignored or rejected its
humanist approach to geopolitical issues. See further, General Assembly Resolution 1710 (XVI) “United Nations
Development Decade: A Programme for International Economic Co-operation” (19 December 1961), para 1.
40
United Nations, International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade,
Resolution 2626/XXV, 24 October 1970.
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Speech by President Sukarno of Indonesia at the Opening of the Conference in Asia-Africa Speaks from Bandung,
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peace and cooperation.42 The first two themes were considered by two committees between 19 to
22 April 955. From 23 April 1955, the heads of delegations considered the remaining issues in
another three committees to consider questions of racial discrimination and racial problems,
weapons of mass destruction and disarmament, and the third committee was to consider other
ancillary issues of the UN. Five other drafting committees were constituted to draft necessary
resolutions on these range of issues. Prompting most of these discourses/programs and texts were
the propositions of economic justice, economic development, and reform of the international
economic system. For example, prominently featuring in the Final Communique of the conference
was economic development and cooperation between Asian and African countries, the need for
stabilization of commodity prices, enhancing inter-regional trade and promoting technical
assistance.43
Commentators see the significance of the Bandung Declaration in the institutional history
of the Global South in quite an intriguing light. As the first international meeting of former colonies
to address the postcolonial struggle for distributive justice, the Bandung Conference embodied a
bold “ethic of global equality.”44 This inaugural moment catalysed the increasing visibility of
Third World identity and agency in the postwar international politics. It served as a strategic
launching pad for future Third World intellectual, political, and socio-economic mobilization and
resistance in the international arena.45 It lent impetus to the anti-imperialist agenda and
postcolonial aspiration of altering the global economic structures that legitimated inequality
between nations.46 According to Okafor, the Bandung Conference was a significant historical
moment for its stimulation of the various Third World solidarity movements that challenged
hegemony of the North.47 Such movements included the Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty
Over National Resources (PSNR)(1962), the Declaration on the NIEO and Programme of Action
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(1974),48 the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) (1975), and the
Declaration on the RTD (1986).49
As recently the reconstruction of this all important history shows that Bandung ethic
converged on (a particular) “discourse of developmentalism.”50 It is said that human rights also
featured in the vision of a new world it anticipated.51 The Bandung Conference thus became one
of the first heterodox moves that signalled the imperative of hybridizing development and human
rights objectives to tackle structural injustices. It could be viewed as a shift from, or at the very
least, as a moment that inspired the Third World contestation of the universe constructed by
Western episteme and its imperialist logics.52 This is a dynamic that the Declaration would later
perfectly personify in its legal formulation, contrary to the Western and Liberal accounts of the
human rights historiography.53

3.3

A History of the Politicization of the Third World Developmentalism

The Bandung spirit of solidarity effectively captured the Third World aspiration for development.54
It is these Third World postcolonial developmentalist claims that set a foundation for the
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emergence of an international norm that radically departs from Western Liberal bases. It goes
without saying that the RTD “emerged from the legitimate preoccupation of newly independent
countries with problems of development.”55
Developmentalist claims are traceable to as far back as 1944 at the debate on the formation
of Bretton Woods Institutions. It is at this conference that Third World delegates (Mexico and
India) had made a clear demand that the development of “economically backward” countries be a
high priority for the new institutions being founded.56 Throughout the subsequent clamour for
international development justice, the Third World intention was to draw urgent and serious
attention to the economic plight—for example, unequal economic relations and the indigence of
their people—of the newly won sovereignties. They also sought to institute social and economic
justice as the remedy to backwardness. They endeavoured to pursue a form of political democracy
in the international economic system based on the ideal of equality and equity. Inevitably,
development would become the ideological tool for navigating this cause in international politics
and diplomacy. Partly, the explanation was that once decolonization was achieved, development
would be the next obvious step in realizing better living conditions for people who had been
exploited during the years of colonial encounter.
While development has been seen as the new criteria for the categorization of the West and
the non-West,57 it provided the first terrain on which the Third World would encounter and exert
dogged opposition (in the interests of political and economic self-determination) to hegemonic
international law.58 Then, as now, development has served as an arena for the perpetuation of
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divergent worldviews. It has been the fertile ground for alternative political practices in
contestation of the modes of marshalling consent advanced by the hegemonic social classes.59 For
instance, unlike the international Bill of Rights, the political, moral and ideological underpinnings
of the Declaration are seen as rooted in the notion of equitable development.
Inspired by the equality ethic and struggle against structural injustice, the RTD mantra
became a new “vision” possessing an egalitarian ethic that departed from the prevalent economistic
paradigms. The kind of Third World politics was exemplified in the fact that the RTD debate
provided a new outlook on development from the perspective of the subjugated groups by
channelling and tending to concerns of poverty, inequalities, and other structural barriers to
development. This historical occurrence disturbs conventions in the development enterprise. From
a development perspective, this appears in the RTD’s partial reconception of development in noneconomistic terms. The RTD imaginary assumes a multidimensional approach that takes account
of, for instance, people’s social conditions of life or the maximization of people’s well-being as
indicators of development, which reveals the unique ancestry of the right.60
The non-economistic formulation can be said to be a Post-Bandung developmentalist
thinking that was preoccupied with the balancing of interests and the ending of inequality between
nations. This kind of developmental politics became the device of engagement with an imperial
and colonial international system. In the 1970s, this developmental politics co-opted human rights
into that contestation as developed countries were coerced to accept added responsibilities in
development planning and poverty eradication. A good example of this “venturesome” politics
was the framing the Declaration as an instrument harnessing “categorical imperatives” of human
rights to compel dominant states to renegotiate the global economy.61 As alternative imagination
of development, the kind of resistance that the Third World succeeded to write in international
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politics underscored that dominant yardsticks were rapidly unravelling and losing grip as
competing imaginations and counter-narratives inundated international law.
As international debates raged, concurrent debates within nation-states articulated
alternative versions and new development aspirations that were, in some sense, economistic in
conception but obviously in deviation from Western intellectual and philosophical thought. At
first, in decolonized Africa, for example, ongoing developmentalism debates were mainly
conducted within an economic growth and development frame, all in the name of a fundamental
“restructuring of under-developed societies.”62 From as early as the 1960s, developmentalism was
so common in the language of decolonized countries that in the postcolonial dispensation it became
the central ideology defining almost all facets of their policy aims for economic and political
transformation.
For instance, the African Socialism that Tom Mboya, Julius Nyerere, Kwame Nkrumah,
and Leopold Senghor fervently commended for adoption as Africa’s new philosophy of economic
independence calcified into the socialist blueprint for economic development in Tanzania and
Ghana, while Kenya amalgamated the socialist and market economy models.63 Espoused as the
policy tool for meeting the challenge of underdevelopment, African Socialism was conceived as
the basis of the new relationship with foreigners in the intervening period.64 It contextualized
development teleologically within the decolonization imperatives: fighting poverty and a clear
intention of reducing the developmental divide between the industrial West and the
underdeveloped South.65 With the appreciation of the power and economic differentials between
states, especially discussions surrounding a new international economic order, domestic debates
on development were couched in largely economistic terms, and the very politics of development
of states was perceived in the “catching up” mental framework.66
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One leading African nationalist was Mboya, who, like most revolutionaries at the time,
recognized that the underdevelopment of newly decolonized territories was not a culmination of
some natural order of things. Mboya saw underdevelopment from a not so purely economic
perspective. For him, rather, the “acquisitive instinct” of capitalism that was “largely responsible
for the vicious excesses and exploitation” engendered underdevelopment and poverty of a people,
and thus he believed that there was something that African values could contribute.67 He readily
embraced endogeneity and the cultural superiority of African “thought processes and cosmological
ideas” as integral to reimagining postcolonial development policies. Such policies were summed
up as “industrial modernity and national development,” but their central plank was meeting the
expectations of the people by providing basic conditions of living.68
The political concern with development therefore readily found a suitable refuge in African
political thought at the time, in large part as a historically specific project of mimicking Western
trends, even though some alternative objectives such as addressing poverty and inequality were
also being advanced.69 The shortest expression of it all, as put by Hickel, is that developmentalist
thinking “wanted a fairer global economic system with the latitude to determine their own
economic policies.”70
The politicization of Third World developmentalism, though economistic in substance,
were the ideological forerunner to the unique idea of a right to development. It brought with it an
imagination of development as a human right issue. This is something that was always unknown
to Western Liberal thought, including the liberal economic understanding of the development
paradigm, perhaps untilthe1970s when the idea of international development law was jostling for
attention in the international discourse.71 By this time, development was anchored on very broad
ideals and in fact a new usage of the term was now being deployed, and new institutions were
brought into the purview of censure. For example, by focusing on the international economic order
with his political critique of the “international system of poverty and poverty of the international
system,” Bedjaoui reckoned that “a body of new norms should be matched by new institutions to
67
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be responsible for the application of those norms.”72 This kind of politics that had gathered steam
affirmed the peculiar and unique emergence of a norm in the Third World imaginations of radically
transformed developmental models. Strong affirmation of this politics was echoed by Doudou
Thiam, Senegal’s foreign minister at the time who declared that the “old colonial past, of which
the present is merely an extension, should be denounced” and that states should “proclaim, loud
and clear, the right to development for the nations of the Third World.”73
More generally, the deeper undertone of the new notion of the RTD that had been
compelling and rupturing the international human rights discourse was that “a new human right to
development be created.”74 Notions of development as a human right rooted in a new international
law of development crept out of this compelling necessity to prioritize Third World development
to achieve socio-economic justice. These notions were ideologically inspired by post-Bandung
alternative conceptions of development. For instance, in seeing the RTD emerge as “a rhetorical
centrepiece for achieving global distributive justice between states,”75 the North would regard
Third World international politics as “violating hallowed and classical principles of international
law.”76 However, it was not only the heretical views that the new norm was couched in that rankled
in the West, it was its ideational challenge to the development paradigm and human rights corpus.
All in all, the Third World developmentalist clamour was to affirm that development was not just
the new criteria of distinction between the North and South, but a device that could be deployed
to their cause and plight.77

3.4

Questioning the Fundamental Assumptions of Development

3.4.1 Dependency Theory’s Critique of Economistic Development Models
I recognize that development traditionally stands out as one of the most contested concepts and
ideals, with no common ground on what it means. Development has been theorized and defined in
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competing and diverse ways and from different ideological standpoints.78 The three schools of
thought that have produced pluralism in the conceptual understanding of development that I want
to address in the limited space I have in this chapter are dependency theories, post-development
theory, and the RTD discourse.
In general, the way in which Western narratives propagated the idea of development was
said to overlook the comprehensive nature of development as a totality of political, social, and
cultural transformation. This reality dawned when dependency theorists supplied the alternative
imaginations necessary for contesting the meanings, assumptions, outmodedness, and utility of
development.79 For instance, Escobar’s main argument has been that the ethnocentric discourse of
development that emerged in the postwar period and heightened in the 1950s produced massive
underdevelopment that is marked by misery, exploitation and oppression.80 Similar views echoing
Escobar’s called for a revision of several planks of, as well as “blind faith” in, modernization
discourse.81
As Rist’s historical and post-development telling of the genealogy of the development
enterprise reveals, dependency theories questioned the fundamental premises of classical and neo-
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classical economic development theories.82 By the 1960s, the leftist dependency theory had surged
to levels of respectability and was in vogue for offering differing views of development and
contesting the linear conceptions and Western development orthodoxies in the guise of growth,
employment, industrialization, international trade, raw materials export, capital accumulation,
private investments, savings, and so forth.83 The central tenet of this school is that the dynamic of
underdevelopment is located in global structures. It criticizes the development promise of
modernization for: its failure to “expand human freedoms”; its “extremely uneven record of
development; its role in the persistence of poverty amid increasing affluence; its role in the increase
in unemployment despite expanding production; its contribution to the failure to ameliorate the
impoverished conditions of people in the poorest countries of Africa and Asia”; and its “increasing
association … with ecological disasters”.84
The fledgling debate over the RTD, a confrontation between hegemonic and counterhegemonic geopolitical perspectives, was shaped and characterized by these sensibilities and a
deep-seated disillusionment with Western perspectives on development. It is these perspectives
that also assimilated the entry of social objectives into the UN thought and practices of
development.

3.4.2 Assimilating Social Objectives into Development
One of the earlier policy documents that relied on the radical interrogation of development by
dependency theories to conceptualize the notion of the RTD was the 1979 Secretary General’s
Report, which acknowledged that development has a capacious nature.85 Adopting a leftist view
(echoing preceding counter-discourses such as dependency theories), the Secretary General’s
Report discussed the fluidity of development and admitted the conceptual fallacies of pre-existing

82

Rist, supra note 79.
See Arjun Sengupta, “On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development” in Arjun Sengupta, Archna Negi
& Moushumi Basu eds, Reflections on the Right to Development (New Delhi; Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications,
2005) at 68 [Sengupta, “Theory and Practice II”]. On development as needs as a critique of development as growth
that was inspired by dependency theories, see for example James Gathii, “Good Governance as a Counter Insurgency
Agenda to Oppositional and Transformative Social Projects in International Law” (1999) Buff Hum Rts L Rev at at
123 [Gathii, “Good Governance”].
84
Banuri supra note 81 at 31.
85
The International Dimension of the Right to Development as a Human Right in Relation to Other Human Rights
Based on International Cooperation, Including the Right to Peace, Taking Into Account the Requirements of the New
International Economic Order and the Fundamental Human Needs, Report of the Secretary General, UN Doc.
C/CN.4/1334 of 2 January 1979. [Secretary General’s Report]
83

70

development theory and practice. Rights, the Report declared, are integral to the development
process, as conditions and as aims of development.86
Since then, it is no longer tenable to hold onto the orthodoxies and definitions of
development in the traditional unilinear fashion.87 It has been recognized that the concept of
development is expansive enough to encompass other elements and that “that an effective
development strategy, whether at the national or international level, must be based on respect for
human rights and incorporate measures to promote the realization of such rights if it is to be
effective in fostering development in the most meaningful way.”88 This new appeal rests on the
recognition that human rights and development are so interrelated in object that, although they are
different in strategy and implementation, they are compatible and intertwined.
The Secretary General’s Report noted further that “[g]rowing awareness of the complexity
of the development process has served to underline the difficulty of describing it within the
confines of a single definition.”89 The complexity and dynamism referred to entailed additional
phenomena that development now had to account for, such as equity, the well-being of the human
person as the subject (not object) of development, and the promotion of human rights. The
capaciousness of development thus called for re-inscription of the social (political, cultural, and
economic) dimensions into development. This is a view that unidimensional growth theories had
fiercely de-emphasized. But ironically, social objectives had to be made the objective aims of
economic growth or development in the economistic sense. Development was now a dynamic
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reality, a variegated phenomenon partially constituted by the economic, on the one hand, and the
social, on the other.
The (re)definition of development as a comprehensive and dynamic reality was later
captured in the Preamble to the Declaration, upholding development as “a comprehensive
economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the
well-being of the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and
meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting
therefrom.”90
Even though these Third World perspectives were new, the environment in which they were
articulated were not. The legacy of Bandung and the subsequent Third World coalescence around
RTD advocacy had cemented this fact. It can be argued that as much as these perspectives] “did
not constitute an alternative to development, they amounted to a different view of development
and an important critique of bourgeois development economics.”91 Such ideological effervescence
opened up new spaces for contesting the meaning, philosophical bases, and the practice of
development. The RTD discourse, while reflecting a different strand of critique, also questioned
the assumptions of modernization theory. It is this move that saw it assume an ineradicable, and
certainly the most enduring, counter-hegemony to this day. Thus, we now have, for the first time
in the history of human rights, a right that questions the modernist and neoliberal development
praxis. The RTD marks a fundamental departure from Western-liberal notions of development
measured in terms of economic metrics and physical transformation, instead linking development
to the fulfilment of human rights objectives.92

3.5

The RTD and the Interrogation of the Governance of the International Order

The RTD discourse also opened a battlefront with IFIs, where new postcolonial human rights
visions were articulated as relevant to the development discourse. The proponents of this discourse
pursued deeply shared cosmopolitan convictions that global distributive justice had a realistic
chance of attainability only if the international community pursued reform of the architecture and
orientations of international public bureaucracies to make them participatory, representative,
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inclusive, and democratic—to the benefit of all humanity.93 Pulling international public
bureaucracies into the developmentalist debate resulted in some semblance of counter-hegemonic
censure.
IFIs are always assumed to have more political power, resources, considerable intellectual
power, and influence over policies of developing countries—though which they overreach into the
economic and social policies and development agendas, including poverty reduction programs, of
developing states.
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Besides, they tend to be viewed as gatekeepers. But it is Third World

oppositional human rights and development thinking, as opposed to Western ideological frames,
that tended to see international bureaucracies as imbalanced inter-state formations championing a
sinister growth and development agenda. Because of the roles IFIs perform and their determinative
influence, Third World “radical” and dissenting perceptions often tended to view them as the
foremost coercive social institutions inimical to their claims for egalitarian developmentalism.
One area that drew immense critique was the mantra of basic needs approaches to
development, where the World Bank led the pack, a move that the IMF would only grudgingly
embrace much later in the nineties when pressure became overwhelming against its
macroeconomic orientation.95 Earlier Third World opponents such as Galtung understood the basic
needs approach as “an instrument to enlarge the First World market in the Third World” and “make
the Third World less of a threat to the First World hegemony.”96 For some, the social welfarism
intrinsic to the basic needs approach would sanction “an international regime based on
redistribution of income (concessional aid) rather than sharing of productive resources and
technology.”97 More recently, Sharma has argued that this was a deliberate strategy by the Bank
to distract from NIEO demands and promote its own parochial vision of development. 98 For the
Global Consultation Report, supra note 17 para 167-168 observed this point that “the concentration of economic
and political power in the most industrialized countries” stymies development. It is “perpetuated by the nondemocratic decision-making processes of international economic, financial and trade institutions.”
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indignant Third World, there was no egalitarian or redistributive objectives in the basic needs
approach to development, as it was seen as “too perfectly timed to avoid” and “outflank” the
emanations of cosmopolitan visions that NIEO claims had accentuated in international discourse.99
In the eyes of the Third World, despite the good intentions of global bureaucracies such as
those that mimic the basic needs approach, IFIs were seen as decidedly a hindrance to Third World
aspirations for development justice and equity. As it has been observed, since the 1980s, the RTD’s
focus still remains the dismantling of international structural impediments to development—such
as the democratic deficit of international institutions—economic and political power imbalances,
“the rigged rules of the system” harming developing countries, and structural conditions of
neoliberal economic orthodoxy that debilitate the economic functionality of developing states.100
Opening a battlefront with IFIs as agents of the North marked a structural approach under
the RTD movement. This structural approach seemed to have exposed something new for human
rights vocabularies, far beyond the circumscribed capacity of conventional understandings of
human rights theory. By seeking the recognition of human rights responsibilities beyond sovereign
repositories of power to include all “social institutions”, the RTD discourse availed a new way of
thinking and articulating global redistributive justice through human right paradigms.101
The other issue of disaffection that the Third World brought into the human rights and
development discourse was the insistence on restructuring the imbalanced structural arrangements
for the governance of the international economic order.102 These imbalances were seen from the
prism of democratic deficit and unequal relationships, for which participation and self-
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determination in international institutions would be the antidote.103 What this narrative emphasizes
is that the invention and emergence of the RTD uncovered the inability of conventional human
rights approaches to recognize and respond to the root causes of vulnerability embedded within
institutional arrangements and models of economic organization. The UN General Assembly made
this recognition three years after the NIEO Declaration. 104 The import of the resolution was to
focus on the global order’s contradictory and ambiguous potential to be a facilitator of as well as
a real hindrance to development as the vehicle through which socio-economic goods can be
attained. This, in my view, was the inception of the aspiration for a cosmopolitan polity. It was an
anticipation of new relationships in the provision of global public goods. The envisaged polity
would be one that would be “more democratic, however, in the sense of all states enjoying effective
self-determination, equal access to resources and economic opportunities, and an equal role in
macroeconomic decision-making.”105 Equality of states in decision-making at the multilateral
level was as predominant preoccupation of the RTD norm.
What we may conclude at this stage is that instead of the totalizing individualist-cum-antistate conception of rights, the RTD emerged as a norm that enforces a cosmopolitan understanding
of the human rights paradigm. The quintessence of cosmopolitanism is the idea that all of humanity
(“citizens of the world”) are inextricably joined in a single polity (that supplants a nation-state
normative order) based on, and committed to, commonly shared values. These values derive from
human rights as the fundaments that the international society, including international institutions
has agreed to abide by.106 For me, this is how the Declaration on the RTD has presented its
intransigence in seeking to regulate all international development institutions engaged in
international economic governance.
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To sum up, I have demonstrated that the RTD has peculiar political, legal, moral, and
philosophical bases that stand in contradistinction to the Western and the classical Liberal account
of the human rights tradition. As a Third World idea, it installed a different approach and a way of
knowing that radically departs from the Western practices and worldviews. Its historical
emergence reveals that the idea of a peoples’ right to development espouses pluralized visions in
questioning structural inequality of the global economic system. Given its evolution in the counterhegemonic ideation and strategies of the Third World, we have now a genre of right that draws the
nexus between the global institutional order and the under-fulfilment of human rights
commitments. It frames these issues as development justice concerns.107 This feature captures the
true essence of institutional cosmopolitanism. The neglect of material inequality innate to the
neoliberal development enterprise, as Moyn argues, is something that conventional human rights
discourse has perfected.108 Human rights, as we all know, were preoccupied with constraining
sovereignty (civil and political rights) and the provision of social welfare goods (in the case of
socio-economic rights). However, the “juridical re-imagining” of the utility of human rights in the
global justice project109 that the RTD discourse has brought forth signifies an enlarged scope for
the human rights agenda.
In the next section, I address how the distinctive and sui generis character of the RTD as
influenced by its counter-hegemonic persona ought to be considered in formulating and rethinking
accountability for the materialization of development justice.

4. THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER OF THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT NORM
IN CONTEMPORARY HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
In this section, I highlight instances of the sui generis character of the RTD norm that has
crystallized from the historical antecedence of questioning the fundamental assumptions of
international law and development. It is the aim of this section to show that the RTD espouses a
conception of justice that calls into question the usual accountability regimes in use in the realm
of development practice. The enumeration of the particularities and peculiarities of the RTD norm
107
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is very crucial for the thesis I develop in chapter 6 that the normatively distinct character of the
RTD calls into question the principles forged within Western understandings of international law
of accountability. It may be applied to challenge those universalized and standardized principles
that ignore the direct and distinct accountability of international financial institutions.
I contend that, as a sui generis right, the RTD significantly departs from conventional
human rights understandings, by going far beyond state-citizen dichotomization.110 As Brownlie
notes, the RTD embodies “the enthusiastic legal literature to develop an isolated genre …
completely outside the mainstream of diplomacy and international law.”111 Others argue that in
the entire human rights gamut, the RTD is “somewhat distinct” from other rights.112 This identity
and peculiarity of the RTD as an “isolated genre” appears markedly in several facets of the RTD
norm: in its compositeness, hybridity, credo, vision, object, and conceptual formulation.
Peculiarities of the RTD in those respects ought to be accorded critical reflection in thinking about
accountability and implementation of the RTD going forward.
First, as a composite right, the RTD integrates into its purview all rights—civil, political,
social, cultural, and economic rights—into an umbrella right.113 This may be a feature worth
pondering whenever the global community thinks of implementing the RTD through the
accountability functionality. According to Sengupta, it is sui generis in that it is the only right that
integrates civil and political rights with socio-economic rights, and indeed all rights into “a vector
of human rights.”114 A such, the RTD is regarded as the composite of, and a precondition for, the
exercise of all other rights. This makes the RTD all the more different from other rights, for its
actualization translates into the fulfillment of all other rights, and all of them together, without a
deterioration in any one of the rights.115 In formulating a suitable accountability model, one must
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appreciate this aspect. One must appreciate that the non-realization of all rights together cannot be
questioned ex-post through a sanctions-heavy approach. Such default cannot be remedied through
periodic review, monitoring, and follow-up. Perhaps an elaborate ex-ante accountability at the
policymaking stage may provide a suitable alternative.
In terms of vision, by appropriating the concerns of poverty, inequalities, and other
structural barriers of the international economic system as human rights claims, the RTD offers a
new outlook on human rights from the perspective of subaltern groups. Unlike the conventional
political and welfarist agenda of human rights discourses, the RTD norm incorporates the
redistributive agenda as a historical concern of Third World peoples. It particularizes the collective
plight of the Third World (for example poverty, material inequalities and social justice) in
contesting the economic forces behind the hegemonic interests of the North.116 By heightening
consciousness of global poverty and inequality and stirring demands for redistributive justice, the
RTD questions the vested interests that IFIs champion through default rules and standard norms
of trade, finance, and investment.117
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In their present formulation, conventional human rights ideology and practice, as Shivji
argues, ignore the “social injustice inherent in the international imperialist order.”118 By such an
audacious resort to battle inequality and inequity at the level of formal international law and
institutions, the RTD discourse is seen to be highlighting the potent power of law in the global
movement toward a cosmopolitan international polity. In this way, it departs significantly from
the old international human rights law conceived as a regulative order of states. Traditionally,
human rights law does not countenance directly and distinctly calling Bretton Woods institutions
to a common regulative order.119
Thus, we must be alive to the fact that to impose accountability for those structural
violations intrinsic to the nature of the global economy, Westphalian international law must be
reclaimed from its conceptual limitations and incompleteness and be rendered capable of
remedying economic injustices inherent in the global institutional order.120 The simple question is
how to formulate accountability politics that are pro-poor, pro-Third World, and capable of
delivering development justice (through the equitable redistribution of global wealth and power).
Doubtless, as I will show in chapters 5 and 6, the received legal doctrines such as
“extraterritoriality,” “due diligence,” and “respect, protect, and fulfil” have all been unsatisfactory
to the task of delivering pro-poor justice.121 I will propose that it is incumbent upon us to critically
examine how we can craft a new accountability architecture “from the standpoint of historically
oppressed groups.”122
The other sui generis character of the RTD norm that is relevant in the development
calculus is the Declaration’s humanistic credo. The Declaration defines development as “a
comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant
improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals.”123 This humanistic
credo to realize the enjoyment of all rights through development (others call it the capabilities
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approach) affirms the close linkage between the two projects.124 On this unique premise,
development can no longer be defined as one monolithic construct or from the perspective of some
expert knowledges.125 Such a radical reconceptualization of development as interlinked with
human rights illustrates the utility of rights standards and principles in the development enterprise
(rights as constitutive of and instrumental to development).126 The entry of human rights into
development concerns or the merger of the two flags the question of what effective development
strategies should look like, including the undergirding accountability as a policy issue and a human
right standard.
On a broader spectrum, the evolving conception of development as interlinked with human
rights calls into question the conventional legal accountability praxis. It interrogates whether a
conception of justice that the merger of the two projects envisions can be materialized through
accountability measures constructed by traditional understandings of international law and
development. The question is: are pure legal doctrines of accountability applicable to norms that
hybridize development and rights concerns? Or ought there be a shift to accommodate the
normative hybridity of the RTD? This question is answered in chapter 3. Again, given that the
rights and development interface has only been rhetorically emphasized but not practically
experienced or actualized, is there cause for asserting ex-ante compatibility of policy measures
with rights norms? Would this render functionally obsolete the practice of ex-post accountability
for violations? If so, how do we translate this policy commitment into a legal position so that all
development agencies could adhere to rights norms as a legal obligation and be held accountable,
in law or through other public measures? These questions are answered in chapters 4, 5, 6 and in
the concluding chapter.
As I have argued above, given that the Declaration radically departs in its vision from the
trickle-down growth and economistic vision of neoliberal development, it suggests an alternative
imagination of the development paradigm. The Declaration frames development in terms of three
core attributes: development is conceived of as a process and an outcome determined by conducive
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structural environments enabling people’s participation and contribution,127 in which human wellbeing is the definitive objective,128 which is accomplished on the basis and in pursuance of equity
and social justice.129 It therefore means that when development is claimed as a right in the sense
understood within the Declaration, the objects are also markedly different—human well-being is
valued above market flourish or growth. Sengupta argues that looking at development differently,
as social and human development and not as income growth or capital accumulation, is “in a way,
introducing a paradigmatic shift in the thinking about development.”130 I argue in the subsequent
chapters that it is imperative that by looking at the development paradigm through this prism, we
must also begin to rethink traditional customary practices of accountability in development,
including those that human rights have assimilated into development.
Furthermore, the attainment of the RTD—in terms of the core attributes of constraining the
national and international order—ought to be assessed structurally according to three broad
rubrics: the (enabling) structures, processes, and outcomes of development.131 In structural terms,
the norm contemplates national and international order with conditions favourable to development.
Regarding processes, the RTD is conceived of as an entitlement to a process of development that
is based on equal and meaningful participation of the people, at all levels of developmental
decision-making. In terms of outcomes, the norm supposes that development shall sustain human
well-being and freedoms that people enjoy, and fairly and equitably distributes the benefits and
costs of development. Such a distributive conception premises the development justice question
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that is radically different from the human rights conception of justice. The Declaration breaks new
ground in bringing this perspective into the human rights paradigm.
Moreover, the fact that the RTD contemplates national and international order with
conditions favourable to development is a distinctive feature that reveals an uncommon vision for
human rights ideology.132 It also establishes salient claims of equity in development practices,
which is a fundamental deviation from the market creed and the associated principle of efficiency.
From a human rights perspective, a claim to a national and international order in which rights can
be fully realized requires that the making of rules and policies of development be subject to
accountability relations. This dynamic redirects human rights ideology away from its traditional
conception as constraints on public authority. The question then is, how do we reconceive the
state-based and state-centred accountability regimes that international law has constructed? It
follows therefore, that, in implementing accountability for the non-attainment of the RTD—and
its complimentary SDG variant on strengthening global partnerships for sustainable
development—it is also necessary to assess the compatibility of extant structures and processes
with the desired outcomes of development. This calls for the accountability of institutions, as well
as accountability within institutions, that generate and steer development initiatives. For
accountability within institutions, perhaps participation is the sure method that advents processbased, decisional level (ex-ante) accountability, in a departure from current voluntary internal
accountability practices that are based on organizational standards and rules.133
Lastly, as explained above, the RTD stands for the idea that human rights have operational
linkages to development. Rights that have operational linkage with development and ordain the
creation of a conducive, just, and equitable international order for development are certainly
different from those accustomed to constraining sovereignty or those aimed at guaranteeing basic
minimum necessities of livelihood. Essentially, this ideal signals a new imperative for both
international law and development. Such a reconceptualization makes it necessary that new criteria
for ascertaining progress in the realization of the RTD need to be formulated. The reformed
accountability regimes may have to contend with the fact that structures and rules constituting a
model of economic organization have to be questioned for their compatibility with the objective
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of the RTD to eliminate barriers to development.134 As currently constituted, neither state
reporting, review, and follow-up nor sanctioning non-compliant rules can secure this goal of a
social and international order for development.135
The foregoing debate has highlighted the various ways in which the RTD norm deviates from
and questions the fundamental assumptions of international law and development. I argue that
these qualities are relevant in rethinking and reformulating a regime of accountability suitable for
securing development justice. Certainly, it is these core attributes and the counter-hegemonic
character that raise the question of the suitability of existing models of accountability not only in
the remedying of breach, but also in the prevention and mitigation of institutional constraints such
as asymmetries of power, state subordination, and paternalism that hinder further realization of the
RTD. The next section discusses how the RTD exposes the way international development practice
obstructs direct and distinct accountability of supranational actors through a complex that I call
the structural contingency of development.

5. THE STRUCTURAL CONTINGENCY DYNAMIC AS THE CORE OF THE
CASE FOR DEVELOPMENT JUSTICE
In this section, I want to lay the foundation for the discussion in chapters 4, 5, and 6 of how the
RTD practice emphasizes that structural arrangements and rationalities of the global policy system
shape development injustices in various national contexts while blurring the possibility of
ascertaining the direct and distinct accountability of supranational actors for such harms. This
approach is critical and indispensable to rethinking the distinct and direct accountability of the
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Bank and the Fund especially in so far as their domains of practice constitute “structural constraints
on the social mobility”136 of peoples of the Third World.
A synopsis of the argument is that the global policy system creates international economic
conditions that are more determinative than, and have a disproportionate influence on, the national
development outcomes in developing states.137 In these complexes, supranational actors invisibly
take on greater influence in shaping policy outcomes in weak countries.138
The dynamic of structural contingency has a historical context. It may be traced in the
Third World agitation for eliminating disparities, asserting self-determination, and rebalancing the
institutional order. In their full tenor, these impassioned debates were conscious of the structural
injustices rooted in the global arrangements. Among the first to locate the causes of poverty in the
international political and economic systems was Doudou Thiam, the then Senegalese foreign
minister and later member of UN’s International Law Commission. He was bold in asserting that
“we must tear down all practices, institutions and rules on which international economic relations
are based, in so far as these practices, institutions and rules sanction injustice and exploitation and
maintain the unjust domination of a minority over the majority of men [and women].”139 It is this
perception that would later on be reflected in the common refrain “that despite their political
independence, [developing countries] were locked into unequal and unfavorable economic
relations with their former colonial masters that constrained their ability to develop.”140
The consciousness of the structural contingency of development deepened in the 1970s
heyday of the RTD debate.141 At its peak, this institutional sensibility even drew favour among
136
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and resonated with leading United Nations agencies. UNESCO could not shy away from letting
known its views on the engendered inequalities and indigence of the international order. In one of
the most popular refrains that gained resonance among Third Worldists, UNESCO posited that
underdevelopment which may manifest in the form of poverty and inequality, is a direct
“consequence of plunging a society and its economy into a world whose structures condemn them
to a subordinate status and stagnation or internal imbalance.”142 In the same vein, the then United
Nations Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Manouchehr Ganji further
stressed that “under-development (as a system of self-reproducing hard-core poverty and
stagnation) … is a complex system of mutually supporting internal and external factors that allows
the less developed countries only a lop-sided development process.”143 The same sentiments were
expressed by Bedjaoui while examining the possibility of a new international economic order,
principally animated by the idea of a RTD.144 Bedjaoui had called attention to schemes of
arrangements that deny autonomies to nations, maintaining that underdevelopment rooted in the
world economy is a “structural phenomenon linked to a given form of international economic
relations.”145
These nuanced views tended to highlight a dependency (to an extent), of states’
development and outcomes, on the structures and processes of the global economy.146 For once,
there was a mounting consciousness in the human rights discourse (among RTD exponents) that
development injustices are rooted in the structural impediments of the global economy. Such views
brought into the human rights purview a deep awareness that structural injustices such as poverty
events with only their own interests in mind and should therefore share the disadvantages, since they benefited from
the advantages. They must realize that the right to development was the natural outcome of the international solidarity
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and material inequality constitute and are constituted by development paradigms that subject poor
countries and their peoples through social schemes of domination and exploitation. Such schemes
not only create subject peoples but debilitate autonomies within national jurisdictions, allowing
others to manipulate the system to their advantage.147
This refrain has become a powerful intellectual narrative among international law scholars
and policy formulators, particularly human rights scholars who embrace a structural approach to
the realization of human rights as a Third World cause.148 As Marks notes, poverty can be
deciphered as a causal outcome of the strategic and deliberate policy measures of others. 149 Even
the United Nations Office of the High Commission for Human Rights shares the widely held view
that the fulfilment of the states’ rights mandate, as well as accountability for that, is structured and
strained by the global political economy.150 Indeed, article 3(3) of the Declaration on the RTD
enshrines the obligation that states work toward the elimination of all national and international
barriers to development that may inhibit the enjoyment of human-centred development.
The RTD is, however, not grounded merely in a critique of structures since the
development injustices it seeks to redress are still seen as produced by (to an extent ) and steeped
in the history of colonialism and imperialism, a praxis in which the economic “advantages”
were/are predicated on rules of trade and so on designed to perpetuate not comparative advantage
but the very advantages of colonial legacy.151 It is therefore easy to see how the RTD episteme
was informed, if only in part, by a Marxist political and intellectual tradition. The common belief
of Marxists and structuralists is that historical material processes underpinned by “patrimonial”
capitalism and imperialism were central to the production and perpetuation of the conditions of
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vulnerability of the colonized peoples over several decades of a colonial encounter with the
West.152
A word of caution is that despite such prominence of the supranational over national actors,
structuralists may not simply turn a blind eye to “explanatory nationalism.”153 Explanatory
nationalism asserts that injustices existing within a country must be explained from national and
not international perspectives. This sort of explanation tends to focus on the national institutional
frameworks which must be interrogated for their implications in development injustices.154 While
the structuralist school of thought does not, of course, entirely discount the role of national factors
in determining and explaining certain maladies within states, it still demonstrates the growing
complexity of the global economy as a potent force in determining outcomes in national contexts.
For the structuralists, it is unthinkable that no account would be taken of the undue determinative
effect of the global factors and actors on national policy systems. As Pogge explains:
The eradication of poverty in the poor countries indeed depends strongly on their governments and
social institutions: on how their economies are structured and on whether there exists genuine
democratic competition for political office which gives politicians an incentive to be responsive to
the interests of the poor majority. But this analysis is nevertheless ultimately unsatisfactory,
because it portrays the corrupt social institutions and corrupt elites prevalent in the poor countries
as an exogenous fact: as a fact that explains but does not itself stand in need of explanation.… An
adequate explanation of persistent global poverty must not merely adduce the prevalence of flawed
social institutions and of corrupt, oppressive, incompetent elites in the poor countries but must also
provide an explanation for this prevalence.… Social scientists do indeed provide deeper
explanations responsive to this need…. These are nationalist explanations which trace flaws in a
country’s political and economic institutions and the corruption and incompetence of its ruling elite
back to the country’s history, culture, or natural environment…. From this it does not follow,
however that the global economic order does not also play a substantial causal role by shaping how
the culture of each poor country evolves and by influencing how a poor country’s history, culture
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and natural environment affect the development of its domestic institutional order, ruling elite,
economic growth and income distribution.155

This explanatory emphasizes the overly determinative and manipulative role of supranational
factors in shaping the direction and outcomes of national policies.156 This dynamic implies an
externalization of framework governance from the Third World state to the global realm whereby
“macro” decisions are made by supranational institutions while Third World states are consigned
to merely making “micro” decisions. As Okafor notes, “while these “third world” governments
still make most of the day-to-day (micro) decisions that affects the lives of their peoples, the
framework (macro) decisions as well as the most crucial decisions are increasingly being made
and outlined by forces much more powerful than these “third world” states.”157 The ultimate result
is debilitation of states from fulfilling their international obligations. Salomon’s reflections in the
context of the RTD sees such disadvantage as rooted in the structural arrangements of the global
economy:
The failure to secure the socioeconomic rights of so many people is largely a consequence of a
global system that structurally disadvantages half the world population. The contemporary global
institutional order—a creation of powerful States—has provided conditions under which
extraordinary deprivation continues to be the plight of many, and inequality has been able to
flourish. The inequality we know today did not come about under a scheme of equal opportunity
and mutual advantage; inequality is not the result of some accidental deviation from neoliberal
capitalism, but rather a deliberate product of the international political economy.158

Institutionally embedded constraints consist of some rules and policies set by international
financial institutions as best standards and practices to be emulated across economies. 159 As
Salomon has maintained, “[the] continued occurrence of world poverty cannot be disassociated
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from the global structural environment that produces and perpetuates it, and from the political
economy that sustains it and provides some with a disproportionate opportunity for access to
wealth.”160
The structural contingency sensibility suggests a new account of justice in the international
development system that radically departs from Western liberal thought on human rights justice.
Invariably, this exposes the rigid character of human rights accountability praxis as it stands
constructed by conventional international law. Alston has argued that human rights and
development disciplines are too rigid and often lose sight of structural violations. In his view:
On the one hand human rights initiatives have foundered because they have sought to treat the
symptoms of repression without paying adequate regard to the deeper structural problems which
gave rise to the symptoms in the first place. In many instances these problems are rooted in
underdevelopment or maldevelopment. On the other hand, development programmes have made
only very limited headway, due in large part to their overriding preoccupation with growth in
macro-economic terms and their consequent neglect of the human factor. Even today the vast
majority of economists and development planners look upon human rights issues as extraneous and
largely irrelevant matters, the consideration of which can only hinder efficiency and provoke
political controversy.161

In international law, the default principle is that the responsibility of the state that is
engaged equally for both its wrongful omission or action, and for failure to restrain harmful
conduct of third parties.162 The structural contingency paradigm discredits these sovereigntist
conceptions of justice as shaky and questionable when development justice is sought in the
international institutional order. It does so by recognizing the determinative roles of the global
institutional order and insisting on an expanded scope of responsibility for justice that encompasses
influential supranational actors. The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights has
recognized this fact.163 Ultimately therefore, the dynamic of structural contingency repudiates the
default principle of accountability of the state. It discounts it as a flawed doctrine that too
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simplistically reflects the positivist legalism of rights as negative claims of individuals against
public authority. Not much of this sensibility permeates the imperative of accountability as a global
justice question.
Second, the dynamic of structural contingency underpins the imperative that the
securement of development justice is hinged on constraining the global actors and factors. This is
now reflected in the settled understanding of the RTD as the entitlement to “a national and global
enabling environment conducive to just, equitable, participatory and human-centred development
respectful of all human rights.”164 This understanding of the RTD as a regulator of the international
order helps direct attention to the real root causes of poverty and inequality in the agency and
structures of international arrangements.165 This conception of justice in the international
development praxis uncovers the spectre that countries coexist in a world of mutual dependence
and growing interconnectedness; a world in which the aspirations of some hinge on, and are
imperilled by, barriers inherent in the institutional structures governing development and the
international economy.166 It is this broad perspective that informs the imperative that the
realization of development justice would have to incorporate supranational actors into the global
accountability politics.
There is a third insight to be derived from the dynamic of structural contingency of
development. We get an explanation of the way international law is implicated in the avoidance
and evasion of accountability for global development injustices by IFIs. This dynamic blurs the
possibility of ascertaining the distinct identity of actors through what I called the intermingle
effect.167 In the guise of collective decision-making (in which states are bound to adhere to
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standardized norms and rules), the structure of the global policy system unifies into an integrated
and complex whole. In these complexes, there is an intermingling of global with national factors.
Because of the intermingle effect, actors become undifferentiated, actions become aggregated,
multiple policies entangle, causal links dissipate, and distributional outcomes cannot effectively
be linked to any specific agent in the assignment of responsibility.168 This makes it improbable to
ascertain the identifiability of actors, the discernibility of effects or outcomes of decisions, for
purposes of allocating responsibility for harms.
I contend that contemporary accountability discourse ought to reflect or account for the
structural contingency of development, which operates through the intermingle effect. This is a
crucial insight brought about by the RTD counter-hegemonic view of the universe. Mainstream
international law and development scholarship has articulated this crucial insight in nearly
insufficient and un-penetrating detail. In fact, development accountability theories have often
tended to empiricize and attribute a large degree of agency for the structural maladies to the
state.169 The reason for this is that international law does not, sufficiently enough, treat causes of
global maladies (i.e. poverty, inequality, climate change migrations, forced displacements and
refugee crisis, transnational crimes) as traceable or linkable to the agency and complicity of the
international institutional setup. By this neglect, the global financial regimes or transnational
factors are treated as epiphenomenon, often within the rubric that “the effects of IFIs [are]
additional independent factors affecting the level of governments’ respect for human rights of their
citizens.”170 This interactional and statist way of understanding causes of development injustices
makes it difficult to easily locate and recognize the responsibility for such maladies in the
international institutional structures. Therefore, to realize development justice, international
politics and practices of accountability ought to recognize, account for, and articulate the structural
nature of violations rooted in the unfair and unjust global system and political practices.
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6. CONCLUSION
This chapter has argued that the legalization of the Third World claims for development justice,
the contestations of the global structural arrangements as human rights claims, and the subsequent
merger of human rights principles with development conceptions reflected in the RTD normative
framework are the ultimate exemplifications of counter-hegemony. I have argued that the unusual
trend of hybridizing rights and development to oppose paradigms of domination is one sense in
which the Declaration confers into the broader human rights corpus a counter-hegemonic right
standard. This way, the RTD episteme challenges the core assumptions of development and
international law. This is a feature that ought to be considered in the conceptualization of an
effective accountability praxis for the furtherance of development justice. Two ways in which the
Declaration enforces this dynamic is its entrenchment of a sui generis right and the notion of the
structural contingency of development. The consciousness about the structural contingency of
development is a dynamic that recognizes the causes of development injustices in, and looks to
accountability at, the global level. In the next chapter, I discuss how the assimilation of human
rights objectives into global development objectives has sparked off divergent thoughts and
practices of accountability that ignore the structural contingency phenomenon.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE INTEGRATION OF A HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA INTO DEVELOPMENT
POLICY PRACTICE
1. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary cosmopolitan usages of rights such as the integration of human rights and
development that has been infused within the RTD discourse have tended to tackle the question of
redressing and ameliorating the accountability deficits in the realm of development.1 And yet such
discourses tend to be defanged of the capacity to secure the direct and distinct accountability of
global development institutions. Discourses such as a human rights approach to development
(HRAD) and the regime of follow-up and review deployed in the implementation of SDGs are
some of the accountability debates embracing the vision of the accountability of all actors in
development. They tend not to focus, as vigorously enough, on remedying and ameliorating the
structural injustices. Simply stated, they do not present a genuinely transformative ambition to root
out structural injustices and inequities present in international development policy practices. In
this chapter, I critically examine this discrepancy by looking at the effect of contemporary policy
debates and practices that seek to integrate human rights and development. The integration of
human rights and development becomes transformative and radical when infused with the RTD
discourse.2 The notion of human rights and development being mutually beneficial is, of course,
now fairly axiomatic, having even been accepted as a policy paradigm in the mainstream
development thinking of the UN.3 Notably, the integration of development and human rights has
OHCHR, “Integrating Human Rights into the Post-2015 Development Agenda Follow-up and Review: Ensuring
Accountability for the SDGs”
online: <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/MDGs/Post2015/AccountabilityAndThePost2015Aagenda.pdf.>
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produced and reproduced the constant alteration of the global development agenda to encompass
far broader commitments such as sustainable development goals (SDGs) and accountability. The
RTD has been an integral part of this ambitiously ascendant discourse.
This chapter investigates the way the human rights and development interface is being
embedded into the debate on mainstreaming and operationalizing the RTD discourse in
international law and development. I examine how this interface continues to spur policy shifts
and adjustments in both the thinking and practice of development, particularly in relation to the
question of accountability for the actualization of development justice. I probe the notion of
structural transformation undergirding attempts to integrate human rights and development. I
examine the implication of this transformation on the question of the accountability of international
financial institutions (IFIs) for their development policies and practices that further engender
poverty and material inequality.
In section two of this chapter, I delve into a brief historical overview of the human rights
and development interface. I focus on its implication as a specific strategy for deepening the
struggle for development justice in the Global South. In this regard, I examine changing policy
paradigms in development, from Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to SDGs—global
commitments grounded on, and linked to, furthering the realization of the RTD.4 Specific to this
inquiry is an examination of how the RTD discourse/praxis has been one integral part of this
transformation. I explore how the RTD sensibility has broadened the scope of the international
human rights corpus by assimilating into its purview the social objectives of development.
In section three, I examine the implications of human rights’ crossover into development.
Along these lines, I critically examine how the ideal of development justice has become embodied
in both the RTD regime and the SDGs policy framework. The first way in which this has occurred
is their (partly) shared push against poverty and material inequality. The second conception of
development justice that the RTD and SDGs share (albeit to varying extent) is the duty of
cooperation and enhancement of global partnerships for the elimination of structural barriers to
development.

linkage of human rights and development in the UN language from 1966 where it was reported that everything done
in the name of the United Nations was to promote the implementation of human rights.
4
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Against this background, section four then examines the way in which the endurance of human
rights talk in development continues to shape different normative understandings of accountability
politics in relation to states, IFIs, and private actors. I discuss, broadly, (i) the policy rhetoric of a
human rights approach to development (HRAD); (ii) the issue of the differentiation of the
responsibilities of various development actors (or the question of “to whom are the responsibilities
addressed”); and (iii) the regime of “follow-up and review of progress” instituted within the SDGs
agenda. In general, these are some of the dominant discourses representing different perspectives
on accountability in the realm development policy practice.
I note that the HRAD continues to resonate in much academic and mainstream development
thinking as an approach primarily concerned with accountability, predicated on the idea that rights
imply duties on actors. Debates on the question of “to whom are the responsibilities addressed”
seeks to clarify the differentiated and direct obligations of actors and performance criteria in
relation to the duties imposed by the Declaration on the RTD. The regime of “follow up and review
of progress” is strongly emerging as the desired accountability regime in the implementation of
SDGs at the UN level.5 This chapter pursues the claim that these regimes are also the sites where
the challenge of the direct and distinct accountability of IFIs in development cooperation is
profoundly entrenched.

2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE INTEGRATION OF DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN
RIGHTS
This subsection discusses the history of the integration of human rights and development. It
discusses how their integration came to be transformed into the SDGs push against poverty and
material inequality.6 It demonstrates that the RTD has been a key and unaltered feature of the
human rights and development interface as part of the human rights framing of justice in
development.
Historically, the Declaration on the RTD has been viewed by many as one of the UN
instruments that integrated these two realms of practice. By this perceived hybridization, the
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Declaration provided a normative framework for development’s turn to human rights.7 Put
differently, the Declaration authoritatively reclaims the notion of the deep interconnectedness of
human rights and development from the level of abstraction, gives it operational expression, and
specifies its underlying principles.8
This character of the RTD in the context of the development enterprise may seem a very
recent phenomenon. However, its pedigree is long and deep. It predates previous global
development commitments such as the UN Millennium Declaration or the current 2030
Sustainable Development Agenda.9 Indeed, the reconceptualization of “development as freedom,”
or the utility of rights standards and principles in the development enterprise, was instantiated
much earlier by the Third World approach to development.10 It was a narrative that emphasized
that the development process has a complex character and that human rights (the social) was only
one of its multiple dimensions.11 At the UN level, this debate on the RTD focused on the structural
injustices present in the development process.12 The UN Debates made explicit reference to
structural inequality as a human rights concern, an incipient form of the human rights framing of
justice in development.13 But even with these early acknowledgements of the interconnectedness
See Peter Uvin, “From the Right to Development to the Rights-based Approach: How ‘human Rights’ Entered
Development” (2007) 17:4-5 Development in Practice at 597 [Uvin, “How Human Rights Entered Development”].
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of development and human rights, in the field of development practice, human rights were often
neglected as it was not yet clear what relevance, let alone role, they would play in development.
This explains why human rights and development existed in almost impenetrable isolation for a
long time, until the 1970s, when it was being urged that there should be respect for human rights
in the development agenda and its practices.14
Today, however, it is axiomatic that development has enormously expanded both its target
and objectives to include myriad issues, such as the environment, governance, poverty, the rule of
law, inequality, and human rights, among others.15 Linked to this fundamentally altered conception
of development is the concept of “sustainable development,” itself part of the evolving conception
of development as normatively based on and operationally directed to the promotion of human
rights. The UN human rights agenda reflects this as the contemporary paradigm.16
The true import of this interconnectedness is that relevant human rights norms, principles,
and standards are applicable to development policy practice.17 This integration also signals that
development has to secure the enjoyment of all freedoms; and all of them together, or as an
integrated whole.18
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Security and Human Rights for All” UN doc. A/59/2005, March 2005, 21 March 2005 at para 14[UN, In Larger
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This ideal of justice, which the Declaration on the RTD embodies, as a matter of legal
commitment, is reflected in the ambitious and sophisticated notion of development as “normatively
based on and operationally directed” to the promotion of human rights.19 It is for this reason that
the principles that the Declaration enshrines are also viewed as constituting the guiding values for
the SDGs, particularly in relation to the social and economic sustainability of development.20 This
commitment to a human rights framing of justice in development is expressed, in part, in the
Declaration’s push against poverty and inequality and in the vision of eliminating structural
barriers to development through international cooperation and global partnerships.21 This is what
I call the human rights framing of justice, a framing that presupposes the elimination of structural
causes of poverty and inequality. It is in this way that I see the Declaration on the RTD as
embodying a clear global commitment to development justice.
The quest for a new form of justice is reflected in the way the SDGs are viewed as being
predicated on a sense of moral obligation to leave “no one behind.”22 This is further reinforced by
“an ethic of global citizenship and shared responsibility” as the new basis of solidarity and justice
of the international community.23 This rationalization affirms a people-centric and rights-based
approach to development. It is this type of cosmopolitan justice that is reflected in the increasing
articulation of the SDGs as bearing the imprint of “a transformative human rights-based
development agenda.”24 This form of justice is anchored to human rights standards, based on an
overstatement of the post-2015 global agenda as being explicitly premised and “grounded on the
UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international human rights treaties and
other instruments, including the Declaration on the Right to Development.”25 Accordingly, the
emergent human rights framing of justice in development seems to be rationalized on the
sensibility that the new framework is unequivocally anchored to rights standards, its ultimate aim
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to realize the well-being of all humans. The Declaration avails that framework in seeking a new
vision of justice in development.
The new vision of justice espoused in the sustainable development agenda, in its social and
economic dimensions, is one of the contemporary discourses articulating a strong commitment to
the RTD’s core promises of human-centred development, social justice, and equity. These
aspirations are enmeshed into the vision of eradicating poverty, reducing inequality, and enhancing
global cooperation (partnerships) for development.26 Indeed, this promise of justice has been the
overarching posture of the RTD in policy and diplomatic debates, where it is seen as a commitment
to tackle “the failure of a half-century [and more] of decolonization and development cooperation
to eliminate poverty and achieve the objectives of numerous development strategies.” 27 By
building on the “core promise” of the Declaration, the SDGs express a bold consensus by the
international community to a rights-based development agenda, with accountability of all actors
being at the centre of policy focus.28 The SDGs agenda is significant for the realization of the RTD
in international development practice.29 Policy analyses do indeed acknowledge that, as a
framework of universal and common understanding, the SDG framework is anchored to, mutually
reinforces, complements, and advances most of the RTD’s core values of human development,
equity, and social justice.30
As I have stated in the introduction of this chapter, the integration of human rights and
development signified a normative change in the way development has been historically viewed.
By foregrounding an awareness about human rights as the underpinning framework for the
materialization of development justice, this interface became an indication that it was no longer
tenable to hold onto the orthodoxies and definitions of development in the conventional
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(modernist) fashion. It also served to illustrate that the concept of development is capacious enough
and capable of accommodating alternative understandings of justice in the economic realm.31
Accompanying this change in the ways in which development has been conceptualized is
the projection of the human person as the central subject, not the object, of development.32 Today,
this view is dominant in the idea that human rights realized through development initiatives should
foster human well-being. This reworking of the meaning of justice in development within human
rights frames continue to spur fundamental shift even in development thinking. Thus, the freedoms
that people enjoy are nowadays considered the means, ends, and parameters of development geared
toward “expanding the capabilities and choices of individuals and peoples to improve their wellbeing and to realize what they value.”33 This new appeal rests on the recognition that human rights
and development are so interrelated in object that, although they are different in strategy and
implementation, they are compatible and intertwined. Influenced by human rights theories, this
specific policy paradigm of development thinking emphasizes the social objectives in
development, a broader vision of development as operationally directed to the improvement of
well-being. The common academic thinking about the social objectives of development is captured
in the dominant conception that rights are constitutive of, and instrumental to, development.34
This framing—accompanied by an enlarged vision of development as constituted by social,
human, governance, structural, and environmental dimensions—has percolated deeply through
international development discourses. It has been the central plank of human development
strategies implemented by development institutions such as the UNDP and the Bank since the
1990s. What is most crucial about the expansion and transformation of development vision is that
it has centred the human rights dimension of development within the development enterprise.35
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This “developmentalization of human rights” has been witnessed in the Bank’s practice of
constantly adjusting its development strategies to focus on broader social issues such as poverty,
education, gender, health in, for instance, the Comprehensive Development Framework and the
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.36
The other aspect of the expansion of the development agenda is its contribution to the
search for a fair and equitable international order based on the respect for human rights. This is
one area where the RTD discourse has made a significant contribution. As I stated in the previous
chapter, the institutional and normative expansion of development apparatus was ignited by the
aspiration for structural transformation underpinning development’s embrace of human rights. The
Declaration on the RTD particularly espouses structural change as a strategy in the quest for
development justice.37 This is to be found in the various UN policy documents showing a concern
with development injustices rooted in the structural organization of the global economy. The
global justice agenda that the RTD has inspired focuses on, among other commitments, alleviating
extreme poverty, reducing inequalities, and eliminating structural barriers to development in the
Global South.
The integration of human rights and development is however not without its downsides.
For example, the good governance narrative that represents neo-liberal logic has been championed
by the Bank as being consistent with human rights, but only if human rights can be rationalized in
terms of free market values in the areas of trade, finance, commerce. As Gathii argues, “[the]
World Bank has, therefore tended to support only those rights that fit within the ascendant laissezfaire commitments.”38 Baxi has also argued that ultimately, within this paradigm, it is only those
rights that privilege private property and freedom of contract that attract the support the Bank and
IMF.39 In other words, at the level of development policy practice, there is a policy hypocrisy
masking the deep fragmentation between human rights objectives and the development agenda.
Shivji maintains that the reason for the development and human rights fragmentation, at least in
their divergent visions of justice, is due to what he calls the “grafting” of development agenda onto
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the hegemonic human rights discourse.40 In other words, even though international law recognizes
the interface and mutuality of the human rights and the development realms, one fundamental
drawback is that it has not crystallized a language of distinct and direct obligations for IFIs in this
regard.

3. THE CONTEMPORARY IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT JUSTICE OF
THE INTEGRATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT
The main aim of this section is to examine how old and new invocations of the human rights
dimension of development have both constructed and continue to construct the quest for
development justice. Development justice is the very thing for which an effective regime of
accountability is being sought. I examine two spaces where the RTD regime envisions the
protection of human rights in development policy, practice, and processes. These are: (i) the push
against poverty and material inequality; and (ii) the aspiration of eliminating structural barriers to
development.41 It is by focusing on these two issues that I can advance this dissertation’s
hypothesis that there ought to be a reformulation and recalibration of our understandings and
assumptions of accountability in the merged disciplines of development and human rights.

3.1

The RTD’s Push Against Poverty and Material Inequality

That global poverty and material inequalities is a development justice question for which the RTD
seeks to find a panacea is not in doubt.42 Concerns for poverty and inequality informed the
Millennium Declaration, which sought to free humanity from the “abject and dehumanizing
conditions of extreme poverty” and of “making the realization of the right to development a reality
for everyone.”43 The Millennium Declaration gave birth to the MDGs and called for “special
Issa G Shivji, “Human Rights and Development: A Fragmented Discourse” in Ruth Buchanan and Peer Zumbansen
eds, Law in Transition: Human Rights, Development and Transitional Justice (Oxford; Portland: Hart Publishing,
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41
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measures to address the challenges of poverty eradication and sustainable development in
Africa.”44 The MDGs marked a global policy shift toward recognizing the clear intersection or
overlap between human rights and development objectives.45 The MDGs served to prioritize— to
an extent—the realization of economic, social, and cultural rights.46 Even though there were
misgivings about the MDGs not being sufficiently aligned with the human rights agenda as well
as concerns that the linkages between development and human rights were not quite clearly
explained or understood in the Millennium Declaration47 the MDGs were nonetheless adopted as
a commitment to tackling poverty across the globe.
Subsequently, the SDGs have also come to endorse the consensus and commitment by the
international community to ending poverty and reducing inequalities as part of the broader vision
of social transformation in development.48 As the current Special Rapporteur on the RTD has made
clear in his first statement, poverty and inequalities are a concern for the RTD community.49 Even
Bretton Woods Institutions have embraced the social sustainability dimension of the 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development (which gave rise to the SDGs) as part of their commitment to tackling
extreme poverty through explicit strategies.50 The UN General Assembly has lauded this
commitment by its special agencies, funds and programmes urging them “to mainstream the right

“We will spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing
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to development into their objectives, policies, programmes and operational activities, as well as
into development and development related processes.”51
This conception of justice in the international development order marks a development
approach that introduces certain hard questions regarding the need for development justice. This
form of justice emphasizes that structural issues, such as the eradication of poverty and inequality,
falling explicitly within the purview of economic development objectives ought to be translated
from charitable claims or benevolence into a language of obligations and duties.52 As the Special
Rapporteur on the RTD has said, the SDGs address “systemic and structural issues and root causes
of poverty, inequality and conflict … so that individuals and peoples may live with freedom.”53
The real issues raised by this form of justice are threefold: first, to quote Salomon, “why it matters
that others have more?”54 (SDG 10 on reducing inequalities between and within nations), and
second, issues of material deprivation and the debilitation of human capabilities (SDG1 on ending
poverty). Addressing systemic root causes introduces the third issue, which is about the alleviation
of institutionalized structural constraints (SDG 17 on strengthening the means of implementation
and revitalizing global partnerships for development).
The import of this is that certain SDGs not only converge but also elevate and provide a
platform for the realization of the RTD’s objective of attaining human well-being, social justice,
and equity in development.55 SDG 1 on ending poverty enunciates this focus on human
development and the improvement of human well-being.56 On the other hand, SDG 10 on reducing
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inequalities within and among countries is another economic dimension of the SDGs agenda
directly linked to the RTD.57 Accordingly, the logic of a poverty-free world and a world of reduced
inequality is consistent with the RTD’s ethos of well-being, social justice, and equity in the
distribution and outcomes of development. It is this very dynamic that partially grounds the notion
of development justice, the idea that there must be equity and fairness in the distributive outcomes
of development.
Sadly, the World Bank itself concedes that, as novel as it is, this relatively more robust
policy paradigm (of deepening the social transformation potential of development) has not
permeated as deeply as it ought international development institutions’ understanding of their legal
commitments.58 It observes that this kind of policy thinking has also not translated into a legal
position at the level of development financing or development cooperation so as to utilize legal
sanctions to encourage or cajole aid agencies to adhere to a legal obligation to work toward
development justice.59 And yet, the imperative of accountability is so paramount for the
development donor industry and for the success of international development cooperation.60 The
apt question is: what legal obligations does this framing of justice (push against poverty and
material inequality) impose in international development cooperation and global partnerships for
the realization of SDGs? How can we strengthen principles that presuppose the direct and distinct
accountability of actors in global partnerships for development?
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3.2

The Duty of Cooperation and Global Partnerships in the Elimination of Structural
Barriers to Development

Concerns with the alleviation of institutionalized structural constraints are reflected in SDG 17 on
strengthening the means of implementation and revitalizing global partnerships for development,
which reflects the RTD concern with eliminating structural barriers to development.61 Indeed
various provisions of the Declaration on the RTD are interpreted as endorsing a transformed sense
of the duty of states to cooperate within a contemporary understanding of global partnerships.62
According to the General Assembly, the envisaged duty is that of “effective international
cooperation, in particular to revitalize a global partnership for development, for the realization of
the right to development and the elimination of obstacles to development.”63 By and large, these
obligations are conceived as tools for eliminating structures and impediments to development that
engender national and global inequalities and poverty.64 These provisions have been interpreted as
imposing legal obligations on states to promote human rights and development through
international cooperation.65 Read from the RTD perspective, these provisions emphasize that
elements of a programme to implement international development cooperation should focus
attention on those forms of structural impediments and disequilibrium in development financing
that may impair the realization of human well-being.
Sanctioning global cooperation for development reflects (a rights-based) global partnership
at the bilateral and multilateral levels for the attainment of sustainable development goals.
Langford contends that this legal injunction needs to permeate “other spheres … in the design of
policies such as loan and development programmes through multilateral agencies.”66 The General
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Assembly has aptly articulated the role of international cooperation as a facilitator of global
partnerships in development, eliminating obstacles to development and furthering the realization
of the RTD.67
The duty to cooperate is, however, couched in a (deliberately) watered down and
normatively weak language in SDG 17 (requiring strengthening the means of implementation and
revitalizing global partnerships toward the achievement of all the goals). Nonetheless, this goal
aligns with and compliments the RTD injunction of international cooperation to eliminate all
barriers to development. Goal 17 highlights the focus areas of finance, trade, capacity building,
technology, and systemic issues as fronts where structural injustices lie and where strengthening
the means of implementation is needed. The vision of tackling systemic issues underpinning
targets 17.13, 17.14, and 17.15 of SDG 17 reinforces this ideal of development justice. These
targets align with the Declaration’s injunction “to formulate appropriate national development
policies that aim at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all
individuals,”68 that is, to create national and international conditions and policies favourable to
development, eliminate all obstacles to development, and cooperate to attain development and
realize human rights.69 Contextually interpreted, goal 17 therefore recognizes that the realization
of some socio-economic aspects of the goals through the objective of development programming,
prioritization, implementation, and the allocation of resources is pegged on those global policies
impacting technology, finance, and institutional arrangements.70
Accordingly, therefore, goal 17 is important to the RTD’s objective of eliminating
structural injustices that imperil the attainment of human-centred development. Various reasons
inform this perspective. First, revitalizing partnerships and cooperation that goal 17 envisages are
specifically indispensable to marshalling the resources that are crucial for the realization of all
SDGs. Secondly, considering the reality of interdependence and economic integration, the duty to
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cooperate or to honour partnerships supposes coordinated and collective policy action on global
public goods (e.g., financing development, macroeconomic stabilization, elimination of barriers to
trade, etc.).71 Third, partnerships can be an important hinge in the elimination of structural and
systemic barriers to development, particularly discriminatory and undemocratic practices of
development and other social dislocations during the planning, financing, and execution of
development strategies by countries.72
In sum, the constant refashioning of the global development agenda, resulting in it
encompassing broader social objectives, has relied, in important respects, on the Declaration on
the RTD’s key legal commitments. This has ultimately been applied to frame anew the vision of
justice in development. Thus, the contemporary understanding of the human rights framing of
justice in development is that the elimination of the structural causes of poverty, inequality and
other forms of economic disparity is a critical hinge for the realization and promotion of the RTD
and indispensable to the attainment of SDGs.73 This a matter of consensus (if not purely a legal
commitment) by the international community.
The question then is, are these understandings of justice adequately captured in the
contemporary discourses of accountability in the development policy practice? Do these reflect
the real intention of accountability as a key pillar in the implementation of the RTD in the context
of SDGs?
Sections two and three have provided some historical background to the human rights and
development interface as well as the development justice question that is articulated within the
2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. I now examine what kind of accountability discourse and
praxis, if any, this interface has brought about in development thought and practice.
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4. DISCOURSES OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT
POLICY AND PRACTICE
This section examines how the above policy shifts have spurred differing understandings and
practices of accountability in development.

4.1

The Human Rights Approach to Development

Most policy thinkers and academic writers tend to emphasize core qualities and properties of the
RTD, such as social justice, human well-being, and participation. Another important principle that
has equally received immense attention in the discourse on mainstreaming the RTD in international
law and development practice, in part because of its relevance to the discourse of accountability,
is the notion of a human rights approach to development (HRAD).
The inexhaustive list of elements and principles constituting a HRAD conceptual
framework have been enumerated by OHCHR, to wit: linkage (of development) to human rights,
accountability, participation, non-discrimination, social justice, capabilities, human development,
prioritization of vulnerable groups, and so forth.74
At its core, the HRAD entails the integration of human rights principles into development
policies and practice so that the development agenda is normatively predicated and operationally
focussed on respecting and promoting human rights.75 That is to say that as an agreed principle,
the HRAD ethic presupposes that human rights are not only relevant but indispensable to
development policy practice.76 Thus the HRAD affirms the interface between development and
human rights. It stands for the idea of the protection of rights bearers in the context of development
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interventions (in relation to the development focus areas of finance, technology, trade, capacitybuilding, and systemic issues). This policy paradigm insists that the objectives of all these
initiatives aim to attain individuals’ and peoples’ well-being consistent with the full enjoyment of
human rights.77 One can therefore surmise that the HRAD envisages a normative basis for
integrating rights standards into all development processes, policymaking, and cooperation.78
It is increasingly being recognized, particularly in the policy discourse, that by integrating
human rights into the development framework, the Declaration on the RTD operationalizes the
HRAD ideal.79 This awareness runs in parallel to the ongoing discussion of a HRAD as embodying
certain accountability principles. One of the first such acknowledgements appeared in the Fourth
Report of the then Independent Expert on the Right to Development, Mr. Arjun Sengupta.80 In his
discussion with the IMF and the Bank, the Special Rapporteur explained what rights-based
development cooperation means; to whom international financial institutions are accountable; the
meaning of development compact; and the added value of the RTD in the IMF’s mandate of fiscal
discipline and macroeconomic stabilization.81 But this discussion avoided the perverse structural
barriers to development that would necessitate a critical rethinking of the existing accountability
praxis.
Since then, other policy commentators and experts, such as Marks, Osmani, Cornwall and
Nyamu-Musembi, have relied on the HRAD, a catchword in the development jargon to
demonstrate how the transformation of the development agenda constructs new theories and
discourses of accountability.82 Emphatically emerging in their intellectual and policy interlocution
is the sensibility that the HRAD is one among many key tenets that the mainstreaming and entry
Patrick Twomey, “Human Rights-Based Approaches to Development” in Mashood Baderin and Robert
McCorquodale, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 49; Arjun
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of human rights into development offers the field of development practice.83 They also argue that
most of the principles underpinned by the Declaration on the RTD are also subsumed within the
HRAD framework. I am referring to participation, non-discrimination, equity, social justice, and
accountability.84 For instance, Sengupta reckons that the “human rights approach helps establish
accountability, and where possible culpability” through the right-duty correspondence principle.85
Marks has argued that the RTD embodies the core elements of a human rights/rights-based
approach to development.86 Further support for this view can be found in the work of Karimova,
who argues that a HRAD is “normatively” linked to the Declaration.87
This leads me to another crucial question: What accountability principles does the HRAD
espouse in the putatively merged arenas of human rights and development practice? Does this
mean that IFIs who disavow human rights duties, are now bound by the legal principles that HRAD
espouses?
Policy thinkers have a general tendency to surmise that the HRAD implies accountability,
based on the understanding that human rights impose duties on actors. But this thought does not
adequately offer a convincing explanatory account of the nature of that principle. Cornwall and
Nyamu-Musembi argue that the HRAD consensus, first and foremost, introduces the right-duty
binary, the notion of responsibility (duties, obligations, and performance criteria) of actors in
development, while simultaneously reinforcing the concept of entitlements, which create
corresponding legal obligations on development actors.88 Responsibilization, expressed in terms
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of the specification of duties and performance standards—what Kant referred to as the “capacity
to obligate others to duty”89—is said to be human rights’ greatest contribution to development
praxis.
Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi maintain that “the language of a rights-based approach in the
development context also offers the possibilities for an expanded notion of accountability for rights
to non-state actors.”90 The OHCHR, likewise, seeks to make this more visible. It maintains that
“Rights imply duties, and duties demand accountability” and that this principle is applies to all
actors, including IFIs.91 This postulate appropriates the language of responsibility into
development through law. Its real legal and political effect is that all actors are now constrained to
adhere to certain universal principles and norms in the practice of development.92 It is, however,
not only the language of obligations that human rights “law” adds to development, it brings a new
orientation toward assessing the status of development and underdevelopment through the lens of
rights—given that rights proffer standards governing behaviour.
But how does the sensibility that “rights imply duties” (even in its theoretical sense) apply
to IFIs who otherwise perceive human rights as not applicable to their domains of practice? Bear
in mind that the Bank and the IMF are irrevocably convinced that they are neither bound by human
rights duties as a legal commitment nor are they ready to embrace this as the agreed principle in
the SDGs implementation.93 I ask this question because the Bank and the IMF’s positions on a
HRAD policy have been marred by conceptual obfuscation. This is the reason the Independent
Expert on the RTD at one time lamented that the IMF is totally oblivious of the ideals of the
HRAD. And even though the Bank is the foremost exponent of a HRAD ethic, there is, in its
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internal policy documents, a frustratingly inconclusive and deliberate misconception of the
HRAD.94
As explained previously, exponents espouse and articulate what they understand to be the
accountability facets embodied in the HRAD ideal. First, as pointed out earlier, the HRAD ethic
presupposes that all development actors are constrained to respect and promote fundamental norms
and standards that international human rights frameworks enshrine. Second, the HRAD ethic is an
injunction that rights should not only be a guiding value that permeates the design and conduct of
development strategies, assistance, lending, and cooperation (normatively based). Rather, it is a
principle of the HRAD ethic that rights norms, principles, and standards are effectively applicable
to development policy planning and financing, as well as to grievance redress mechanisms and
institutions of accountability of development actors.
However, this formulation is as abstract as it is unclear. It does not capture the
redistributionist agenda and the radical (accountability) politics of the RTD implied in the
structural contingency dynamic. The approved language of obligations central to the HRAD ethic
offers no clarity on tackling some of the North-South power and economic differentials that breed
inequality and indigence. As Uvin points out:
If the development community is serious about human rights, then the rights focus cannot be limited
to projects. This is an issue of coherence: why use the approach for one part of life and not for
another? If donors, be they governments, NGOs, or international organisations, profess attachment
to human rights in their development aims, they must be willing to apply the rights agenda to all of
their own actions (the inward focus), and to the global political economy of inequality within which
they occupy such privileged places (the outward focus). In the absence of such moves, the humanrights focus is little more than a projection of power, and the world has had enough of that already…
In other words, the promotion of human rights begins with oneself.95

Uvin suggests that unlike its purport, this schema is deficient of details of how peoples in
the throes of marginalization can rely on its dialect to demand a social and economic international
order based on equity. It ignores the institutional cosmopolitan view of rights as constraints on
social agents in the institutional systems that harm human flourishing. Simply stated, the HRAD
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does not really show an anti-poverty ethic to the same extent and with the same fervour as the
RTD.
It is even said that multilateral development institutions are so scornful of the HRAD ethic that
they regard it as “a new bottle for old wine, … easy enough … simply to repackage” with “what
they have always done.”96 Because the IMF and the Bank’s development thought and practice are
not anchored to human rights principles, one can plausibly say that their ambivalence rests on the
disinclination not to internalize what the HRAD is technically all about.97 In fact, Uvin has an
uncomfortable and blistering truth for the vacillation of multilateral development and aid agencies
toward a HRAD ethic. He decries the imperviousness of multilateral development institutions to
the HRAD ethic, taking up its rhetoric when in fact they are allergic to its operationalization toward
their internal operations, programmes, and policies.98
The general point that “rights imply duties” (as the agreed principle of a HRAD), even if at the
level of academic discourse, seems hollow. It is bereft of specifics for its actualization in practice,
given the economic rationalism by which development institutions constantly disavow rights
normativity in their domains of practice. I deal comprehensively with this issue in the next chapter.
It is, however, discernible that the rhetorical purchase of the HRAD is largely due to its
conception within statist human rights understandings, a limited approach that does not address
the quandary of disaggregating the direct and distinct duties and obligations of every actor in the
context of collective decision-making in international realms.99 What this implies is that the HRAD
ideal is not sufficiently conceptualized to offer a theoretical account of its applicability or relation
to supranational actors. In fact, what we have is the state-centric understanding of human rights
obligations in development, in sync with the traditional view that states should take their human
rights obligations into account as members of international organizations when entering into
agreements with third parties.100 The real implication is that those obligations are limited to
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constraining state behaviour even at the multilateral platforms where states’ voices are
subordinated to the vested interests of stronger members.101
All this adds up to the well-founded perception that, stripped to its essentials, the much-vaunted
HRAD, as a specific discourse of accountability, is facile consensus. It comes across as that
universalist discourse that masks the global development practices of domination and subjugation
of the weak. This is because it lacks details as to how to ensure the realization of the RTD’s
emancipatory and egalitarian agenda of eliminating the structural barriers to a humane, just, and
equitable international order. As a matter of fact, according to Rittich, the intellectual debate of a
HRAD has not only relegated to the periphery, but delegitimized these concerns of the global
redistributive agenda.102 This conclusion lends credence to Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwall, who
have declared that the HRAD is not genuine given that “accountability of multilateral institutions
to beneficiaries of their programmes is an issue that is still in flux.”103

4.2

The Organized Hypocrisy Regarding Accountability for the 2030 SDG Agenda

4.2.1 To Whom are the Responsibilities Addressed?
The challenge for the materialization of development justice is that of a lack of specification of
clear and differentiated responsibilities of IFIs in development cooperation. This effectively poses
a challenge to the institutionalization of direct and distinct accountability of these key global
development actors. In legal terms, the real problem relates to the scope of human rights
obligations and duties incumbent on IFIs as autonomous and independent development actors. This
question was raised when Egypt questioned the over-assignment of responsibility to the states and
not supranational institutions. In a presentation before the Human Right Council, Egypt, on behalf
of NAM, lamented the inclusion of indicators in the High-Level Taskforce on the RTD report of
2010, claiming that it “marginalizes developing countries by emphasizing national responsibilities
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while not guaranteeing fulfilment of international obligations and a proper enabling
environment.”104
The overarching dilemma relates to the clarification and specification of various actors’
distinct responsibilities when the RTD standard is mainstreamed in the context of global
partnerships.105 As interestingly, there are some progressive views proposing the recognition of
direct responsibilities of IFIs. It has been contended that the human rights and development
interface, as reflected in contemporary development thinking, should give scope for IFIs not only
to respect human rights in their domains of practice but also to be receptive to claims of
accountability for development-related violations.106 However, the practice and mindset of IFIs
show the contrary. The Bank and the IMF continue their principled non-embrace of obligations
specified by human rights instruments, in part as a move to retain their predominant economic
stature but also to retain their safety from accountability. This is highlighted by the fact that as
development actors they do not think of themselves as constrained by any responsibilities for
which they need to be held accountable. This is a demonstration of the ready embrace of principles
and credo without a pragmatic embrace of obligations at the level of practice.107
When in 2010 the High-Level Taskforce (HLTF) on the RTD by way of consensus came
up with what is now known as the core norm, attributes and operation criteria and sub-criteria, the
question of responsibilities remained contentious.108 The core norm refers to substantive content
of the RTD as the “the right of peoples and individuals to the constant improvement of their wellbeing and to a national and global enabling environment conducive to just, equitable, participatory
and human-centred development respectful of all human rights.” The three attributes (participatory
development process based on human rights, comprehensive human-centred development, and
social justice and equity in development) clarify the essential features and particularities of the
RTD. The operational criteria and sub-criteria are the indicators to be evaluated and measured in
the implementation of the RTD.
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The HLTF submitted its report to the Inter-governmental Working Group and Human
Rights Council with the intention of translating the RTD from political rhetoric to development
policy practice,109 but the one question that drew disagreement was that of differentiated
responsibility. It was framed as: “to whom the standards are addressed.”110 It is here that the HLTF
discussion took an accountability perspective. It flatly rejected the idea of the RTD imposing
differentiated responsibilities that directly apply to international institutions in their capacity as
legal persons.111
By such a preference for collective responsibility of states over direct responsibilities of
international institutions, the HLTF diluted the imperative of differentiated and distinct
responsibilities of IFIs in development practice.112 This principled non-embrace of human rights
in development is one instance in which the mainstream understanding of the human rights corpus
maintains a consonance with state-centric international law. At the same time, it facilitates the
evasion and avoidance of accountability for those whose actions are more determinative in
development. This kind of obstruction is directed more eminently to the insulation of supranational
development actors from scrutiny or oversight undergirded by universal standards.
Sengupta had offered a compromised path on this protracted controversy, arguing that one
way forward would be understand a development compact as a vehicle for “pursuing a rightsbased approach to development that is anchored on a framework of mutual commitment or
reciprocal obligations between the State and the international community to recognize, promote
and protect the universal realization of all human rights.”113 But Sengupta’s option is not very
satisfactory to the task. As the OHCHR and CESR note, it is not helpful enough in specifying how
109
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international organizations will “assume and comply with their human rights responsibilities.”114
This limitation suggests that without specifying direct and distinct responsibilities of international
organizations, IFIs principled non-embrace of human rights obligations persists. And yet, IFIs are
not only autonomous, they are also distinct from states and take rational and conscious decisions
away from states or state influence.
It is apposite to state here that the foregoing debates, because they reveal the limitations of
conceptualizing the RTD’s progressive accountability politics in consonance with the international
law anachronism of shared responsibility of states, provide a basis for losing faith in international
justice. International law shows no conceptual inclination to adopt a direct and distinct
responsibility formula for international organizations in the context of partnerships for
development. And yet, as Abugre pointed out, symmetrical and reciprocal relationships that
require distinct responsibilities are critical in the context of partnerships, because “partnership
cannot operate on the basis of asymmetrical relationships.”115 Abugre underscored the imperative
of differentiating responsibilities of actors in development cooperation. His salient point critiques
the anachronism of international law to confine accountability for collective decisions and policies
to the states as a matter of individual state responsibility.
The tendency to sideline international institutions in the scheme of assigning
responsibilities in development is prevalent in similar kinds of development policy debates. For
example, in 2004 in a report to the UN Secretary General, responsibility differentiation was being
discussed in terms only of sharing responsibilities between affluent and developing economies.116
No development institutions’ responsibilities were fronted as subject of discussion. This tendency
to avoid distinct responsibilities of IFIs is predominant even today in the realm of international
cooperation and global partnerships for SDGs. As contemplated in target 17.1 and 17.3,
implementing the SDGs is hinged on the bilateral and multilateral mobilization of resources and
facilities, formulation of international economic policies, and the creation of favourable
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environments for sustainable development and the realization of rights.117 In these debates, no
mention of direct responsibilities of IFIs is made.
The exclusive location of responsibility in the state, including the duty of cooperation,
emanates from the generally held view of the duty of states to cooperate as a sanction directed only
to states. Hence, the duties enshrined in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including
global partnerships, primarily assume this rationalization. Thus, strengthening the implementation
of the SDGs and enhancing global partnerships tends to be understood purely as the development
duties of states.118 Yet this understanding of the responsibility in development cooperation ignores
the reality that “development cooperation, [is] the last sphere where damage can still be inflicted
with impunity and even financial gain.”119
Historically, the aid architecture is viewed as a practice that confers so much authority
upward, in the supranational institutions. Lamentably, this conferment has not been accompanied
by the dispersal of responsibility upward to the supranational actors. This is what may be referred
to, in the view of Pahuja, as the “structural homology” complex.120 According to Pahuja, in the
realm of development cooperation, international law authorizes mandate expansion for Bretton
Woods Institutions as it legitimizes the avoidance of their responsibility, all the while locating the
responsibility in the agency of the developing state.121 Such perversion often occurs without direct
and distinct constraints specified against the very powerful and influential actors. As Ebrahim and
Herz emphasize, accountability in development financing is not as clear, notwithstanding the
acknowledgement that development may harm the very people it is intended to help.122
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Even in the implementation of socio-economic rights, both circumspection toward
constraining IFIs with differentiated responsibilities in development and the mindset that tends to
shift obligations to the state are still prevalent.123 The general conclusion that those obligations are
limited to constraining state behaviour speaks to how doctrines and conventions have been
constructed and reproduced in international law to legitimize responsibility avoidance by private
actors and IFIs. By such reproduction of minimalist, restrictive, and parochial doctrines,
international law formalizes the hegemonization of development and the corresponding
obliteration of the accountability of those dominant actors, which furthers the subordination and
marginalization of the weak in international economic governance.
As Bexell and Jönsson reiterate, therein lies the folly of having faith in asymmetrical and
paternalistic relationships.124 They point out that there is a hollowness in the SDG accountability
agenda because it does “not explicitly assign blame in terms of agency or acknowledge
contemporary implications or of historical causes of structural problems.”125 This point captures
the lack of grasp of institutionally sanctioned violations or the structural contingency of
development. First, it was Rajagopal who exposed the folly of integrating human rights standards
in development as the shared responsibilities of states, claiming that “the normative framework for
imposing responsibilities on development institutions is underdeveloped.”126 It is in this same light
that Okafor observes that the “now quite tired and historically less than effective platitudes” cannot
constrain the institutionally sanctioned domination and inequality in development policy
practice.127
The evasion and avoidance of accountability by IFIs, as shown in the foregoing debate is,
now changing a little, albeit unsatisfactorily. This inadequate level of change is reflected in the
propositions and shift toward soft law norms like the United Nations Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights (widely known as Ruggie framework)128 and hard law norms like the
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2020 Draft Convention on the Right to Development.129 Take, for example, the Ruggie framework,
which establishes, on the one hand, the duty of businesses to respect human rights, while the state,
on the other hand, has the duty to both protect—through regulation and policies—and remedy
rights violations, though the foundational principle of the framework rests on an understanding
that states are the primary duty bearers.130 Accountability by way of soft law and voluntary
measures such as the Ruggie framework, to name a few, are inefficacious, because soft law
measures are “non-justiciable” codes that can be “flaunted” or “ignored altogether” or applied
“inconsistently”,131 and often utilized as veils against media censure with major shortcoming being
that they are accompanied by “weak enforcement mechanisms”, “lack of independent
oversight”.132
The conclusion of this part is that the language of human rights responsibilities is
constantly disavowed by IFIs as a strategic manoeuvre not only to retain a safety from
accountability in development but also to assure they bear no direct and distinct responsibilities.

4.2.2 The Regime of Follow-up and Review in the Implementation of Progress
In intergovernmental policy debates on mainstreaming the RTD in the context of the defunct
MDGs framework, the question of accountability was not ignored.133 Subsequently, as the 2030
Sustainable Development Agenda commenced its life, accountability was deemed an essential cog
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in the implementation of the goals.134 Consequently, United Nations policies have been strongly
in favour of the accountability of actors, including private actors, being assessed within the existing
accountability regimes. The accountability regimes that were initially envisaged include periodic
reviews, special procedures, national human rights institutions, and other institutions provided by
the diverse human rights treaties which rely on data to generate evidence-based reports that can be
integrated into the SDG monitoring framework.135
However, due to the polarized nature of intergovernmental debates,136 in the
conceptualization of post-2015 accountability theory and praxis, the OHCHR and the UN human
rights system in general seem to favour the traditional (horizontal) mechanisms of “follow-up,”
and “review” of progress on goals, promises, and targets by actors; duties that are addressed only
to the state.137 The first evidence of this is to be seen in the endorsement of the reporting
mechanism by the United Nations Human Rights Council’s High Level Panel of experts. 138 The
body charged with this mandate is referred to as the High Level Political Forum. It is convened
under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council. It is stipulated that its specialized mandate
shall be to “provide political leadership, guidance and recommendations for sustainable
development, follow up and review progress in the implementation of sustainable development
commitments, enhance the integration of the three dimensions of sustainable development in a
holistic and cross-sectoral manner at all levels and have a focused, dynamic and action-oriented
agenda.” 139 The Forum is an intergovernmental mechanism open to participation by all states and
specialized United Nations agencies such as the Bank and the IMF, who may voluntarily
participate in the review and follow-up on the commitments to UN declarations and resolutions.140
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On the face of it, even without further interrogation, it strikes one that the UN policy
rhetoric of ensuring accountability for the SDGs is organized hypocrisy. The follow-up and review
regime comes forth as a normatively weak approach, bearing the counter-statist outlook now
ubiquitous in human rights practice. This regime is marked by the absence of direct and distinct
accountability of international financial institutions. This particular architecture of SDGs
accountability constitutes a drawback to the robust debates on the accountability of “all actors” or
the need for institutional accountability in the implementation of SDGs. Its demerits lie in the
conservative approach of the traditional reporting of progress in the implementation of
commitments that is now dominant in the UN human rights system of accountability. This system
is not only voluntary but also excludes international institutions and private actors. At best, this
design of the regime of accountability praxis as a voluntary mechanism gives a wider discretion to
actors. At worst, it enables the most influential actors to cloak themselves from oversight or
scrutiny and stay at a safe distance from accountability.
Another issue, in addition to the voluntary nature of the SDGs’ accountability processes,
is the reliance on disaggregated “high quality, timely and reliable” data and indicators (SDG 17,
goal 17.18) to track and monitor progress on states’ adoption of institutional frameworks,
implementation of commitments, and other concrete achievements.141 Reliance on data for
quantification of phenomena points to evidence-based accountability in the achievement of
targets.142 As well, the essential premise of this model is the role of participation in these processes,
including “a commitment to making information publicly available, facilitating multi-stakeholder
inputs into the monitoring and reporting process, and ensuring an enabling environment in which
all stakeholders are free to engage without exception,”143
Indubitably, evidence-based accountability relying on data is a form of quantitative
accountability in development practice. Its other feature, in the tradition of the UN reporting
processes, is an emphasis on mutual accountability that is marked by horizontal relationships and
the responsiveness of partners to each other. This model introduces a new conception of
141
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accountability at great variance with its human rights counterpart.144 In development practice,
mutual accountability relies on actors’ good faith, commitments, and promises, including
transparency on and provision of data to monitor progress.
In the context of SDGs governance, this model relies on the measurability of targets, based
on a country’s fulfilment of commitments and goals, as assessed from its submitted reports and
data disaggregation.145 This model of accountability has its own weaknesses. Measurability of
states’ progress in the achievement of targets cannot by any account be relied upon as an allencompassing accountability measure that ensures that institutions are individually and
autonomously answerable in the design of models of development that states implement at the
national or international level. It is a system designed to track progress and not to directly and
distinctly question institutions for failures of collective international policy decisions. In the field
of development, Buchanan and others go further to warn that measurements are not as objective
as they may seem; they can be used to produce and maintain hierarchies and biases that actors may
wish to advance in development practice.146 Activists and thinkers keen on real accountability
politics in the global arena must be wary of the preference for data disaggregation as the new
modality of accountability. The crucial insight by Buchanan and others that “data [is] a technology
of knowing and governance” should already be an alarm bell that measurability and data
disaggregation are embedded technologies, that is, an “orchestrated strategy for consolidating and
monopolizing power by experts in a way that conceals the real objectives of measurements.”147
The subjectivity and biases of measurements casts further suspicion on the UN policy
framework of accountability in the implementation of SDGs, not because it deviates from the
traditional vertical or ex-post remedial accountability but because it cannot be reconciled with one
ineradicable reality. As Escobar had long enlightened us, development is “a technocratic practice”
and “a technical intervention” where people are regarded “as abstract concepts, statistical figures,
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to be moved up and down in the charts of progress.”148 As such, in development thinking,
evidence-based accountability may, at times, be directed to serve the covert and unstated interests
of development bureaucracies.149 This is a reminder that the very galvanization of the methodology
of measurements and indicators is no more than a technocratic practice of “knowing” the intended
beneficiaries.150
Furthermore, in mimicking the traditional reporting, review and monitoring procedures of
the UN and other pan-continental human rights systems, the contemporary SDG policy imaginary
gives a short shrift to the fact that in their current formulation as state-based regimes of oversight,
they cannot sanction any violations by the states or enforce their commitments.151 Such a
configuration of the SDG policy schema ignores the fact that statist models of accountability do
not allow for the incorporation of a wide range of actors whose influence is determinative,
paternalistic, and subordinating in development policy making and implementation. Follow-up and
review, as they are currently imagined, leave out IFIs. By this normative feature, SDG
accountability schema fall short of providing a clear strategy for incorporating international
institutions into future mechanisms of reporting and monitoring.
In addition, the current sustainable development discourse does not address the imperative
of common and differentiated responsibilities as a function of accountability in international
development policy formulation.152 By such omission, contemporary debates merely focus on
148
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framing principles of accountability of states as members of international institutions. This focus
is evidenced in the compromise reached in the SDG accountability vision that the issue of
accountability will, “more precisely, [be] the question of how governments will be held to account
for implementing the commitments made in this new agenda.”153 This compromised vision of
accountability reeks of a re-enactment of the statist conception of accountability built on
exceedingly abstract and arbitrary maxims that have no relation to contemporary challenges. As
abstract and arbitrary, this vision of accountability gives a short shrift to the imperative of holding
actors directly responsible for their commitments and actions. Shared and collective responsibility,
if specified, could have targeted, even in a weak fashion, the direct and distinct accountability of
international institutions, on account of their capacity for state subordination and paternalism.154
The other legitimate area of concern for accountability policy debates is the question of
value disjuncture in the formulation of some targets of SDG 17. As a paramount policy objective,
strengthening the means of implementing SDGs through financing strategies and the imperative
of coordination and policy coherence in development is reflected in targets 17.13 and 17.17. These
targets focus on institutional and policy coherence as a systemic theme of SDG 17. In themselves,
they furnish the challenge of value disjuncture in the context of global partnerships and the duty
of state cooperation to eliminate obstacles to development. Value disjuncture arises from a clash
between respect for sovereign policy space (target 17.15)155 and the rationality of policy
coordination and coherence (targets 17.13 and 17.14). This raises the issue of which governing
standards are to be applied in policy formulation and whether such policies honour international
standards or respect states’ “policy space” (or the right of states to regulate to achieve national
development priorities)?156 The clash between the sensibility of policy coherence and coordination
and respect for policy space comes with several disturbing accountability avoidance dimensions.
The first is the ambivalence toward the applicable standards to evaluate policy formulation.
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The fact that SDG 17 privileges the macro-structural view of things under the rubric of
policy coherence and coordination presents a second accountability challenge. The macrostructural view of development relates to the determinative and manipulative roles of IFIs relative
to developing states. Ordinarily, development financing and stabilization lending are often tied to
a host of policy prescriptions and standardized norms of supranational institutions.157 While these
structural conditions are tailored to ensure coherent economic policies and a stable international
economic system, they overly preserve the idiosyncratic preferences of development
institutions.158 Their policy effects impact a wide gamut of domestic policy areas, such as public
spending, national budget spending, trade policies, currency valuation, and debt repayment.159
Macrostructural policy streamlining that international financial institutions prescribe or advice on
these issues have been proven to have far reaching negative ramifications in developing
economies.160 Studies have shown that they hamper tax revenue generation, cause redirection of
social welfare spending, and in effect limit states’ capacities to protect local economic sectors and
vulnerable populations.161 Whenever the prescriptions are made, they come with a variety of
justifications, such as triggering inclusive growth, creating fiscal prudence, assuring macroeconomic financial stability, ensuring trade and financial liberalization, or safeguarding social
dimensions of development. It is well known that by these prescriptions, the sovereign policy space
of states has constricted while the authoritative influence of these institutions has enormously
expanded and strengthened.162 The mandate creep happens in the context of the absence of

Daniel Bradlow, “The Reform of the Governance of the IFIs: A Critical Assessment” in Hassane Cissé, Daniel D.
Bradlow and Benedict Kingsbury eds, The World Bank Legal Review: International Financial Institutions and Global
Legal Governance Vol. 3 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012) at 39; Jakob Vestergaard & Robert H Wade, “Still in
the Woods: Gridlock in the IMF and the World Bank Puts Multilateralism at Risk” (2015) 6 Global Policy.
158
Ali Burak Güven, “Whither the Post-Washington Consensus? International Financial Institutions and Development
Policy Before and After the Crisis” (2018) 25:3 Rev of Intl Pol Economy at 394.
159
Most of these policy objectives are framed as targets in SDG 10 and 17. Trade falls in the mandate of IMF Article
I (ii) and IBRD Article I but not IDA.
160
See an earlier publication by World Bank, World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development (Washington,
DC: World Bank/Oxford University Press, 2006) at 16. The Bank was categorical that “…global markets are far from
equitable, and the rules governing their functioning have a disproportionately negative effect on developing countries.
These rules are the outcome of complex negotiating processes in which developing countries have less voice”. Similar
views have been expressed by UNDP, Human Development Report 2005: International Cooperation at a Crossroads:
Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 36-37.
161
See e.g Khan, supra note 118 at 3; June Nash, Mayan Visions: The Quest for Autonomy in an Age of Globalization
(New York and London: Routledge, 2001).
162
Salomon refers to policy coherence as “a unified approach among international economic organizations to
economic growth strategies that limits scope for diversity in both international and national policies, models which
may serve to lift the world’s poorest out of poverty in a manner more consistent with universal human rights standards
and objectives.” Salomon, “International Economic Governance” supra note 106 at 17.
157

127

oversight and the lack of answerability of dominant policy formulators to the people affected by
those very policies.
4.2.3 Concluding Remarks
The evolving conception of development as interlinked with human rights has continued to shape
discourses of accountability that marginalize the RTD’s agenda of bringing IFIs into the regulative
order and tackling structural injustice. Effectively, development justice vision of eliminating the
structural causes of poverty and inequality has not been part and parcel of the new conceptions of
accountability, in both the academic and policy discourses. Three regimes of accountability suffer
this anomaly. These are: the human rights approach to development (HRAD) as a discourse of
accountability; the debate on the responsibility dimension of accountability in relation to IFIs; and
the SDGs policy agenda of accountability
Despite the foregoing misgivings expressed in relation to the SDGs’ accountability agenda,
some positive attributes may be mentioned. This model is based on a non-punitive approach to
examining failure to accomplish obligations and commitments on polycentric issues involving the
eradication of poverty and the elimination of inequality. They establish the accountability of
institutions and states to each other—thus shifting from command and control. They deviate from
the sanction-based approach to accountability—which only relieves breaches while neglecting
institutional relationships that produce and sustain such breaches.163
All in all, what emerges from this subsection is that the RTD vision of materializing
development justice through accountability praxis seems to be strategically diminished, or
rendered effete, in the SDGs’ accountability agenda. The accountability-depleting dimension is
brought about by the absence of a policy specification of “distinct accountabilities” that is at the
heart of the notion of partnerships for development.164 While development partnership places a
premium on distinct accountability as a key pillar of shared responsibilities, this logic does not
boldly permeate the implementation of the 2030 SDGs agenda.165 Accountability as envisaged in
163
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the “follow-up and review” mechanism does not adequately address the imperative of distinct
accountabilities in development cooperation.
This deliberate policy anomaly is poised to severely undermine the expectation that the
2030 Agenda will be a vehicle for the implementation of the RTD in the post-2015 development
era. The reason is that the accountability politics and ideals that the RTD impose seem to take on
effete and hypocritical meanings. The selected regime of follow-up and review of progress of
implementation under the aegis of the High-Level Political Forum is a product of “little political
will for solid accountability processes and mechanisms.”166 It is deficient because it neither cures
the deep power asymmetries nor guarantees the direct and distinct accountability of international
organizations. This architectural anomaly renders the SDG regime of accountability incapable of
focusing on locating causal chains of harms in the global policy system. It simply pins
accountability on the agency of the state. It does not appreciate that supranational factors invisibly
take on more determinative, manipulative, and subordinating roles in the creation of national and
international conditions that perpetuate development injustices and therefore ought to be
constrained by accountability standards.
A second general insight of this chapter is that the human rights and development interface
has generated myriad new ideals, such as human development, rights-based development
cooperation, global partnerships, social dimensions of development, and so forth. On the contrary,
accountability as a concept in human rights theory seems not to have undergone any radical
recalibration by this new overture, at least not in the sense that it can potentially hold international
financial institutions’ feet to the fire. Basic conceptions of accountability are unscathed and remain
tethered to abstract and minimalist statist understandings. They rehash old “platitudes” forged
within statist paradigms.167 They are silent on distinct and direct accountability of non-state actors.
Conceptions of accountability retain the traditional rights-centric approach. Even in the face of the
integration of human rights and development as affirmed by SDGs policy commitments, the
discourse is bereft of real accountability of non-state actors. This negates the structural
transformation in development that would have necessitated the recalibration of the fundamental
assumptions of the existing accountability praxis to comport with the ideal of distinct
accountability in development partnerships.
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Moreover, in the contemporary context, the Declaration on the RTD embraces a wider
vision of eliminating the structural impediments that cause poverty and inequality. It makes human
rights values the basis of sustained development policy mainstreaming. This is the essence of
development justice, which necessitates a distinct narrative of accountability that fundamentally
deviates from human rights rhetoric of accountability. However, in this new vision of
development, there is still an unfulfilled impulse to incorporate IFIs to adopt human rights
standards, as these institutions still consider themselves as “human rights free zones.”168 What this
reveals is that the RTD discursivity has laid the groundwork for human rights norms and principles
to permeate development practice and to demand a just and equitable development order.
However, the drawback is that the pragmatics for the actualization of this ideal are totally
subordinated to the strategic priorities of the dominant development institutions. Nothing is more
implicit than this in the new SDGs agenda, which proselytizes normatively weak and abstract
maxims incapable of delivering development justice.

5. CONCLUSION
This chapter investigated two main issues of the human rights dimension of development, which,
through UN debates on the RTD, transformed the development justice: (i) antagonism against
poverty and inequality; and (ii) the specification of the duty of cooperation and global partnerships
as means to eliminate structural barriers to development. In this regard, I discussed the historical
evolution of a structural transformation in the international human rights discourse that was
marked by the integration of development and human rights. I critically examined both the constant
alteration and repurposing of the global development agenda to encompass broad ideals such as
SDGs (and their push against poverty and material inequality) and the discourse of accountability
aimed at the implementation of the RTD.
I have demonstrated how this transformation has spawned different understandings of the
accountability praxis that applies differently to states and IFIs. I have argued that conceptions of
accountability such as the HRAD and the state-based and state-focused High-Level Political
Forum for follow-up and review of progress bear no radical promise for securing development
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justice. It was the principal argument of this chapter that the contemporary understanding of the
human rights and development interface is fraught with relics and “platitudes”169 that largely
rehash state-centric accountability practices. Such mechanisms have often evaded, and are
therefore irreconcilable with, the question of the direct and distinct accountability of IFIs in
development policy practice. Related to this was a contention that extant accountability theories
as applied in practice are devoid of specific details and bereft of any potential to enforce the RTD’s
inherent redistributionist agenda and the elimination of structural barriers to development. This
weakness undermines the promise and potential of the SDGs accountability policy, however
genuine and earnest. It also renders them irreconcilable with the imperative of development justice.
I have argued that without detailing modalities of distinguishing and differentiating the
responsibilities of IFIs in collective development policymaking and implementation, the SDGs
policy agenda of accountability and the HRAD logic fall far too short of being a reliable and
effective model.
The main contribution of this chapter to the overall dissertation is to show that international
development policy practice, although eminently stated to be “normatively based on” and
“operationally directed” to the promotion of a human rights agenda (which the RTD enunciates),
lacks specificity on the direct and distinct accountability of IFIs. As a matter of fact, the existing
SDG policy debates are implicated in the embedment of accountability deficits for IFIs.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE
ACCOUNTABILITY
PRAXIS
OF
INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS: FUNCTIONAL DOMAINS AND ACCOUNTABILITY CHALLENGES
1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I discuss international financial institutions’ (IFIs’) understandings of their
accountability for the policies they make and actions they take within their their core areas of
functioning to provide certain global public goods (e.g. development financing and international
financial and monetary stabilization).1 I discuss four key challenges to accountability in this sphere
that impede the realization of a national and international order favourable to a just, equitable,
participatory, and human-centred development. I focus on how the idea of the provision of global
public goods by IFIs facilitates accountability avoidance, disconnections, and obstructions in the
realm of development policy practice. This kind of facilitation of accountability dysfunctions is
key to understanding development as “a structural relationship of dominance, discrimination,
power and control.”2
I ask the following questions: how does international law formulate the accountability of
IFIs in development practice? In the development realm, is there an absolute or a qualified
accountability system for IFIs? I further inquire whether there is an international mechanism that
recognizes the imperative of the direct and distinct accountability of IFIs in development practice.
The answer to these questions is to be found in the central argument of this chapter: that
international law and the discipline of development legitimize and rationalize accountability
avoidance, disconnection, and obstruction by IFIs in their interventions in the realm of
development. This phenomenon is pronounced within the work of the Bank and the IMF in the
provision of global public goods. I discuss the idea of global public goods, particularly how it has
been “mobilized” to produce “meanings”3 that are then used to usurp “Third World legitimate
governance frameworks,”4 perpetuate various accountability challenges, produce relations of
Bram van der Eem, “Financial Stability as a Global Public Good and Private International Law as an Instrument
for its Transnational Governance—Some Basic Thoughts” in Horatia Muir Watt and Diego P Fernández Arroyo eds,
Private International Law and Global Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) at 295.
2
Gilbert Weiss & Ruth Wodak eds, Critical Discourse Analysis: Theory and Interdisciplinarity (Palgrave Macmillan
Limited, 2002) at 15.
3
For the constitutive role of discourse in producing meanings to which practices correspond, see Teun A Van Dijk,
“Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis” (1993) 4:2 Discourse & Society 249.
4
Obiora Chinedu Okafor, “Re-Conceiving “Third World” Legitimate Governance Struggles in Our Time: Emergent
Imperatives for Rights Activism” (2000) 6 Buff Hum Rts L Rev 1.
1
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domination and social inequality, and expand the mandate of IFIs amid the changing dynamics of
the international development project.
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section is the introduction. The second
section is an overview of IFIs’ allocative, regulatory, and policy advisory roles. I reconceive these
functions as the provision of global public goods. Section three discusses how IFIs’ policies and
actions related to the provision of global public goods constitute entrenched accountability
challenges that further compound development injustices afflicting the poor. I then discuss in
section four the Bank’s and the IMF’s understanding of their own accountability praxis and
relations. I examine the functional and institutional strengths and weaknesses of the Independent
Evaluation Office and the Inspection Panels of the IMF and the Bank respectively.
In developing my arguments in this chapter, I draw some guidance from David Kennedy, who
describes the global policy system as a site of “knowledge practices” and competing “projects,”
an “uneven terrain of powers and vulnerabilities” and “parochial objectives” that blunt
“responsibility for distributional outcomes.”5 In my view, these are some of the illustrative, though
not exhaustive, ways in which the international political economy constructs the hegemonization
of development and the corresponding depletion of the accountability of IFIs.

2. THE TECHNOCRATIC NATURE OF THE ALLOCATIVE, REGULATORY, AND
ADVISORY ROLES OF THE BANK AND THE IMF
2.1 The World Bank’s Development Financing & Research and Knowledge Generation
as Global Public Goods
The World Bank Group has five main institutions within it: the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA),
and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). In this dissertation I
focus on the IBRD and the IDA, which I refer to jointly as the World Bank.
The Bank performs the role of financing developing and transition-economy countries’
long-term economic development and poverty reduction through the provision of technical,

5

David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape Global Political Economy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016) at 5-6. (He goes on to argue: “When distribution is accomplished
without the use of force, the coercion may not be obvious on the surface. But it is there. When people agree or go
along, the discourses that persuade them may reflect a hegemony forged in an earlier distributional settlement” at 59).
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capital, and financial assistance.6 The main lending institution, the IBRD, grants non-concessional
loans to middle-income and credit-worthy client states.7 The IDA focuses on extending grants and
loans, otherwise known as credits, to very poor and low-income developing countries on
concessional terms.8 Concessional loans are those that are pegged on zero to low interest rates,
depending on debt distress and credit risk of the country concerned. The IDA provides the biggest
reservoir of development capital for the development of basic social services in poor and highly
indebted countries.9 Aside from the loans and grants, the IDA has other two facilities: the Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI),
which provide debt relief and restructuring for poor countries.10 The IFC is the private lending arm
of the Bank, extending loans and credits to private investors, while MIGA undertakes financial
guarantees against risks for private investments.
The Bank provides financing for development in three ways. First, it provides long-term
loans, at times allowing up to twenty years for repayment, that may be pegged at commercial
interest rates. There are also very long-term loans, referred to as credits, with a maturation period
of up to thirty years, whose interest rates may be below commercial rates. The IDA also offers
grants. Most of the borrowing from the IDA nowadays is from developing countries, a fact which
has made the Bank the pre-eminent development financing institution in the world.
Essentially, the Bank provides finances in the form of loans to governments to undertake
development projects or to provide budgetary support by availing funds for government programs.
This mandate is provided in Article I of the IBRD’s Articles of Agreement, which stipulates that
the purpose of the Bank shall be to “assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of
members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes, including the restoration
of economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion of productive facilities to peacetime
needs and the encouragement of the development of productive facilities and resources in less

6

Factsheet: The IMF and the World Bank February 25 2019 online:
<https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/07/27/15/31/IMF-World-Bank>.
7
The World Bank, “What We Do” online: <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/products-andservices>.
8
International
Development
Association,
online:
<http://ida.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/1ida_brochure_2018.pdf>.
9
Development Finance Vice Presidency of the World Bank Group, “International Development Association”
Washington D.C September 2019 at 3. Basic services include support of primary education, basic health infrastructure,
development water and sanitation utilities, support for agriculture, business, and investment climate improvements,
infrastructure development, and institutional restructuring.
10
Ibid.
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developed countries.”11 In the operational policies, this kind of lending is known as Investment
Project Financing.12 Investment Project Financing targets infrastructure development, the
agricultural sector, and public administration sectors with major capital investment in service
delivery, community projects, and institutional building and reform.13 Lending for development
projects such as building schools, roads, hospitals, dams, major infrastructure, and other facilities
is falls within the Investment Project Financing14 The Bank notes that project financing is always
accompanied by knowledge transfer and technical advice in the design, management, and
implementation of the project, including on fiduciary, environmental,

and safeguard

responsibilities.
The second type of financing the Bank provides for development is what the Bank
describes as Development Policy Financing, which supports a government’s budgetary programs
and institutional policy actions and reforms for delivering sustainable development.15 This kind of
financing accounts for a quarter of the Bank’s whole lending and is provided in the form of “nonearmarked loans,” credits, grants, or policy-based guarantees.16 It is aimed at supporting
government initiatives, institutional and policy programs with various objectives, such as the
improvement of fiscal management, the investment climate, and economic diversification. It is
governed by the rules of the Operational Policy OP/ BP8.60. The third type of financing the Bank
provides for development is through the Program for Results Financing (PfoR), which is a
financing facility linked to the achievement of specific program results. PfoR is aimed at
strengthening institutional capacity and processes and building efficiency and effectiveness within

11

Article I, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement (As Amended
February 16, 1989), 1944.
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Investment Project Financing Project Preparation: Guidance Note April 9, 2013 online:
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a country’s governance setup in order to deliver concrete results. Other financing instruments
include Trust Funds,17 grants, and Multiphase Programmatic Approach.18
The Bank also conducts research on a vast number of issues and disseminates publications,
academic articles, working papers, reports, policy reviews and data analysis, impact evaluations,
and consultancies from time to time. The Bank has become a leading research and knowledge
institution, churning out a copious amount of publications that are viewed by many as skewed in
favour of the neoliberal market episteme.19 I will come back to this issue in the next section when
discussing challenges to accountability presented by the research and knowledge generated by the
Bank.

2.2

The IMF’s Lending, Surveillance and Advisory as Global Public Goods

The IMF is an overseer, in collaboration with states, of a critical global common interest:
international monetary and financial stability as global public goods.20 It prides itself as the chief
intergovernmental organization promoting and managing the “health” of the global financial
system, a role it performs by getting “involved in international financial market oversight and in
reviewing its member states’ financial regulatory frameworks.”21 In this regard, the IMF performs

“Trust funds, including Financial Intermediary Funds (FIFs), are an important source of development finance and
partnership, providing support for global public goods, fragile and conflict-affected states, disaster prevention and
relief, global partnerships, knowledge and innovation. Trust funds complement IDA and IBRD and account for 10
percent of Bank disbursements to our clients (17 percent in the case of IDA countries). Nearly 50 percent of all trust
fund disbursements go to fragile states. Finally, trust funds are essential to the knowledge agenda, financing roughly
two-thirds of all World Bank Advisory Services and Analytics”. See World Bank, “2017 Annual Trust Fund Report”
online <https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/trust-fund-annual-report-2017/trust-fund-reform>
18
World Bank, “Multiphase Programmatic Approach” 18 July, 2017 online:
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/203081501525641125/Multiphase-Programmatic-Approach>
19
See for example, Robin Broad, “Research, Knowledge, and the Art of ‘paradigm maintenance’: The World Bank’s
Development Economics Vice-Presidency (DEC)” (2006) 13:3 Rev of Intl Pol Econ 387. This is what Kingsbury calls
international organizations’ “epistemic influences”. Benedict Kingsbury, “Introduction: Global Administrative Law
in the Institutional Practice of Global Regulatory Governance” in Hassane Cissé, Daniel D Bradlow & Benedict
Kingsbury eds, The World Bank Legal Review: International Financial Institutions and Global Legal Governance
Vol. 3 (Washington, D.C: World Bank, 2012) at 10.
20
Annamaria Viterbo, International Economic Law and Monetary Measures: Limitations to State Sovereignty and
Dispute Settleent (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012) at 13; Joseph E Stiglitz, “Global Public Goods and
Global Finance: Does Global Governance Ensure That the Global Public Interest Is Served” in Jean-Philipe Touffut
ed, Advancing Public Goods (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006).
21
Daniel D Bradlow, “The Reform of the Governance of the IFIs: A Critical Assessment’, Hassane Cissé, Daniel D.
Bradlow and Benedict Kingsbury eds, The World Bank Legal Review: International Financial Institutions and Global
Legal Governance (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011) at 38
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three key functions, what it calls “the Big Three”, namely lending, surveillance, and capacity
development.22
Its lending role has to do with availing hard currencies in the form of loans to member
states to offset their balance of payment deficits and foreign exchange shortages that arise when a
country cannot meet such external financial obligations as making payments that exceed foreign
exchange earnings. Balance of payment deficits arise in ordinary transactions in which countries
find themselves short of foreign exchange when their external payments are depleted or exceed
their foreign exchange earnings. Providing short and medium-term finances to offset this
maladjustment is known as stabilization financing. The rationale for this role is that the funds
derived from this loan facility are a safety net. They are utilized to cushion a country’s currency
from volatility and instability that may trigger other distortions and disequilibrium in the
international financial markets. This helps borrowing states restore their foreign exchange
reserves, from which they can continue drawing to pay for import, and to maintain economic trends
within the country without having to resort to adverse measures. Under its Articles of Agreement,
the IMF provides member countries “with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance
of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.”23
Like the Bank, the IMF has two kinds of lending: concessional loans with low or no
interests rates, often extended to low-income developing countries, and non-concessional loans
with interest rates.24 Non-concessional lending is conducted through the General Resources
Account (GRA), the main IMF portfolio, made up of financial resources (i.e., the aggregate of
currencies and reserve assets) from member countries’ paid-up subscriptions based on their
respective quotas. Under the GRA, there are a number of non-concessional credit facilities, such
as Stand-By Arrangements, Extended Fund Facility, Flexible Credit Line, Precautionary and
Liquidity Line, and Rapid Financing Instrument, each with its own distinct purpose, conditions,
phasing, monitoring of disbursement, access limits, charges, and repayment periods.25 There are
three lending facilities for low income developing countries. These include Extended Credit
Facility, Stand-By Credit Facility, and Rapid Credit Facility, again each with its special objective,
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purpose, eligibility, qualification, requirement of Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy
document, conditionality, access policies, financing terms, and terms of usage.
IMF financing operates according to a conditionality regime (in one form or another),
which applies to access, program design, disbursements, and post-program monitoring. In their
own words, these are “conditions intended to ensure that IMF resources support the program’s
objectives, with adequate safeguards to the IMF resources.”26 Categorically, the IMF justifies
conditional lending on the idea that “all who play by the rules benefit.”27 In general, this is how
global development institutions create a global policy system—with its own rules and standards
of borrowing—as well as domestic economic governance tethered to external policy paradigms.
For instance, in order to access IMF funds, countries are required to meet some or all of the
following prerequisite conditions: implement poverty reduction strategies that aim to foster growth
and “safeguard social and priority spending”; “establish a further track record of good performance
under an IMF program”; and “implement other key structural reforms” that have been agreed on.28
The further rationale for conditionality, in the IMF’s own words, is to ensure that the Fund
diminishes lending risks, that is, “risks of programs not achieving their intended objectives.”29
Conditionality also guarantees debt repayment.
The second of the IMF’s three key functions is surveillance.30 Surveillance enables the
IMF to oversee and monitor the global economy in general, assess trends, policies, and
development of countries.31 Under the surveillance mandate, the IMF supervises the global
monetary and financial system, monitors trends in global economic developments, engages in a
health check (annual appraisal) of the economic and financial policies of member countries, and
provides policy advice to member states “on adopting policies to achieve macroeconomic stability,
accelerate economic growth, and alleviate poverty.”32 It does so by sensitizing countries to
potential financial risks to economies and outlining policy steps that countries or the international
community need to take to remedy or avert threats and foster economic development. The IMF
26

Ibid at 50.
James A Haley, “Lagarde’s Fight for the Rules-based Order” online:
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Articles of Agreement stipulate that the IMF shall “respect the domestic social and political
policies of members” in its surveillance and lending roles.33 The actual surveillance takes place at
either the country or international level. The “financial health check” is conducted annually, either
bilaterally (IMF-country level appraisal) or multilaterally (the general oversight of the global
economy).34 Bilateral surveillance is conducted pursuant to Article IV consultation, which requires
a review and evaluation of both a country’s “macro-critical” economic policies in a range of
areas—financial, fiscal, foreign exchange, monetary—and the extent to which these policies are
sensitive to risks and grasp vulnerabilities as well as response measures.35
The consultation process involves some form of dialogue, in which the IMF and country
officials, together with other stakeholders, confer on the pertinent policy issues. After this, a report
is presented to the Executive Board, which then publishes its assessments and findings.36
Multilateral surveillance focuses on the analysis and prediction of regional or global economic
trends and macroeconomic policies of individual members that may present risks or spillover
threats to the integrated global economy.37 The IMF has recognized the value of integrating
multilateral and bilateral surveillance as crucial for discerning risks and spillover effects.38 The
IMF has its main focus on the provision of global public goods.
The third of the IMF’s key functions is capacity development through technical assistance,
training, and institution and capacity building. This is normally prompted by requests from states
in need of effective economic policy design, strong institutions, and enhanced financial
management.39 The IMF believes that capacity building is integral to and mutually reinforces its
lending and surveillance roles. It argues that “[strengthening] economic policies through capacity
development also helps increase the understanding of IMF policy advice in the country, keeps
institutions up to date on global innovations and risks, and helps address crisis-related challenges
and spillovers.”40 This may happen through short- or long-term placement of its team of advisors
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with countries’ bureaucracies or through its sixteen regional capacity development centers, which
can “respond quickly to a country’s emerging needs”.41
Capacity development, coupled with technical advice and research extend to a host of
areas, such as fiscal policies (revenue, tax, customs, budgeting, public finance management, debt
portfolio, and safety nets), monetary and financial policies, legal and regulatory reforms, measures
for reducing inequality, statistical capacity, and so forth. The IMF notes that capacity development
requires partnerships as the vital tool in the sustainable development agenda since multilateral and
regional partnerships harness resources for capacity building on global development needs.42 Like
the Bank, it is the vast capacity for knowledge generation that has aided the IMF to conduct its
capacity development.43

2.3

The Changing Roles of Development Institutions in the Provision of Global Public
Goods

The roles that IFIs play in contemporary development have undergone fundamental shifts and
recalibrations since their founding at Bretton Woods. The IMF has noted that the Articles vests it
with the “enabling authority” to adopt policies that can be adjusted to the “changing
circumstances” provided that such adjustments are consistent with and “provide more specific
content to these powers and members’ obligations.”44 Part of the justification for these shifts and
recalibrations is that IFIs, through such practices as financial stabilization and development
financing, constitute the provision global pubic goods. Thus, we now see IFIs constantly bringing
within their ambit a growing repertoire of missions, such as poverty, global economic health,
sustainable development, sustainable debts, governance, corruption, climate change. Importantly,
the admission that human rights are relevant in the work of the Bank is also part of the recalibration
of IFIs.45
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When the Bank and the IMF were created under the direction of Britain and the United
States in 1944 during the World War II period with the intention of formulating a post-World war
II international economic order, international monetary and financial governance were top on the
agenda.46 Their envisioned role was to create a “world with expanding trade and easily convertible
currencies”; establish an international clearing union with a stabilization facility; mobilize finances
for the reconstruction of Europe; and respond to the United States implicit desire to dethrone
European imperialism and replace it with open markets for America’s commercial entities.47
Freedom in exchange and financial stability underpinned the envisaged system, thus the
elimination of exchange controls and restrictions was prioritized, alongside the imperative of
currency stabilization.48 Furthermore, besides financial governance, a common fund for economic
development and reconstruction in the postwar period was also another necessity. In the end, the
Articles of Agreement that were drafted overshadowed the trade agenda. The World Bank’s
mandate was to provide capital for the reconstruction and development of war-ravaged economies
in Europe, while the IMF was, among other purposes, responsible for international financial
stabilization (monitoring exchange rates of states, overseeing monetary cooperation, and financing
balance of payment maladjustments, etc.).49
However, today, the functional domains of the twin institutions have expanded enormously
to include sustainable and inclusive economic growth, poverty eradication, and development.50
One is in doubt as to what does not fall within the ambit of promoting growth and development
that these institutions now embrace. Today, the Bank and the IMF see their roles assisting
developing countries address trade, investment, and finance-related policies (deemed the engines
of growth, innovation), solving debt vulnerabilities, and promoting job creation and productivity
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as both crucial to the global economy and the means of realizing human development.51 The Fund
now considers its primary role to be promoting inclusive global growth.
The Bank’s and the IMF’s imagined roles are at much variance with those specified in the
Articles. While the Bank began operation with the main agenda of financing European
infrastructural reconstruction, it now posits its foremost mandate as fighting poverty, and it prides
itself on financing development as a pivotal hinge for the viability of all dimensions of
sustainability, including eradicating extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity.52 The Bank
has, for example, receptively embraced its central role in the UN mandated Post-2015
Development Agenda and Financing for Development, through which it envisions providing
technical expertise, assistance in project design, risk management, and advice.53
There could probably be many explanations for this constant transformation of the
development mandate of IFIs, such as what Rajagopal refers to as the political necessity of
international bureaucratization.54 However, for now, I want to limit myself to the concept of global
public goods, which has provided a relevant explanation of the constant transformation and
bureaucratization of development institutions, at least in the more recent past. As an insider at the
time, Stiglitz relied on this concept to explain the shift toward “equilibrium” amid competing
demands and expectations in the international development juggernaut.55 In 1998, Stiglitz
observed that we have to look at the changing dynamics of the global economy as the force that
constantly caused these institutions to modify and understand anew their mandates, and to apply
new knowledge technologies toward adaptation and equilibrium.56 While still the chief economist
World Bank “Our Mission Is More Urgent Than Ever”
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at the Bank, Stiglitz thought that changes “in the international economic environment, and, most
importantly, our better understanding of economics in general require that we rethink the role of
international financial institutions.”57
Stiglitz had in mind an evolving world, which called for regeneration in the face of “crisis
management.” The evolving international financial setup, in his view, made the projection of
future roles ever more uncertain, thus IFIs had to rethink their roles afresh, expedient with the
changing dynamics of development.58 Stiglitz set out to show that because the roles IFIs perform
constitute policy interventions with cross-boundary and even cross-generational effects, they
should be seen as the “provision of global public goods.” This sensibility has prompted both the
World Bank and the IMF, in their own policy debates, to reconceive their mandate of financial and
monetary stabilization, development financing, and knowledge generation as crucial facets of the
provision of global public goods.59 Global public goods are those issues—peace, economic
stability, the safekeeping of the environment, and the provision of development knowledge—that
are so important that they require effective international coordination and collective action to
solve, manage, mitigate, or eliminate. The idea of global public goods is derived from discussions
in the field of economics, where it was defined as follows:
Issues that are broadly conceived as important to the international community, that for the most
part cannot or will not be adequately addressed by individual countries acting alone and that are
defined through a broad international consensus or a legitimate process of decision-making.60

In the classical economic usage, the concept of “global public goods” was first popularized
in 1954 by American economist Paul Samuelson. He distinguished between “private consumption
goods,” those goods sharable between individuals, and “collective consumption goods,” those
goods “which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual’s consumption of such a good
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leads to no subtraction from any other individual consumption of that good.”61 Samuelson’s point
was that the state has public authority over the management of national public goods since the
oversight and provision of citizens’ welfare—which central planning and the economy are
implicated in—fall under the aegis of the state. The concept of “global public goods” was later
expanded on by Musgrave, who outlined two components of publicness (non-rivalry and nonexcludability) in the consumption of the goods. Non-rivalry implies that the consumption of a good
does not affect its availability to other people. Non-excludability entails that the enjoyment of a
good by one or more people does preclude others.62 The notion of publicness in consumption has
been construed to have three important dimensions: worldwide application (a spatial dimension);
cross-boundary application (an impact dimension); and durability effect (a temporal dimension).63
As a concept, “global public goods” has been used and popularized, mainly by the Bank, in the
expanded national, regional, or international sense. Therefore, global public goods may be regional
or national, and can extend beyond one geographical boundary or nation, and may be considered
regional public good or national public good.64
The concept has seen an explosion in usage across many disciplines, especially after its
popularization by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1999.65 It has been
applied in such diverse disciplines as international law, development economics, human rights,
political science, and international development. In the field of development economics, it has
been used as a lens through which to capture and describe conditions arising from neoliberal
globalization, natural factors, and other areas of human activity that require collective action to
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avert global risks.66 Global public goods also describe the way we can describe “immaterial values
carrying ethical and humane significance”67 of which human rights, rule of law, good governance,
or even norms and standards of accountability constitute an essential part.68
The concept of global public goods has been used to justify the intervention of the Bank
and the IMF in the international economic framework, under the guise of collective action and
cooperation to tackle global challenges. Covertly, the provision of global public goods has
effectively supplied the rationale for the de facto expansion of the IFI’s mandate. IFIs argue that
collective action and cooperation on common interests (a euphemism for IFIs’ interventionary
measures) do tackle a vast array of problems affecting the stability of the global economy,
sustainable development, global norm-making, and effective international policymaking.69 As
Stiglitz has been bold in arguing, “the main raison d'etre for international financial institutions is
the provision of international public goods such as peace, economic stability, the safekeeping of
the environment and the provision of [development] knowledge.”70 Some of the potential causes
of global instability warranting multilateral interventions through the Bank’s and Fund’s policy
advisories, technical assistance, and resource allocation include financial meltdown, unsustainable
international development practices, ecological disasters, inequalities, endemic poverty, and so
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forth.71 The rationale for the interventions of IFIs is often that “only international public
institutions are capable of providing these goods.”72
In the next section, I explain that the provision and administration of global public goods,
which the Bank and the IMF proudly embrace and spearhead, manifests significant accountabilityobliterating dimensions and fosters entrenched development injustices in various forms.

3. ACCOUNTABILITY CHALLENGES IN THE PROVISION OF GLOBAL PUBLIC
GOODS
I identify four key challenges to holding the IFIs accountable for their policies and actions in their
provision of certain global public goods: (i) the global policy system as a structural constraint to
development justice; (ii) knowledge encumbrances; (iii) the rationalization of human rights as a
non-economic agenda; and (iv) the participatory development deficit. These challenges also
constitute the impediments to the realization of development justice, that is, a claim for a
development model whose rules, structures and processes can secure the global redistribution—of
power, wealth, resources and opportunities-—and social justice. I commence the analysis by first
understanding the nature of the contemporary global economy in which interventionary policy
measures, practices, and ideas of the Bank and the IMF exert manipulative, determinative, and
subordinating influence.

3.1

The Global Policy System as a Structural Encumbrance to Development Justice

In many ways, the deployment of the notion of the provision of global public goods by IFIs is very
much implicated in the way the global policy system constitutes an encumbrance to the
accountability of development institutions. This can be explained in many ways. We have to begin
by understanding how IFIs have justified their interventions in terms of the provision of global
public goods.

Carbone, supra note 61 at 183; Stiglitz, “Provision of International Public Goods” supra note 55; Viterbo, supra
note at 20. Stephany Griffith, “New Financial Architecture as a Global Public Good” observes that:
International financial stability and efficiency is a very important global public good, especially significant
for poor people in developing and emerging countries. Financial stability and efficiency can make an
important contribution to development; lack of financial stability—both nationally and internationally—can
be an important obstacle to growth, development and poverty reduction.
Online: <https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/griffithj4.pdf>.
72
Stiglitz, “Provision of International Public Goods” supra note 55 at 116.
71

146

An underpinning logic for the interventions of IFIs is the need for, what Kaul calls, the
collective action for “common interest regulation” and the “compulsion to cooperate” to avert
global challenges.73 The justification is that there is need for coordinated international response
and regulation in the context of globalization fraught with unprecedented risks. By this
justification, the IFIs attach the label of global public goods to most of their development work,
and the rules and advisory policies that these institutions proliferate at the international level are
considered best practices and norms to be used and re-used by borrowing economies.74 These rules
require standardized replication in the borrowing economies, it is argued, because they assure a
stable and sustainable world order.
For example, by looking at the financial regulatory role of the IMF, it has been argued that
there are certain issues, especially risks and emergencies, that “a single country, however powerful
it may be,” cannot address alone.75 It is argued that neoliberal globalization has both liberating and
debilitating potential, and therefore it constitutes externalities with potential harmful effects
(“malprovision” or “underprovison” of global public goods). There is thus a need for cooperative
approaches to global governance. It is claimed that if global threats are not keenly monitored and
restrained, they may spill across boundaries to harm our common good, now and in the future.76
By looking at threats through a “global instability” optic, the assumption is that collective policy
action or oversight by states would restrain the spillover effects that may trigger even more grave
harms to the detriment of the global community.77 In a working paper, one IMF official has argued
that “managing global risks requires a cohesive international community that enables its
stakeholders to work collectively around common goals by facilitating sharing of knowledge,
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devoting resources to capacity building, and protecting the vulnerable.”78 This common-interest
approach to development governance provides the overriding rationale for the compulsion to
cooperate in the provision of public good. This rationalization results in indirect governance
techniques, anchored to the logic that certain policy issues are of general importance to the global
community.
But woven into this rationality of collective action for common interests are serious
accountability avoidances. These accountability avoidances reveal the way language is deployed
in the hierarchization, domination and legitimization of power. The first challenge is presented by
norm conflict or a clash between national and international norms and standards. The global policy
system always imposes on Third World states a model of development complete with its own rules
and ethos of governance. Those rules and ethos that are often justified as the provision of global
public goods may themselves constitute a contravention of other universally accepted values such
as a rights-based international order.79 Whether in the area of trade, investment, or finance, for the
Third World people, the ultimate challenge is that of a clash of norms. A clash of norms raises the
question of what relevant rules are to be applied as the basis of development policymaking and
implementation, which can then be interrogated by the people or their legitimate institutions.80
The second challenge is what Okafor calls the re-location of “framework governance” for
policymaking from national to the supranational institutions.81 This phenomenon has been the
reason for the decline of state policy control in the Third World; state subordination is sanctioned
through policymaking that neither respects a democratic ethos nor gives scope for individual state
autonomy.82 This in itself constitutes a violation of the RTD principle of self-determined
development. Kaul argues that the roles that the Bank and IMF perform in the provision of global
public goods constitute another danger, “contravening another core principle of our present world
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order: national policymaking sovereignty.”83 On a broader spectrum, this usurpation of Third
World governance has meant that a powerful network of supranational development institutions
now permeates the autonomy and regulatory authority of weak states. This has often tended to
occasion the detriment of some public values, albeit without the possibility of recourse to
oversight, mitigation, or vindication within the traditional state-based accountability mechanism.
Kennedy refers to this as the parochialism of the international political economy “blunting
responsibility for distributional outcomes.”84 As such, globalization has provided an arena, often
characterized by asymmetrical relations of power, for IFIs to be illegitimately involved in the
management of global public goods.85 Such interventions are not accompanied by adequate
internal accountability processes or external accountability to the implementing state or the people
experiencing adverse outcomes.86 This relationship manifests some of the subtle ways in which
globalization compounds the challenges of accountability in the Third World. It is trite knowledge
that governance and policymaking has shifted to supranational institutions that are detached and
safely distanced from accountability constraints. In other words, globalization obliterates
accountability of IFIs by making them invisible and even invisibilized from accountability in the
complex interdependent structures.
The third dilemma presented by the notion of global public goods complicates the ex-post
accountability approach. The fundamental question in this regard relates to how this powerful
network of non-state actors can be held accountable whenever their interventions result in a global
economic order unconducive and unfavourable to just, equitable, and human-centred development.
Take, for example, the reported case of Ghana, where macro-economic prescriptions contained in
the 2015-2019 joint lending by the IMF and the Bank is said to have led to a reduction of public
expenditures by 17 percent per person as part of the conditions of the loans. In that lending
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arrangement, the freed funds are said to have been directed to paying external loans at interest rates
of 8-10 percent.87 This usurpation of autonomy raises the problem of how to address such adverse
policy outcomes. It also raises the question of how to hold autonomous institutions accountable
(separately and independently) in the context of collaborative and collective bureaucratic decision
making.88 The real problem is that in the course of collective policymaking, the global policy
system integrates into one whole and affects national policy outcomes. When, however, harms
occur, the problem is that individual actors and actions cannot be differentiated in the responsibility
allocation. The consequence is that tracing causal links of harms to actors becomes uncertain and
indeterminate.
The other aspect in which we can perceive the rationality of the provision of global public
goods as an accountability hindrance is its justification of mandate expansion and regeneration for
Bretton Woods Institutions. As Okafor argues, the “internationalization and externalization of
governance” comes not only with the assumption of Third World policy space, but also the
usurpation and influence in determining, shaping, and driving policy priorities in the global
economy.89 Some see the idea of providing global public goods as enabling IFIs mandates to creep
into other domains of practice.90 This is “a conjunctural paradox” between international law and
development, whereby international law and development praxis continually vest so much
determinative authority upward in international institutions and yet confer all the responsibility
downward in the nation-state.91 In other words, the global policy system provides wider
operational scope but restrained accountability for global development institutions. As Pahuja
adds, the responsibility for consequential harms is too often localized at the level of state
institutions and not at global agencies.92 It is this dynamic that further compounds the development
quandary of “governance without government.”93 This obliteration of accountability has been
brought about by “a particularistic” way of understanding of social reality and the discourse of
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development as the provision of global public goods. As Ngugi argues, “the creation of a discourse
allows for a particularistic articulation of knowledge and power, the process through which social
reality comes into being.”94 This nuance has attracted very marginal attention, if any at all, in the
international institutions’ understanding of the accountability praxis.
The other way in which global development institutions create a global policy system that
undermines sovereign autonomies and institutionally “bypasses”95 states’ own internal oversight
and accountability processes is through the “conditionality regime.” Conditionality denotes the
requirement of conformity to a raft of rules and standards of borrowing set by lending institutions.
In practice, financing by the Bank and IMF is subject not only to key policy documents
(operational directives and operational policies and procedures)96 but also generalized standard
practices and policy blueprints. Good examples of these are: the Poverty Reduction and Growth
Framework (PRGF) of the IMF and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) of the Bank respectively.97 The PRSPs were
invented in 1999 when the Bank’s President Wolfensohn made it a requirement for funding to be
subject to the preparation of PRSPs.98 The IMF followed suit and its poverty reduction strategies
became a key global benchmark for access to concessional loans and debt relief.99
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This adaptation to a new policy framework marked the move from the Washington to the
Post-Washington Consensus, or the alteration of the regime of structural adjustment and
conditionality to that of partnership, ownership, participation, and accountability in the
implementation of social objectives. 100 Unsurprisingly, even with the shift to a new development
policy paradigm, nothing has always remained as clear as the fact that the IMF conditionality
regimes connote macro-structural reform in the target states (in one form or another). It is always
said that the structural reforms and imposed conditionalities are aimed at maintaining, among other
things, fiscal stability, improving sustainable debt management, and strengthening general
governance climate. Similarly, the Bank still requires structural reform measures, in keeping with
the neoliberal creed of development. Commentators have noted that the “neoliberal-globalist core
was never disputed” in the technocratic shift from Washington Consensus to a new variant, the
post-Washington Consensus (of PRSPs) as a development policy.101 Others have even argued that
the perceived shift does not tell the whole story. They observe that the policy accoutrements
constituting the post-Washington Consensus represent “not a paradigm shift but a paradigm
expansion within mainstream wisdom”.102
A conditionality regime, in whatever form it comes and despite its justification, is another
way in which the contrived global policy system exerts influence and control that subordinates
policy autonomies in the borrowing countries. A conditionality regime affords the IMF room to
maneuver, to exert influence, and to exercise control as it perpetuates the parochial interests of
hegemonic states who may not be held to account because of their invisibility in this scheme of
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institutional deceit.103 Conditionality poses a different form of control that questions the traditional
accountability relationships. For example, it is argued that PRSPs serve as “a regulatory restraint”
insofar as a recipient state has to demonstrate its “discipline” to a set of core principles and
operational directives underpinning the PRSPs.104 Under the guise of national ownership, states
involuntarily adopted universal economic plans, governance structures, “uniform development
targets,” and the “common prioritization of public policy” in compliance with the rules of the
global policy system.105 The adoption of predetermined policy measures defeats the objective of
answerability by bypassing the oversight mechanisms of the government at the policymaking level.
This accountability distortion arises from the fact that the predetermined conditions defeat any
attempts to hold institutions or governments answerable in the course of decision-making.
The development model of standardization of norms and universal codes therefore implies
a fundamental distortion of traditional accountability relationships. By this policy paradigm, states’
bureaucratic institutions and governance structures are supposed to be responsive and accountable
to international development institutions and not to their own citizenry in the design and
implementation of development. Whenever development policies result in adverse economic and
social effects, international institutions are invisible, standing at a safe distance from accountability
while the state must account for and even repair the adverse distributional outcomes.
Even as Raffer calls international development a “perverted incentive system [of]
rewarding errors,” it is also very much a fettered system obsessed with the accountability of
borrowers.106 It is therefore easy to discern that part of the aim of adjusting to a new policy
paradigm was to ensure the direct and distinct accountability of the state in the delivery of results
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and targets and not of development institutions in their dealings with developing states.107
Effectively, we have a global policy system where the demarcating lines and direction of
accountability seem to look only toward the state. The development accountability praxis is not
made to be inward-looking toward IFIs. This is how the global policy system and the retention of
conditionality regimes undermine and obstruct the accountability of IFIs.
The other way the global policy system undermines and obstructs IFI accountability is
through technocratic surveillance of global monetary and financial stability, which the IMF
defends as crucial for discerning risks and spillover effects.108 In this way, the IMF maintains its
focus on the provision of global public goods through the “[b]ilateral and multilateral surveillance
[that] are underpinned by a shared and deeper understanding of global interconnectedness and
linkages across sectors.”109 But as Goetz and Jenkins argue, discounting this rationale, the advisory
role is one that enables the IMF to evade accountability by staying in the shadows of policy
implementation.110 The guise of the provision of global public goods is therefore a kind of
institutional deceit. Surveillance, and the institutional deceit that informs it, allows the IMF to
remain disconnected from claims of accountability for policy effects that may endure from its
macro-structural measures and prescriptions.
On the whole, the global policy system, seen through the prism of development justice, is
an organized scheme of accountability avoidance for IFIs. Accountability avoidance and
disconnection is rationalized and even legitimized, most prominently, by the idiom of “global
public goods.”

107

This is well pronounced in the logic that the World Bank continues to advocate; one that centralizes the state as the
singular institution to be constrained by human rights and accountability praxis. “The intrinsic reasons for integrating
human rights in development include those related to the legal obligations that emanate from the international human
rights framework. States parties to human rights instruments are under a duty to respect, protect, and fulfil human
rights”. World Bank & OECD, Integrating Human Rights into Development: Donor Approaches, Experiences and
Challenges, 3rd ed, (Washington DC: World Bank, 2016) at xxii.
See more particularly the pronounced language of accountability of the state in CDF Secretariat, The World Bank,
“Comprehensive Development Framework: Meeting the Promise? Early Experience and Emerging Issues” September
17, 2001 para 21, 78, 81.
108
Ibid at 30.
109
IMF Annual Report 2018, supra note 22 at 30.
110
Anne Marie Goetz & Rob Jenkins, Reinventing Accountability: Making Democracy Work for Human
Development (New York: Palgrave Macmillan; 2005) at 24.

154

3.2

Encumbrances of Knowledge Technologies as Accountability Challenges

The Bank and the IMF have become influential institutions and regulatory regimes in the
international economy, courtesy of knowledge generation and practice, which they apply to the
processes of development and stabilization capital lending. Knowledge practice may come in the
form of financing instruments111 and/or hegemonic thoughts and particular rationalities.112
Traditionally, Bretton Woods Institutions justify knowledge generation and practice as a global
public good because of its potential to “contribute, or limit damage to stability and
development.”113 The understanding is that:
Lack of relevant knowledge is a key obstacle to effective risk management. Knowledge deficiencies
become more formidable as risks grow in intensity and complexity and as the uncertainties about
their sources, drivers, and potential impacts deepen.114

It is the necessity of risk avoidance that gives impetus to knowledge generation as a global
public good.115 Hence, the Bank has come to enjoy enormous influence in the development
financing industry through knowledge and research. Commentators observe that IFIs have, more
or less, relied on knowledge generation and practice as a technology of power, in its productive
senses, and as a form of governance.116 This happens through the vast research resources and
capacity available to IFIs, which places them at a relative knowledge-power advantage.
Consequently, IFIs have consolidated an enormous capacity to shape policies and development
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discourse in their preferred direction, notwithstanding the inherent policy fallibilities, even as they
delegitimate other views that may contest their policy paradigms. As Verger notes, most of the
Bank’s publications have biased economic leanings and are impervious “to external ideas and,
even less, to the concrete effect of external participation in the Bank’s policies.”117 This
consolidation of governance through knowledge is so strong, in fact, that some countries prefer
borrowing from the Bank because of its repertoire of technical advice, without paying much
attention to the interest charged on loans.118
Governance through knowledge in the form of a “vast expert bureaucracy and research
presence,”119 as Güven remarks, undermines Third World governance. It is not difficult to see this,
in the language of Okafor, as “a colonial praxis of tutelage” by empires in the subjugation of the
subaltern classes, either in the over-production of development themes, or in the “inequalities of
the global norm-negotiation processes, amidst a veneer of formal equality.”120 Some policy experts
refer to this as knowledge practice, whose pervasive dominance in the national economies of
nation-states is often facilitated by a combination of policy and regulatory interventions that
accompany lending and surveillance in developing countries.121
Apart from undermining Third World governance, such a resource and knowledge
advantage has tended to delegitimize any alternative worldviews that stakeholders may wish to
express. By way of example, the Bank and IMF rely on their deep knowledge of global economic
trends to construct economies and control borrowing in Third World countries in ways that they
paternalistically argue benefits them.122 Except for the Bank’s technocrats and consultants, very
few people or even scholars participate in the generation of such knowledge resources. In fact, this
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is always de-emphasized as necessary in order to overcome or grasp policy failures and humaninduced disasters.
The first concern regarding knowledge aid as an impediment to accountability in
international development relationships stems from the understanding that governance through
knowledge is a form of governance from a distance.123 IFIs not only use their research power as a
modality of governance but also rely on their financial wherewithal, aura of authority, and
reputable image as “a symbolic power” to predetermine, steer, and shape policy agenda.124 This
means that IFIs’ reliance on information as a technology of knowing occurs when they do not
govern but their interest does. Knowledge-based regulation represents an ideologically guided
vision of transformation. It is a symbol of development institutions’ fetishized understanding of
the world. These ideologies and fetishes are pushed by IFIs in the form of recommendations for
best practices, research findings, expert opinions, and generated statistical data. These are then
used to sway state behaviour, social policy spending, public opinion, and actual policy practice
─in uncritical ways that fail to take account of developmental circumstances of states in the Global
South.125 Implicit in this praxis is the paradigm of governance from a distance in which the research
and advisory roles of the Bank and the IMF constitute hegemonic tools for constructing,
manipulating, and shaping “policy directions in aid-recipient countries.”126 Because of the
influence and ideational power of lenders, state policy formulators always tend not to defer to
countervailing values such as human-wellbeing, equity and social justice as specific concerns to
be prioritized in development programme and projects.
In reality, the act of swaying a state behaviour in a particular direction suggests that some
governance machineries have shifted and are now exercised by IFIs that are detached and distanced
from oversight or from any claims of accountability that citizens may raise. In this scenario, IFIs
stand at a distance from, and are invisible in, policy implementation. This dynamic poses a
hindrance to the answerability of the Bank and IMF. Governance from a distance through
knowledge also creates relationships for possible responsibility avoidance. It ensures that
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development institutions are distant from accountability in the planning and implementation of
projects. And whenever “any project fails to materialize its target, the blame goes to the victims
and their culture, not the planners”.127 Accountability and development justice discourses omit this
crucial dynamic.
Furthermore, knowledge technologies that development institutions exercise with
asymmetric power generate nuances and significations to which performative practices
correspond.128 In effect this correspondence phenomenon produces forms of domination,
subordination, and paternalism that do not explicitly lend themselves to the cognitive grasp of
conventional accountability mechanisms. Sande Lie argues that contemporary development
models establish a façade of freedom.129 A façade of freedom arises from arrangements in which
there is a compulsion on states’ policies and programs to conform to a litany of Bank and IMF
internal policy instruments (which, almost entirely, deploy a macroeconomic view of
development).130 For him, in the context of economic or political power differentials, it is easy to
generate knowledge to which practices correspond. This is explained by the way the perceived
shift away from old policy paradigms, such as conditionalities and structural adjustments, to
paradigms emphasizing ownership, partnership, and participation have been accepted without deep
interrogation. While some development scholars have argued that such a shift marked an
“escalating commitment to hypocrisy,”131 Sande Lie saw in them a façade of freedom in control.
The façade of freedom that they underpin arises in arrangements in which states are free to plan,
own, and implement their own development strategies. But this freedom occurs under the fetters
that such states’ policies and programs must conform to Bank and IMF internal policy
instruments.132 Under this façade of freedom as a specific exercise of power from a distance,
traditional accountability relations and chains are distorted. States are accountable to development
institutions rather than their own citizens.
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A good example of this façade of freedom are the PRSPs or PRGFs that borrowing states
are required to prepare, outlining concrete actions to be implemented as prerequisites for
qualifying for loans. States were expected to “institutionalize procedural and institutional reform”
measures that development financial assistance ought to achieve in line with the CDF. 133 PRSPs
are prepared by borrowing countries but evaluated and assessed by the Bank and IMF through a
Joint Staff Advisory Note, subsequent to which they form the benchmark for lending by other
multilateral and private financiers. In content, PRSPs had to specify the government’s
development priorities, macroeconomic, social, and structural measures and programs, as well as
the policy framework and strategies for achieving growth and poverty reduction.134 Under this
lending instrument, a state has the right and discretion to formulate these papers in compliance
with the Bank’s recommendations. In other words, the borrowing state is accountable in policy
formulation to the lending institution. The Bank requires that “[c]onsulting directly with civil
society [is] a key input … in the preparation of [a country’s development strategies and
policies].”135 This is, however, honoured more in the breach than observance. Besides, there is an
attendant paradox to it.136 From a RTD perspective, these knowledge practices offend Article 1 of
the Declaration on the RTD, which provides the right to participate in and contribute to the
processes of development. People in the affected states lack ways of asserting their real autonomy,
ownership and self-determination in development.137
In conclusion, the hegemonic thoughts of Bretton Woods Institutions and the rationalities
that underpin them has enabled them to capture, or in some way recolonize, the development policy
discourse. This recolonization happens through knowledge practices, too often heartedly justified
as the provision of global public goods. Stripped to their bare essentials, the practices of the
provision of global public goods reveal the role of development discourse in the functionings of
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hegemony and power subjugation in social relations. This is evident in the manner in which global
development practice tends to subordinate Third World states, mobilizing them to pursue values
that do not comport with the universal commitments and standards.138 These parochial values often
tend to engender an unfavourable national and international environment that breeds wanton
vulnerabilities for subject peoples.139 The practical effect of this circumvention is that there can be
no real accountability of culpable international institutions on the basis of those values. I elaborate
on this below.

3.3

The Disavowal of Human Rights Normativity Through the Dominance of Economic
Rationalism

One of the persistent accountability challenges is the Bank’s and the IMF’s push against being
bound by international human rights law. The Bank has consistently disavowed any binding human
rights obligations, and it is difficult to see how the RTD could have been spared this disclaimer.
The Bank still “shirks from openly embracing their own member States’ human rights treaty
obligations as the normative template for their development mandates, preferring to refer strictly
to their internal mandates under their respective Articles of Agreement.”140 This in itself raises the
question of how accountable IFIs are in development.
As a matter of fact, one can argue that, more likely than not, the Bank’s policy documents
feature more of human capital than human rights. And those of the IMF feature economic stability
and growth more than human well-being. Simply, there is an overwhelming focus on economic
rationality at the expense of the human dimensions of development.
Historically, this refusal to bind economic rationalism by human rights norms is done in
consonance with the political prohibition doctrine, under which Bretton Woods Institutions are to
take into account only economic considerations.141 There are, of course, dissenting views that the
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political prohibition is a specious neutrality that readily supplied an ideological cloak for powerful
Western states to perpetuate their parochial policy objectives in the global economy.142 It is
thought that the insulation from political ideologies that was intended by this clause was long
hijacked by other ideologies, more often mercantilist projects.143 Thus, the notion propounded by
the Bank’s legal counsel Ibrahim Shihata that “the Bank cannot act on behalf of donor countries
in influencing the political orientation or behaviour of client countries” flies in the face of reality.144
Though excessive economic rationalism is dominant within the Bank’s understanding of
its technocratic mandate, it has never been the case for human rights as a political question.145 In
certain cases, the Bank has even entertained general exceptions to the political prohibition
doctrine.146 In the 2015 report to the Human Rights Council, Alston, the Special Rapporteur on
human rights and extreme poverty, had lamented the disclaimer by the Bank on the question of the
relevance of human rights to its work.147 However, a 2015 Bank policy paper is cited as admitting
that there is a “growing recognition of the need of the Bank to address human rights in a more
explicit fashion” and that “there have been significant advances in the Bank’s thinking on this
issue.”148 Such a policy position is merely an indication, but not evidence, of the Bank’s
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willingness to recognize human rights as an intrinsic part of its mandate. 149 It does not reflect a
clear position of legal significance on the matter. For this line of disavowal of human rights, one
scholar has labelled it the demise of accountability praxis at the level of the World Bank.150
The IMF too has over the years maintained the stance of economic rationalism, on account
that it is an economic institution. Human rights, they argue, falls in the realm of the non-economic
and is accordingly not relevant in its work. This posturing first emerged in the opinion of the
former IMF General Counsel, Gianviti, in a 2002 legal opinion, referring to ICESCR.151 Informing
this conclusion was his thinking that the IMF is “a monetary agency, not a development agency,”
and that it is tasked with maintaining “orderly exchange rates and a multilateral system of
payments free of restrictions on current payments.”152
It is not just their disavowal of rights through economic rationalism, the twin institutions
blow hot and cold when it comes to embracing into their mandate the globally accepted rightsbased development agenda. I am referring to the SDGs held out as the means for realizing the RTD
among other rights.153 Both the Bank and the IMF acknowledge they have a duty, particularly of
financing, supporting, and cooperating with the UN, to help the global community meet the SDGs
that are explicitly linked and geared to the promotion of a human rights agenda.154 But this
narrative is without any formal legal commitment.

149

Fergus, supra note 145 at 541. For earlier legal opinions that the Bank is under no obligation to respect human
rights in development, and therefore not amenable to be held accountable for breach of human rights obligations, see
Ibrahim F I Shihata, “Democracy and Development” (1997) 46 Intl & Comp L Q 635 at 638; Ibrahim F I Shihata,
“Human Rights, Development and International Financial Institutions” (1992) 8 Am U J Intl L & Pol 27 at 28.
150
Natalie Bugalski, “The Demise of Accountability at the World Bank” (2016) 31 Am U Intl L Rev 1 at 2.
151
Francois Gianviti, “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Monetary Fund” in Philip Alston
ed, Non-State Actors and Human Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 135:
There are three reasons for concluding that the Covenant does not apply to the Fund: the Fund is not a party
to the Covenant; the obligations imposed by the Covenant apply to States, not to international organizations;
and the Covenant, in its Article 24, explicitly recognizes that ‘nothing in the present Covenant shall be
interpreted as impairing the provisions…of the constitutions of the specialized agencies which define the
respective responsibilities…of the specialized agencies in regard to the matters dealt with in the present
Covenant.
152
Ibid.
153
Sumudu Atapatu & Sean S Fraser, “SDG 1 on ending Poverty in All its Forms: Contributions of International
Law, Policy and Governance” at 3 online: <http://cisdl.org/public/SDG%20Icons/SDG_1_Poverty_-_Issue_Brief__UNEP_CISDL_-_13.07.2016_-_Final.pdf>
154
UN-World Bank Group Joint Statement on Signing of a Strategic Partnership Framework for the 2030 Agenda
online:<https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/05/18/un-world-bank-group-joint-statement-onsigning-of-a-strategic-partnership-framework-for-the-2030-agenda>; The International Monetary Fund, “Review of
Implementation of IMF Commitments in Support of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” June 3, 2019
online:<https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2019/06/03/Review-of-Implementation-of-IMFCommitments-in-Support-of-the-2030-Agenda-for-Sustainable-46960>.

162

The same is true for IMF policy statements, which express the IMF’s amenity to
broadening the scope of issues that may be considered macro-critical in lending relationships.155
Like in the case of the Bank, Alston’s examination the IMF’s internal documents unearths a degree
of vacillation when it comes to accepting that human rights are relevant in their development
interventions. He concedes that there has been a shift away from pure economic rationalism,
marked by the IMF’s willingness to broaden the scope of issues that may be considered macrocritical, a policy flexibility that comports with the powers conferred on the institution.156 He
discerns that the IMF has embraced such social issues as inequality reduction, poverty eradication,
debt management—policy issues which it deems important to economic stability, social inclusion,
and inclusive economic growth.157 But Alston complains that, despite the IMF’s declared policy
flexibility in mandate practice as well as in giving scope to staff for innovation on issues relevant
to its work and its tendency to treat a broad range of issues as macro-critical,158 it has consistently
maintained its human rights disclaimer with a blatant assumption that human rights are “not
relevant to macroeconomic policy.”159 Alston observes that the IMF has no official position on
human rights. Essentially, the broader implication is that the IMF position is that human rights are
still regarded as “taboos” even in the enlarged conception of development as interlinked and
interconnected with human rights.160
Excessive economic rationalism and vacillation toward human rights has an accountability
obstruction, disconnection and avoidance dimension to it. These accountability dysfunctions lie in
the fact that IFIs are yet to come to grips with the imperative that for better development, human
rights ought to provide alternative and external criteria to economic decision-making.161 In a world
in which the economic rationalism of the structural adjustments and conditionality regimes hurt
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the weak more than they assure their social transformation, there is need for countervailing values.
In practice, however, this is not the case. The rejection of rights obligations translates into the
spectre that there cannot be a corresponding (formal) dispersal of binding obligations to the Bank
and IMF consistent with their mandate expansion. The practical consequence of this is the
exclusion of any possibility of assessing the compatibility of global economic policies and rules
with values such as equity, social justice, or human well-being that are implied in the integration
of development and human rights.

3.4

Participatory Development Deficits

The contemporary development model is that of shrunken policy leverage and no meaningful
participation for developing countries in development policymaking at the global level. This
exclusion applies to states acting on behalf of, or as agents of their people and human persons or
entire populations or as sub-sets or groups or communities. One exception is the Bank’s
Operational Directive, Indigenous Peoples (OD 4.20) and Operational Policy/Bank Procedures on
Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4.10) which require participation and respect for their rights in the
development projects.162 OD 4.20 requires among other things, “informed participation,” “direct
consultation” and “incorporation of indigenous knowledge,” requirements which the Bank does
not fully abide by.163
A defining characteristic feature of global development practice is that not so many people
participate, through their states, in their economic and financial governance. The injustice inherent
in the international development policy practice is that technocratic development practices
subordinate peoples’ voices, choices, and active, free, and meaningful participation in
development. The participatory deficit and influence asymmetries that pervade the processes and
procedures of decision-making extend to the way treasuries in developing countries conduct
business with development institutions. In these arrangements, the preferences of development
institutions impinge on national autonomies. And in addition to this participatory deficit,
historically, the provision of global public goods has been characterized by an acute political and
democratic accountability deficit.
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Theoretically, in development policymaking, developing countries have the onus to initiate
and prepare policy documents containing the terms for lending that reflect national priorities and
aims. However, this is not the case, as donors are continuously enmeshed and deeply entangled in
national policy discussions and dialogue. Their consultation has become the norm.164 In the high
noon of the structural adjustment regime, it was observed that “The Negotiation stage of the project
cycle is seen by many Borrowers as a largely coercive exercise designed to ‘impose’ the Bank's
philosophy.”165 This dynamic of the heavy presence and manipulation of IFIs in developing states’
policy formulation is evident in many sites. One of this sites is the technical assistance and
secondment of foreign advisors within the ministries or country missions where international
economic institutions are involved in the day-to-day formulation of economic policies through
consultation and advisory.166 The procedure for loan approval is that domestic officials initiate
proposals, which are intensely negotiated with IMF or Bank staff—often, development
institutions’ terms hold sway167—and then recommendations are submitted to the Executive Board
for approval.168
The common critique is that development policies and stabilization conditionalities are
paternalistic; they tend to reflect predetermined donor priorities and preferences, while recipient
countries take ownership and responsibility for their implementation―as donors retain control.169
When “policy formulation is treated as a matter of technical expertise rather than political choices
and prioritisation,”170 development policy misses the imperative of participation of wider
constituencies.
The technocratic nature of development further undermines participation (through which
people may demand the answerability of institutions) through donors relying on what is known in
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development jargon as “policy instruments.”171 These are standardized norms and rules that these
institutions proffer to be replicated in borrowing economies on the grounds that they are
prerequisites for a stable and sustainable world. Apart from their dominant posture of embodying
the specific knowledge concerns and advisory preferences of the Bank and IMF, they seldom
reflect the legitimate governmental or peoples’ economic preferences. Precisely, their formulation
is not open and transparent and/or susceptible to public interrogation.
I am aware of the participatory ethic enacted within the Comprehensive Development
Framework (CDF). This framework stipulates as lending criteria that borrowing countries own and
align programs, consult with stakeholders on the design of reform measures, coordinate with
donors, and manage risk in relation to environmental, social, and sustainability aspects. 172 CDF
defined anew the donor-recipient relationship, by emphasizing such ideals as national ownership,
participation, and accountability, and policy effectiveness.173 This kind of lending is also subject
to borrowing countries maintaining sound macroeconomic frameworks and properly assessing
poverty and social impacts as determined by the Bank and IMF.174 As Sande Lie argues, its
participatory deficit lies in the requirement of compliance with the predetermined policy
prerogatives of development institutions:
[The] Bank, already at the structural level and from the very outset, is not completely disengaged
from the government’s own PRSP process, but that it plays a role in scrutinising and monitoring
the government’s performance. Herein lays a route to power in the form of an indirect, tacit
trusteeship—or developmentality. Moreover, the client government needs to have its PRSP
accepted by the Bank’s board in order to become effective and open the Bank’s purse of
concessional lending. Yet having an approved PRSP is no guarantee of the Bank’s full financial
support. Because the PRSP is formally the government’s document, the Bank merely selects those
policies it is willing to support financially.175

The requirement of conformity to external standards is a perfect exemplification of the way
development models undermine objectives and contravene the purport of participation as the pillar
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of PRSPs. By extension, such a negation also contravenes the core value of the Declaration which
requires active and meaningful participation in development.
On closer scrutiny, the supposed participatory ideal of PRSPs actually serve a different
rationale of state accountability. Development scholars such as Sande Lie have argued that the
participatory approach of PRSPs have allowed the Bank to shift its focus to the state as “an
effective partner and facilitator aligned to” its discourse. 176 Supposedly, this shift was to foster
accountability of the state to the people, on the one hand, given the wider view by the Bank and
IMF on participation of the people as a mechanism for the mutual accountability of the state to its
citizens and financiers, and of financing institutions to the constituent governments, on the other
hand.177
One thing must be emphasized: PRSPs fundamentally altered aid topography, introducing
a new lending architecture of tacit and indirect governance whereby the Bank is in control of the
terms of partnership and therefore controls the levers of freedom enjoyed by the recipient state.178
While the PRSPs have extensively altered the relationships and engagement between indebted and
poor states with their donors, their drawback is that they have instituted a participatory
accountability that is predominantly outward facing (toward the state) rather than inward facing
(toward development institutions). A framework really concerned with the participation of the
people, stakeholders, and social movements would focus on the content and design processes of
conditionalities and structural reform measures. The fact that this is not the case is a negation of
the answerability prong of accountability. It is only through answerability that people can demand
information and explanation from development institutions.
Furthermore, structural reform measures that IFIs impose on borrowing countries as the
prerequisites for lending are not only politically and democratically unsound when used to
restructure and rewrite key economic policy domains of developing countries, they are also
accompanied by a participatory deficit.179 Imposed unilaterally by these institutions, there is often
no room for participation through which the people can be consulted and institutions become
answerable.
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Besides, borrowing governments are often coerced and subordinated that they cannot be
able to exert their influence nor challenge the policy instruments that development institutions
justify as safeguards against economic stability. For example, the World Bank is clear that in
development policy financing, funds are disbursed to client countries subject to “(a) maintenance
of an adequate macroeconomic policy framework, as determined by the Bank with inputs from
IMF assessments; (b) satisfactory implementation of the overall reform program; and (c)
completion of a set of critical policy and institutional actions agreed between the Bank and the
client.”180 While to some, this non-participatory development model is a mechanism for
“disciplining of the [Third World],”181 to others this constitutes illegitimate governance framework
and processes that derogate from the participatory edict of the Declaration in development.
Essentially, participation is negated by the fact that the knowledge technologies in use by
development institutions already offer nuanced meanings and modes of practice to which policies
should correspond in development practice.182
Another good example of the deficit of meaningful participation is the Article IV
consultation mandate. The IMF is required to review and evaluate a borrowing country’s “macrocritical” economic policies—financial, fiscal, foreign exchange, monetary—and the extent to
which these policies are sensitive to risk, grasp vulnerabilities, and elaborate response measures.183
The consultation process often involves some form of dialogue, in which only the IMF and country
officials together with stakeholders (whose selection criteria is unknown), confer on pertinent
policy issues. After this consultation, a report is presented to the Executive Board, which then
publishes its assessments and findings.184 These processes are always complex, highly
professional, and far removed from the people. Hiding behind the veil of its advisory role, this is
how the IMF influences and manipulates weak states and avoids scrutiny of their decisions through
a façade of participation.
All in all, the totality of the development policy instruments and their formulation, together
with the new development policy paradigm of ownership, partnership, participation, and
accountability are still fraught. They are hegemonic. They obliterate political, democratic, and
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participatory accountability in the sphere of economic governance of developing countries. If
anything, the participatory development models deployed by the Bank and IMF are parochial and
idiosyncratic. They perpetuate the very vested interests that usurp both legitimate Third World
governance and people’s voices in their own governance. They transfer vital decision-making to
unresponsive multilateral institutions.185 These external policy measures violate Article 1 of the
Declaration on the right to participate in and contribute to the processes of development. 186 On
account of this subversion of sovereignty, people in the affected states lack ways of asserting their
autonomy and self-determination in development.

4. THE

WORLD

BANK

AND

IMF

UNDERSTANDINGS

OF

THEIR

ACCOUNTABILITY AS INTERNAL INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES
The existing institutional accountability mechanisms of the World Bank and the IMF do not
address or account for any of the discussed challenges posed by the technocratic development
policies, practices, and processes. In the section that follows, I discuss the IMF’s Independent
Evaluation Office and the Bank’s Inspection Panels; the way they understand accountability as
well as the limitations in theory and practice of that understanding. In this section I will be arguing
that the precepts, doctrines, and procedures of accountability of international financial institutions
seem to have been conceived for single-cause, single-effect mechanisms and not for development
injustices that may have multiple causalities, particularly in the structural arrangements of the
global economy. I will argue that by understanding their own accountability in the way they do,
we are given to and fixated on the notion of accountability as redress of grievances and potential
outcomes of harms. Such a breach-focused approach to accountability omits structural violations
that imperil the realization of all rights together, the idea animating the notion of the RTD.

4.1

The IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office

The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) performs the task of “review and evaluation” of the
Fund’s work by consulting other informed and interested parties. Created so recently as 2001, it
has the most circumscribed mandate and is the weakest accountability mechanism of multilateral
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development institutions. This is evidenced by the fact that it is “intended to serve as a means to
enhance the learning culture within the Fund, strengthen the Fund’s external credibility, and
support the Executive Board’s institutional governance and oversight responsibilities.”187 This fact
limits its capacity to offer any meaningful and practical accountability function that can constrain
the injustices of the global policy system or countermand knowledge technologies with which
bureaucratic development institutions obstruct, avoid, and stay disconnected from oversight or
scrutiny in their development interventions.
The shortcoming of the IEO as an effective accountability regime appears in the fact that
it has been designed in such a way that it does not entertain complaints from victims or parties
affected by IMF programmes and policies. McBeth observes that it is “the IEO rather than the
complainant [who] holds the ability to initiate the process.”188 A further weakness of the IEO is
that in its constrained review-and-evaluation objective it provides institutional advice for selfimprovement and “institutional learning” to the Fund rather than address the Funds’ accountability
or redress complaints of persons in recipient countries. The IEO also stands in a very weak position
relative to the Executive Board,189 and thus this model of accountability is fraught with possibilities
for obstruction and countermanding. The IEO is a highly fettered creature, especially by the
requirement to honour the guidelines of the Board. 190
Another constraint relates to what is known as the “zone of privacy”191 and the duty of
confidentiality.192 The rule of confidentiality and privacy establishes a real hindrance to the
answerability aspect of accountability, by which stakeholders may demand information and full
disclosure and explanation of policy rationales. One other common limitation of the IEO is that,
just like the Inspection Panel, this regime of accountability does not assess the behavior of the
Fund according to the international human rights standards and its procedures are inconsistent with
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human rights standards.193 In summary the IMF’s understanding and mechanism of accountability
is a highly qualified accountability system, fettered in its discretion and limited in its functional
utility. The IEO is completely different from that of the Bank.194 I demonstrate this below.

4.2

The Bank’s Inspection Panels

The Inspection Panel of the IBRD and the IDA provides what is believed by some to be an
independent complaints mechanism.195 The Inspection Panel (the Panel) was created in the 1993
after massive outcry and protestation against the Bank’s lack of transparency, accountability, and
responsiveness in relation to project financing.196 The Panel was also instigated by internal
operational inefficiencies exposed by the Wapenhas Report of November 1992. The Report
uncovered a pervasive “approval culture,” a tendency to approve new project loans without
attention to such key considerations as a borrower’s commitment to and safeguard guarantee for a
project’s effectiveness.197 The Report to the Executive Board noted, in addition to internal factors
related to the Bank’s operations, other exogenous global factors that caused a decline in developing
countries’ macroeconomic and institutional capacities.198 The Report also cited questionable
conduct on the part of the Bank, such as its failure to comply with procedures in the design,
appraisal, approval, management, and implementation—as well as the poor performance-—of
projects, which led to “declining portfolio performance” between the years 1981 and1989.199
The Inspection Panel was a pioneering accountability mechanism in international law,
based primarily on its “citizen driven” nature and complaints procedures. According to this
progress narrative, these features heralded the first international institutional transformation of the
Bank, marking its transition from “a lawless institution” to one open to scrutiny by individuals and
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communities.200 The progress narrative follows from the perception that these mechanisms have
created new legal relationships (between people and international organizations) in international
law, though it remains uncertain what these relationships are.201
Since the advent of the Panel model, the Bank understands accountability as internal
institutional accountability, or what is popularly known as an independent (internal) accountability
mechanism.202 This derives from the mandate of the Panel, which is to look into complaints that
“rights or interests have been or are likely to be directly affected by an action or omission of the
Bank as a result of a failure of the Bank to follow its operational policies and procedures with
respect to the design, appraisal and/or implementation of a project financed by the Bank.”203
Strictly speaking, this is an accountability process that seeks the Bank’s compliance with its own
rules and operational procedures. The logic of compliance with own rules is not a regime of
instilling compliance with international law, unless the law complained of arises directly from the
Bank’s operational policies.204
The Panel has bifurcated procedures for, first, assessing the admissibility (eligibility) of
Requests for Inspection and then getting approval for an investigation of an eligible request. At
the eligibility phase, the Panel receives the Request for Inspection from the Requesters (who can
be aggrieved members of a community or people). It then decides whether the request is merited
and within its mandate or frivolous. If admissible, the Panel has first to inform the Management
of the Bank and seek approval for investigation from the Board of Executive Directors (the Board),
notwithstanding that the Panel is an independent arm of the Bank. In this procedure, the Board is
vested with the ultimate decision-making power, deciding whether or not a Panel investigation
should be launched. If granted permission to investigate, the Panel visits the complaints’ area for
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a pilot study, after which it issues an eligibility report and a recommendation whether to
investigate.

4.2.1 Far from Independent
Yet again, investigations are subject to the Board’s approval.205 This is one instance in which the
institutional architecture of the Panel may permit the Board to invoke its powers to obstruct or
avoid accountability of the Bank for political purposes or other motives.206
At the investigations stage, the chair assigns one or more panel members to
investigate/conduct the inspection, and while doing so they are to consult with the Bank’s various
departments and officers as well as the borrower and its Executive Director. They are also to
conduct fact-finding in the affected area. The Panel is to submit an investigation report to the
Executive Directors and the management (President), with a finding on the facts, highlighting
whether the Bank complied with “all relevant Bank policies and procedures.” Management then
responds to the report’s findings by making recommendations to the Executive Directors (an action
plan). The Board then deliberates on the report and Management’s recommendations. It then
informs the requesters of the Board’s decision and the steps to remedy the complaints, after which
it makes public its decision.207 These procedures have been criticized as a limitation on the
autonomy and independence of the Panel from the Bank.208 To the extent that the investigation
procedure is subject to the Board’s approval, the Board is merely an administrative body and not
a judicial one.209 The “Board has ultimate authority to interpret the Panel’s resolution to authorise
inspection.”210 More than anything else, this is one clear way in which the institutional architecture
of the Panel has been designed to ensure that whenever expedient, the Board can offer the Bank
accountability obstruction and, where possible, even avoidance, so as to meet the “functionalist
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needs” of the Bank.211 The Panel claims it is an independent accountability mechanism, but the
truth of the matter is that it is far from independent.
This lack of independence is largely due to the Panel’s relationship to the Board of
Directors and is evident in the fact that its decisions lack any binding force and that it lacks systems
to follow-up on or monitor compliance with its recommendations.212 The Board has override
authority, which may trump and render ineffective the Panel’s deliberations and recommendations.
Such override powers make the inspection procedure a highly qualified accountability model. Such
powers can often be invoked to ensure the avoidance of complete obstruction of the Bank’s
accountability to the people affected by development. This qualification of accountability is further
amplified by the restriction of compliance standards to operational rules and not international
norms and standards. 213
Given that the Board has override authority on the Panel’s mandate, this power may be
exercised to obstruct or countermand the Panel’s deliberations and recommendations, which may
lead to accountability avoidance by the Bank.214 This politics of “manipulated accountability,”
witnessed in the China Western Poverty Reduction Project, is what some have called “institutional
shackles to internalize screening processes designed for softening external challenges from
NGOs.”215 Such institutional processes, in which the Board enjoys override powers, may be
applied to facilitate accountability avoidance.
A good example of this kind of obstruction by the Board is the case of the India
Ecodevelopment Project of 1998, for which the Panel was limited in its investigation to
determining whether the Bank’s directives had been complied with. 216 The Panel’s investigations
found a number of violations of the right of indigenous people displaced from the forest and
recommended further investigation be authorized by the Executive Directors. However, the Board
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decided that no investigation was necessary, an act that served to countermand or obstructed the
Panel’s work. No follow up could then be done by the Panel.217 Another example of accountability
obstruction is a thermal power construction project where complaints of environmental
degradation and forced evictions were raised but the Board denied the Panel the right to do field
visits, though they still went ahead to indict the project.218
The Board’s final authority also implies that the Panel’s recommendations may be ignored,
such as in the Mumbai Urban Transport Project, where the contested implementation was stopped
but resumed within a short period of time.219 These are manifestations of the manipulation of
internal processes to assure the Bank a disconnection from peoples’ scrutiny and claims of
answerability. In some cases, they depict the avoidance and obstruction of the accountability of
IFIs in development. As Kim argues, such inbuilt accountability deficits inhere in the wider
discretion given to the Board or Management. The discretions are present in the various phases of
registration, eligibility, and investigation, all of which are susceptible to political manipulation
either by the Management or the Board.220

4.2.2 The Logic of Adherence to Operational Procedures and Policies as Human Rights
Accountability Avoidance
It is not in doubt that the Panel does not apply human rights standards in the assessment of the
Bank’s behaviour.221 Critics point out that the avoidance of human rights standards in the
jurisdiction of the Panel is a design weakness that undermines the integration of human rights and
development.222 In response to the lingering question, “what are international organizations
responsible for?,” the Bank, as a development institution, offers the following rebuttal: the Panel
has no clear human rights mandate and therefore is not a human-rights-compliant body.223 As such,
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the Panel cannot conduct human rights due diligence in its work due to the conception and design
of its mandate. This is signaled by the fact that rules governing the procedures of the Panel on
questions of evictions, environment, Indigenous communities, and resettlement are not grounded
in international human rights standards, and the Bank’s approach does not seek to assimilate
human rights norms into its policies.224 The clear avoidance of human rights obligations in the
design of the Panel procedures and rules is a clear avoidance of human rights standards as the
undergirding norms for development practices and processes.
The Panel only examines the Bank’s compliance with the Operational Policies and
Procedures, which include directives and internal policies governing development lending
operations.225 The operational policy framework and the operational policy procedures serve as
safeguards against environmental, social, and economic risks.226 By this delimitation of riskprevention, the Panel rarely references or seeks compliance with human rights.227 This shows a
different understanding of accountability; completely divorced from any sense of human rights
accountability of the Bank. This is accountability avoidance and evasion at the level of applicable
standards. The inspection model, for instance, is predicated on a conception of accountability as
the execution of “relevant operational policy frameworks” and the “[strengthening of
management] and governance structures” through the Panel’s functions “of fact-finding, problemsolving, compliance review, policy advice, and monitoring.”228
One exception to the human rights accountability avoidance attitude/praxis of the Panel
was the case of Chad-Cameroon Petroleum and Pipeline Project, in which questions of human
rights and governance were raised by the requesters, among other alleged violations relating to
social and environmental violations. This case raised an issue of Indigenous communities’
involuntary resettlement between 1994 and June 2002. After a full investigation, the Panel was of
the opinion that it had to consider human rights violations insofar as the alleged violations would
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constitute impediments to the implementation of the project in accordance with the Bank’s
policies.229
But the dominant posture of shirking human rights standards remains. Even though the
Bank and IMF as development institutions have recognized the mutuality of human rights and
development, they are yet to internalize the instrumental value of such integration. Plainly stated,
they are yet to appreciate the purpose that such an operational interface is to serve at the level of
practice.
Although the Bank has in some instances accepted the relevance of human rights to its
work, it has yet to grasp the full tenor and implication of the HRAD that it continues to
proselytize.230 Its imperviousness to the HRAD ethic and the logic of operational procedures and
policies amounts to human rights accountability avoidance and disconnection. The fact that only
internal institutional standards are applicable to development financing has come to undermine the
core idea that “development is not simply an economic concern, and does not just mean growth in
the sense of more of the same.”231 It negates the highest ideal that development now embraces
broad ideals that cannot be pigeonholed within operational rules and internal procedures.
Furthermore, it shows that the Panel was not, per se, institutionalized with the
understanding or clear endorsement of accountability based on international legal standards.
Clearly, this is a qualification of accountability processes and standards. It shows a political
necessity to allow the Bank to operate outside the rules and norms that the international community
has propagated and therefore avoid and stay disconnected from accountability based on those rules.
In Bugalski’s view, these mechanisms remain internal to operations of these institutions, while
human rights come to bear on them only indirectly, not because they constitute binding norms on
them but because they are merely incorporated into their policies or evaluation criteria.232
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What makes this kind of shirking of human rights standards a deeply problematic issue is
the Bank’s and the IMF’s ambivalence. They expressly acknowledge that they have direct roles to
play in the alleviation of poverty, ending inequality and underdevelopment and other structural
issues. By this acceptance it is expected that they would be bound by the precepts that require them
to respect the values governing such relations. This is however not the case because of the
permissive culture of the international society that allows international institutions to hide under
the pretexts of legal technicalities to avoid oversight and stay disconnected from responsibility and
scrutiny.
On the contrary, however, De Schutter mentions something worth appreciating. He does
not see anything wrong with shirking human rights standards in the internal accountability praxis
of IFIs. He contends that it allows international institutions to navigate the “two apparently
irreconcilable worlds” of human rights and their specified institutional mandates.233 He believes
that this navigation permits them to tailor an accountability process sufficiently in consonance with
their operational mandate as provided in constitutive documents and international, customary, or
general principles of law.234 He does not, however, understand that a mechanism that only instills
the compliance with operational mandates and procedures is a clear avoidance of, and a
disconnection from, accountability in accordance with universal norms and standards.
Finally, according to the OHCHR & SERI, these internal accountability praxes are shorn
of uniformity of standards, not subject to monitoring, based on discretionary unenforceable rules,
and bereft of the universal language that human rights exact in international law.235

4.2.3 The Fixation on a Conception of Accountability as Redress/Prevention of Harms as
a Retention of the Quintessential (restrictive) Legal Accountability Paradigm
Notably, the crucial trait of legal accountability deployed in this model is that of redress or remedy,
which is entailed in the fact that people can bring requests and the Panel can make a report or the
Bank can respond through an Action Plan. Presumably, these measures are directed to addressing
grievances that are based on real or foreseeable harms. The panel mechanism is therefore rooted
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in the classical principles of accountability as constraints of power or redress of excesses of power.
This conception of accountability cannot address the four accountability challenges I discussed
above (i.e. the challenges of the global policy system, the encumbrances of knowledge as a
technology of governance, participatory development deficits, and human rights avoidance
through excessive economic rationalism).
One dominant feature of the Panel is its image as an institution of recourse whose mandate
is fixated on a conception of accountability as redress of complaints or potential harms.236 Some
think of the panel as retaining “a quasi-judicial oversight mechanism,”237 adjudicating claims of
project-affected people and breach of some internal rules and standards. The inspection process
is, however, not vested with remedial powers. Instead, Management submits a raft of measures
that would mitigate the problems complained of to the Board. It is upon the Management to
implement those remedial measures proposed in the plan of action.238
The redress of harms approach is evident in the operational procedures of the Panel and
the dominantly held view that the Panel is a grievance redress mechanism for communities and
peoples whose interests have been harmed.239 The rules of the Panel require that the allegations
made by Requesters must contain evidence of violations of “a serious character,” implying that
harms must be visible and occurring or have occurred, or are anticipated and knowable.240 In other
words, the Panel’s modality retains a key notion of traditional legal accountability. It shall only
entertain facts in proof of (actual or potential) harm suffered or threatened to be suffered. As such,
particularized facts must be directly linked to action or omission of the Bank.241 For instance, in
the Chad-Cameroon case, the Panel stated that it was only considering “Management’s actions
and omissions as they relate to the Projects.”242
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The inspection model is thus both backward and forward-looking in its approach to breach,
especially those related to projects. Besides, the Panel will be tasked with resolving any conflicts
between the rules of the Bank and other specified standards, and it typically seeks either to
harmonize the project to the Bank’s operational rules or to rule in favour of the complainants’
infringed interests. Essentially, the Panel privileges one set of standards, exalting its status over
another.
Overall, the inspection mechanism leans heavily on the politico-legal understanding of
accountability as fact-finding, fault-finding, and remedy, mitigation, or prevention.243 This is
somewhat similar to domestic law and legal systems way of adjudicating normal rights of action.
Internal institutional accountability is necessarily reactive, and not proactive. It is therefore
interactional in that the Panel focuses on discrete circumstances of actual or potential harm, either
in the past or of some likelihood. The Panel determines whether an institution’s actions followed
some set guidelines, or in other words, whether some internal legal codes and norms were violated.
This accountability mechanism therefore mirrors conventional legal accountability in some
respects.
Further, the fact that responsibility for noncompliance, as a trait of accountability, is
pegged on such internal frameworks, policies, and procedures as the Environmental and Social
Framework, means that there must be performance criteria against which conduct is assessed. Such
criteria of performance can be likened to what Lindberg calls “standards or measurable
expectations”.244 This is an accountability mechanism that does not necessarily question the very
rules on which development is conducted. These accountability mechanisms allow the Bank to
neglect the fact that its policies and rules, in one way or another, may themselves be the structural
constraint to a rights-based vision of development.
In sum therefore, by retaining a violations approach (breach-focused in nature and oriented
to remedy), this model neglects the kinds of violations innate to global economic patterns of
arrangements. By this retention of the quintessential model, the inspection regimes of
accountability omit the necessary insight that remedial accountability neither contemplates ex-ante
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accountability within institutions nor looks to the compatibility of structures and processes with
desired distributive outcomes. Because they are often applied to the Bank’s projects in client
countries, the inspection cannot account for the broader structural issues or correctly redress their
distributive consequences. This is especially the case in the Bank’s projects which are
implemented at the domestic levels. As the only international accountability institution applicable
to the Bank’s work, it is inadequate and ill-adapted to structural violations.
The fact that even in domestic legal systems legal redress does not focus on deeper
underlying structural issues does not mean that there are no models that can question structural
violations and attend to distributive injustices. Accountability mechanisms and processes can be
designed to deal with structural violations ex-post or ex-ante. As we will see in chapter six,
judiciaries in Kenya, South Africa and Colombia have adopted measures that seek distributive
justice by addressing structural violations, ex-post, albeit with a measure of political and practical
difficulties and conceptual challenges. An ex-ante method has the potential of ensuring the
answerability of the institution sought to account, thus avoiding the redress and remedy approach.
While this already exists, such as in cases where indigenous communities are consulted in project
activities, there is no so much clarity as to how answerability can be applied to bypass the
institutional failures of the panel or how it can be effected to overcome the systemic challenges of
the global policy system.

4.2.4 The Unknowability of Actuality, Extent, or Potential of Harms: Lesotho Highlands
Water Project
The Panel’s website declares that it is “an independent complaints mechanism for people and
communities who believe that they have been, or are likely to be, adversely affected by a World
Bank-funded project.”245 The deployment of the language of complaints that is so central to its
mechanism assumes that harms are either threatened or actual and must be discernible or
knowable. This is, however, not the case in the global policy system, where far-reaching
consequences of a given development project or program may not have immediate and
decipherable consequences. This is what I referred to in chapter 1 as the indiscernibility crisis in
integrated economic decision-making that is brought about by the intermingle effect. In fact, the
Panel lacks a mandate to entertain complaints related to harms or violations that are causally linked
245
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to projects and that arise subsequent to or after their completion. People who may be affected by
harms subsequent to completion of Bank projects have no recourse to accountability.246
As part of the conditions of eligibility, actual harms or the knowability of anticipated harms
must be proved. For instance, the Requester must show that they “have been or are likely to be
adversely affected by project activities”; that “they may suffer actual or future harm resulting from
a failure by the Bank to comply with its policies and procedures.”247 According to the operational
policies, the request should provide “an explanation of how the Bank policies, procedures or
contractual documents were seriously violated” together with “a description of how the act or
omission on the part of the Bank has led or may lead to a violation of the specific provision.”248
Actual harm, breach, and a well-founded belief in the likelihood of harm is a predominant feature
replicated from traditional legal accountability. This fixation on harms ignores the internal rules
and procedures according to which the Bank’s projects are conducted. These rules may in
themselves constitute harm insofar as they contradict universal values and norms.
The Panel’s fixation on a notion of accountability as redress of harms or potential harms
reaffirms an understanding of accountability as prevention or mitigation or redress of outcomes of
harm that must be linked to particular conduct or omission. For example, it is often observed that
the mandate of the Panel is restricted to receiving complaints from project-affected people
regarding the Bank’s compliance with its Operational Directives and policies during the financing
and implementation of projects. Some of the major projects include mega infrastructural financing,
which have development impact on indigenous and local communities.249 The Panel targets the
social and environmental harms, not the human rights, that Indigenous and local communities may
suffer during the life of the projects. All these are overwhelming factual indications that the Bank’s
accountability mechanism mirrors key features of standard legal accountability praxis that looks
to redress infringements of an affected party, ex-post, or ex-ante, provided the requesters can
identify the potential harm and sufficiently link it to a specific violation of the Bank’s
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procedures.250 This requirement of “identifiability” of harm and “link” means that where there are
harms that cannot be linked to a specific violation of the Bank’s operational policies or
procedures—for instance, in cases of subsequent human rights violations—no complaint can be
entertained. Such a rule assures the Bank a safe distance from accountability distance when their
policies infringe on human rights.
A good example of this is the complaint filed against the Lesotho Highlands Water Project,
where, out of genuine apprehension of future harms, requesters complained and demanded that the
implementation of a dam project located in Lesotho, which was meant to supply water to Gauteng
province in the Republic of South Africa, be halted until proper assessment of “demand-side”
issues were completed.251 Requesters alleged that if the project was not delayed and proper
assessment done, unresolved “demand-side” management issues in Alexandra township would
lead to a corresponding increase in the cost of water, cut-offs, and inaccessibility, and cause other
sanitation issues in Alexandra, a poor informal dwelling in Johannesburg.
The Panel set three issues for determination: “whether there is preliminary evidence that
prima facie the Bank has failed to follow its policies and procedures”; and, “if so, whether there is
preliminary evidence of alleged material harm”; and, “if so, whether such harm prima facie appears
to be a result of a Bank failure to follow its policies and procedures.”252 In particular, the
Requesters complained that the project would raise undue burden on the poor, and the Panel
acknowledged this issue implicated Paragraph 28 of OD 4.15 on Poverty Reduction, which
requires the Bank to “eliminate institutional and policy biases against the poor.”253
The Panel acknowledged the deeply entrenched systemic problems of broken infrastructure
and frequent water shortages as inequalities rooted in the legacy of apartheid. It indeed made a
finding that there had been historical neglect of infrastructure in Alexandra and Soweto, that the
poor communities “suffered widespread inequities” which “imposed enormous hardships,” and
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that “conditions were harsh and unsanitary” for people living in these areas. It found, however,
that proper assessments of both the adequacy of the investment portfolio and the policies directed
at reducing poverty need to be taken holistically and not in an isolated focus on one project.254 It
stated that this legacy of poverty “neither stems from, nor should it be aggravated by, the decision
to proceed with” the project. It found therefore, that the Bank was not in violation of OD 4.15.255
In rejecting the request for investigation, the Panel was of the view that the claimants had
failed to prove the linkage between the alleged human rights violations to any specific policy of
the Bank. The Panel recommended that the Executive Board should not authorize investigations
into the Request. Here, by the criteria that there was no “linkage,” of the harm to any of the Bank’s
policies meant that the Panel lamentably deferred to that technical rule so that it could sanction the
avoidance of human rights accountability of the Bank. By this technical rule, the demand-side
issues of the project that would occasion inordinate and undue burden on the residents, which were
acknowledged by the Bank as a potential cause of harm, could easily be ignored as irrelevant
because it was not in the Panel’s remit to consider issues not directly related to, and touching on,
the Bank’s operational rules and procedures. By deferring to this technical rule, the Panel avoids
an institutional approach to accountability capable of interrogating deeper and complex underlying
issues.
The Panel was affirming and reiterating an interactional criterion for accountability that
has always ensured the Bank a complete avoidance of and disconnection from being held
accountable for development injustices that raise human rights concerns. This is to be seen in the
principle that the Bank is not accountable for harms directly related to the project if those potential
violations do not arise from noncompliance with operational procedures and policies. The failure
to prove “linkage” between harm and rule is not the problem in the Inspection modality. Rather, it
is this logic of “compliance with operational rules and procedures” that obstructs the direct
accountability of the Bank where universal standards are alleged to have been infringed. A system
of accountability based on universal norms and standards would ameliorate this deficiency.
Inspection therefore turns out to be an interactional accountability model that focuses on
conduct and omits the engendered deprivations. The Lesotho Highlands case suggest that we need
a mechanism of accountability that focuses on structural violations. As some decisions from the
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Canadian Human Rights Tribunal have shown, these violations are a result of historical prejudices,
stereotypes, and practices and that are now deeply embedded in the work of institutions.256
Structural violations “implicate multiple government agencies found to be responsible for
pervasive public policy failures that contribute to such rights violations.”257 A structural remedy
goes beyond conduct causative of harms and focuses on correcting the systemic root causes of the
failures of programs and policies of government.258 In South Africa, causes of these kinds have
been remedied by judicial reliefs known as “structural interdict,” which by their very nature allow
the court to remain seized of the matter after judgment so as to supervise or monitor its orders.259
Colombian socio-economic rights litigation points to the Constitutional Court’s power to issue
structural remedies that address systemic violations of socio-economic rights by the actions and
omissions of public authorities.260 Courts have defied the functus officio doctrine to retain
jurisdiction after handing their judgments with the aim of supervising compliance with their orders.
In the case of T-025/04261 the Colombian Constitutional Court joined the constitutional
claims (tutelas) of over 1,150 displaced families which it heard in a consolidated proceeding. The
claimants sued several agencies and departments of government. One of the legal issues for
determination was “whether problems in the design, implementation, evaluation and follow-up of
the corresponding State policy contribute, in a constitutionally relevant way, to the violation of
displaced persons’ fundamental constitutional rights?”262 The Court made a declaration that there
was an existence of an “unconstitutional state of affairs” concerning the conditions of the displaced
population. This decision took account of the inadequacy of allocated financial resources and
apparent constitutional deficiency in legislative measures meant to guarantee the protection of the
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rights of the countrywide displaced persons. Importantly, the Court observed that the violations of
the displaced persons’ rights “were not attributable to a single authority, but are rather derived
from a structural problem that affects the entire assistance policy designed by the State, as well as
its different components, on account of the insufficiency of the resources allocated to finance such
policy, and the precarious institutional capacity to implement.”263 The Court was cognisant that
the claims were due to “deep-seated structural failures.”264 It then gave its ground-breaking
judgment which required a number of structural measures.
One, the judgment’s implementation was to be taken over a period of time supervised by
the Court.265 Second, to effectively remedy the complaints of all the countrywide internally
displaced persons, the court ordered a number of measures. There was to be a follow-up on the
implementation. The order also directed several government agencies to remove the
unconstitutional state of affairs of the displaced persons by allocating the necessary financial
resources and to take some practical steps to guarantee and protect the affected persons’ basic
rights. The Court directed that the representative of the displaced communities be allowed to
participate effectively in the adoption of the alleviation measures and that the Court be regularly
informed of all the relevant progress made. The Court was particularly concerned with authorities’
compliance with its orders, and to that effect directed that the judgment be transmitted to the Public
Ombudsman and the General Controller of the Nation (Procurador General de la Nación), so that
they could, “within their spheres of jurisdiction, carry out a follow-up of the implementation of
(the) judgment, and oversee the activities of the authorities.”266 Other cases in which the
Colombian Constitutional Court ordered a redesign of government programs, including orders
touching or budgetary matters are T-0153/98267 and T-060/08.268 In T-060/98 for example, the
Court ordered a restructuring of the government’s healthcare system complete with an elaborate
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process of monitoring the compliance with its orders that would address the entrenched
infrastructural impediments.269
This institutional approach is the kind that the Panel ought to have adopted in the Lesotho
Highlands case to broaden its inquiry into systemic violations. But it chose to limit itself to the
circumscribed jurisdiction of “compliance with operation rules, directives and procedures.” By
neglecting the institutional approach to violations, the inspection model omits the perspective that,
in most cases, potential harms or pervasive failures of development projects and programs are
unknowable and even unforeseeable by the very authorities that design them. Thus, to posit an
accountability regime that does not contemplate this possibility is to ensure the avoidance of
actors’ accountability for harms that are deeply rooted in policy design or that subsequently result
from long-term project implementation. More often, in development financing, it is not conduct of
an institution but the engendered effects that constitute the way development affects people it is
intended to help. Accountability in development financing does not seem to reflect this reality of
the unknowability of subsequent harmful effects.

4.2.5 Deradicalization of the Third World and Subordination to the Subaltern Position
The fact that the global policy environment is a determinative factor that shapes the performance
and outcomes of national policy projects was not considered in the formulation of the inspection
panels or the IEO. Indeed, it is disturbing that even after the Bank’s Wapenhas Report made clear
that the global policy system is a determining factor that affects project performance, no attention
was directed to the formulation of an accountability mechanism that could deal with such a
situation. The Report was categorical in its statement that “[country] factors, often conditioned by
changes in the global environment, have a strong impact on project outcomes”.270
Nothing was more revealing than that in assessing the correlation between national and
global factors in project failures as the impetus for internal accountability, global factors were
more to blame than national. In other words, according to the Report, the effectiveness of project
portfolios was largely contingent on the global policy environment and external shocks.271 Having
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reached this conclusion, it was reasonable to expect that this would be sufficient reason to look to
accountability procedures that would constrain uncertainties and instabilities of the global policy
environment. What we ended up with is an institution with severely circumscribed jurisdiction.
Such a curtailment of remit would ensure that the global policy system would always remain
unscathed by future Third World resistance movements. Due to this deliberate design, there would
be no direct accountability in the international system for policy failures of the global policy
system.
Chimni has argued that indeed the deliberate curtailment of structures of accountability
coupled with restricted Board representation in these institutions is deliberate and serves to
diminish the leverage of developing countries and to keep them in “a subaltern position.”272
Chimni’s views confirm the political necessity doctrine that made it imperative for the creation of
weak inspection panels. Rajagopal’s incisive historical observations affirm this fact. He argues
that demands for reform in the 1990s that produced internal and voluntary dispute settlement
processes had no real intention of creating genuine redress fora for grievances and only served to
“deradicalize” Third World resistance movements.273 Criticisms and staunch oppositional stances
mounted against international institutions that have stimulated such reforms, he argues, always
provide these institutions an opportunity to reimagine and recreate themselves. They offer them
moments of reflection and moments to mobilize knowledge for purposes of self-proliferation and
expansion of remit.274
It can be said that the sort of mandate expansion by Bretton Woods Institutions came with
the responsibility avoidance given that the genuine search for effective accountability of these
institutions was thwarted by the deradicalization mission. In Rajagopal’s view, this is the reason
the engagement with alternative conceptions from the Third World is a constant attribute of
international institutions’ evolution since the Mandate system. It is an engagement key to the
refocusing and reconfiguration of these institutions. It is an experience key to the proliferation of
others, in response to the constant engagement with Third world public resistance.275 Noticeably,
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the expansion of the sphere of authority of international institutions in the domain of development
is always marked by a characteristic silence on accountability for outcomes of poverty and
inequality.276

4.2.6 Some Positive Attributes
Some commentators have, however, seen this modality of internal accountability as progressive
for an international organization to adopt, notwithstanding the neglect of human rights as an area
of concern in development projects. It is argued that it “proves how seriously the Bank takes its
commitment to abide by its own standards.”277 This internal mechanism, it is argued, has brought
“a significant impact on responsibility and answerability within the Bank.”278
This internal accountability mechanism is also seen as the first of its kind in which an
international organization can be brought to accountability, directly to the people. It marked “a
watershed moment” in the international jurisprudential landscape279 and could “influence
substantive areas of international law.”280 It improves internal governance: the complaints process
can correct flaws and risks in the design and implementation of development, lead to selfimprovement; acts as checks and balances and as feedback loop on the work of international
development institutions.281 They help improve the Bank’s compliance with its rules and policies
through decentralized community and people-driven processes, signaling “an evolving form of
transnational governance … within the pluralist and complex development context” marked by
de-formalization of governance and regulatory arrangements and the collapse of public-private
and international-national divides.282 Darrow commends these as “incremental steps towards
transparency of decision-making and public consultation on significant policy matters [in]
administrative international law.”283 And De Schutter is optimistic that these mechanisms of selfregulation are neither completely devoid of merits nor as deficient as alleged. They leave
institutions with a measure of autonomy and avoid control by member states in their decisions;
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they are preferable over an undesirable situation of subservience to an international or national
framework of accountability which may limit their scope of manoeuvre or render them functionally
ineffective. But all these praises overlook the fact that to hold an actor accountable to its own rules
and policies and not to universal standards cannot really be an impactful accountability.

4.2.7 Summary Remarks
Before I conclude this chapter, I want to make the following summary remarks: First, the foregoing
debate reveals that development practice is a discourse of representing and constituting the world
into binaries. One side of the divide enforces a Western and monocultural way of life, is defined
by parochialism and paternalism, and understands development as a colonial practice of
domination.284 It is Escobar who argued that development was not supposed to be about people.
He questioned the neutrality of development enterprise, which he saw as a technique of power
laced with insidious motivations.285 Esteva and Prakash too see development as a mono-cultural
global project of the West that, for the most part, tends to railroad its various paradigms: that is,
its norms of behaviour and attitudes, institutions, and rules.286 It is therefore foolhardy to expect
that the very creators, either by themselves or through their appendages or agents, can enforce an
accountability praxis for their own violence or those of their own institutions. Plainly stated,
international development discourse sanctions such entrenched accountability avoidance,
disconnection, and instances of obstruction. International law does not construct and reconstruct
absolute accountability evasions for IFIs but rather a highly qualified accountability system in
development practice. International development accountability praxis tends to leave the
development juggernaut unscathed.
It is irrefutable that there are internal bureaucratic procedures of development institutions
that lend themselves as the only existing and functioning modalities of accountability. It is
irrefutable, too, that they are normatively weak and conceptually fraught, with serious institutional
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and functional shortcomings. The adoption of internal institutional accountability modes did not
dislodge such unsatisfactory conceptions of accountability as redress or prevention of breach. They
do not contemplate addressing, preventing, mitigating, or remedying distributional outcomes and
other structural injustices linked to the broader global policy system. They adopt the cause-andeffect standard of accountability. They ignore the spectre that development injustices are produced,
perpetuated, and sustained by global structural constraints and multiple interacting regimes
(consisting of rules, policies, processes, and structures of development). Because they are forms
of ex-post accountability mechanisms, they cannot assess, ex-ante, the extent of compatibility of
structures and processes of development with the desired outcomes. Ultimately, they can be faulted
as severely “limited creatures” given their heavily circumscribed jurisdiction.287 Simply stated,
they cannot secure development justice.

5. CONCLUSION
This chapter has analyzed the understanding of accountability by IFIs in relation to their domains
of practice and competence. It critiqued the inspection models of the World Bank and Independent
Evaluation Office of the IMF. It has demonstrated how the technocratic practice of development
and the allocative, advisory, and regulatory roles of international financial institutions in the
international financial governance and development policy practice present tremendous
accountability obliterating dimensions. It demonstrated that the Bank and IMF understand their
accountability as internal institutional accountability. The very architecture of internal
accountability mechanisms, I have argued, cannot account for the severe accountability challenges
attendant to the technocratic development policy practice. The narrative woven throughout this
chapter is that the accountability dysfunctions and deficits innate to the development policy
practice and international financial governance reflect a constructed realty that is constantly
rationalized and legitimized by international law and the very practice of development.
In my analysis of the IFIs’ understandings of the accountability praxis, I conclude as
follows: Bretton Woods Institutions’ view of accountability is so conceptually and normatively
flawed and cannot guarantee the protection of the people of the Global South against the vagaries
of development (i.e., institutionally embedded constraints of the global economy, knowledge
encumbrances, participatory development deficits, and excessive economic rationalism). Indeed,
287
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the inspection model reveals instances of the avoidance of, a disconnection from, and obstruction
of accountability whenever Bretton Woods Institutions’ interventions in countries’ development
are challenged. This is perfected by several institutional design strategies: (i) the selective
interpretation and application of jurisdiction of the Panel and IEO; (ii) the “rubric” or criteria of
compliance with operational rules, policies, directives, and internal procedures; (iii) a fixation with
reforming the behaviour of institutions; (iv) the disavowal of rights normativity in the economic
sphere; and (v) the manipulative and override powers of the Boards.
The selective application of the Inspection Panels’ jurisdiction reveals how international
law constructs convenient principles and defines meanings of law for usage in ways that
delegitimize subaltern resistance. This is what Rajagopal refers to as the “deradicalization” of the
Third World. By such institutional flaws, the existing internal accountability mechanisms
exemplify international law’s implication in the immiseration and deflection of claims of justice
and emancipation from the marginalized social classes. At another level, the rationality of
compliance with internal operational directives and procedures provides a convenient mask for the
avoidance of accountability based on universal standards and norms. And so, does the economic
rationalism by which IFIs refuse to accept binding rights obligations. I have demonstrated that
such normative weaknesses of the Inspection Panel and IEO are deliberate and parochial
manoeuvres to diminish the responsibility of IFIs in the realm of development practice. Implicit in
such manoeuvres, I conclude, are the accountability dysfunctions and deficits key to facilitating
the functionings of hegemony and power in the international development arena. It is for this
reason that IFIs’ understanding of the development accountability praxis remains unsatisfactory
and inadequate. So far, the experiment with the Bank’s and the IMF’s understanding of their own
accountability as internal institutional accountability bears no promise or potential for eradicating
those injustices that inhere in the international development project.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AS THE MAIN DOCTRINAL
ANCHOR OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY

1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents a critical review and analysis of the law of international responsibility as the
main doctrinal anchor of the norms of legal accountability applicable to international financial
institutions (IFIs). It examines the suitability and applicability of the general principles of the law
of international responsibility to the peculiar and complex situations of the kinds of structural
injustices that constitute derogations from the RTD norm. Insofar as the responsibility of states
and international organizations are concerned, the Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA)1 and the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of
International Organizations for Internationally Wrongful Acts (DARIO)2 are the main compendia
of the relevant legal principles and doctrines that undergird and capture the way accountability is
understood in international law. I will however focus only on DARIO because it reproduces
ARSIWA’s paradigm and that although ARSIWA is relevant to this dissertation I will limit myself
on DARIO as the lex specialis. The law of responsibility for internationally wrongful acts sets out
parameters for defining wrongfulness/breach or violations, attributing conduct, discerning
causation, imputing responsibility on actors, and setting out legal consequences in connection
thereto.
Throughout this chapter, I examine the norms and processes of establishing the
responsibility of IFIs for wrongful acts that entail a breach of primary rules. In a judicial
mechanism of accountability, a breach of obligations/primary rules is followed by the allocation
of responsibility and possibly the making of satisfactory reparations.3 This is what I refer to as
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Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries (United Nations, 2001)
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international legal accountability. The regime of DARIO provides a comprehensive accountability
praxis distinguishable from follow-up and review as well as the internal institutional models
discussed in the previous chapters or the participatory models of accountability in the next chapter.
The central argument of this chapter is that the legal formulation of DARIO constructs and
legitimizes the acute accountability avoidance, disconnection, and obstruction practiced by IFIs.
It does so both at the level of the specification of obligations and in terms of the assignment of
responsibility for breaches and harmful outcomes. I expound on how the international law of
responsibility is replete with various flaws deliberately designed to elide the structural violations
linked to the development interventions of the Bank and the IMF. I contend that for the most part,
and in several instances, international legal accountability is inadequate for dealing with
development injustices produced by the contemporary model of economic arrangements.
The law of international responsibility is inadequate in two ways, the one concerning
norms, and the other in regard to process. The first is due to the circumspection shown by IFIs
toward the specification of a normative system of obligations (primary rules) that would constrain
their development praxis toward what this dissertation views as development justice, based on the
basic tenet that human rights obligations have historically remained largely a state-centric
discourse that focuses on the state as the sole duty bearer.4 I argue and conclude that by perfecting
a circumspection toward primary rules, DARIO, even in its thus expanded conceptions, furthers
international law’s characteristic feature of contesting the normativity of human rights in the
domains of IFIs praxis. Thus, responsibility for conduct infringing on certain new guiding values
and norms in the development arena may not be enforced. The second inadequacy is located in the
tenuous and hazy rules governing the process of attributing and allocating direct and distinct
responsibility for wrongful acts to international organizations.
This chapter is written from a TWAIL perspective. Key techniques of TWAIL that I will
use include the following: historicizing Third World experiences into the analysis of ARSIWA
and DARIO; disavowing the various precepts that enable the avoidance and obstruction of, and
disconnection from accountability by supranational institutions therefore oppressing the Third
World; discerning “continuities and discontinuities” of marginalization and even subjugation in

Wouter Vandenhole, “Obligations and Responsibility in a Plural and Diverse Duty-bearer Human Rights Regime”
in Wouter Vandenhole ed, Challenging Territoriality in Human Rights: Building Blocks for a Plural and Diverse
Duty-Bearer Regime (London & New York: Routledge, 2015) at 116 [Vandenhole, “Obligations and Responsibility”].
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these doctrines of law.5 This chapter is also shaped by institutional cosmopolitan insights, with the
aid of which I theorize the fundamental defects of the conception and praxis of the law of
international responsibility, especially as they apply to the IFIs’ accountability avoidance and
evasion as a legitimization of the oppression of the Third World. I rely on Thomas Pogge’s
philosophical differentiation of the institutional from the interactional approaches to the
problematique of responsibility allocation in the global institutional order. Pogge has extensively
applied these two standards, relying on moral philosophy to critique the conventional ways of
ascertaining responsibility for global injustices. Throughout his moral theorization of the question
of global responsibility for poverty, apart from perceiving the phenomenon as a question of
distributive injustice, Pogge’s political philosophy gave very little attention to international law
precepts or the law of responsibility within that body of norms. This gap needs to be closed, or at
least narrowed. This is the contribution I make in this chapter by weaving together certain
interdisciplinary theoretical insights and TWAIL to critique international law and international
institutions’ accountability deficit, especially as it relates to TWAIL. I surmise that existing
accountability practices in international law are predominantly interactional, and that this is the
greatest mark of their defectiveness and unsuitability to the realization of development justice.
This chapter proceeds as follows: In the next section, I expound on Pogge’s two paradigms
of understanding accountability deficits. In section three, I define the legal concept of
responsibility for wrongfulness as understood within the DARIO framework. Section four
examines two related and interlinked issues: the first is DARIO’s evasive engagement with human
rights as primary obligations; and the second is the problematic nature of the process of attributing
wrongful conduct to international organizations, especially IFIs. I then make the conclusion of this
chapter in section five.

For this view, see Obiora Chinedu Okafor, “Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL):
Theory, Methodology, or Both?” (2008) 10 Intl Com L Rev 371 at 377 [Okafor, “Theory or Method]; Obiora Chinedu
Okafor, “Newness, Imperialism, International Legal Reform in Our Time: A TWAIL Perspective” (2005) 43:1&2
Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 171 at 175 [Okafor, “Newness”].
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2. APPRAISING

POGGE’S

TWO

STANDARDS

OF

RESPONSIBILITY

ASCERTAINMENT: THE INSTITUTIONAL VERSUS THE INTERACTIONAL
APPROACHES
It is apposite to go deeper into a differentiation of the interactional and institutional paradigms of
accountability that I briefly stated in chapter one. This is warranted here because this is the first
time the norms and practices of international law of responsibility are being critiqued from the
perspective of moral philosophy. Therefore, a much more nuanced understanding of the
differentiation between the two approaches is required. Thomas Pogge dichotomizes two
approaches to the allocation of responsibility for global distributive injustices by differentiating
the institutional from the interactional accounts of the causes of global distributive injustices. He
takes poverty as a good case study.6 An interactional approach, in his account, takes a clear-cut
approach to causality, wrongfulness, and attribution of conduct and assumes that wrongful acts are
either foreseeable and avoidable or immediate and can be directly attributed to an actor.7 On the
contrary, an institutional approach employs a holistic understanding of global injustices as
distributive injustices sanctioned by the global structural arrangements. It outright avoids a linear
and straightforward approach to violations.
An interactional perspective focuses on overt ex-post forms of internationally wrongful
acts or breaches that occur at the secondary stages when states give effect to global economic
policies. He calls these incidences “clear-cut human rights violations.”8 An interactional account
of rights violations, according to Pogge, is the standard approach in human rights accountability
practices that focuses on the more experiential and more visible harms produced by the more easily
identifiable conduct and action of one or more actors. In its emphasis on the visibility and easier
discernibility of responsible actors and their actions, an interactional account seeks to hold actors
accountable for wrongful conduct or failure to prevent harms more easily and directly attributed
to them. By this approach, it can be said that is fixated on redressing outcomes. It adopts an expost approach on the responsibility ascertainment. Accordingly, an interactional method is a
straightforward exercise that follows a linear approach to causation and attribution of conduct to

6

See Thomas Pogge, Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor (UNESCO; Oxford;
New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 15-53 [Pogge, Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right].
7
Ibid at 16.
8
Ibid.
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actors.9 From this perspective, violations can be likened to those direct cases where conduct or
omission of identifiable actor/s “must constitute a breach of an international legal obligation.”10
Underlying this approach, which is also implicit in the human rights jurisprudence of
accountability, is the assumption that agents, as the case may be, “act in such a way that they
foreseeably and avoidably deprive others of their livelihood.”11
In contrast, an institutional account offers a broader and fundamentally different optic. It
avoids the direct approach to causality, wrongfulness, and attribution of conduct deployed within
ARSIWA and its progeny, DARIO.12 Pogge argues that instead of focusing on the outcomes of
the conduct of a single actor and characterizing them as human rights violations, an institutional
optic looks to the multiple primary causal elements that are linked to the globalized institutional
framework.13 An institutionalist optic, Pogge reflects, appreciates that multiple “cooperating
causes” (multicausality) inherent in global institutional arrangements defy the conventional
unilinear mechanics and dynamics, and make intractable the exercise of assessing causation and
wrongfulness in the conservative manner of the law of state responsibility or its replica.14
Pogge argues that an interactional approach that fails to account for the global institutional
order’s engenderment of poverty may be a deficient device for assessing the global responsibility
for poverty.15 Such an approach is defective because it sidesteps the institutionally embedded
constraints consisting of rules and policies that structure and condition international relationships
and outcomes. Pogge calls this phenomenon “engendered deprivations,” which he ably
distinguishes from “established deprivations.”16 An institutional system “engenders deprivations”
through effects that it predictably and actually produces, while an interactional order, on the
9
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contrary, “establishes deprivations” by that which it “mandates or at least authorizes.”17 At the
core of this differentiation is the notion of effects/consequences produced, on the one hand, and
the idea of authorized conduct, on the other.
Pogge postulates that global institutional processes intermingle with decisions of other
actors in national contexts, where they condition and produce various outcomes.18 An intermingle
effect presupposes that there is “a holistic understanding of how the living conditions of persons
are shaped through the interplay of various institutional regimes, which influence one another and
intermingle in their effects.”19
An interactional account, on the contrary, does not appreciate the intermingle effect in its
assessment and explanation of structural violations. It fails to recognize that the endemic
vulnerabilities of people in developing countries are quite often not the direct causal effect of a
single and identifiable actor’s conduct, but are rather a consequence of an interlocking matrix of
cooperating constraints rooted in international economic systems. These may include contravening
provisions, rules, or principles of investor protection treaties, predetermined structural and macroeconomic reforms prescribed by multilateral lending institutions, or global trading rules whose
implementation may create certain policy effects such as social exclusion, inequality, or poverty.
Often unforeseeable though avoidable, such harms have no immediate and knowable repercussions
on human development.
Leaning on the interactional/institutional binary, I charge that the law of international
responsibility, the shorthand for international legal accountability, is strongly inclined to the
interactional version.
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3. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONCEPT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR
WRONGFULNESS
For the most part, ARSIWA and DARIO formulate the way legal accountability is understood in
international law. The predominant form of accountability in international law is that of
enforceability. This order relies on the rules relating to the attribution of wrongfulness, and the
ascertainment of culpability and liability, which then leads to the enforcement of sanctions
(reparations) or other forms of remedies.
ARSIWA and DARIO codify a body of norms referred to as secondary rules. Secondary rules
are those rules that govern the legal consequences that flow from conduct or omission of the state
or the international organization that constitute a breach of primary rules.20 Primary rules are those
basic rules defined by international law such as treaties and conventions, custom, declarations or
general principles that stipulate the content, substance or the nature of international obligations
binding on actors. In the broader conceptualization of the law of international responsibility,
conduct or omission in breach of primary obligations are otherwise known as “internationally
wrongful acts.”21 What constitutes an international obligation is broadly defined by the domain of
law. Human rights norms and standards fit into the category of primary obligations and must
therefore be brought within the purview of the laws of state responsibility and the responsibility
of international organizations, unless exempted by the lex specialis rule.22
Fragmented international and regional human rights regimes enshrine a constellation of
primary obligations and norms. The Declaration on the RTD is one component of the fragmented
human rights corpus enshrining primary obligations and norms, and as such it defines and
contributes to the gamut of rights that we now call the right to development, a norm constituting
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the primary rules of international law. The Declaration on the RTD spells out the content, nature,
and performance standards of primary obligations incumbent on actors.

4. FORMALIZATION OF THE EVASION OF DIRECT AND DISTINCT
ACCOUNTABILITY BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (SUCH AS IFIs)
4.1 Circumspection Towards Primary Rules
The rejection of human rights obligations as binding on non-state actors (such as IFIs) is also to
be found in the circumspect and tenuous way in which DARIO specifies primary rules for
international institutions. It is a rejection that reflects what Roberto Ago had sensationalized as the
need to avoid “un mélange de genres” (a mixing of categories).23 DARIO’s circumspection toward
primary obligations is reflected in the International Law Commission’s (ILC) obfuscation of the
issue when it states the following in the General Commentary to the DARIO: “Nothing in the draft
articles should be read as implying the existence or otherwise of any particular primary rule
binding on organizations.”24 The ILC’s point is rather blatant. It is also willfully blind to the
obvious imperative that IFIs’ conduct now needs to respect the commonly agreed universal values
of the international society.25
It is, however, understandable that ILC leaves a margin for those who seek to enforce
responsibility for breach of international norms, to source those primary obligations elsewhere—
in treaties, custom, or general principles of law.26 This view applies as well to ARSIWA. It cannot
therefore be said that DARIO’s evasion of primary rules is a special isolated case, as both
instruments were not meant to deal with primary rules. What must be said is that this homogenizing
avoidance of primary rules in the formulation of ARSIWA and DARIO is not natural. It is a

Cited in Eric David, “Primary and Secondary Rules” in James Crawford, Alain Pellet & Simon Olleson, eds, The
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product of international lawyers which embodies dominant and homogenizing viewpoints and
positions expressed by traditional international law scholars. These positions and viewpoints have
found their way in contemporary legal norms, notwithstanding their fundamental flaws. Such
homogenizing positions are reflected in the ILC’s circumspection toward primary rules—which
invokes Roberto Ago’s irreverence for primary obligations as the “mixing of categories.”
Effectively, such positions and worldviews are a manifestation of a willful attempt to construct a
body of norms that reflect particular positions and persuasions.
No doubt, such positions and persuasions (i.e DARIO as only a body of secondary rules)
have their deeper justifications in law and ideology. One of the justifications that is now widely
embraced supposes that ARSIWA and DARIO were to be applied only to the process of
establishing the responsibility of an actor for a wrongful act. A corollary to this reasoning holds
that primary rules or a body of norms governing the behaviour of actors falls outside the province
of DARIO and ARSIWA. According to this consensus, these two instruments would leave it open
for primary rules to be sourced elsewhere. This fact, this position that DARIO was not meant to
contain primary rules is not contested. But as I see it, the ILC intended to bifurcate the regime of
obligations from that of allocating/assigning responsibility for wrongfulness. By this bifurcation,
the ILC conveniently and expediently avoided answering the question of the conflict of norms or
international rules. That way, it would be easy to apply the subjective view that responsibility of
an actor is invoked not by fault but by conduct in breach of an international obligation stated in
some other treaty or body of international law.
This deliberate framing of DARIO whereby primary rules are to be sourced elsewhere is
very problematic. The problem first appears in the flawed definition of wrongful conduct. Articles
2 (ARSIWA) and 4 (DARIO) stipulate that a wrongful act is comprised of conduct or omission
attributable to an actor and that the conduct or omission must constitute a breach of international
obligations/norms.27 The criterion of conduct/omission in breach of an obligation is a very fluid
and vague definition of wrongful conduct. This is because what may be considered an international
obligation incumbent on an international organization remains contested in a fragmented
international legal order. And due to the fragmentation of international law, marked by norm
conflict, what may be assumed to be a breach of primary obligation may not even be as clear-cut
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Olleson, eds, The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 201.
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(or interactional) in the context of multilateral development relationships. Article 10 of DARIO
provides that a breach of an international obligation arises when “an act of that international
organization is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of the
origin or character of the obligation concerned.” The underlying rule is that IFIs conduct must
conform to that which it is “required of” by an international obligation. This essential rule
(“required of”) shows how DARIO takes an interactional and highly abstract approach to the
question of ascertaining breach of primary rules.
How is the abstract nature of Article 10 manifested? In reality, IFIs are governed by their
constituting documents, which set the rules of behaviour and bounds of competencies, which may
be referred to as primary rules. This, however, does not preclude international organizations from
respecting other international rules, including customary international law.28 But in the context of
their mandate to provide global public goods that impact human rights, the most apt question is:
do human rights norms constitute international legal obligations to which the conduct of
international organizations is required to comply with? In the guise of avoiding “mixing of
categories,” DARIO is circumspect on the question of what obligations an international
organization is “required of.” If the ILC gave deeper introspection to this problem of regime
conflict and norm fragmentation, one would be presented with a more accurate and satisfactory
rubric for determining what constitutes a breach of international obligations. As it is, ILC was very
circumspect of the question, thus effectively giving a badge of approval to the fragmentation of
international law that facilitates obligations avoidance for IFIs. Such a flaw typifies the fragmented
character of international law that has failed to provide a common regulatory framework for
different forms of international reality.29
The lacuna is also exposed by the traditional conception of the international law of human
rights as a specific relationship operating only between the state and the individual. This reignites
the unresolved question of whether human rights obligations are primary rules binding on IFIs in

This can be traced in the 1951 ICJ decision that held that international organizations are “bound by any obligations
incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under their constitutions or under international
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A/HRC/WG.2/19/CRP.1[De Schutter, “A Fresh Start Towards Accountability”] at 8. De Schutter appreciates the
phenomenon of multiple regimes intersecting. Because of a plurality of actions in “a multiple duty-bearer regime,”
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their domains of practice. DARIO completely avoids this question, following what the law of state
responsibility traditionally did.
If we go further, we find that in itself, the criteria of “breach of an international obligation”
or “breach of primary rule” is conceptually problematic. This is because it does not appreciate the
dilemma of norm and rationality conflict presented by the fragmentation of international law.30
That is, it does not address whether human rights norms constitute international obligations
“required of” or in conflict with international organizations’ other duties. Because of its flawed
framing, DARIO’s definition of wrongfulness as breach of obligation shirks resolving the
contestation as to what obligations are applicable to actors when primary rules of one regime are
offended by decisions or policies competently undertaken within other competing arrangements. I
acknowledge that this is something that human rights law should clarify, but the fact that DARIO
doesn’t address it adds to the lacunae of international legal accountability of IFIs.
The other fundamental flaw of the “breach of primary rule”/ “breach of primary obligation”
approach is that it is predicated on an interactional view of reality. Its assumption is that any
conduct that does not honour internationally recognized obligations constitutes wrongfulness for
which the responsibility of an actor is invoked. Yet, such a traditional international law view of
breach is too linear and does not account for distributive injustices. Distributive injustices such as
poverty and inequality are sanctioned by rules and policies which are otherwise lawfully made by
international institutions within their enabling regimes. Even though such policies could have
produced impugned outcomes (breach), such as the failure to equitably and fairly allocate the
benefits and burdens of development, the resultant wrongfulness is not necessarily a consequence
of the easily disentangled and discernible conduct of actors. They are a consequence of the
entanglement of various policy actions whereby breaches are contingent on policy changes. They
take the form of policy effects that may take a considerably long time to manifest as violations.
Looking at such misallocations (maldistribution) from “a breach of primary obligation” approach
misses how the complex of distributive injustices are produced by the global policy system. Since
the definition of wrongful conduct is narrow, it excludes subsequent injuries and does not cover

For a view of rationality conflict, see Sebastian Oberthür, “Regime-Interplay Management” in Kerstin Blome,
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effects such as those resulting from policy actions that may constitute an unfavourable economic
environment hindering the realization of human rights.31
Furthermore, judicial practice of the international law of responsibility predominantly
reflects a statist understanding of the notion of “breach of primary obligations.” It is argued that
ARSIWA (and therefore DARIO) have come as a legacy of the aphorism that “if one attempts …
to deny the idea of State responsibility because it allegedly conflicts with the idea of sovereignty,
one is forced to deny the existence of an international legal order.”

32

Such a mindset has always

assured international organizations (such as IFIs) and private non-state actors a high degree of
safety from accountability. This pervasiveness of a statist understanding of the breach of primary
obligations, together with the question of locus standi, was reflected in the Ogoni case.33 Here, the
perception that states are the signatories to human rights instruments and therefore the only duty
bearers resulted in the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights resorting to the
technical interpretation of state responsibility, by which human rights obligations are deemed
incumbent only on states. In this case, Shell Petroleum Development Limited, an oil mining
consortium was accused of a range of indictable human rights misconduct, including
environmental degradation of the Ogoni land where its activities were concentrated. In its
reasoning that rights “generate at least four levels of duties” for the state, the Commission took
guidance from judicial precedents that set the expectation of the due diligence standard on the
state’s duty to protect.34 The due diligence rule originated in the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights in the case of Velὰsquez Rodríguez versus Honduras.35 In this case, it was held that:
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a State
(for example, because it is the act of a private person or because the person responsible has not
been identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself,

De Schutter, “A Fresh Start Towards Accountability”, supra note 29 at 17.
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Commission on Human and People’s Rights, Communication No. 155/1996 [Ogoni case] online:
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but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by
the Convention.36

It is this jurisprudence that has established what is now called the due diligence standard
that has gained judicial endorsement and practice across human rights jurisdictions.37 The due
diligence rule reflects the thinking that “the interpretation of human rights treaties has been shaped
in notable ways by the general law of State responsibility.”38 Relying on this rule in the Ogoni
case, the African Commission considered that it is the duty of the state to take positive measures
to enact legislation to protect people against violations, including restraining private parties from
inflicting human rights violations.39 That dictum therefore meant that Shell Petroleum
Development Corporation could not be held directly liable for massive violations of the rights of
the Ogoni people. Okafor points out that though the African Commission found indictable human
rights breaches that could be directly imputed on Shell Petroleum, its legally constrained decision
to interpret the duties as only incumbent on states meant that attribution of conduct for breach of
the Charter’s obligations could only target the Nigerian state.40
Put to its full effect, this form of derivative accountability is an embedment of and
justification for accountability disconnection and obstruction for private actors in international
law. It is this conservative understanding, based on the classical liberal conception of rights as
negative qualifications of state sovereignty, that has constructed and naturalized the conceptually
defective and functionally ineffective statist and state-based accountability regimes.41
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The statist conception of the law of responsibility (reflecting international institutions’
circumspection toward the assumption of primary obligations), which is captured in the notion that
the state is the “addressee” of, and has the onus (responsibility) to secure human rights protection,
is pervasive in judicial thinking in other jurisdictions. Take, for example, the judicial adjudication
of Greece’s structural adjustment and bailout measures. In Federation of Employed Pensioners of
Greece (IKA-ETAM) v Greece (hereinafter the Greece Troika case),42 the European Committee of
Social Rights (the Committee) found Greece liable for the cumulative effects of austerity measures
and conditionalities that offended social security protection. Even when it was clear that Greece
implemented those policies at the behest and with the oversight of the European Commission, the
European Central Bank, and the IMF (the Troika), the Committee adopted a statist understanding
of breach. Greece had argued that the structural reform measures it adopted in response to the
escalating economic catastrophe were specific obligations deriving from its contractual
agreements with the Troika, as antecedent conditions for the continuation of the financing
arrangement, for which it could exercise no control or direction.43 As a matter of fact, Greece
argued that the implementation of the bailout conditionalities were to be overseen directly by the
Troika.44 The austerity policies stipulated, among other reforms, drastic reductions in public
spending, privatization of public assets, and labour reforms as part of measures which would stem
the total collapse of the Greek economy.45 In the end, the measures worsened the economic
environment, causing massive socio-economic havoc that further limited Greece’s social welfare
spending capacity.46
The Committee rejected the contentions that the Troika bailout conditions were more
determinative of the outcomes or that Greece lacked any policy discretion or autonomy on those
42
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bailout packages. Indeed the Committee found no breach on the part of the Troika in the ratio that
“the requirements of [such] legal obligations does not remove them from the ambit of the
Charter”47 and “that despite the later international obligations of Greece, there is nothing to absolve
the state party from fulfilling its obligations under the 1961 Charter.”48 This seems to be a
conservative statist reading of the obligations incumbent on international organizations. It is one
that legitimizes the IFIs avoidance of human rights obligations. It ensures that IFIs are
disconnected from scrutiny or oversight for harms related to their interventions in the economies
of weak nation-states. Even when their interventions in weak economies are so direct, visible, and
determinative of the adverse outcomes, through “meanings” applied in practice, international law
constructs doctrines that assure international institutions safe distance from accountability.
The Greece-Troika and the Ogoni cases are a classic study of how international law,
through its doctrines and practices, rationalizes international institutions’ avoidance of and
disconnection from accountability.49 Such a rationalization is explicit in the anachronism that the
state has a duty to honour obligations entailed in human rights even when acting as constituent
members of international organizations. This anachronism ignores the reality that IFIs are
nowadays in the driver’s seat in the perpetration of socio-economic injustices through predatory
development interventions. This anachronism, however, assures a safety and disconnection from
accountability when IFIs are the objects of censure in development. These cases further illustrate
that the reason for the avoidance, and the substantial rebuttal of rights by IFIs, has some political
underpinning to it. It ensures that parochial goals that IFIs champion, and which do not comport
with the social objectives of development, can always go unquestioned.
Happily, by now, a daunting number of experiences with global development institutions,
as the Greece-Troika case demonstrates, have cast doubt on the dominant Western-Liberal notions
of the international legal accountability of IFIs. Different philosophical accounts continue to
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discount the traditional assumptions of human rights theory. They maintain that these theories
misconceive the historiography, philosophy, and functions of rights.50 Some maintain that the
objects of human rights can be expanded to constrain market supremacy.51 Notwithstanding this
dissension, however, the articulation and practice of the language of human rights obligations, and
the doctrines of law that ground them, inescapably bear the imprint and permanent cast of Western
Liberalism. The disavowal of obligations as primary rules incumbent on international institutions
continues unabated. This is so even as contemporary pluralist accounts emphasize that in a world
of multi-variegated value systems, there certainly are manifold political and moral lenses through
which the human rights paradigm can be deployed in the remediation of global distributive
injustices.52
The focus on the state in the conceptualization of breach is as overwhelming as it is
vehement in its denial of the direct human rights obligations of international institutions. This
spiral of denial is so stark and yet has not drawn serious attention, even in the very articulation of
the 2011 Maastricht ETO Principles.53 Oddly still, for its exclusive focus on state conduct within
intergovernmental organizations, the Maastricht ETO Principles, like the Tilburg Principles,54 do

Only a few scholarly work can be mentioned in this space: Arjun Sengupta, “Poverty Eradication and Human
Rights” in Thomas Pogge, Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Poor (UNESCO; Oxford;
New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 328. He argues that in any case, the Lockian conception of rights stands
evacuated of soundness. Sengupta pointed out that historical accounts that confined rights to relationships of power
between the individual and the state were at all time baseless. In his view, historicity of human rights show that rights
were “foundational norms of a society, [entailing] obligations for all agents or members of the society, whose actions
can have an impact on the fulfilment of the rights.” Steven Ratner, “Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of
Legal Responsibility” (2001) 111:3 Yale LJ 443 at 468 also argues that the focus on states as the sole duty bearers is
highly doubtable even from Locke’s contractarian conception of the state and rights. Taking a specific and exclusive
cultural standpoint, Makau Mutua has argued that there exists African communitarian notions of human rights, an
approach that differs fundamentally from the Western conception. Western understanding, he argues, is sorely limited
and incomplete. Makau Mutua, Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2002) at 72-73,80.
51
Margot E Salomon, “Challenges of Market Primacy for the Human Rights Project” in Wouter Vandenhole ed,
Challenging Territoriality in Human Rights: Building Blocks for a Plural and Diverse Duty-Bearer Regime (London
& New York: Routledge, 2015) at 188-204.
52
Philip Alston, “Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control’ (1984) 78 Am J of Intl L 615
urges that “rights should reflect a fundamentally important social value; be relevant, inevitably to varying degrees,
throughout a world of diverse value systems … be capable of achieving a very high degree of international consensus.”
53
“Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”
2011. For this critique see Vandenhole, “Obligations and Responsibilities”, supra note 4 at 129.
54
Willem Van Genugten, “Tilburg-GLOTHRO Guiding Principles on the World Bank Group, the International
Monetary Fund and Human Rights” in The World Bank Group, the IMF and Human Rights: A Contextualized Way
Forward, ed (Intersentia, 2015) 55.
50

208

not adequately interrogate the dominant state-centric human rights praxis.55 The dominant
understanding is that for there to be a breach, one must seek to find responsibility either territorially
or extraterritorially, based on the international law principle that states have territorial (national)
and extraterritorial (international) human rights obligations.56
For the extraterritorial method of ascertaining responsibility, the assumption is that while
acting within the decision-making framework of international institutions, states’ conduct
adversely impacts the enjoyment of human rights in other countries, for which they should be
jointly or severally held responsible. This fixation on the state endures, even when the debate on
extraterritoriality signals the manipulative agency and culpability of international institutions in
the perpetuation of development injustices.
Thus, it is not difficult to see these restatements of the law of extraterritorial human rights
obligations as missing the structural contingency dynamic. They do not reflect the institutional
cosmopolitan view of rights obligations as constraining all social schemes and institutions.57 For
instance the Maastricht Principles state in the preamble that “human rights of individuals, groups
and peoples are affected by and dependent on the extraterritorial acts and omissions of States.”
This view misses the crucial dynamic that some violations are embedded in the kind of institutional
schemes that govern inter-state relations. Therefore, to have an institutional view is to be aware
that international organizations are nowadays in the driver’s seat in the perpetration of socioeconomic injustices through predatory development interventions.
In conclusion, circumspection toward the normativity of human rights in the international
organizations’ context, is predominant even in the conceptualization and practice of the law of
responsibility of these bodies. This is proven by the experience that statist understandings permeate
the very interpretation and application of the concept of breach/wrongfulness. Articulated through
idioms such as due diligence (or derivative accountability) or extraterritoriality, such
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rationalizations are designed to shield IFIs from the normative practices of human rights
obligations.
It seems to me, therefore, that what classical international law regards as the avoidance of
the mixing of categories has today become a justification for IFIs avoidance of and disconnection
from accountability at the first level of the specification of obligations and performance criteria.

4.2

Circumspection Towards the Assignment of Direct and Distinct Responsibility of
International Organizations for Wrongful Conduct

4.2.1 The Intermingle Effect and Accountability Obstruction
I want to revisit my discussion in chapter 2 of the structural contingency of development as a
crucial aperture to understanding how international law complicates the process of establishing the
direct and distinct responsibility of IFIs for wrongful conduct done jointly with others. I want to
explain how this phenomenon permits IFIs’ avoidance of and disconnection from accountability
in development. Underlying the structural contingency dynamic is the fact that global factors, in
their interface with domestic conditions, are the engines of economic growth, or of development
defined in economistic terms. This is what I mean when I say that the realization of the RTD—or
a rights-based international framework—is structurally contingent on global systemic factors.58
As I explained in chapter 2, due to levels of interdependence and interconnectedness in the global
economy, decisions of significant effect are made at the global stage through lawful (if not always
legitimate) processes, through arrangements in which supranational institutions have assumed
what are all-too-often the most determinative roles.59
The determinative and manipulative character of global over national factors is due, in
large part, to their great impact on the production, distribution, and allocation of both economic
endowments and rewards in the respective countries to which the policies, regulations, or rules are
applied.60 That policy decisions of supranational institutions are always the most consequential as
58
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they intermesh with actions of state bureaucracies at various levels in the national contexts is one
issue that I underscored as an important consideration in accountability praxis.61 Thus, global
determinants are seen as an overweening force that has precipitated “a pervading sense of
impotence” on the regulatory capacity of nation-states and that “no economy can any longer be
national” in the traditional statist fashion, the statist structures and autonomy having been
subordinated by the assignment of vital functions to supranational institutions.62
The shriveled autonomy of the state is an important factor in rethinking accountability
relationships in development. This is because of an important concept that the law of responsibility
refers to as “control.” As I am about to expound, the RTD episteme introduces the perspective that
in instances of global structural violations we cannot focus only on single-cause, single-effect
mechanisms and direct cases of control.
While focusing on international organizations as institutions exercising “international
public authority,”63 we must reflect on a complex policy system. Such a policy system has multiple
undifferentiated actors, complex causal chains of events, and different kinds of control (exerted by
different social agents) that result in multifaceted consequences. The complex global economic
system is characterized by the “entanglement” of global and the national policy factors in the
production of distributive injustices. The idea of entanglement refers to the “imbrication of
institutions, the intertwining of different sets of actors, national and global, local and global” to
shape the trajectories and structures of inequality and poverty in national contexts.64 Often, the
rules, structures, and processes of the global economy have no consequence in national contexts
except when they interact and amalgamate with decisions, policies, and regulatory frameworks of
states. This interface produces various outcomes, some intended and beneficial, and others
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unintended, unforeseeable, or harmful to human development. This complex is what I call the
intermingle effect, which presents the second puzzle to the ex-post apportioning of responsibility
for wrongfulness.65 The intermingling complexity mainly complicates the domain of legal redress
in international legal accountability, which relies on the (linear) precepts of DARIO and ARSIWA.
The puzzle is that of attributing wrongful conduct to an actor in circumstances in which actions of
a plurality of actors combine in intricate intermingling processes to produce varied outcomes.
The intermingle phenomenon poses obstruction to accountability by making actors
invisible and wrongfulness indiscernible in entangled processes. What this obstructive dimension
implies is that when assessing levels of actors’ responsibility for distributive injustices (poverty
and inequality) in an interactional account, one cannot quite accurately specify the offending
action, discern their relevant causes or identify a (single or joint) responsible and most culpable
actor/s to hold accountable for the wrongful acts ex-post. This is due to the multicausality of
factors, the implication of several rules, policies, and processes, and the multidimensionality of
distributional outcomes in structural processes. It is this intermingling that effectively defies the
normative precepts of ascertaining responsibility. That is to say, the intermingle effect renders
wrongful conduct indeterminate, the identity of responsible actors unknowable, the chain of
causation indiscernible, and wrongful conduct unattributable to actors, whether jointly or
severally.66
In international law, the discussion by the ILC of the main legal precepts of responsibility
ascertainment lacks a deep appreciation of, and does not pay significant attention to, the
intermingle effect. The law of responsibility is basically interactional, obsessed with wrongful
conduct or omission, to the point that it neglects to account for the “engendered deprivations.” In
the section that follows, I discuss this issue.

4.2.2 Attribution of Wrongful Conduct
Under Article 4 of DARIO, internationally wrongful conduct is constituted by two elements: an
act or omission that: (a) is attributable to an international organization under international law; and
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(b) constitutes a breach of international obligation binding on the organization. The first element
requires that for wrongful conduct to be attributable, it must be an act or omission on the part of
an identifiable international institution.67 The second element of the rule of attribution is that the
wrongful conduct or omission leads to a breach of an international obligation. Put differently, this
rule of attribution requires that some acts or omissions be regarded as wrongful conduct
constituting a breach of international norms and standards (primary rules). Such acts ought to have
been performed by the international organization when they aid or assist (Article 14) or direct and
control (article 15) another international organization or a state in committing the wrongful act.
The requirement that an international organization assist, aid, direct, or control another institution
in the commission of the act is paramount for that act to be attributed to the international
organization. As some international jurisprudence holds, the position seems to be that for an IFI to
be said to be in control, there must be established some “ultimate authority and control” 68 in such
affairs. In most cases however, the legal test of ultimate authority and control is always not the
case, as what it means to control, direct, aid, or assist is not clear-cut in international economic
relationships. I demonstrate this claim below.

4.2.3 The Criteria of Control, Direct, Aid, or Assist
I want to emphasize that distributive injustices defy the linear assumptions of DARIO’s
conceptualization of what it means to control, direct, aid, or assist. In the multilateral context, the
implementation of policies by states do not often give rise to clear-cut cases in which a party’s
conduct leads to some identifiable consequence that can be regarded as a breach attributable to
identifiable international organizations or their agents. International institutions’ policies often
have indirect impact on outcomes within states. In international economic and financial
policymaking, I want to emphasize, there are rarely clear-cut and totally direct cases of actions or
conduct on the part of organs or agents of international organizations controlling, directing, aiding,
or assisting a state in the commission of wrongful conduct. What one would find are policy controls
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or subordination resulting from the intermingling of national and international rules, policies, and
institutions.
The challenge above attends to Article 6 of DARIO, which stipulates that it is conduct of
an agent or organ of an international organization in the performance of their functions that is
considered an act attributable to the international organization. In the expectation that an
international organization can control the state or another entity, DARIO defines organs of
international organizations as officials and other persons who act on behalf of international
organizations on the basis of functions that those organizations have conferred.69 The definition of
an agent of an international organization in Article 6 has been construed as wide enough to include
any person “charged by an organization with carrying out, or helping carry out, one of its
functions—in short any person through whom it acts.”70 The interpretation that the ILC has
adopted in its commentary places so much premium on control. It proposes that “Should persons
or groups of persons act under the instructions, or the direction or control, of an international
organization, they would have to be regarded as agents according to the definition given in
subparagraph (d) of article 2.”71
According to Articles 14 and 15 of DARIO, to attribute responsibility to an international
organization because of its acts or those of its agents or organs, it must direct or control or aid or
assist a state “with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful acts” and with
knowledge that “the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that organization.”
What is problematic is that one would be at great difficulty to find a situation where a state is at
the disposal of an international organization or where organs or agents of an international
organization are charged with policy implementation in the borrowing state. Typically, in
international economic and financial governance, direction or control or aid or assistance does not
take place in an interactional and linear fashion as conceived by the ILC. Control and direction
take subtle, but nevertheless recognizable forms, often in the fashion of knowledge technologies
or overt policy rationalities.72 A clear demonstration of this claim is suggested by the observation
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that developing states’ policy autonomies have shriveled and that weaker states cannot any longer
be said to be in control of allocating social and economic goods to their own peoples.
The interpretation that the ILC adopts is fraught with conceptual ambiguity. It does not
address whether states’ implementation of program conditionalities under the surveillance of the
IMF, which often shapes (and even defeats) the redistributionist work of developing countries,
constitutes direction or control in noncompliance with international obligations. One can see the
way international law’s basic precepts neglect the nature of control in complex international
economic relationships. In these arrangements, the circumstances that may constitute a wrongful
act are unknowable and there are no discernible acts that can be cited as internationally wrongful.
This kind of conceptual ambiguity is also apparent in the statement of the CESCR, which assumes
that states can assert themselves in their lending relations with IFIs so that programme
conditionalities do not force them to derogate from their duty to protect rights.73 Van Genugten
had criticized a similar position as being “vague and far from … outcome oriented.”74
In the ILC’s scheme, there are also situations in which the state can control the international
organization in the commission of a wrongful act. In fact, the express reference to the state as a
potential controller of international organizations appears in Article 61. This provision stipulates
that “[a state] member of an international organization incurs international responsibility if, by
taking advantage of the fact that the organization has competence in relation to the subject-matter
of one of the State’s international obligations, it circumvents that obligation by causing the
organization to commit an act that, if committed by the State, would have constituted a breach of
the obligation.” De Schutter appreciates this likely situation as applying to circumstances where a
state “seeks to avoid compliance with an international obligation by transferring powers to an
international organization and allowing it to take measures that run counter to such international
obligations.”75
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This interpretation seems to implicitly address the possibility of the state circumventing its
responsibility for binding decisions made by the international organization where the state has
caused the international organization to commit an internationally wrongful act in matters for
which the international organization has competence.76 Such avoidance is known as
“circumvention” by conduct of the state and includes those of abuses of powers related to or
failures to comply with incumbent obligations.77 The ILC commentary makes it clear that for the
state to be responsible in this way, the international organization must have competence over the
matter.78 The second condition is that there must be “a significant link” between the impugned
conduct of the state and that of the international organization.79 The third requirement is that of
intention, “of causing the organization to commit an act, if committed by the state would have
constituted a breach.”80 Article 61, according to van Genugten, is intended to curtail the mischief
of a sovereign state that may wish to circumvent incumbent obligations on the pretext of acting
within the veil provided by the IFI.
To the contrary, however, the possibility of a weak state circumventing its responsibility
by causing an international organization to commit a wrongful act is highly unlikely in
international economic and financial relationships between a developing state and an IFI. I
emphasize the context of international economic relations, not all other contexts. It is more likely,
and therefore prone to occur, that a Global North state may direct an international organization to
commit a particular act which binds the international organization concerned. The power map of
control at the Executive Boards which takes the form of a Global North>IFI>Global South clearly
illustrates this. I call this the first scenario. For example, due to its majority voting powers, the
United States may block a resolution of the World Bank or IMF’s Executive Board. By omission,
a vetoe wielding state may block a decision of the UN Security Council, thus hindering the
humanitarian interventions of the UN, an omission for which the UN as an international
organization may be held responsible.
But the reversal of power matrix to a second scenario of Global South>IFI>Global North
is more unlikely. That is, a situation of control of an international organization by a weak state
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would seldom arise in the context of development policy financing or stabilization lending
agreements. A necessary qualification must be made here. I am referring to control or direction of
an international organization by a weak or developing state in the context of development
financing. More likely than not, we always find that IFIs are in the driver’s seat, paternalistically
writing the terms of agreements when lending to developing states. While the first scenario of a
veto-wielding state controlling an international organization because of the voting-quota
asymmetries is real, the contrary is often too prevalent when it comes to developing countries.81
Even as the CESCR adopts the phraseology of the ILC for the interpretation that a state’s
“circumvention” of responsibility may arise in situations where the borrowing state fails to ensure
that the conditions attached to loans are not retrogressive and will not lead to violations of the
Covenant,82 we know that, in reality, this cannot be the case. I am underscoring the point that in
international economic governance, the kind of circumvention contemplated by Article 61 may
not be how circumvention of international obligations arise all the time, in all situations. As
structural contingency of development reveals, the global policy system usurps the national policy
infrastructure debilitating states’ capacities to exercise their will at the international level. A good
example is the structural adjustment programs designed by the IMF, but which a borrowing state
cannot alter given that the Board has more say than the state. There is therefore a greater likelihood
of control by IFIs in the usurpation of national policy space than the contrary. That Article 61
scenario remotely addresses such international economic reality cannot be gainsaid. We are all too
familiar with the way control is shaped by the totality of the global policy system marked by deep
economic and political power asymmetries.
More sophisticated problems of control in different aspects of relationships arise in Article
7 of DARIO on the requirement of “effective control,” a criterion that determines the actor to
whom conduct can be attributed. Article 7 provides that for there to be effective control “conduct
of organs of a State or organs of an international organization placed at the disposal of another
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international organization shall be considered an act of that international organization.”83 The legal
test for establishing control seems to rely on the question of “at the disposal of.” But the complex
issue relates to who may be said to be at the disposal of an international organization for purposes
of attribution of conduct. ILC takes a catch-all position that “control” arises where an organ of a
state “may be fully seconded to that organization.”84 And this is where the blanket, one-size-fitsall approach of the international law of responsibility tremendously fails those who demand
development justice. The realization of this kind of justice ordained by the Declaration on the
Right to Development demands national and international conditions favourable to human-centred
development, participation and social justice and equity. A good example is international lending
conditionalities implemented by states through development policy programmes.
Whether the ILC’s “at the disposal” criterion is a kind of secondment that arises in most
kinds of economic relationships is very much open to question. This is so especially when we look
at the situations that the ILC relies on to construct the legal rule of “at the disposal of.” The ILC
emphasizes that the “practice relating to peacekeeping forces is particularly significant in the
present context.”85 It is apparent that the legal rule, and its test that the ILC advocates, has
antecedence in the application of armed force. It seems to have been crafted from some principle
of the command-and-control kind of relationships often witnessed in situations of military and
armed conflict. Keenly observed, economic or commercial kinds of relationships did not feature
in the ILC’s considerations of control.
A keen reading of commentary to Article 7 illustrating the legal concept of “at the disposal
of” would inevitably reveal an abstract doctrinal discussion of factual control of conduct. The
situations discussed by the ILC are those of physical actions, such as armed conflict or
peacekeeping missions, in which military agents of the state may be placed at the disposal of an
international organization and vice versa.86 I invite the reader to examine the cases under review
in the commentaries to articles 7 and 61 of DARIO. One would notice that the ILC’s homogenizing

Compare with Article 8 of ARSIWA: “The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a
State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instruction of, or under the
direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.”
84
DARIO, general commentary 1 to Article 7.
85
DARIO, general commentary 7 to Article 7.
86
See e.g Matteo Tondini, “‘The Italian Job’: How to Make International Organizations Compliant with Human Rights
and Accountable for their Violation by Targeting Member States” in Jan Wouters et al, eds, Accountability for Human
Rights Violations by International Organization (Antwerp; Portland: Intersentia, 2010) at 180-190.
83

218

emphasis and criteria of “who has effective control over the conduct in question”87 was derived
from the Nicaragua case.88 This case involved physical combat in armed conflict where the United
States were alleged to have supported military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua
in violation of international obligations.
As pointed out by Van Genugten, the discussion in Article 7 may not be neatly extrapolated
to extraterritorial socio-economic violations sanctioned by structural relationships.89 Essentially,
the most pivotal point to be derived from this insight is that other forms of control not grasped by
the descriptive legal language of the ILC do exist. Take, for instance, the IMF and Bank’s debt
sustainability benchmarks, which analyze a country’s debt portfolio and propose restructuring
according to methodologies and frames of reference predetermined by these twin institutions. The
nature of control in issue here is that of knowledge as a technology of control, apart from its utility
as a crucial element for development and economic productivity indicators.90 Knowledge is a form
of manipulative control; it is neither a coercive kind of control nor that of aid, assistance, or
direction stipulated in Articles 14, 15, and 16.
A good example is that a borrowing country will qualify for debt relief, restructuring, or
further international borrowing from private, bilateral, or development institutions only if its policy
documents meet the prescribed benchmarks of the Bank and IMF. Mark you, these benchmarks
are often detached and do not “capture real situations” of developing countries.91 This kind of
indirect control, whereby IFIs stand at some distance from visibility in policy mainstreaming—as
well as discussion of which actor is at whose disposal—is missing in the ILC’s debate on control.
As a form of control, governance through knowledge is distinct from the command-and-control
kind that has crystallized as a legal test in the international law of responsibility. The Nicaragua
rule of “effective control” is inapplicable to all these contexts.
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Okonjo-Iweala, the then Nigerian Finance Minister documents a good example of how
Nigeria was in 2004 drawn into a subtle yet manipulative control dynamic by the entrenched global
policy system. This case witnessed a clash of values between the Paris Club, the Bank, and the
IMF, on the one hand, and Nigerian technocrats, on the other, during debt cancellation
negotiations. The issue was what policy commitments were necessary to meet the Millennium
Development Goals, which Nigeria was keen on implementing while honouring the debt service
agreements spelt out in the Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) frameworks of the Bank and IMF.
The World Bank relied on one of its standard policy instrument, the Bank-Fund Low Income DSA
to illustrate the preconceived view that high spending on MDGs would lead to a “sizeable
insolvency problem” that even debt cancellation would not alleviate.92 Even though Nigeria would
later end up with a 60% debt relief package from the Paris Club on June 29, 2005, attributable to
a number of factors, including intense lobbying by social movements, the fact that the agreement
was subject to a number of standard terms to be negotiated by the IMF Board meant that Nigeria
was not in full control of the process of formulation or the subsequent development of policy
programmes that it would implement.93 Control lay somewhere in between the knowledge
asymmetries (between Nigeria and Bretton Woods Institutions). It also lay in the debt restructuring
instruments (DSA) wielded by the hegemonic development partners, whose consent and
endorsement was key to Nigeria’s economic rejuvenation.94
The Nigeria’s fight for debt relief and Greece economic catastrophe amid encounters with
development agencies tell a much different story of control in development policy practice, a story
that departs from all the discussions by the ILC. The fact that standard policies always espouse the
neoclassical creed of the market and a fetishized way of understanding Third World economies
means that there is, indeed, a different form of control that international law of responsibility for
wrongfulness ought to account for. This scenario of restricted policy space reeks of a hegemonic
praxis, of a dictated state retreat in the economy (reverse dirigisme). It is always unnoticeable that
distributive outcomes are themselves strongly conditioned and structured by external and intrusive
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forms of control that situate states in institutional and material conditions of malleability. Such
malleability renders them incapable of exercising their own autonomy or control in policy
mainstreaming. This is one way the global policy system wrests control and autonomy out of the
hands of Third World peoples.95 This scenario suggests that the kind of control we are talking
about is not “effective control” or “exclusive command.”96 And yet international law’s conceptions
and assumptions make no mention of such subtle control.
Sande Lie’s ethnographic study of Uganda’s development policy practice and interaction
with the World Bank is another work that reveals subtle and manipulative control in development.
He argues that recipient states are seen to be in control, but in a real sense they are often not in
control. They are amenable to accountability to the donors because:
the donor may have renounced their dominant position, but they retain control, albeit indirectly,
by: instigating the processes and objectives, framing and thereby limiting the degree of freedom
and room for manouvre by upholding their means to sanction deviant or non-discursive practice;
and administering and monitoring the partnership arrangement.97

Sande Lie uncovers for international lawyers the façade of freedom in control that attends
to global partnerships and development cooperation. He argues that aid conditionality is a “more
tacit and indirect form that allows for continued donor control over the developmental process.”98
He notes that this mode of control stirs a large degree of problem. It comes across as an
“individualizing-cum-totalizing” hold whereby donors, although they “give up control, they also
retain it through other means.”99
The façade of freedom in control is a reminder that the ILC’s criterion of “factual control”
is conceptually limited, or it at least not in grips with certain facets of economic injustice. As a
matter of fact, indirect and invisible control through knowledge technologies as a form of
governance from a distance is the norm in the contemporary neoliberal world order. Knowledge
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technologies have come to reflect a broader paradigm of IFIs’ construction of hegemony that is
rooted in the Bank’s and the IMF’s perceived prudential terms and policies. These policies and
instruments exert a different kind of control of the state.100 Development scholarship excavates
this subtle and invisible form of control that still resides outside the cognitive senses of
international lawyers, perhaps due to disciplinary blind spots. They inform us that the kinds of
control in the international development realm are subtle and interwoven into the fabric of
economic relations.
I am belabouring the simple point that in structural arrangements, economic policy
programs written in agreements engender structural violations. Because of the structural nature of
the violations, the situation of deprivation is not always so clear-cut as to directly point at a chain
of causation or a party in control of the policy apparatuses. Certainly, one would not plausibly
differentiate actors in “effective control” in the manner contemplated by Article 7. In structural
relationships, causalities are multiple (multicausality). Outcomes (largely distributive) also tend to
be multidimensional. The effect is that a catch all standard of control with in-built criteria
constructed by clear-cut cases may not fully capture these dynamics. The justification for this claim
lies in what Pogge calls the “many cooperating causes” that influence one another, making it harder
for actors to predict and avoid the effects of their conduct.101 This phenomenon clouds all genuine
efforts aimed at assigning responsibility. As Marion concluded, one cannot possibly “trace how
each person’s actions produce specific effects on others because there are too many mediating
actions and events.”102
I am therefore suggesting that the legal rules of DARIO on control, direction, aid,
assistance, and attribution may not get traction outside of military or peacekeeping situations, that
is, in situations that lack command structures. In these cases, agents of the state or the international
organization may not physically/factually be placed at the disposal of the other. The form of
control, direction, aid, or assistance in international economic governance is that of indirect
control, where the real influential actors stay at a distance from policy administration or
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implementation. By this distancing, IFIs are invisible and invisibilized from accountability. What
enables IFIs to stay in the shadows of policy implementation are newly minted idioms and jargons
in use in development such as conditionalities, PRSPs, PRGFS, operational policies and directives,
surveillance and so forth. Therefore, to look at the responsibility for poverty and inequality in
actions and conduct of actors, within the parameters of DARIO, is to rely on irrelevant analogues.

4.2.4 The Criteria of Causation and Shared Responsibility
The other puzzle is that of tracing chains of causation of harms in the complex interface of a
plurality of actions. I want to emphasize, yet again, that the challenge to the application of general
precepts of causation also arises in the context of the structural dynamics of violations. Structural
violations have no clear or direct links of causation to specific actors. This is because the
outcomes/effects involved are “engendered deprivations” and not harms “established by
conduct.”103 Whereas conduct can lead to discernible outcomes, engendered harms are
multidimensional effects of policy decisions of many actors made jointly with others and often
implemented within the ambit of competing legal regimes. Not a single agent can be cited as
responsible for the outcomes produced by an institutional system of multiple causalities. The
networked institutional system brings about an indiscernibility crisis in attempts to trace causal
explanations of events and differentiate responsible actors for aggregated actions. This crisis
results from the multicausality and multidimensionality of harms, or what is referred to elsewhere
as “the paradox of many hands.”104
There is therefore a need to appreciate the context of violations and the nature of a right in
question. The need for a sensitivity to context specificity and exclusivity is captured in Pogge’s
argument that in the integrated global economic order where many actions intermesh and various
actors mediate, it is implausible to discern what actions have caused what effects, or what exactly
those effects are:
This is unknowable because, as they reverberate around the globe, the effects of my economic
decisions intermingle with the effects of billions of decisions made by others, and it is impossible
to try to disentangle, even ex post, the impact of my decision from this vast traffic by trying to
figure out how things would have gone had I acted differently.… This pervasive feature of modern
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economic systems shifts attention from the responsibilities of individual agents to that of other
causal factors affording sufficient visibility.105

The indiscernibility and unknowability crisis that Pogge talks of strikes at the heart of the
interpretation of ARSIWA and DARIO’s precept of causation.106 Causation is a key ingredient of
the determination of whether responsibility is individual, joint, several or shared or “separate but
shared.” According to ARSIWA, in cases “where several States are responsible for the same
internationally wrongful act, the responsibility of each State may be invoked in relation to that
act.”107 Article 48 of DARIO replicates this ambiguous formulation of separate but shared
responsibility for joint conduct with a state or another international organization. These provisions
envisage a situation in which the attribution of primary responsibility for joint conduct of an
international organization and a state would be to the state or the international organization
concerned. In the case of ARSIWA, wrongfulness would be attributable to the state or the
international organization, consistent with the individualized notion of state responsibility. Some
scholars have argued that this rule is predicated on the idea that it is the state whose responsibility
is engaged, regardless of the fact that other actors are responsible for the same act.108 This approach
of separate but shared responsibility still seems so mechanical that it would be so unsatisfactory in
fixing the often-missing causal nexus between wrongful conduct and an outcome of violations in
assessing an international organization’s international responsibility in connection with the joint
act of a state. Could this signal a failure of causation?
Indeed, some have even argued that in talking about shared responsibility for joint conduct,
we are talking about the failure of causation. D’Aspremont takes the position that it is precisely
because of the failure of causation that we cannot answer the question of whether the attribution
of wrongfulness is for shared, overlapping, or joint responsibility for the damage suffered. 109 He
emphasizes that absent any theory of shared responsibility, the paralysis of causation will
105
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continually point more in the direction of the indistinguishability of responsibility than the
impossibility of shared responsibility. While Article 48 of DARIO stipulates the attribution of
primary responsibility for joint conduct of an international organization and a state to the state and
the international organization concerned, it does not address the crucial question of the
indistinguishability of responsibility. The lacuna is that of the inability to devise a tool for
distinguishing the extent of responsibility of respective actors in circumstances of joint conduct or
multiple and indistinguishable causation. It is this lacuna that inevitably leads to the default
position of shared responsibility.
The fact that there are no definite legal standards or tests for distinguishing responsibility
in international economic relationships may avail a possibility for actors to insulate themselves by
covering their conduct in others’ actions.110 This may portend the undesirable outcome that some
perpetrators, who may be the most influential actors and to whom causation covertly point, are
excused from accountability. Indeed, this is typical in international financing agreements. In such
cases, even though the terms are at the behest of IFIs, they are masked from visibility because they
have no remit in policy implementation and therefore cannot share any responsibility with
domestic organs. This shortcoming of the shared responsibility principle (in the face of the failure
of causation) shows how international law discourse rationalizes a disconnection from
accountability when it comes to IFIs’ responsibility for harms.
Indeed, as one commentator argues, shared responsibility that points at failure of causation
is more of an exception than a general rule in international law. Vandenhole argues that ARSIWA
inclines strongly toward independent and direct accountability of the state, in accord with
international law tradition.111 Accordingly, therefore, he argues, precepts of separate but shared
responsibility that DARIO replicates in article 48 are arguably alien to the international law
language of responsibility. He argues that “an incremental development of a legal regime of shared
responsibility … is unlikely to happen” because the law of state responsibility treats this as a
limited exception to the general rule. In his view, the general rule, which is the convention in
international law, is that of direct, distinct, and individual responsibility of the state. Thus, for
Vandenhole, DARIO makes this reintroduction of shared responsibility, if only to disturb the
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settled principle, making the exception the rule “at the price of disrupting the homogeneity of
international responsibility law.”112
If the exception is being made the general rule when dealing with a complex problem of
indistinguishability of responsibility, then Article 48 either suffers from an anomaly in its
calibration or serves some motive. Even if speculative, we can clearly decipher international law’s
rebuttal of direct responsibility of international organizations through such idioms as shared
responsibility, when actually that principle is an exception to the norm. As argued by d’Aspremont,
the situation of shared responsibility contemplated by DARIO actually implies a functional defect
of the principle of causation as the foundational principle of the law of responsibility.113 The defect
is a deliberate one, of making the exception be the general rule.
No matter how one may reframe the issue, the undeniable fact has been made without
exaggeration. The point is that such a defect supposes that joint wrongful conduct and its outcome
cannot be discerned and responsibility cannot be allocated when actors cannot be differentiated.
Such indiscernibility shows that international law cannot cure the accountability obstructive
dimensions of networked structures. International law does not provide adequate formula for
distinguishing and sharing responsibility commensurate to an actor’s contribution to the harm.
This anomaly arises from the technical formulation of the doctrine of causation in a way that cannot
articulate a method for differentiating actors or rendering them visible for responsibility allocation.
The same logic applies to the apportionment of blameworthiness in a manner commensurate with
influence or degree of control. DARIO perfects this penumbra in the law, making IFIs invisible
and invisibilized when their responsibility is sought to be allocated.
This dynamic of the failure of causation in collective decisions is the case when dealing
with weak states or those whose autonomies are more often constrained by the hegemonic
international development policy praxis. This is the reason some have sounded caution that shared
responsibility should not always be invoked so readily, since, as experience shows, there may well
be exceptional situations where either of the actors to whom responsibility is apportioned had no
“individual agency or power to prevent the wrongful conduct.”114 This sympathetic outcry casts
its lot mainly with the state, especially a weak one. A weak state, especially in the Third World,
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may not always be in a position to get its way when dealing with a powerful international
organization. The ultimate point raised by this consciousness is that one should not blame the
victim or assign to it shared responsibility for the acts of the predators. Assuring as it is, its flipside
is that differentiation of the responsibility of international organizations for wrongful conduct in
multilateral contexts would still remain unsettled.115 It is the reason why new legal criteria such as
“complicity” and “influence” are being proposed to augment or even correct the blind spots and
penumbras of DARIO’s shared responsibility rule.116 Sadly, these two principles have not been
embraced even in the judicial decisions examining non-economic relationships.
Sympathies with a weak state aside, there would be many cases of victimization of helpless
non-complicit states. As interestingly, many of them continue to be called upon to bear
responsibility for breaches that occur when they innocently implement agreements that they are
externally bound by and that they cannot extricate themselves from as a matter of discretion. A
good example of the case of demonizing the victim (the state) for the wrongful acts of the predator
(IFIs) can be cited from the European contexts. Take, for instance, the Greek Troika case, where
the IMF, the European Central Bank, and the European Commission were all absolved of
responsibility, and therefore avoided accountability for, socio-economic harms of the imposed
austerity measures. In the case of transnational corporations’ breaches, a good example is the
Ogoni case. Another case depicting the classic victim-blaming character of international law is the
Kadi case, where the EU Court of Justice held the EU responsible for implementing the UN antiterrorism resolutions that were at odds with the EU normative system.117 In a similar case, that of
Nada, Switzerland was held to have violated the European Convention on Human Rights for
implementing UN sanctions that were binding upon it as a matter of law and not choice.118
Clearly, the victim blaming psyche is the golden thread running throughout the fabric of
international law. This comes in the guise of shared responsibility for joint conduct. But more often
than not, the state is always the actor that is held responsible. Such statism is the marker with
which the international law of responsibility is etched. Its ultimate incarnation is in the Valequez
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v Honduras due diligence jurisprudence that valorizes “the state duty to protect” as the general
rule informing accountability in international law.119
It can be suggested that there are fundamental “failures” of a causality approach because it
does not take into account structural contexts. The causality approach will always not account for
the intermingle effect phenomenon. The reason is because the international law of responsibility
is linear and takes a one-size-fits-all approach that neglects the existence of special circumstances
in development-related matters. The special roles of IFIs, for instance, is one of the special
considerations that should have prevented the transposition of ARSIWA principles into the law of
responsibility of international organizations.120
Some international lawyers, however, are inclined to maintain an unwavering faith in the
causality approach. They argue for a case-by-case approach on the (mistaken) belief that “it is all
about establishing sufficient factual links between the decision and the (negative) outcomes, to be
done by independent third parties … leading to justifiable and reasonable outcomes.”121 This
“case-by-case approach,”122 based on the “reasonableness”123 standard, has its devoted exponents
out there. But its antagonists are quick to think that it does not convey a clear principle for
delineating the direct and distinct accountability of actors. Antagonists such as Skogly are already
questioning its soundness, suggesting that there are penumbras and blind spots in the regime of
responsibility as it is currently configured.124 They are already pointing out that the inability of the
international law of responsibility to decipher direct causation, delineate conduct, and apportion
responsibility to distinguishable actors in multilateral state institutions for the purpose of
apportioning liability may not be neatly resolved by linear standards of attribution of wrongfulness
in the traditional fashion.
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Skogly sounded an alarm over resorting to “a causality approach” to extraterritorial human
rights violations that occur through multilateral institutions.125 She elucidates that in “multilateral
setting, the direct causal effect between acts/omissions and human rights violations may be
difficult to establish.”126 Skogly drew on insights that, as yet, there is no legal tool in international
law for determining a linkage between a wrongful act and an actor, or what she refers simply as
“the determination of which acts and omissions actually led to” impugned outcomes.127 Skogly
would not stop there, though. Her reflections on this issue leave no doubt that the legal test for
assessing factual or legal causation with respect to the responsibility of one state or international
organization for rights violations in another state, however one may look at it, are not yet settled.
In fact, they are obscured by pure legal questions such as “remoteness,” “foreseeability,” or
“proximity.”128 Skogly underscores that these legal questions pose a quandary for distinguishing
actors, discerning causation, and allocating direct responsibility for wrongful conduct. She
underscores the fact of the intermingle effect in the law of international responsibility.
Establishing control for purposes of ascertaining chains of causation or retaining some
powers in the cycle of policy implementation defies even the robust attempts to broach ideas about
“contextual assessment of the factual circumstances” or consequences.129 Both causation and
foreseeability of harms are difficult to discern where the issues complained of are distributive
outcomes of a global policy system. The real problem, which none other than the ILC
acknowledges, is really whether such a situation in which multiple actors are responsible, and both
national and international policies are entangled, may be addressed by the technical reliance on a
causality approach:
Strict liability may alleviate the burden that victims may otherwise have, but it does not eliminate
the difficulties involved in establishing the necessary causal connection of the damage to the the
sources of the activity. Courts in different jurisdictions have applied the principles and notions of
proximate cause, adequate causation, foreseeability and remoteness of the damage. This is a highly
discretionary and unpredictable branch of law. Different jurisdictions have applied these concepts
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with different results. It may be mentioned that the test of proximity seems to have been gradually
eased in modern tort law. Developments have moved from strict conditio sine qua non theory over
the foreseeability (‘adequacy’) test to a less stringent causation test requiring only the “reasonable
imputation” of damage.130

That even the ILC recognizes the causality criterion as “an unpredictable branch of law,”
and that various jurisdictions have often not uniformly applied the standard, should in itself be a
warning shot that the operationalization of this principle is bound to be fraught with practical
challenges when claims of development justice are raised. It would be so problematic for those
who will go the route of enforcing the RTD to rely on the current law of international
responsibility. The RTD is a new norm that introduces the new perspective that structures, rules,
and processes are equally to blame as actors and should be interrogated in accountability
relationships. This is problematic because DARIO deals only with wrongful conduct. DARIO is
not concerned with the effects or damage produced by conduct or policies or whether those rules
and policies in themselves constitute wrongfulness.131 The fact that DARIO emphasizes only
conduct and not effects is problematic. It raises the question of how one can assign responsibility
for conduct only when the causal background of the acts are just as relevant for the attribution of
conduct, the assessment of responsibility of actors and the liability for the damages or injuries
incurred?

4.2.5 Summary Remarks
At this juncture, there are sufficient grounds to surmise that the DARIO regime is so minimalist
and restrictive and thus inadequately configured to be the legal basis for direct and distinct
accountability of institutions in development cooperation.
From a TWAIL perspective, the ILC’s conversations on DARIO are characteristic of the
very linear nature of international law, a law that fails to bring into purview major historical
happenings, particularly those of the Third World, in the narration and re-narration of the
development of international law.132 DARIO for example was purposively designed as an analogue
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of state responsibility. During its codification, Ian Brownlie noted that “[l]ooking at the topic
against the background of the Commission’s work on State responsibility, it was clear that, while
one must guard against the use of facile analogues, past work on other topics should not be
ignored.”133 The fact that DARIO deals with complex international organization and still replicated
state responsibility norms implies that it relies on irrelevant and facile analogues. It is this reliance
on facile and irrelevant analogues that makes international law incomplete. As Moldner explains,
the principal reason for ILC’s codification of precepts constituting DARIO was to give effect to
the customary law principle that responsibility follows the breach of an international norm.134 The
motivation to give life to a widely accepted principle seems to have been behind the ILC’s decision
to formulate principles governing the responsibility of international organizations.135 ILC thus
seems to have been driven by keeping fidelity to customary international law developed in the
context of state responsibility.136 The dominant discourse of customary law, as Chimni explains,
tends to take an ethnocentric view of reality, reflecting values and thought processes forged within
Western worldviews.137 The yet unexplained side of this bounded perception is accountability
avoidance and disconnections. This is exemplified in the IFIs circumspection toward obligations
and the direct allocation of responsibility for wrongful development processes, rules, policies and
outcomes. While IFIs proliferate economic standards for the implementation of development that
have proven to be detrimental to the very people they are intended to help, there has not been any
propensity to redesign principles of law to address this anomaly. As the chasm between
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international law and Third World realities continue, we continue to witness the “cruel logics of
social exclusion and abiding communities of misfortune.”138
This chapter has critiqued the basic precepts of DARIO in order to highlight the evolution
of the rules of international law that often do not take account of Third World situations.139
DARIO’s doctrines depict the deployment of versions of law and history that completely ignore
non-Western experiences in its characteristic marginalization of the rest.140 And yet, with the
glaring ambiguities and silences, the universalization of DARIO has been articulated as if its
precepts were hewn out of common practices of all peoples of the world, even when the contrary
is indeed true.
The fact that DARIO precepts were not honed on the basis of common practices of all
societies is manifested in the dominant feature that the law of responsibility of international
organizations has been forged from the law of state responsibility, itself reflecting customary state
practices. On this account, DARIO as the progeny of the law of state responsibility remains
handicapped by the “limited availability of pertinent practice.”141 I may add that there is an absence
of practice in a wide range of areas and aspects, such as human rights and international economic
relationships. Accordingly, such oversights in the evolution and rigid conceptualization of precepts
calls into question whether DARIO principles may provide a workable framework for the
allocation of direct responsibility for structural violations inherent in the global policy system.
It is therefore plausible to surmise that the law of international responsibility, “a corollary
of international law,”142 has been neither integral nor adequate to a proper understanding of the
way accountability for development injustices ought to be recalibrated and reformulated. Perhaps
the reason lies nowhere else than in the reflections that law cannot address that which has not been
put within reach of its cognitive grasp. As Weeramantry notes, “law is not an omnipotent
instrument, law can only control matters that lie within the reach of its formalized principles and
prohibitions, and of its ability to oversee and punish.”143 Questions of how the intermingle effect
138
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obstructs accountability and ensures an accountability disconnection for IFIs have not been
adequately explored in the theory and practice of the law of international responsibility.

5. CONCLUSION
The conclusion of this chapter is that international law legitimizes and operationalizes
circumspection toward direct and distinct obligations, responsibility, and accountability of IFIs. It
follows, accordingly, that the international law of responsibility is ill-formulated and conceptually
flawed to ordain direct and distinct accountability of IFIs for development injustices. Secondly,
international law of responsibility is fraught with profound and deliberate disconnections and
avoidance of accountability, most acutely in relation to IFIs.

Thirdly, and regarding the

disconnections, the indictment goes to the very root of the premises of the international law of
responsibility, which is so linear that it omits a distributive understanding of violations in
development practices. In effect, these imperfections lend credence to the suspicion that the
universalization of the debate on DARIO as the normative framework of the legal accountability
of IFIs is a facile discourse of accountability. This discourse serves to mask deeply rooted
responsibility avoidance and evasions. Said differently, international law rationalizes and
legitimizes the accountability disconnections, obstruction, and obliteration insofar as hegemonic
international institutions are the objects of legitimate censure and indignation from the Third
World. As a result, it is doubtful whether the international law of responsibility, a derivative of
Western thinking, can be counted upon, unproblematically, to secure development justice. Can the
international law of responsibility secure a world free of poverty and reduce inequality through its
mechanics and precepts of accountability? As this chapter demonstrates, DARIO’s normative
potential to achieve this objective is very doubtful. I proceed in the next chapter to explain why
these regimes are unsuited and ill-adapted to the task of securing development justice. It is in the
next chapter that I substantiate the legitimate concerns that international law produces and
reproduces accountability regimes that cannot guarantee the protection of Third World peoples
against the vagaries of neoliberal development policies.
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CHAPTER SIX
FIRMING UP THE BACKBONE OF THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT REGIME-IN
AID OF DEVELOPMENT JUSTICE
1. INTRODUCTION
To provide a needed background to this chapter, the claims made in chapters 3, 4, and 5 warrant a
brief rehash. The principal argument in these chapters was that contemporary international
accountability practices in the development realm are, as currently conceived, inadequate for the
task of delivering development justice. I maintained that international law and its praxis legitimizes
the avoidance of, a disconnection from, and the obstruction of, the direct and distinct accountability
of international financial institutions (IFIs) for their interventions in the global economy and the
development realm. In addition, the point was made that internal accountability praxis of the
relevant international institutions is mired in an unsatisfactory conception of accountability as the
redress of harms resulting from their non-compliance with operational procedures and directives.
This retention of the traditional idea and regime of legal accountability for such bodies, I argued,
is the normative shortcoming that renders the relevant regimes woefully inadequate in constraining
the global policy system as a structural impediment to rights-based development.
This chapter investigates ways through which we can strengthen the implementation of the
RTD through an efficacious accountability praxis. Firming up the backbone of the RTD
framework, I maintain, must entail focused attention to the crucial question of the accountability
of the most influential and unregulated IFIs engaged in global development practices.
One of the key theses advanced in this dissertation is developed in this last main chapter
of the work. Two main claims are pursued in this chapter. The first central contention, which builds
on the discussion from the previous chapters, is that the suitability and adaptability of the
fundamental premises of existing human rights accountability regimes are shaky and questionable
for the protection of the peoples of the Global South against global development injustices. I then
argue that to thus realize development justice for deserving recipients through the functionality of
accountability, the practice must (i) be contextually-aware, and (ii) account for the specific
character of the right in issue. An effective accountability mechanism, I argue, ought to take
account these two factors. It is through building upon this premise that I develop the notion of
participation from below as the basis for accountability in international law—not as the remedy to
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the severe limitations of international legal accountability, but as a pragmatic approach that can
appreciably supplement existing but ineffectual accountability regimes.
Throughout this chapter, I conduct a critique of the dominant concepts, doctrines, and
practices of accountability by remaining fidel to TWAIL techniques of centering the experiences
of the Third World into the analysis of international law, disavowing “glib universalism,”1 and
positing a counter-hegemonic critique of the dominant approaches of international law,2 including
challenging the subordinating character of international financial and economic governance.3
This chapter is divided into four sections. In the next section, I tease out the supporting
arguments for the main thesis that accountability praxis ought to (i) be contextually aware and (ii)
take into account the particularities of the right in question. Substantively, to theoretically and
factually ground this claim, I draw from the academic work that has retold and analyzed the
difficulties experienced by subalterns in the enforcement of socio-economic rights across Third
World jurisdictions such as Kenya, South Africa, and Colombia.4 In principle, contextual
awareness entails that accountability practice ought to appreciate the context, nature, and causes
of rights violation (e.g. whether interactional or institutional), while right specificity requires that
accountability for actualizing development justice must be sufficiently sensitive to the nature and
peculiarities of the undergirding norm (or the specific right in question). In section three, I rely on
these two factors as the basis for my scepticism toward an unquestioning embrace of the
standardized precepts of the international legal accountability that have grown out of the dominant
Liberal thinking and anti-sovereignty posturing tendencies of the Westphalian international legal
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order.5 I offer an explanation of how the distinctive traits of the RTD norm and the structural
contingency dynamic discloses the functional and conceptual limitations of the contemporary
accountability praxis of the IFIs global development institutions’ accountability praxis.
In section four, I proceed to develop the answerability prong of accountability by proposing
participation as accountability from below as the basis for firming up the backbone of the RTD
regime. The Declaration on the RTD embeds participation as a core attribute of a rights-based and
people-centric development practice. Accordingly, I argue that the RTD’s greatest contribution to
the international law of development, or its feature that can be optimally harnessed, is its
embedment of participation as accountability from below. Participation is an important aspect of
the answerability dimension of accountability. To strengthen answerability as accountability, I
draw upon a diversity of literature, from social movements and post-development scholarship, to
propose a theoretically and empirically grounded idea of participatory accountability from below,
a pragmatic alternative to “Western-derived” institutional models of accountability. This is the
interdisciplinary turn of this dissertation’s recommendations.

2. TWO DETERMINING FACTORS OF THE EFFICACY OF ACCOUNTABILITY
PRAXIS: THE CONTEXT OF VIOLATIONS AND THE NATURE OF THE
RIGHT
The main point of this sub-section is that the properties of the RTD should shape the
conceptualization of a normative accountability framework for the effective governance of IFIs.
In relation to this point, the foremost issue to emphasize is that there are indeed qualitative
distinctions of character as between rights. Variations of character immanent or assigned to each
right is an essential fact indispensable to, and influences the outcomes of, all the practices of
accountability or implementation.6 For instance, in the sphere of international legal accountability,
it has been suggested that “remedial discretion must be grounded in the overriding principle of
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effective remedy, and the unique character of human rights legislation, its broad purposes, distinct
provisions and administrative machinery.”7
The above point captures the idea that for efficacious accountability outcomes, remedial
measures must be contextualized, accounting satisfactorily for the “broad purposes” of the right as
encapsulated in the legislative instrument, as well as the administrative machinery for its
implementation. The underlying point is simple, but not reductionist: the accountability of actors
must be contextual, sensitive to the particularity and peculiarities of every given right or its genre,
as well as attentive to the causes of violations. To lend credence to this claim, I point at the lived
experiences of Third World peoples in countries such as Kenya, Colombia, and South Africa. In
these countries, the judicialization of socio-economic claims has confronted judges with
unprecedented practical difficulties and enforcement pitfalls. These experiences are relevant and
offer insights for rethinking and reformulating the contemporary accountability praxis to make
them suitable and adaptable to the securement of distributive justice in the national and
international order. Both socio-economic rights and the RTD share this aspiration for distributive
justice, an aspect of development justice that emphasizes the structural nature of violations and
insists on fashioning specific remedies that can vindicate specific rights only.
The challenges judiciaries have faced in enforcing socio-economic rights are due largely
to the nature of obligations imposed by these rights as well as the contexts of their violations. For
this reason, both the litigation and judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights continue to be a
work in progress.8 The difficulties judiciaries confront in crafting appropriate remedies that can be
complied with to vindicate those infringements are both practical and conceptual.
In the first place, conceptual difficulties range from questions of the polycentric nature of
socio-economic claims or the classical dilemma of functional competence of the judiciary.9 There
is also the legitimacy and democratic deficit concerns actuated by the notion that judges are not
elected and ought not reallocate public goods.10 On the other hand, practical difficulties are those
Gwen Brodsky, Shelagh Day & Frances Kelly, “The Authority of Human Rights Tribunals to Grant Systemic
Remedies” (2017) 6:1 Can J of Hum Rts 1 at 3 & 17-18.
8
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of fashioning appropriate (structural) remedies that can vindicate the structural nature of
infringements that too often attend to welfare-based entitlements.11 These problems are so deeply
entrenched that today we witness the slow, sparing and patchy, though progressive, change to
novel mechanisms of enforcement in the Global South.12 Such visible forms of progressive change
are legion: they include judicial activism and creativity in the furtherance of the social
transformation potential of law. Examples include such methods as dialogic judicialism (Kenya
and Colombia).13 Other creative measures such as deferential standards14 or structural interdicts
have been in use in South Africa.15 In Canada, judicialization of welfare-based claims has seen
courts resorting to such measures as the suspended declarations of invalidity where courts have
deemed it necessary to give the government time to reform a legislative infrastructure on which
public goods are dispensed.16 It seems that fashioning creative and progressive remedial
accountability measures of these kinds often take cognisance of complex nature of the rights, and
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longstanding structural issues that underlie their violations. The context of violations underscores
whether the infringements are structural or interactional, while the nature of the right would dictate
the appropriate vindications their violations demand.
While the normative potential of these novel measures is without question and their
premises solid, they point to incompleteness, if not anomalies, in the traditional configurations of
remedial accountability. Essentially, they flag the defects in the devices that the sanction or
remedial typology of accountability deploys. The defects appear in the practicability challenges or
what Landau calls the “legitimacy and capacity strains.”17 It is the legitimacy and capacity strains
that stretch courts to be innovative. Thus, they expose the various challenges for fashioning
appropriate remedies to vindicate socio-economic rights violations.18 Besides, by their novelty,
these novel remedies emphasize a distributive philosophy of justice. Unlike the backwards-looking
received remedial tradition for vindicating ordinary rights, distributive justice is forward-looking.
It is focused on vindicating structural violations that traditional corrective remedial sanctions for
civil and political rights cannot attain.19
Because these novel measures depart significantly from the (traditional) coercive,
individualistic, monologic, and backwards-looking remedies for civil and political rights
violations, and given that they are designed specifically for vindicating the derogation from
welfare rights, they attest to the claim that the normative character of a right ought to inform its
implementation, enforcement, and remediation. By extension, to the extent that they are aware of
the structural causes of violations (unlike the remedial tradition which only relieves infringements
resulting from conduct), they emphasize that accountability of actors for the non-attainment of
rights needs to be contextually aware.
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And yet, there is no deep appreciation in the conventional accountability praxis that the
remedial difficulties are rooted in the kind of design of the existing models. In international thought
and practice of accountability, there is as yet no full awareness of the limitations of traditional
remedial measures from a distributive justice perspective. Human rights practices of accountability
are sanction-heavy, remedial, redressive, monologic, and interactional. 20 At least not within the
mainstream international legal thought has the insight about structural violations and the
imperative of distributive justice permeated the discourse on IFIs accountability deficit. The
conventional implementation agenda, even in the context of the SDGs policy schema, does not
quite keenly reflect this thinking about distributive justice that demands an institutional approach
to accountability. An institutional approach would not only look to constrain conduct and remedy
outcomes of violations, but it would go further to question the compatibility of the rules, policies,
and processes of development with fundamental values. The RTD as a claim to a particular national
and international order emphasizes this notion while questioning the inherent assumptions and
rationales of the ex-post remedial accountability. It introduces the new insight that conceptions of
accountability should not be tailored to merely focus on outcomes of breach, they must also
examine and question the rules, processes, and structures that produce these very conditions.21 This
is the notion of distributive justice.
The idea of distributive justice has brought with it a new line of thinking: the unworkability
of extant regimes in the enforcement of rights of a subsistence ethic is due to the fact that their
violations tend to be structural, implicating various governmental bureaucracies and their policies
and programmes. Such awareness brings forth a deep sense that socio-economic rights
enforceability challenges relate to their normative and distinctive character. This is comprised of
the nature of obligations they impose and the form of justice they demand. Aware of the very
distinctive nature of rights and the vast accountability challenges posed, some scholars have been
inclined to call for “broad-based perspectives” and a “new methodological orientation” in the
enforcement of socio-economic rights.22 Thus, it can be argued that socio-economic rights
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enforcement has been shaped and informed by the nature of obligations entailed (right-specificity),
the form of justice sought to be achieved, and the appropriateness of remedies suitable to the
vindication of the violations (contextual awareness).23
I draw upon the foregoing debate for the explanation that the normative character of a right
should determine the method of its implementation, inform the modality of sanctioning nonattainment, as well as shape subsequent remedial measures. This imperative is compelling. Even
if it means stepping out of the circumscribed bounds of international legal accountability or coming
up with some remedial innovative tools, as was stated in the South African case of Fose v Minister
of Safety and Security, one should be prepared to break the new ground.24 Even if such new ground
does not lie in the conceptually bounded doctrines of law, one should be prepared to blaze the trail.
Such preparedness to aggressively innovate must be met by a readiness to embrace new
modes and notions unknown to the traditional accountability methods. This questioning of
orthodoxy is what the story of socio-economic rights enforcement thus far contributes to rethinking
IFIs’ accountability for development injustices. Innovative remedies such as structural interdict
and dialogic judicialism bring forth a structural approach to remedy in the legal jurisprudence,
enforcing the idea of context-awareness and right-specificity.25 It follows that the suitability of a
model of accountability should focus on factors specific or germane to the right at issue, such as
the obligations entailed by the right. It must appreciate the causes and context of violations, be
attentive to whether the violations are institutionally sanctioned or interactional in nature.
As some litigation against the World Bank has revealed, some causal factors in the
derogation of rights obligations are structural in nature. By their nature, structural violations indict
various institutions and implicate different rules, policies, and several processes for such failures.
Other violations may be interactional, involving decipherable sanctionable conduct and traceable
causal chains directly linkable to actors. The former is the perspective brought about by
development justice perspective. The latter typifies human rights accountability, which seeks
corrective/retributive justice. The distinctions between the interactional and institutional
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sensibilities lies in two important legal concepts of droits-attribut (freedom from) and droitscreance (right to).26
A good example of interactional violations is that of the recent US Supreme Court decision
in Jam et al v International Finance Corporation.27 In this matter, a host of complaints were
levelled by farmers and fishermen in rural India that the coal-fired power plant financed by the
International Finance Corporation (IFC) had caused environmental degradation and health hazards
to the local people in Gujarat, India. IFC, an arm of the World Bank that finances private projects
ventured into funding this project. In 2015, a group of farmers and fishermen sued the IFC before
a Washington federal District Court. They alleged that the project caused wanton destruction of
the habitat, marine life and respiratory injuries to communities living nearby. They argued that
these adverse effects could have been prevented by the IFC before the plant was built. These
substantive issues were not determined since the court dismissed the suit on a technical ground
that the suit was barred by the rule that IFC enjoyed absolute immunity from lawsuits. The matter
went all the way to the US Supreme Court which ordered that the matter be remanded to the District
Court which had jurisdiction on the matter. What is most important for our purposes here is that
such violations as complained of here are relatively easy to discern and remedy for the reason that
tracing the chain of causation of the outcome of violations can easily be linked to the conduct of
an entity alleged to have committed the harm. This interactional approach predominantly focuses
on the conduct of an actor, its immediate causes, and manifestations of harms or violations.28
On the other hand, as I already discussed, questions of causation and attribution get
muddled when structural violations are at issue. This was the case in the Lesotho-Highland case,
where multiple rules and policies, not conduct, were implicated in the “engenderment” of
consequential harms. The institutional approach that development justice seems to require takes
cognisance of the immediate causes, their structural context, and their long-term effects. That is,
there is an imperative to appreciate how rules of the game conflict with other applicable standards
in ways that engender and perpetuate violations, both in the immediate and long term. By focusing
on the long-term effects, one looks at how multiple policy systems (national and supranational)
Stephen Marks, “The Human Rights Framework of Development: Seven Approaches” in Arjun Sengupta, Archna
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entangle and interact to produce unforeseeable and unpredictable outcomes such that not a single
agent can be said to have occasioned the violations. A good example is poverty as a manifestation
of the violation of many aspects of socio-economic rights. By its very nature, poverty is a structural
and multidimensional phenomenon.29 Many factors, rules, policies, actions, and omissions
intermingle, over a long period of time, to produce diverse outcomes that manifest in forms of the
deprivation of human capabilities and the ability to live the life of one’s choice. Not a single
isolated conduct can be attributed as the cause of poverty.
Conventional human rights critiques of IFIs’ accountability deficit need to sufficiently
apprehend these intriguing complexes. They ought to bring into purview the structural and
distributive understanding of violations and harms. It is imperative that they appreciate conceptual
and normative distinctions of character between universal rights as necessitating a different
approach to accountability.30 The RTD enforces this consciousness. Nothing makes this imperative
more than the judicial experiences of enforcement of socio-economic rights. These cases point out
that praxis (theories, doctrines, or practice) of accountability that ignore the distinctive character
of norms, and fail to contextualize their violations, remain severely incomplete, limited, and
limiting.
The lack of the appreciation of normative character distinctions and contexts of violations
is so apparent in the standardized and general (state-based and state-centred) accountability
regimes operational in most domestic legal systems and international law. It is apparent in the
catch-all DARIO doctrines propounded as applicable to all international organizations. Some
regimes of accountability that deploy standardized state reporting and monitoring mechanisms to
police state compliance with rights obligations also suffer from this architectural anomaly that
omits the distributive and structural understanding of harms. Apart from the fact that these
procedures are not vested with enforceability mandates, their nomenclature as “monitoring”
processes serve a very unsatisfactory purpose when it comes to structural violations.31 The regional
29
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human rights systems, which mimic the reporting mechanisms of the major international treaties,
also suffer from an interactional deficiency. On the other hand, in domestic contexts and some
regional human rights bodies, (most) accountability always enlists the jurisdiction of courts and
tribunals that seek to remedy violations of any right suffered. In almost all of these institutional
formalities and designs, apart from the procedural dichotomization of civil or political from socioeconomic rights, there is no appreciation of the distinct peculiarity of different rights as the reason
for rethinking the architecture or suitability of such sanction-heavy accountability regimes.
Standardization and replication of such limited accountability regimes seem to be the norm
across most human rights systems. Implicitly, they seem to be justified on the flawed assumption
that universal accountability doctrines and models apply to all rights and all actors uniformly. They
pay no regard to the variations of character that underlie the different generations or categories of
rights. In international legal thought as well, I note that in the assessment of the suitability of
conventional regimes of accountability to non-state actors, little effort has been spent to grapple
with the imperative of the normative nature of rights and context of violations (whether structural
or otherwise). This question is different from a holistic approach to human rights; it does not
invoke the old ideological polarities of neatly distinguishing civil and political rights from socioeconomic rights on the basis of the nature of obligations entailed or immediacy or progressivity of
their realization. Pitfalls in socio-economic rights enforcement, which has pushed judiciaries to be
innovative, and even activist, severely challenge this kind of orthodoxy.
I am not, however, by these propositions suggesting the oversimplification, if not
trivialization, of the holistic approaches to human rights that emphasize the indivisibility,
universalism, interdependence, interrelatedness and the mutually reinforcing nature of all
categories of rights.32 Far from it, I note that mainstream human rights law debates seem largely
informed by normative theories imagining how the world should be and not how the world really
is. The limitation of law in this aspect is what Koskenniemi calls “a utopian, context-breaking
aspect” of international law and legal thought.33 He concedes that law cannot at all times be a
reflection of social and historical facts, but may slightly deviate from them, reflecting a utopia and
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a distance from context. This is what Koskenniemi defines as international law’s development on
“familiar,” “fragile and contested assumptions.”34 See, for example, that despite our solid
knowledge of the defects of the due diligence rule (developed in the old Velὰsquez Rodríguez
versus Honduras jurisprudence) as the appropriate standard for indirect accountability in
multilateral decision-making, we still seem not to question its generalizability, suitability, and
adaptability to the contemporary realities of structural kinds of violations.35 The due diligence
certainly reflects a utopia and distance from contextual realities of our world today.
The debates in chapters 3, 4, and 5 are clear evidence that our imaginations of
accountability in the development sphere (and even more generally) need to confront the world as
it is, not as it is imagined. I make the case that human rights accountability regimes should not be
unthinkingly standardized without being tailored to comport with character variation (read the
composite nature and normative hybridity of the RTD) of different rights. They must also account
adequately for the different nature of violations. This way, we will formulate models that can
confront the spectre of development injustices rooted in the unfair and inequitable international
system. Conventional accountability regimes should not miss this crucial insight, otherwise their
underpinning logic would remain suspect and incredible.
It is apposite to recall the RTD’s normative and distinctive character. As I argued in chapter
2, this right is radically different from other rights in substance, persona, vision, and the obligations
it imposes. There, I projected the RTD as a counter-hegemonic right, its most compelling
normative trait and distinctive feature in international law and development discourse. I elaborated
that by this normative trait, in many ways, the RTD presents “alternative visions” and other “valid
ways” that challenge the fundamental premises of the liberal understanding of rights as well as the
basic conceptions of development. In chapter 3, I demonstrated that the RTD, as the guiding value
for the SDGs, envisages a different vision of justice, a development justice that consists of the
push against poverty and material inequality as well as the vision of eliminating structural barriers
to development. This kind of justice is unknown to conventional human rights practices of
accountability.
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It is the central claim of this dissertation that the character distinctiveness and context of
violations must bear upon the critique and assessment of the suitability and adaptability of
standardized accountability models. It must also be taken into questioning the Western-derived
rules and institutions of accountability. I contend that the RTD’s oppositional and alternative
understanding of human rights doctrines (particularly its introduction of the structural contingency
dynamic), if brought to bear on our analysis of praxes of accountability, exposes their unsuitability
and ill-adaptability to the vindication of collective claims for development justice. I pursue this
claim in the section below.

3. THE UNSUITABILITY AND ILL-ADAPTABILITY OF CONTEMPORARY
ACCOUNTABILITY REGIMES TO THE REALIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT
JUSTICE
Let me first point out two eminent scholars’ misgivings about Western-derived doctrines of law.
Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito make the observation that:
[H]uman rights institutions and doctrines, with their Western roots and liberal bent, have
oftentimes been blind to non-Western conceptions of human dignity and collective rights
that hold out the prospect for an expanded, cosmopolitan conception of rights.36
The above quote on the conceptual blindness and rigidity of human rights cultures (law,
institutions, and praxes) is the premise for my claim that the existing regimes of accountability are
unsuitable and ill-adapted to realizing development justice. Such thinking highlights the
predominant Western and liberal bent of human rights law and its characteristic neglect of other
(if alternative) conceptions of justice. In the sections that follow, I demonstrate this discrepancy
by showing how contemporary accountability frameworks fail to take into account the structural
contingency dynamic (which emphasizes the need to take account of the context of violations) and
the distinctive normativity of the RTD. The reasons as to why the existing international regimes
miss these two crucial dynamics are elaborated below.
The first is international law’s obsession with the juridical facets of international reality
and a characteristic neglect of structural injustice. Human rights practices have traditionally been
conducted on the highly restrictive, generalized maxims, and unchallenged assumptions of

36
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universalism, interdependence, interrelatedness, indivisibility and mutuality of rights.37 These set
of unchallenged assumptions show an obsession of international law with the juridical facets of
international reality. It is an obsession that is accompanied by a characteristic neglect of the
structural injustices of the international political economy. As An Naim, for example, has decried
this level of generalization and universalization as unable to supply “an authoritative list of what
these rights are or specify the precise content of any right in particular.”38 Alston agrees that there
are new rights, and their conceptions and pedigree challenge conventional understandings of the
universal human rights paradigm as we know it today.39
Such standardized frames and single lens approaches assume that if IFIs’ contestation of
the normativity of the assignment of rights of rights obligations to them (the responsibility
dimension of accountability) is overcome, IFIs would then be amenable to enforceability within
the extant accountability regimes. Yet, such wisdom may not be that conventional when looking
at some sui generis rights norms which seek a cosmopolitan conception of reality and ordain a
model of development that aims to secure human well-being as its paramount objective. Such
rights that have operational links to development practices—and that are born outside the Liberal
tradition of focusing on constraining state sovereignty and that are not exclusively concerned with
the welfarist ethic of the provision of the minimum needs of life—demand a different approach to
accountability. They demand a different approach because they espouse a different vision of justice
in the global policy system.
The point to be emphasized is that conventional human rights approaches have made few
or no attempts to question the suitability or even adaptability of extant regimes in the protection
and vindication of rights that are sui generis and of non-Western pedigree. The Western-derived
regimes of accountability, as we have seen so far, tend to be so abstract and legalistic, neglecting
the structural injustice of the international system. This has been witnessed in the beleaguered
judicialization of socio-economic rights claims as well as in international efforts to formulate
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measures for their progressive realization.40 It has also been revealed by the RTD discourse,
particularly its introduction of the structural nature of violations and harms that are too often rooted
in the global policy system. This view is almost always omitted by human rights narratives of
justice and accountability.
The second factor explaining the unsuitability and ill-adaptability of existing regimes to
the realization of development justice is the questionable minimalist conception of accountability
in terms of power relations. In the dominant human rights cultures, accountability relationships
are predominantly conceived according to the classical liberal tradition that tends to define it so
minimally in terms of power relations.41 In other words, the broad consensus in human rights
theory and practice largely reflect a power-based conception of justice. Based on this classical
minimalist understanding, accounts of justice tend to view accountability function as a constraint
on excesses of power or authority that is exercised as an ex-post remedial measure against breach
of obligations.42 The “remedial” tradition has come to define most accountability approaches in
law. It is what defines the inspection model of the Bank. It is the marker of international legal
accountability that relies on the law of international responsibility to discern and attribute
wrongfulness. Even in the political parlance, where accountability may be conceived in terms of
answerability, whereby public authorities explain and justify their decisions ex-ante, there is still
a retention of the power-centric and breach-focused approach to accountability.43
In international law, accountability is rigidly tied to the concept of “responsibility-forwrongfulness” and is thus confined to situations in which an international organization’s conduct
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or omission constitutes a breach of an international standard.44 The problem lies in the definition
of “responsibility,” which holds a key place in the theory and practice of international law. Even
though the concept of responsibility lends itself to multiple definitions and senses, it basically
revolves around “attributing consequences and their control” and “effective sanctioning powers.”45
A responsibility approach, as I demonstrated, does not adequately account for the institutionally
embedded violations that intermingle with national factors.
In theory, we see this power-centric approach in how De Schutter defines accountability as
the process of seeking remedies before national or international tribunals for violations suffered
(due to excesses of power).46 Khalfan defines accountability restrictively in terms of the legal or
political bodies that can entertain complaints and offer remedies, monitor, enforce, and reward
state compliance with human rights obligations or rebuke noncompliance.47 According to this
minimalist view, which explicitly venerates the ex-post approach, the ends of accountability is
served by those processes that impose legally binding decisions or other political forces capable
of influencing actors’ behaviour.
These limited conceptions permeate the actual practice of accountability. Falling into such
machineries of questioning the compliance with powers and obligations (conformity to assigned
duties) are the periodic human rights reporting procedures within the United Nations and other
treaty bodies. Also included are the individual complaints procedures, inter-state complaints
mechanisms, universal periodic reviews, and international tribunals and judicial institutions. The
United Nation’s Guidelines on “adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered” as
the legal test for accountability is not so far from the minimalist frames of responsibility-forwrongfulness.48 In the realm of development practice, the mutual accountability practice is
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defined, significantly, by the power-based approach.49 Mutual accountability emphasizes the
horizontal relationships and accountability of partners to each other. This is a limited conception
emphasizing bounds of authority in mutual relationship between actors. One of its weakness is that
it omits from purview an engagement with structural issues. Its silence on the direct and distinct
accountability of international institutions as actors in development cooperation severely indicts
its suitability to securing development justice, which requires a minimum of answerability of
institutions.
The practice of international law of responsibility fixated on the responsibility for wrongful
conduct (or excesses of power) omits the productive forms of power. DARIO does not contemplate
that contravening rules constitute conduct, therefore economic policies that are inconsistent with
human-centred development hardly figure into the determination of responsibility for
wrongfulness. Such rules may include macro-structural reform measures, aggressive debt
sustainability policies, pro-capital foreign direct investment, and liberalization rules that
contravene universal values of domestic public policies. For this neglect of the productive forms
of power, the law of responsibility cannot offer effective vindication of development injustices
that inhere in the rules and policies of the allocation and provision of global public goods. The law
of responsibility seems to delegitimize what Salomon has termed the juridical reimagination of the
utility and scope of human rights in the global justice project.50 This runs counter to the RTD’s
basic conception of power and conduct as constituted by, and existing within and without, state
structure, as well as in the policies and the rules that development institutions paternalistically
recommend to developing states.51
The standardization and generalizability of power-based accountability mechanisms of
these kinds predominantly look to constrain or remedy excesses of power which manifest in
violations or failure to fulfil obligations. Often, the ex-post approach is obsessionally fixated on
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constraining conduct. They omit to engage with structural issues at the root of such wrongful
conduct. These kinds of minimalist and restrictive approaches also overlook the fact that the
exercise of power or omission potentially leads to violations and calls for the enforcement of
sanctions. The resort to sanctioning excesses of power neglects the fact that even rules, processes,
structures, and policies that contravene other countervailing values constitute violations.
The third limitation of existing mechanisms, which render them ill-suited and ill-adapted
to the kind of justice required by the RTD norm, is due to the universalization of statist and counterstatist precepts of law. The universalization and generalization of these principles is not
unquestionable. However justified, such attempts at universalization emphasize the characteristic
nature of the state-dominated view of international law, which tends to produce predominant
counter-statist doctrines of accountability.52 Take for example the emergence of DARIO and its
replication of several key precepts of the law of state responsibility notwithstanding their
provenance in state practice and irrelevance to the complexes of international economic relations.
The other example is the SDGs accountability praxis that mimics traditional state reporting and
monitoring mechanisms that are designed for the ex-post interrogation of failure to fulfil
obligations as a dysfunction of power. The state-centric practice of accountability looks away from
the structural and even historical causes of poverty and inequality. Nowhere else is this
restrictiveness and minimalism so perfectly exemplified than in the international legal
accountability, which predominantly remains the law of state responsibility. For the most part, it
is ARSIWA that has been in usage, and whose principles inform those substantive provisions of
DARIO.
The predominance of the limited, rigid, and linear state-centric view of accountability
poses its own challenges. Because the law of the responsibility of international organizations was
for a long time undeveloped, the law of state responsibility has been dominant in judicial practice
and jurisprudence.53 The state-centric approach, in the view of Ryngaert, proceeds from the broad
premise that “states are, in principle, not responsible for acts done by private or non-state actors ...
[and that only] acts of state organs can engage the responsibility of the state, even if the act has
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been done ultra vires.”54 So far, however, the notion of the non-attribution of private conduct shows
a systematization of the principle in the reverse sense. In human rights accountability practice, the
responsibility-for-wrongfulness approach implies only one thing: that wrongful conduct
potentially has a direct causal relationship to an identifiable actor, more often the state. Save for
limited exceptions contemplated by ARSIWA,55 even where a direct causal relationship is not
decipherable so as to render wrongfulness easily attributable to the state because the impugned
conduct is that of a private actor or a different entity, the (received) technical understanding of
“the state duty to protect” invariably applies.56 Hence, derivative responsibility and liability will
be imputed to the state for breach of one of its duties, often the duty to protect.57 This logic is
rooted in the due diligence rule, established in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in
Velὰsquez Rodríguez versus Honduras.58
The due diligence jurisprudence is the settled legal principle in human rights law of

accountability. It has been followed in the Ogoni case, where the African Commission took the
view that rights “generate at least four levels of duties” for the state, which include the duty to
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restrain conduct of third parties.59 The notion that the state bears human rights obligations was
approved in SERAP v Nigeria60 where the Economic Community of West Africa States Court of
Justice (the Court) first declined to exercise jurisdiction against Shell Nigeria, a transnational
corporation operating in the Niger Delta and accused of environmental degradation in the area, on
grounds that Shell Nigeria was not a party to the ECOWAS treaty therefore not subject to its
jurisdiction. The Court however found that the Nigerian government was responsible for the
violations because of its failure to effectively regulate transnational corporations. The Court took
a state-centric reading and ordered the Nigerian government to remedy the situation by taking all
necessary measures to protect the environment and any future harms.61
Applied to the human rights accountability context, the due diligence rule presupposes a
derivative accountability of states for wrongful conduct or violations by third parties. It emphasizes
a principle of accountability that the state is (indirectly) responsible for violations of third parties
on account of its negligence or failure to prevent harms or protect individuals within its
jurisdiction. Sadly, this received principle restates and re-enacts the original dilemma rather than
resolve it. Not oddly enough, this theory of state-centred accountability praxis that the liberal
conception of rights has enacted has been shown to be so severely bounded that it is therefore
unworkable in grasping the structural contingency dynamic.62
The contention that statist accountability doctrines are conceptually defective is
illuminated more clearly by the RTD’s counter-hegemonic view of the world, which exposes how
the global policy system institutionally sanctions subtle violations outside the province of the state.
Flowing from the institutional cosmopolitan vision of constraining and bringing into its regulative
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order the entire international community, there is a new imperative that the state cannot deliver
rights on its own, even if it had the full capacity.63 This progressive view emphasizes the structural
contingency of development, acknowledging that actions of others are also key to the realization
of rights.64 This distributive view affirms that contemporary approaches that over-glorify the place
of the state in human rights theories of justice offer an inadequate explanation of the endurance of
global injustices.65
The fact that human rights causes tend to locate responsibility and accountability in the
state and not in global factors and institutions is yet another factor in their unsuitability to the
realization of development justice. Human rights accountability praxes omit the crucial dynamic
of the inherence of development injustices in global forces. Instead, human rights praxes of
accountability look to constrain conduct and their outcomes. Therefore, to suggest that
international law has not adequately grasped or grappled with the structural view of the
phenomenon of development justice is not a radical conclusion. It is to bring into purview how the
minimalist and restrictive statist reformulation of doctrine conceals development injustices. It is to
demonstrate the way international law continues to proliferate like precepts of law such as
extraterritoriality, due diligence, and derivative accountability that retain the statist traits.
At this juncture, it is plausible to say that international law adopts a narrow and restrictive
view of the accountability of actors for development injustice. It does not seek the direct and
distinct accountability of IFIs as development actors. In its conservative and minimalist element,
it formalizes and legitimizes their insulation, immunity, and disconnection from accountability.66
On this account alone, international law is implicated in, and is the explanation for, the obliteration
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and distortion of accountability relationships in development. As experience with the Bank’s
inspection panel shows, in certain cases, international law brazenly sanctions international
institutions’ obstruction of accountability.67 In other words, international law cannot draw a nexus
between the global struggle for a more equitable and just world and human rights causes.
The overarching explanation is that international law praxis of accountability misses the
structural and distributive understanding of violations, something that the RTD accountability
praxis insists on and emphasizes the most. To come to a clear grasp of the limitation of
international law in this way, we must draw bright lines between this minimalist and restrictive
state-centric international law and the institutional cosmopolitan conception of justice.
Institutional cosmopolitan conceptions of justice are cognisant of the causes of poverty and
inequality embedded in the global structural order. The creed of institutional cosmopolitanism in
this context is its non-hesitation to call for the recognition of human rights normativity beyond the
state.68 Institutional cosmopolitanism trains its eyes on other social agents that are more
determinative and more manipulative of policy systems that are implicated in the “engenderment”
of injustices that harm human flourishing.
Lamentably, however, despite this institutional cosmopolitan awakening, human rights
practices have not quite sufficiently appreciated the maximalist ethos of emphasizing the
deterministic global factors and causalities over national causalities. So far, proponents of the need
to hold inter-state institutions accountable for human rights wrongs committed in third-party
territories have gone ahead to recalibrate the statist view of human rights by resorting to the
extraterritorialization of human rights understandings. But by overlooking the imperative of
structural contingency, they have ended up reconceiving the extraterritoriality question from
within the statist contours. By this neglect they maintain a conception of the extraterritoriality
principle as underpinning state obligations toward individuals in third countries. Thus, they limit
their extraterritorial reading of the law to how “conduct of states may affect the human rights of
individuals located outside their national territories” and examine the accountability of states for
the harms of their policies or conduct.69 Consequently, such new concepts remain beholden to little
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more than the mundane and the old. This conceptual limitation causes the growing interest in the
extraterritoriality principle to ring hollow; it is unable to champion pro-poor causes and advocate
the direct and distinct accountability of international organizations.
The ineffectiveness of most of these doctrines is rooted in the fundamental flaws of what
is now known as “derivative accountability.” Derivative accountability supposes that international
institutions are indirectly accountable through their constituent states. According to Salomon, since
there is a difficulty of disaggregating the conduct of a single actor from the collective decisions of
states, there is need to restrict direct accountability to the state.70 The justification for this approach
is that in integrated and interdependent global economic relationships where the conduct of states
are enmeshed when acting at the level of international organizations, there are “imperfect duties”
addressed to states when acting multilaterally. Therefore it would be uncertain to disaggregate
duties and attribute wrongful conduct to a specific state actor in the conventional sense of state
responsibility.71 According to Salomon, the due diligence principle laid down in Velὰsquez v
Honduras may come in handy to offer a technique for neutralizing the imperfect obligations
dilemma. She proposes that the due diligence principle that imposes a duty on a state not to act
negligently (at the multilateral level) by foreseeing and avoiding probable harms that their conduct
may occasion to people living within its territory, should be applicable in the context of IFIs’
decision-making. The use of this technique, Salomon argues, has the effect of making “imperfect
obligations” of the international community perfect.
Stripped to its bare essentials, this thinking skirts around the question of the direct and
distinct accountability of IFIs.72 Its practice has failed to institute a direct normative regime of
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accountability of international economic institutions. Its flaw is in the disinclination to locate
causalities for national harms in global factors. The point is not that critical international law
scholarship completely lacks the structural view of the phenomenon. Rather, mainstream legal
scholarship has tended to pursue a bounded perception of these issues. On this bias, they fail to
characterize structural violations as development justice questions to be invoked as human rights
causes. Even black letter international law scholarship has questioned the wisdom of such classical
liberal approaches to global justice. They argue, albeit in a limited legalistic way, that, by ignoring
the autonomy, personality, and “distinct will” of international organizations constituted by states,
international lawyers treat the structural contingency dynamic with circumspection.73 They go
further to question the liberal worldviews that overlook the basic insight that “if international
organizations would not be independent actors, there would be no need for them to be
accountable.”74 They therefore recognize the “pervasive policy influence” of the Bank and IMF
in the poor borrowing countries. This is what Darrow has called the “generally superior bargaining
position and policy leverage enjoyed by the Bank and the Fund vis-à-vis the lowest per capita GDP
client countries.”75
I note that even as contemporary thought tends to be more progressive in acknowledging
the limitations of the dominant statist understandings of accountability praxis, they do not
sufficiently appreciate a structural understanding of human rights violations.76 They leave
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uninterrogated the suitability to some rights and adaptability to different contexts of the universal
accountability mechanisms. They glide over the complex that Pahuja refers to as “structural
homology.” This dynamic presupposes that international law authorizes mandate expansion for
Bretton Woods Institutions as it legitimizes the avoidance of their accountability, all the while
locating causality and responsibility in the agency of poor and developing countries.77
Traditional international law thought seems not to disturb the safety from accountability
enjoyed by IFIs, as facilitated by expedient doctrines and rationales (for example collective state
decisions, or the compulsion to cooperate in the provision of global public goods, due diligence,
and so forth). The limitations of international law thought and practice in this regard are not
without historical precedence.78 Historically, the human rights framing of justice focused only on
conduct and outcomes of violations. By focusing on conduct and outcomes, we ended up with a
regime so rigidly fixated on redress of harms. A focus on outcomes of harms omits a crucial
understanding of how economic policies and processes, the prevailing economic models and
idiosyncrasies of global development institutions are implicated in the “engenderment” of
development injustices (for example inequality, poverty, structural discrimination, state
subordination, inequitable development practices).79
It is the rights-centric focus on conduct and outcomes that made it impossible to assess the
unjust institutional system and recognize the institutional context of violations. One good example
of the limitation of international lawyers in grasping a structural understanding of violations was
the 1992 Wapenhas Report into the conduct of the World Bank.80 Other examples are found in the
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civil society oppositional campaigns against the World Bank dam and canal projects in India that
focused on the “violence” of development without paying keen attention to how such violence is
produced by the global policy system.81 Other current examples of the interactional approach are
the state-centric accountability mechanisms of SDGs, which look away from the causes of
violations rooted in the global policy system.
Thus, we ended up with a severely limited development accountability praxis because of
our fixation on interactional approaches to violations.82 The lack of clear thought on the
institutional contexts of violations render contemporary models so weak that they cannot confront
the radical deprivation of the global policy system. For good measure, however, we must give
credit where it is due. For instance, the Inspection Panels have been replicated by multilateral
development banks where they serve, at minimum, as the guarantors of internal accountability.
Even if unsatisfactory, they address peoples’ claims opposing the social and environmental harms
of development within their communities.
Perhaps the answer for such standardization and generalization would be that universal
approaches couched as emancipatory projects are not always pro-South or even as pro-poor as they
claim.83 Perhaps, as Koskenniemi fears, the discourse about universalism is too often about the
hegemonic spread of particular ideas and ideals capable of “deradicalizing” the others.84 It is for
this reason that most international law norms and regulative orders are ill-adapted to divergent
contexts and non-Western experiences.85 We are therefore justified to decry the way in which
development and international law fail to develop a cosmopolitan and non-Western outlook on
human rights causes of justice.86 The human rights corpus, a product of Western positivization of
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morality, are undeniably too-narrow constructs. Too often, they are so narrow that they cannot
adequately capture the fact that some genre of norms, together with the understanding of justice
that they espouse, seem to have been forged outside the demarcations of the positive theory of
rights.87
Intriguingly, international law has a peculiar tendency to make proclamations of
universality for doctrines that are brokered without, or even in total disregard of, divergent contexts
and experiences of different (especially Third World) peoples, nationalities, and identities.88 To
appreciate this disregard one has to understand the implication of international law in the
emergence of what Pahuja calls new categories and domains. Pahuja posits that international law
produces and defines categories; it “produces its own subjects” and domains, determines their
“discursive constitution,” and “also makes a claim to universality for them.”89 This, inarguably,
is how one must appreciate the seeming universalist content and character of modern public
international law doctrines, with their classical antecedents, which reflect Eurocentric, absolutist,
and monocultural conceptions of the universe.90 Effectively, this monoculturalism cements a
universality dominated by European socio-economic, cultural, and political biases, values, and
self-images.91
The fact that international law doctrines and the superstructure of post-modern institutions
of development are not fashioned to reflect the diversity of people or complexities underlying their
divergent values systems points to the incompleteness of international law. Thus, because some
international doctrines cannot lay claim to the universality necessary for their legitimacy, however
normative their justifications, they constitute a flawed normativity and universality. It is this
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deformity that supplies their discrepancy with the task of delivering accountability for
development injustices.
What is indictable about the incompleteness of international norms, as Koskenniemi has
come to enlighten us, is that international law is often marked by a tendency to proliferate a catchall language “with contextual vocabularies that are as messy as the world they propose to
organize.”92 Characteristically, this messiness and incompleteness is a defining feature of how
international law precepts arise and evolve. It would, in this context, be unsurprising that
international law suffers a conceptual incapacity to bring about the direct and distinct
accountability of global development actors.93 Put differently, by such utopianism or
incompleteness, international law has fallen far short of indicating the causal relationship between
culpable development institutions and their failure to guarantee human flourishing. Because of
such blind spots, international law has hitherto failed to secure economic justice or guarantee
minimum conditions of wellbeing for those facing the “cruel logics of marginalization and social
exclusion”. Permissibly, one can surmise that it is the conservatism, monoculturalism,
incompleteness, and anachronism of international law that abets the accountability disconnections,
obstructions, and avoidance. This has therefore facilitated all the difficulties in the quest for the
direct and distinct accountability of international institutions.
If international law was to forge a non-Western outlook on accountability in securing
development justice, some principles and regimes would benefit from an opportunity to be
rethought to shed the statist biases with which they are written. Their diversification into
egalitarian and cosmopolitan projects such as development justice (which the RTD enunciates)
would be made possible. This would create a better chance of confronting the hegemonization of
development and its corresponding eclipses and displacements of the accountability of
international institutions.94 To achieve this objective, accountability regimes must be made to
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appreciate the context of violations and the nature of the right at issue. Hence, such new approaches
will take into account that a right such as the RTD, as the right to a national and international order,
can be violated by structures (imbalanced economic arrangements), processes (non-participatory
and undemocratic procedures), and rules (conditionalities or standardized norms and practices that
offend universal commitments).
I contend that the universalization of international regimes of accountability potentially
comes with the inherent limitation of omitting the crucial insight of context awareness and the
normative and distinctive nature of some norms. Existing accountability mechanisms seem to be
conceived on a flawed thinking that overlooks the relative distinctions of character or genres of
rights. Their conceptions also sidestep the contexts of violations or the types of justice that the
vindication of certain rights demand. It seems to me that these homogenizing perceptions not only
downplay the normative distinctiveness of rights but see it as irrelevant to the assessment of the
suitability and adaptability of machineries of accountability. These limited conceptions of
accountability result in standard analytical attentions and unsatisfactory treatments of different
contexts of rights violations. They seem oblivious of new rights for which vindication cannot just
be guaranteed by ex-post constraints on power, fashioning of remedies, or correction of behaviour
(as in the case of the IMF Independent Evaluation Office). They do not appreciate that some rights
require more elaborate mechanisms that can honour the objects of such a right.95
It is also remarkable that the RTD’s characteristic nature of focusing on and helping to
reveal the structural nature of violations as injustices sanctioned by the global institutional order
questions the suitability of contemporary regimes of accountability. It disturbs the logic of those
mostly interactional mechanisms. The RTD discourse serves to uncover the ill-adaptability of these
regimes to the materialization of development justice. As stated, a development justice perspective
offers a structural and distributive approach to human rights violations. This is something that is
still new for human rights conceptions of accountability and far beyond the circumscribed capacity
of conventional understandings of human rights theory.
In this connection, I have been able to show, without being reductionist or falling into the
folly of generalizability, how a deployment of the RTD perspective uncovers the inability of
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conventional human rights accountability praxis to recognize and respond to the root causes of
vulnerability embedded within undemocratic and inequitable institutional arrangements. Thanks
to its epistemologies (of emphasizing context-awareness and its distinctive nature), the RTD has
veritably exposed the cognitive limitations of conventional human rights practices of
accountability that do not question violations underpinned by the contemporary economic
organization.
On the whole, the main thrust of this dissertation thus far is that norms, institutions, and
rules of accountability premised on liberal rights theory, and those theories that they produce and
reproduce, are inadequate to the protection of people in the Global South against violations
causally linked to the development interventions of the World Bank and the IMF. This follows
from eminent critiques that human rights regulative orders are “naïve legalism.”96 As argued in
this dissertation, contemporary regimes of accountability fail to understand the determinative role
of global factors and their intermingling with national factors to produce harmful outcomes. They
deploy an interactional account of institutionally embedded injustices, viewing them as
wrongfulness or human rights violations without rendering a proper account as to their rootedness
in the global policy system.97 The same can be said of the Bank’s Inspection Panels and sustainable
development accountability praxis, which epitomize the interactional nature of contemporary
accountability.
What way forward, therefore, does this dissertation propose in the face of these severe
limitations, utopianism, anachronism, and the incompleteness of the existing accountability
mechanisms? I propose recourse to the answerability dimension of accountability.
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4. NEW

FRONTIERS

FOR

THE

ANSWERABILITY

DIMENSION

OF

ACCOUNTABILITY
4.1 Going Beyond Linear International Legal Conventions and Frameworks
In this section, inspired by TWAIL’s counter-hegemonic thinking and writing on international law,
I help advance the notion of “subaltern cosmopolitan legality.” I make the case for exploring
alternatives not founded on the formal, limited, and limiting norms and practices of the
international law of accountability. I imagine an international practice from a cosmopolitan
perspective that insists on accountability from below. This is a departure from the exceedingly
bounded perception of accountability as “responsibility-for-wrongfulness” or as sanction/remedy
of outcomes of harms.
I also admit that there is no common ground on which a universal system of accountability
can be conceived to respond to such complex societal problems like development injustice, neither
can we all agree on the normative purposes and common underpinning values of accountability.98
Rather than seek a universal and standard approach, I ask what kind or quality of accountability
mechanism can be suitable to different settings, one that recognizes Third World agency and
resistance in international law.99 Accordingly, I address how human rights and development can
suitably and adaptably respond to international law’s legitimization of the avoidance and
obstruction of, and disconnection from, accountability by IFIs. I am therefore not about to suggest
a monolithic model as the only viable option to or way out of the constructed legal conundrum.
Rather, I focus on what has been tested in different arenas, in diverse contexts, through various
strategies, by various social agents and movements.
Two rationales inform this conclusion. First, resolving complex global problems demands
no less than pragmatic solutions that go beyond simplistic adherence to legal conventions. Even
though law is an important device for both social engineering as well as providing spaces for
resistance, it can also be “a force for status quo and domination.”100 What is even more intriguing,
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as the International Law Association observes, forms of accountability are diverse and other
interests, not “only legal interests may trigger accountability.”101 These other interests may include
those of instilling responsiveness, inclusiveness, transparency, and political and democratic
accountability.
Second, I am cognisant that the solution to development accountability deficits,
dysfunctions, eclipses and displacements may lie in multiple approaches not limited to a one-sizefits-all model. A universal or workable accountability regime, no matter its legal innovativeness,
cannot be reduced to a single, homogenizing framework. Rather than remain tethered to inflexible
international law frameworks (which are too often minimalist, utopian, restrictive, and
incomplete), my proposition here is that we should seek to reform and modify extant accountability
regimes to be contextually aware and responsive to the complexity of development injustice. It is
imperative that we explore what works, is workable, or has worked before.
The “what works” approach is the preferred way forward for this dissertation. The what
works approach does not radically depart from what is already known. It does not challenge that
which is in development policy practice. However, what works is a repudiation of state-centric
models in favour of a people-centred human rights enforcement systems.102 By recognizing the
potential limits of law in providing recourse to multi-variegated problems that fundamentally
question the known norms, I propose that which has been tested in other disciplines of practice. I
propose social movements praxis to ground alternative politics of accountability. I propose that it
be transplanted to the human rights framing of development justice. By extension, it can be
transplanted to the pursuit of accountability in development policy practice.

4.2

Revisiting Social Movements Praxis as Alternative Politics of Accountability

Those rationales are supported by a strong conviction I hold. I propose that to be effective, the
accountability politics for the realization of development justice in the twenty-first century ought
to be likened to the strategies of past historical movements and activism. I have in mind Third
World mobilizations against such evils as slavery, imperialism, colonization, neo-colonization,
climate change, and more recently hegemonic globalization.
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Social movements praxis presents various forms of mobilization, organization, strategies,
ideology and knowledge practice. These are mechanisms that are less formalistic yet can enlarge
the goals and ends of accountability beyond “responsibility-for-wrongfulness.” Social movements’
role in ensuring community participation in development and deepening human rights and
democracy throughout the world, through elaborate strategies and actions, is now well
documented.103
Social movements, with their reliance on participatory methods, call for a different kind
and quality of accountability—of extracting answerability of institutions toward the people
affected by decisions. They thus seek to move beyond a conception of accountability as sanction
of breach.104 Noticeably, participatory accountability is not a reinvention of the wheel in
international law. It was one of the crucial human rights pillars that was always emphasized in the
RTD discourse. It was asserted as the next best thing under conditions of inequality to deliver the
virtues of representation, responsiveness, inclusivity, voice, and self-determined development.105
Whatever diverse roles social movements have played in development, their enduring
feature reflects a cosmopolitan reimagination, for good or ill, of international law and international
development structures from below. Social movements’ perspectives and praxes have also
bolstered peoples’ participation as a counter-power to global hegemonies, fostered a subaltern
counter-hegemony manifesting proactivity for clear alternatives, forwarded community
counterplots to the deleterious effects of globalization, and advanced transnational movements or
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advocacy networks.106 These subaltern formations further various agendas, among them those
seeking to regenerate peoples’ autonomy in development.107
In advancing these different agendas in development practice, social movements have
emerged as oppositional local formations that articulate causes and aspirations of the subalterns as
they challenge global norms and institutions.108 In some cases, they present a brand of grassroots,
national, and transnational activism and politics.109 In multiple arenas and contexts, they seek the
answerability of actors, the democratization of processes, the responsiveness of institutions, and
various forms and claims of global justice.110
Rajagopal demonstrates the national and transnational character of mobilization by
grassroots forces against the Narmada Valley dam project that brought local communities, farmers,
local and international NGOs, and other transnational social movements together in opposition to
the World Bank, local corporations, the Indian government, and other international forces.111
Public resistance and opposition to Narmada Valley Project has a long history which may not be
fully recounted here.112 From 1979, the World Bank joined to finance this project of dams
construction along the Narmada valley. The project would harness the river for hydropower,
supply drinking water, and irrigation.113 Thousands of dams were to be built along the river. This
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project was expected to wreak profound environmental and human costs such as displacement of
thousands of people, damage to biodiversity and land degradation.114 These are the reasons the
project attracted intense national and international resistance as it evolved. Environmental
consciousness that had gathered since the 1970s among the urban and rural social classes as
supported by social movements shifted attention to the Narmada Valley project.115 Several social
movements of peasants, women, farmers, middle classes, and progressive intellectuals came
together to campaign against the human and environmental harms.
Opposition to the project was led by Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) and Save the
Narmada, an organization that brought together human rights and environmental activists, people
affected by the project, academics and scientists.116 An international NGO Environmental Defence
Fund based in Washington also supported the movements. In the end this social movements
mobilization became a national and international cause triggering solidarity with other
international NGOs and drawing attention of the US Congress and other legislative bodies of
Western countries.117 In 1992, due to immense opposition nationally and globally, the World Bank
constituted an independent review committee to look into the complaints. The committee found
that the Bank had failed to follow its own directives and procedures. It recommended that the Bank
withdraws from the project. In the end, the Bank abandoned the project, highlighting how local
actions can mobilize across borders to oppose global forces, at the local levels, and from below.
The location of these forces are within the domestic spheres, where they exert counter-plots to
global projects at the local level. “Such success was based on local actions, well articulated for
many grassroots networks which offered an active solidarity for that purpose.”118
In my view, RTD accountability politics stands to benefit immensely from these alternative
forms of engagements, not that these are perfect revolutionary strategies but because these are
pragmatic alternatives that can be termed international “institutional bypasses” to the embedded
obstacles against institutional reform and change.119 Prado explains that an “institutional bypass
114
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creates new pathways around clogged or blocked institutions”… “it does not try to modify, change
or reform existing institutions. Instead, it tries to create a new pathway in which efficiency and
functionality will be the norm.”120 As some form of institutional bypasses, social movements
praxis captures Rajagopal’s insights that these may constitute “extra-institutional forms of
mobilization” capable of influencing institutional outcomes as they “constitute important arenas
of resistance that remain beyond the cognitive boundaries of international law’s sole, approved
discourse” of human rights.121
This kind of subaltern politics may also secure, in the language of Okafor, “modest
harvests” in other contexts of struggles.122 As Keck and Sikkink observe, some social movements
are transnational advocacy groups that coalesce with the agenda of framing and inserting
alternative ideas into policy debates.123 According to Bradlow, social movements’ reliance on
protests not only injects accountability into development decision-making but also broadens “the
range of issues that decision-makers consider, and expand[s] the range of decision-makers who
can participate in decision-making.”124
I lean on the above insights and others for the considered view that, if we leave aside known
flaws and limitations that may render social movements praxis ineffective in securing the goals for
which they may be deployed, participatory accountability which they assure has some promise and
potential. Participatory accountability from below can guarantee a measure of tangible results in
making institutions answerable, responsive, transparent, and democratically accountable if it
draws from or deploys social movements praxis and techniques of resistance or advocacy.
More critically, I see the resort to participation as an alternative form emphasizing that our
understanding of emancipation and egalitarianism (pro-poor strategies) that the Declaration on the
Right to Development envisions need not be tied to the totalizing conceptions of accountability
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constructed by international law or its other iterations. As I have demonstrated throughout this
dissertation, absolute jural conceptions of accountability suffer from an enduring rigidity,
anachronism, restrictiveness, minimalism, utopianism, and incompleteness. All too often, too
much recourse to legal formalism has tended to limit our ability to grasp the potential and
effectiveness of other “leftist alternatives” outside the domain of law.125 In proposing a leftist and
pragmatic approach that assumes a participatory model, I am alive to the reality that different
mechanisms and processes do exist and can be invoked in holding institutions to account in ways
that transcend the sanctions approach.126
I am however not unaware that incorporating social movement praxis/principles into
accountability may itself be coopted either by the states or the IFIs target of such resistance. The
cooptation may happen because the resistance posed by various movements always tends to shape
and are shaped by working from within the paradigms and norms set by the hegemon that is being
resisted.127 Two rebuttals to concerns of cooptation are this.128 Social movements specifically work
from outside the state and IFIs that they seek to challenge. Context therefore matters more for the
failure or success of social movements activities and thinking. 129 Two, in some cases counterhegemony is itself more about deepening alternative visions of social reality than a challenge and
direct confrontation with hegemony.

4.3

Core Techniques and Sensibilities of Participatory Accountability from Below

In this venture, I take inspiration from what De Souza Santos and Cesar Rodrigue-Garavito have
called the “subaltern cosmopolitan legality.”130 I break ranks with conventional international law
thinking to propose what I call participatory accountability from below, which goes far beyond
the limited and contrived understandings of accountability in international law. I rely on the now
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familiar and tested strategies of subaltern counter-forces, particularly their use and reliance on
social movements’ strategies of resistance to international law and institutions.
Drawing upon social movements’ theories of resistance, subaltern cosmopolitan legality
has emerged as a praxis and an approach vested with several sensibilities and techniques. Its core
sets of techniques that go beyond prevention, mitigation, and remedy as the traditional objectives
of accountability are: (i) “social inclusion”; (ii) promoting the agency and autonomy of the people
in development decision-making; (iii) mobilizing the masses in the articulation of and struggle for
responsive development; (iv) creating localized terrains for counter-hegemonic engagement with
global institutions; (v) seeking the dethronement of “coercive institutions” and ideational power
that firm up domination; (vi) relying on law and politics to “reimagine” international institutions
from below; (vii) articulating solidaristic rights discourses that transcend the individualistic-cumliberal paradigms; (viii) and producing counter-hegemonic knowledge oppositional to, and seeking
the retrenchment of, the hegemonic presentations of reality.131
As I explain later, with these techniques offered by subaltern cosmopolitanism, we can
radically reimagine and enlarge the clamour for development justice, pragmatically and far beyond
the bounds of legalistic models of accountability. I conceive of this as a reimagination of
international practice and norms in consonance with what Baxi refers to elsewhere as the “authorial
role played by the Third World in all its complexity” or as Fakhri adds “[constructing] histories of
international law that resonates with peoples of the Third World so that they have a foundation to
stand on to make a new future.”132 My optimism rests on the view that participation as a form of
bottom-up accountability resides in the spaces availed by well-established subaltern cosmopolitan
strategies of resistance to global development institutions. These include protests, media censure,
naming and shaming, transnational lobbying, mutual engagements. For, as Falk himself had earlier
rendered, “[a] focus on social movements with restructuring agendas itself incorporates a political
judgment on how drastic global reform can best be achieved at this stage of history.”133
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4.4 The Legal Foundation of Participatory Accountability
Participation as a practice that enhances public accountability has a legal foundation in
international law and is recognized in UDHR, ICESCR, ICCPR and CEDAW, among other
instruments.134 In fact the Human Rights Committee recognizes participation as a vital component
of democratic governance.135 Participation occupies a central and defining place in the
Declaration’s framework.136 Article 1 of the Declaration is the ultimate embodiment of the
cosmopolitan principle of exalting the individual’s voice, contribution, and welfare in an
international platform. It ordains that “every person and all peoples are entitled to participate in,
contribute to, and enjoy civil, economic, social and political development in which all human rights
and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.” This has been replicated in article 4 of the draft
Convention on the Right to Development “which recognizes that participation in and contribution
to … comprise the foundation stones for the right to development.”137 Article 2(3) of the
Declaration further reflects the institutional variant of cosmopolitanism by seeking to constrain all
social agents (i.e., the state and its other formations) in the development enterprise to adhere to the
injunction of people’s participation in development. Article 2(3) mandates a distributive agenda
for states, while acting individually and multilaterally, “to formulate appropriate national
development policies that aim at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire
population and of all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in
development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom.”
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This participatory vision is anchored on some core values. For example, the idea of “free”
introduces voluntariness or non-coercion in seeking consent, consultation or approval of the people
affected by national and international development. “Active” implies representation or direct
participation in decision-making, while “meaningful” suggests that people’s participation has to
have real impact on decision-making.138
As an earlier report recognized, “participation is the right through which all other rights in
the Declaration on the Right to Development are exercised.”139 Apart from the international legal
instruments that require people to take part in civic matters, the African Commission on Human
and People’s Rights has been trailblazer clarifying the legal scope of participation, at least in the
context of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. The Commission upheld in the
Endorois case that participation is a cardinal principle so significant in the development process.140
This case ought to be accorded seriousness, particularly in national and multilateral contexts where
states would be negotiating development pacts.
One such case which the state ought to take seriously in national development context is
the Ogiek’s case. In 2009, the indigenous members of the Ogiek community brought before the
African Court a case (the Ogieks case) challenging their eviction from Mau forest.141 The
Applicant cited a number of alleged violations, including the violation of Article 22 of the African
Charter on Human and People’s Rights.142 It was claimed that the eviction notice did not fully take
into account the interest of the Ogiek relating to the use and enjoyment of the forest as their
ancestral land and that they were not consulted in the decision to evict them from the forest.143 In
its judgment in 2017, the African Court read Article 22 of the Charter in consonance with Article
23 of the United Nations Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) 144 to
“determine and develop priorities and strategies for exercising their right to development” and “to
be actively involved” in all development matters affecting them, such as health, housing, and other
socio-economic programmes.145 The Court therefore found in favour of the complainants a
138
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violation of the right to be consulted, a violation which impacted their right to social, economic
and cultural development in contravention of Article 22 of the Charter.146 The right to be consulted,
and to free, active and meaningful participation seems to hold significant imprimatur in both
national and international development contexts.
The right to self-determined development underpinned by common Article 1 of ICESCR
and ICCPR is similar in purport and tenor to Article 1 of the Declaration on the Right to
Development. The notion of free, active and meaningful participation that forms the basis of selfdetermined development has been recognized in other jurisdictions. Giving meaning to the
ICESCR and ICCPR common Article 1 right to be consulted and to participate in development,
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has determined in Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v
Suriname that the right entails self-determined development which enshrines the right of
indigenous communities to “freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”147
The requirement of free, prior and informed consent is key to self-determined development. This
requirement has been recognized by the 2000 World Commission on Dams report as necessary to
enable informed participation that allows for broader public acceptance by the people affected by
development project.148 It should be noted that UNDRIP expressly incorporates the RTD into its
provisions.149
Consent, consultation and participation are rooted in the notion of autonomous governance
that is so essential to indigenous communities’ control of their development and use of
resources.150 Autonomous governance is itself essential for securing democracy and ameliorating
the subordinate status of indigenous communities in development. The tenets of consultation and
consent operate to safeguard peoples’ rights that may be affected in the development process.151
Therefore, these cases and more, together with the express legal provisions, form the basis of the
substantive elements and foundation of the right to participation as the basis of participatory
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accountability in international law. I will discuss in the subsequent section how the core
sensibilities and techniques of social movements praxis can harness the right of participation in
development to achieve certain objectives of accountability that can aid the securement of
development justice.

4.5

The Nexus Between Participation and the Answerability Dimension of
Accountability

In this dissertation, I develop the links between the participation and answerability aspects of
accountability. I understand participatory development processes as constituting the answerability
element of accountability. This is supported by the legal anchorage of participation in the
Declaration and the cosmopolitan vision of having all those facing marginalization and exclusion
involved in self-determined development and development policymaking at the national and
international levels. Participation as a core attribute of the RTD norm underscores the centrality of
the answerability of institutions in the development process because it ensures “that people
affected have a real say in the priorities, design, and implementation of development policies.”152
But international law lacks theoretical rigour in sufficiently grasping the way participatory
practice entails or subsumes the answerability dimension of accountability. Suffice it to say that
the innovation of participatory development has not grown apace with the understanding of
participation as a component of the answerability typology of accountability in international
human rights law and the study of international organizations.153 Besides, a solid conception of
participation from below as accountability in international law has not yet percolated through the
international law and development discourse of accountability.154 Attempts such as Rajagopal’s
construct of counter-hegemony is part of a broad discussion of social movements praxis as a form
of Third World resistance in international law from below, but not accountability. Instead, he
conceives mass mobilization from below as a power of resistance against hegemony.
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We recall that in chapter 1 I noted that answerability of actors (the duty to explain, justify,
and communicate decisions) can be engaged ex-ante, at the policymaking level, or ex-post, through
a dialogic process between duty bearers and rights holders or stake holders. 155 This fledgling
definition is yet to be captured by the theoretical literature on accountability in international law.
This, however, is not to suggest that participation, or its applicability, is something new for
international law. The ideal of peoples’ participation has long been regarded as a core component
of national development process, governance, development cooperation, and even in international
law.156 A considerable amount of academic thinking and policy practice in the field of development
indeed equates these participatory models with varying concepts of voice, empowerment,
ownership, partnership, governance, involvement, and inclusion, among others.157
Participation and answerability are linked in fundamental ways. As a practice, participation
avails the basis on which to actualize answerability. They are linked because answerability is
inherently attached to the right of access to information, freedom of expression, and the duty to
explain and communicate decisions. A good deal of current literature dwell on the linkage between
participation and development, but not participation as an aspect of answerability in the
accountability paradigm. I must say that the reason answerability is peripheral in international law
is because of its intellectual roots in political theory, with its emphasis on communication,
information, and justification. It also remains unknown to positivist international law which is ever
more obsessed with legal doctrine and legal formalism. As it is well known, international law
distances itself from politics, including the politics of resistance habituated in the Third World. On
For the answerability dimension of accountability, see Andreas Schedler, “Conceptualizing Accountability” in
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this score, I agree with Beyerly that “the shortcomings of classical international law as a whole are
traced to its positivism.”158
It is only recently that the relevance of dialogue (information and justification) and
communication as essential elements of the answerability prong of accountability are emerging in
international law theories of accountability. Take, for example, Dekker, who draws from multiple
disciplinary theories to elucidate the implicit linkage of answerability to participation. He views
accountability as “involving the justification of an actor’s performance vis-à-vis others, the
assessment or judgment of that performance against certain standards, and the possible imposition
of consequences if the actor fails to live up to applicable standards.”159 It is not only the
“justification” criterion which makes participation an ideal core component of answerability (or
emphasizes their overlap). As Dekker reiterates, the nexus lies in the fact that accountability has
emerged as a social relationship, defined by a variety of ideals such as the right to demand
information, scrutiny of decisions against predetermined standards, and the duty of justification of
conduct by actors.160 So far, we may cite three elements that emerge as prerequisites underlying
participation as an essential component of the answerability dimension of accountability (i.e the
duty of communication, information, and justification of decisions to the people affected).

4.6

Strategies for Actualizing Participation as a Form of Subaltern Cosmopolitanism
Against Global Institutions

So how may we tease out the essentials of an answerability dimension of accountability that relies
on the sensibilities and techniques of the ideal of participation as a form of subaltern cosmopolitan
strategy against IFIs development praxis? How do we advance a Third World, cosmopolitan,
subaltern perspective on accountability in international development practice? How can
participation from below secure the kind of development justice envisioned by the RTD?
Encouragingly, interdisciplinary research engagements have long offered reflexive lenses
critical for rethinking new frontiers for a counter-hegemonic engagement with international law,
notwithstanding that such new forays may not sufficiently be justified on positivist foundations.161
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A rich body of work reposes in social movements theories. Post-development theories have also
been able to critique the hegemonizing discourses of development and international law. 162 For
our purposes here, the notion of participation as accountability can be integrated with social
movements and post-development theories as frames of reasoning to improve our understanding
of the answerability dimension of accountability that the Declaration envisions.163 This
understanding may then be applied to IFIs accountability praxis. In what ways?
Social movements praxis and post-development thinking reveal the eight core sensibilities
of subaltern cosmopolitan legality that foregrounds participation in international law from below.
They present these as more productive alternatives than reliance on the enforceability dimension
of accountability. The core techniques (i.e., social inclusion, exalting peoples’ autonomy in
development decision-making, mass mobilization for struggle, the creation of localized terrains
for struggle, the articulation of solidaristic rights, inscription of counter-hegemonic knowledge in
the development universe, bottom-up reimagination of law and institutions, and seeking the
dethronement of institutions and their ideational power)164 may be instruments for use to achieve
other ends of development accountability that far transcend prevention, mitigation, and remedy as
some of the declared objects of accountability. The RTD’s participatory ethic as an alternative,
broad-based and less formalistic form of accountability (in both the political, democratic and legal
senses) offers these leftist ideas.
As concerns mass mobilization for struggle, this has been demonstrated when people’s socialcounterpowers are exercised at the national, transnational and international level in challenging
social movements pose radical theoretical and epistemological challenges to international law … to the extent that
they articulate alternative conceptions of modernity and development that cannot be sufficiently captured by extant
branches of international law, including human rights” (at 235). In his view, thinking international law through the
alternative of social movements is more productive than through formalistic state-centric approaches in the traditional
style of positivists and liberals (at 236).
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See Santos & Rodríguez-Garavito, Law and Globalization From Below, supra note 35 at 13-14; Carroll, supra note
131.

278

hegemonic policy paradigms and seeking to empower individuals and communities to participate
in their own governance and development decision-making.165 The idea of “the people,” according
Esteva and Prakash refers to those who are “autonomously organized” … “for their own survival,
flourishing and enduring; both independent from and antagonistic to the state and its formal and
cooperative structures; hospitable to “ the Other” and thus open to both diversity; mainly expressed
in reclaimed or regenerated commons, in both urban and rural settings, and clearly concerned with
the common good, both natural and social.”166
There are innumerable examples of social movements praxis relying on people’s mobilization
for struggle against global institutions. A good illustration of this mobilization that the clamour for
development justice can learn from is the Indian Narmada Valley Dam Project, which social
movements resisted, culminating in the creation of the Bank’s Inspection Panels.167 The other is
the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), which “skillfully [drew]
international attention through publications, lobbying at the UN forums and high-profile
leadership.”168 What makes these kinds of strategies relevant for global context struggles is their
way of mobilization and drawing solidarity across countries that parades the plight and causes of
a people in international forums. They may be applied, in incremental steps and reiterative
processes, to oppose policy decisions that the World Bank or IMF may seek to enforce during
lending negotiations. Special interest groups and activist forces within a country will have to
repurpose their strategies of resistance to policymaking at the national level. Often policy decisions
take place between the government bureaucrats and IFIs technocrats who reside in the country or
those on specialized missions. It is at these levels where specialized interest groups may seek to
challenge policies, from below.
The mass mobilization for struggle, for example in the case of the Narmada Valley Project that
drew international attention and forged alliances with civil societies nationally and internationally
showed how social movements can oppose global institutions at the national level. The fact that
the World Bank instituted the inspection committee to look into complaints and later established
a permanent Inspection Panel that exists to this very day shows how grassroots mobilization,
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however frail, can have far-reaching impact at the global institutional level. The fact that today
there exists environmental and social impact safeguards together with indigenous communities’
policies is a demonstration that resistance from below can lead to institutional changes and reforms
at the global level. These mobilizations and solidarities express the everyday emancipatory power
struggles and politics against formal global institutions beyond the premises availed by
conventional law.169
In the case of the Narmada Valley social movements, the various grassroots environmental
social movements that had evolved from the 1970s offered to communities and other forces
localized terrains for struggle necessary for the articulation of solidaristic rights of peasant
communities who would be displaced by global projects. The fact that local people can challenge
global projects by offering alternative worldviews inscribes a sense of counter-hegemonic
knowledge in the development universe through a bottom-up reimagination of law, development
and institutions. Seeing that the World Bank abandoned the Narmada Valley project after intense
opposition endorses the participatory sensibility of seeking the dethronement of institutions and
their ideational power and certainties that firm up their projects. Indeed Rajagopal sees these forms
of mobilization as availing important localized pedestals for institutionalizing resistance that has
not been captured within the ambit of international law such as human rights as international law’s
only sanctioned language of resistance.170 What the RTD participatory ethic can borrow from is
Rajagopal’s demonstration of how interest groups, anti-poverty movements, the press, civil
society, or specialized NGOs deploy these strategies that inject “extra-institutional forms of
mobilization” that operate outside the realm of the state by providing legitimate causes and arenas
for speaking against development institutions.171
This resistance to international institutions from below may happen at the national or even at
the transnational level, where economic policies of development institutions are discussed.172 But
to be most effective, as post-development thinking emphasizes, international institutions are best
opposed at the local level, not their global incarnations, to expose their infirmities that cannot
otherwise be apparent when they are openly opposed at the global levels. Local communities can
169
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fiercely oppose Western development interventions at the national level when they are being
written into contracts between borrowing states and the financing institution. This is where social
mobilization comes in. Effectively when local communities mobilize this way, at the local and
national level, they end up into possibilities of opposing the global development project at the local
and national levels. The local mobilization which underpins the idea of participatory accountability
from below, recognizes that even if they end up in no success, such a drawn-out confrontational
engagement creates an arrangement of power struggle that does not legitimize the machinery of
the hegemon. If global institutions were to be opposed at the global level, we end up with the ironic
outcome that it leaves intact the very “evil threatening people’s lives.”173
This is the lesson that emerged out of the Zapatistas solidarity in opposing the Mexican
government’s implementation of neoliberal policies. Esteva and Prakash have studied the
Zapatistas movement of local communities in Mexico. This was an uprising of January 1 1994
organized by local communities in Chiapas against the state-led development projects that were
enforcing disruptive exogenous development models.174 The movement involved thousands of
people issuing communiques and manifestos, through the media and other national and
international platforms about their plight which gained spontaneous international attention and
sympathy. This international attention enabled them to create national and international solidarity
with other organizations, a fact which discouraged the government from quelling their uprising.175
What we can draw from this movement is the kind of mobilization and solidarity that is
relevant for consideration of the question of power asymmetries, either at the national or
international levels. The attention of communities that would rise up against global projects would
have to be on how to undermine global hegemonies by undermining the state institutions, policies
and modes of implementation that further the agenda of the global hegemon. This can happen
through activist forces that challenge trade rules such as those that limit access to anti-retroviral
medicine, or those that enforce a stable financial environment, or those that favour private
enterprise at the altar of human wellbeing. Note that this struggle happens at the national level, but
the target is global norms and policies. Esteva and Prakash argue that mobilizations of this kind
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may have no effect on power structures but nonetheless undermines “the dominant system” at the
turfs where this can most effectively be deployed. This resonates with the proposition of subaltern
internationalism from below through localized terrains for struggle that challenge international
development projects at the national level.176 By this approach, social movement who double up
as the RTD adherents would emphatically reverse the technocratic modernization thinking, within
the imperative that development is about people and their wellbeing. Well-being here implies
human-centred development and not growth or production or markets or protection of intellectual
property. Besides, their emphasis would not just be on the accomplishment of the ends of
development but also on the process (means) of achieving development, albeit with a prerequisite
that the process be equitable, just, participatory, respect all other rights and focus on promoting
wellbeing of populations.177
Another lesson appears in how civil societies have been able to empower and sensitize the
people to be able to assert their rights and demand effective “social inclusion” at all stages of
planning and implementation of development. By this tradition, if there can be open, public and
transparent discussion and consultation on development policies of the Bank and IMF, we would
create an environment for the exercise of the right to information, freedom of expression and
speech, and possibility for communication which makes institutions responsive in decisionmaking.178 Uvin sees this as a rights-based participatory model that adopts “a root cause” approach
to “policies of exclusion and discrimination.”179 A root cause approach that Uvin proposes can
draw from some judicial opinions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, particularly on
the question of consultation of indigenous communities in development. In Kichwa Indigenous
People of Sarayaku v Ecuador the Court set out the parameters for effective participation in
development.180 The holding of the Court was that:
[The] obligation to consult the said community in an active and informed manner, in
accordance with its customs and traditions, within the framework of continuing communication
between the parties. Furthermore, the consultations must be undertaken in good faith, using
culturally-appropriate procedures and must be aimed at reaching an agreement. In addition, the
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people or community must be consulted in accordance with their own traditions, during the
early stages of the development or investment plan, and not only when it is necessary to obtain
the community’s approval, if appropriate. The State must also ensure that the members of the
people or the community are aware of the potential benefits and risks so they can decide
whether to accept the proposed development or investment plan. Finally, the consultation must
take into account the traditional decision-making practices of the people or community. Failure
to comply with this obligation, or engaging in consultations without observing their essential
characteristics, entails the State’s international responsibility.181

The duty imposed on the state is to ensure “active and informed” participation of the people or
entire population, “within a framework of continuing communication,” and to be apprised of all
the “risks and benefits” so as to make informed decisions. This jurisprudence of free, prior and
informed consent can be likened to a root cause approach to accountability that participation from
below enforces in development. Its instrumental value is that it makes all actors and their policy
contribution visible and visibilized at the initiation stages of projects or at the policymaking stage.
It is an ex-ante approach that allows the people subject of development to probe and question the
rationalities that inform policymaking and other conditionalities that are attached to development
or financing projects. The ex-ante approach to accountability offers a viable mechanism of dealing
with the intermingle effect dilemma in that it renders international actors and their policy choices
visible, discernible, and determinate, at the decision-making stages, which policy choices and
actions can be interrogated. This interrogation has some possibility of making development
institutions responsive to the local needs and development priorities of the people.
The obligation of public participation applies as well to situations where the state bureaucrats
initiate or negotiate investment project financing with the Bank, or when the IMF technocrats
engage treasury mandarins in setting the structural conditionalities in a target country. The focus
of participatory accountability is active, free and meaningful engagement with these institutions
from below, in a communicative process that informs the subjects of development of all the risks
and benefits of undertaking certain development initiatives. This duty is binding on the state
nationally, bilaterally and multilaterally. In fact, Article 8 of the Draft Convention on the Right to
Development imposes on the state a duty to ensure that all public authorities and institutions adhere
to the obligations entailed in the Declaration while Articles 7 and 9 of the said draft convention
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enshrine the obligations of international organizations to respect human rights and not to aid, assist,
direct or control any entity in the conduct that derogates from the obligations entailed in the RTD.
The fact that both the international organization and the state are enjoined to the injunction to
adhere to the legal obligation of participation and to ensure conformity of other institutions with
this obligation has the potential to impose a sense of social inclusion and people’s voices in
development. Participatory accountability from below relies on these core sensibilities and
techniques.182
With regard to economic decision-making, Rusumbi and Mbulunyi183 have shown how
Tanzanian feminist groupings have made use of political mobilization as a tool for collective action
and championing the will of the people in economic policymaking. These NGOs have engaged
publicly with the higher echelons of government through civil society representatives, assured
strong participation of the masses in policy consultation processes, forged critical alliances with
other movements nationally and across borders to channel pressure to every given level of
decision-making, questioned various levels of policymaking insofar as those laws or policies
would impact the people, and provoked public debate on macro-economic policies with the aim of
emphasizing social justice and marginalizing economic thinking in development policies.184
Rusimbi and Mbilinyi’s work presents some of the core set of ideas that pro-RTD social
movements can rely on to demand answerability of IFIs in macro-economic decision-making.
Specialized civil society and other interest groups may ensure strong participation of the masses
in policy consultation processes at the national level. The target should be macro-economic
policies that the governments initiate with the advice of IFIs technocrats. At the international level,
country-based movements may forge critical alliances and coalitions with other movements
nationally and across borders to channel pressure to global policies to align them to considerations
of equity and social justice, human well-being and participatory development processes.
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It is apposite to note that participatory models are already in vogue in the Bank’s and IMF’s
development and financial decision-making. The Bank and IMF have conceded to the demands
and expanded spaces for civil society organizations (CSOs) consultation and participation in their
engagements with developing states and other stakeholders.185 Increasingly, since 1999, the Bank
and IMF have made attempts to increase transparency, participation, and consultation with CSOs
in their policies.186 In 2003, the IMF came up with a staff guideline on consultation with CSOs,
which was then revised in 2015.187 The Bank has a number of policies that require wider
consultation of stakeholders in policy formulation. Some of the participatory models of the Bank
include the Operational Directive (OD 4.20) and Operational Policy/Bank Procedures on
Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4.10).
Merits aside, it is not lost on us that these participatory models have been decried as
ignoring power dimensions of development practice. As Kapoor shows in his work, they are a
“participatory fig leaf,” “tokenistic,” “compensatory legitimation,” or “ritualistic action … that
tends to reproduce the perspectives of dominant actors.”188 In much the same tone, the IMF itself
incidentally notes the deficiency of its own participatory models.189
I propose that in thinking about participation as accountability from below, we must think
about the role that social movements can play in constructing an answerability regime in
international law. Moreover, in thinking about firming up the backbone of the RTD regime as a
mechanism for delivering development justice, we can go further and draw ample lessons from
post-development ideology.
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Chief among the post-development imaginary that stands to enrich the turn to participation
as a bottom up accountability is the notion that development must be culturally specific, based on
the individual agencies and autonomies of the local people.190 This notion is a comparator to the
RTD discourse, which has in its long career disfavoured a technocratic, top-down approach and
looks to peoples’ active participation and contribution in all the processes of development. One
area where bottom-up planning can rupture practice while investing creative energy is SDG 17.14
on policy coherence and coordination. Social movements can take the lead in championing deeper
and divergent views (“a pluriverse”)191 on national and multilateral development policies, at the
national, regional, and international levels.192 The notion of pluriverse is that there are many sites
of ideation “where there can be no one dominant notion of autonomy.”193 Avoiding the monolithic
approaches also entails looking at social movements not only from the perspective of being, “prima
facie, agents of counter-hegemony in their organized dissent to the existing order,”194 but rather in
the capacity that they fill the gaps of a state-centric international law. That is, they offer solutions
from outside the spaces provided by the law of international organizations.195 This is on account
of its antecedence in the organized resistance that relies on alternative knowledges, strategies, and
visions to alter the conventions, relations, and practices of domination associated with the
expansion and constant refocusing of the market episteme.
The advantage of creating a pluriverse is anchored on the post-development thinking of
reimagining and creating alternative worlds using local and national thought processes that depart
in fundamental ways from the constructs of the Western episteme.196 In fact, OECD has proposed
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stakeholder participation that ensures ownership, involvement, and voice as one of the key tenets
of goal 17 on policy coherence.197 This is also reflected in target 16.7 to “ensure responsive,
inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels.” It is further envisaged in
target 17.16 to “enhance the global partnership for sustainable development complemented by
multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technologies and
financial resources to support the achievement” of SDGs. It is by this root cause approach that
potentially adverse and productive impacts of policies on the well-being of the people can be
diagnosed and modified through an elaborate discursive exchange of ideas from the people.
How future social movements will engage with this imperative of participation and
consultation in international development praxis of IFIs is a matter to be left to the core sensibilities
and techniques discussed above. Conceptualizing Article 1 of the Declaration, now reproduced as
Article 4 (1) of the Draft Convention on the Right to Development can draw from such sensibilities
and techniques that social movements have succeeded in writing in international law.
Article 1 can be read as enshrining answerability as accountability which can draw from
the kind of subaltern cosmopolitan legality and the root cause approach that social movements
instill in development practice. It is important that I underscore this view. I think this is a crucial
dynamic that the RTD accountability politics should advance, based on the recognition that the
implementation of solidaristic rights (such as the right that demands a just and equitable
international order) cannot be left to the domain of law only, but can be advanced through
participatory approaches that enable people to contribute to and be consulted in the development
process. The Draft Convention on the Right to Development makes participation a dominant
feature of the RTD, emphasizing that the process of development is as important as the outcomes
of development, for which the requirement of “active, free, and meaningful” participation is
paramount. The obligations recognized by the draft convention, if it becomes law, including the
duty of participation, applies to international organizations under Article 7 and 9. But even without
the adoption of the draft convention as hard law, already, development praxis of international
organizations are bound by human rights duties deriving from the UN Charter and other
international law norms.
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If we are to revamp the robustness of RTD accountability politics, we need to inject more
ideological fervour into its accountability politics. This reinvigoration must be applied to the
context of the 2030 SDGs agenda, where accountability in the implementation of targets has been
placed front and centre. We need to think of how to mobilize for protracted struggles, social
inclusion, the presentation of alternative developmental ideas, and the reimagination of
development based on authentic local ideas. Active, free and meaningful participation is helpful
to such struggles. Such struggles will see people demanding information and explanation of
development policies negotiated by development bureaucrats—at whatever levels where bilateral
or multilateral development policymaking takes place. Like other activist forces, their purpose
would be to create oppositional groups that drive the agenda for economic and social emancipation
as well as to contest the excessive economic rationalism that pervades the neoliberal development
agenda.
Strategies for actualizing participatory ethic in the accountability praxis of IFIs must
recognize that the future practice of RTD accountability causes must shift. It must channel intense
public scrutiny to such sites as the formulation of the financing agreements and policy issues that
the Bank or the Fund recommend for borrowing states, with a specific attention to structural
violations and the necessity of accountability at the global institutional levels. This shift must
deploy the kind of social movements praxis discussed above. In other words, the RTD
accountability politics must shift towards structural causes of poverty and inequalities, which, as
experience shows, cannot be tackled through the mundane human rights approaches to justice. The
point which must be underscored is that unlike legal notions of accountability, which are reactive,
seeking to address isolated incidences of consequential harm, the conception of participatory
accountability is different. It is not to be triggered by the occurrence of harms or seek to remedy
infringements resulting from an actor’s conduct. Where the RTD participatory sensibility would
be asserted, it would be proactive and reiterative, ex-ante, at the policy making stage and directed
to the agency of development institutions.
I propose that this can happen through national and transnational activism, advocacy and
resistance, among other strategies of people’s counter-power.198 Through mass mobilization and
“…transnational actors such as non-governmental advocacy groups demand to be heard in global policy-making.
States and international organizations can no longer afford to bypass the concerns of transnational actors who have
successfully mobilized around many global issues and have strengthened their bargaining position with significant
moral, financial and knowledge resources.” Benner et al, supra note 126 at 195.
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activism, people will have to demand to be given an opportunity to participate meaningfully and
to contribute their own perspectives on projects and development policy financing, including
scrutinizing the conditionalities that accompany such lending agreements. However, the question
of how participatory processes can be connected to decision-making processes at the bureaucratic
level of the Bank and the IMF remains problematic.
For me, social movements can conduct dialogue with IFIs during decision-making
processes. It does not matter that the Bank and the IMF, together with their Executive Boards are
headquartered in Washington. A degree of answerability is attainable so long as their agents,
representatives, and country missions and staff or the Executive Board can be made to explain and
justify their policy prescriptions at the national level. In my view, in the same way local farmers,
fishermen, and village dwellers rise up against international development banks, they can coalesce
from below to oppose IFIs’ policies at the local level when they negotiate with states and as states
implement those policies. This is what we learn from the notion of “grassroots post-modernism”,
the idea that global forces can only be opposed in their “local incarnation” such as country
missions, country representatives, seconded technocrats, development partners, development
policies.199 The resistance to the Narmada Valley Dam project in India that mobilized intense
national and transnational social movements offers a good lesson for the future of the participatory
accountability from below. While this case shows social movements struggle against development
project financing, its strategies of national, transnational and international mobilization and
solidarity to oppose global project can be harnessed as accountability from below in development
policy financing.
Participatory accountability that relies on these strategies, as Narmada Valley Struggle
illustrates, has seen social movements lobby institutions and demand their answerability by
seeking information and justification of proposed projects. What is crucial is that such strategies
reclaim participatory autonomy for the majorities marginalized in development policy practice;
one that would see to it that voice and control reposes in the people and not in dominant institutions
that usurp legitimate governance. The purpose of participation would be to provide a resurgence
of the lost autonomy and preferences of the people in development. Autonomy and social inclusion
are two key sensibilities of subaltern cosmopolitan legality that I have highlighted previously.
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Given that all policy decisions of IFIs follow bureaucratic procedures that often takes place
between state institutions and Bank or IMF officials, it is here that IFIs and state agencies,
especially national treasuries can be made to explain and justify their policy recommendations in
an open and transparent manner, in line with the core answerability edict of giving information
and justifying decisions. Social movements can lobby to have them included in this negotiation
process. It is through these kinds of engagements in localized terrains that people will be able to
question, prospectively, the potential causes of poverty and inequality that inhere in the proposed
policy system.
By deliberating and exchanging information on policy decisions, ex ante, people can be
able to cite structural violations that pure economistic approaches may not sight. This would
warrant development institutions as well as state agencies to answer for, and therefore be more
responsive, in their decisions at the policymaking level. This ex-ante, process-based approach to
accountability is one sense in which to exert meaningful participation as “an effective expression
of popular sovereignty in the adoption of development programmes and policies.”200 Participatory
ethic promises this ideal of self-determined development. It also envisages the direct and distinct
accountability of IFIs which may be attained through these local expressions of social counterpower that do not necessarily deploy legal techniques. As Sen emphasizes, “social and political
activism is bound to have an important role, both in generating social pressure … and in providing
monitoring and scrutiny” to development institutions.201 Answerability can be demanded by social
movements’ exertion of social and political activism, as agents of the people, whenever state
bureaucrats are in negotiation with the Bank’s or IMF’s technocrats. This is how local forces can
deploy their autonomy to challenge global institutions and global projects in their local
incarnations that may destroy their economies.
The other contribution is organizational strategies. Social movements are diverse in
organizational forms, structures, and objectives and it is difficult to pin down the kind of initiatives
and strategies they can formulate to provide for alternative imaginations in development, at both
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national and transnational levels. They can rely on activism, protests, advocacy, lobbying, writing
letters, and so forth. Effectiveness aside, social-counter-power, in whatever form it comes, can also
rely on naming and shaming institutions by external forces and can apply social pressure, to
influence behaviour, and instill responsiveness of institutions. Political agitation, censure of actors
for violations, or administrative procedures that do not necessarily require bindingness have
always been relied upon outside the appeal of international law.202

4.7

Participation from Below as a Form of Political and Democratic Accountability

The idea that people can create spaces for “the promotion of plural participation” or other
discursive sites for policy deliberation is of profound significance to the answerability typology of
accountability.203 This deliberative policymaking also has a democratic quality that can enhance
political legitimacy in international governance.204 The roles that social movements can play in
this regard—asserting different interests and stake-holding—is significant for democratic
accountability in the governance of the global social relations.205 As experts of global governance
note, expanded participation enhances accountability and the democratic governance of
international organizations, an objective that goes beyond the communication, information, and
justification functions of answerability.206 Therefore, participation as a norm of action in
development introduces a far more nuanced understanding that captures even the political and
democratic senses of accountability, particularly the inclusion and representation aspects. It
displaces the traditional understanding of accountability in international law far from responsibility
and liability for wrongfulness. The International Law Association has studied the concept and
concluded that accountability has different forms and levels.207 It may take legal, political,
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administrative, or financial forms.208 It may also have different levels, such as internal or external
scrutiny, liability for tortious consequences, or responsibility for conduct or omission that does not
otherwise constitute a breach of international standard.209
In the political and democratic senses of accountability, the UN Global Consultation report
on the RTD recognized that popular participation has the further potential, under conditions of
inequality and subordination, to deliver virtues of representation, responsiveness, legitimacy,
inclusivity, voice, and self-determined development.210 These are the kinds of values that most
contemporary accountability mechanisms do not principally aim to achieve. These virtues are
important and relevant for the RTD accountability politics, particularly when applied to
challenging the blemish of the international development enterprise constituted by illegitimacy
and democratic deficit in decision-making.211 Participation therefore has the transformative
potential to ensure that the poor confronted with exclusion, discrimination, and marginalization as
forms of development injustice are meaningfully and actively consulted in a development process.
Such consultation instills a democratic quality in decision-making, through values of
representation, plurality of voices, and deliberation in decision-making. This should be the case,
irrespective of whether those decisions are undertaken by governmental bureaucracies or
supranational institutions.212

4.8

Participatory Accountability and Counter-Hegemonic Knowledges of the People

At the political level, the persistence of resistance and protest implied in participatory
accountability through social movements praxis entails putting policy instruments of
modernization by global institutions at the crosshairs of civil dissidence. This is one way of
democratizing global policymaking, by demanding a participatory role of civil society.213 This
objective is unrealizable through legal accountability.
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As post-development scholarship now reveals, communities have tended to view the
neoliberal policy system not only as one that created daunting dehumanization and marginalization
of the majority poor, but which the masses, such as the Zapatistas, are repudiating by recreating
their own culturally autonomous and authentic local “post-modern” definitions and alternatives.214
Civil dissidence entails that people can mobilize against the global project of development and the
central planks that hold them together. Their target of resistance should include the IMF
conditionalities for credit. Such resistance can happen, at the grassroots level, when Letters of
Intent or Memorandum of Understanding containing loan conditions are being drafted. People,
activists, and other groups can marshal voices to oppose terms of negotiations between the
government and development institutions. This has the modest potential to render irrelevant global
development institutions by what post-development thinkers call “a politics of No.”215 This mold
of politics relies on local thinking and spaces, almost akin to the participatory approach based on
choice, voice, and self-determination that the RTD movement favours. It is a way of ignoring all
the iterations and apparatuses of the global project that constrain peoples’ autonomy to direct their
own development. Resistance and protest may have a way of making it hard for global
development institutions to impose policy constraints and terms that are unpalatable and
unwelcome to a wider majority of the people.
I see that the RTD accountability politics may capitalize on social movements’ active
involvement in and scrutiny of negotiations and processes of development policy approvals.
Consultation can bring new and creative ideas that dethrone, or in some way temper, the
idiosyncratic preferences of development institutions.216 As development thinking emphasizes,
participation should be based on a “genuine exchange of ideas, or deliberation, as well as decisionmaking by reasoned consensus.”217 To this end, social movements may not wholesale seek to
distance themselves from, or supplant, the modernization project or its vision, but they may seek

214

Esteva and Prakash, Grassroots Post-modernism, supra note 107 at 5.
Ibid at 28.
216
IMF 2015 Guidelines on CSOs participation, supra note 187 at 4: “Overall, systematic engagement with CSOs can
help: (i) improve program design and traction of IMF policy advice by providing IMF staff with helpful insight,
analysis, and knowledge of local contexts (for more tailored policies) to supplement official data and perspectives in
official circles; (ii) contribute to constructive public debate on policy options that can help build mutual understanding
of IMF-backed measures; (iii) assess political viability and promote country ownership and citizen oversight by
engaging various stakeholders and constituencies; and (iv) enhance IMF accountability and legitimacy through a more
transparent dialogue with a broader and diverse group of stakeholders.” This reflects self-improvement, transparency,
and responsiveness of institutions.
217
Verger, supra note 185 at 385.
215

293

its normative reorientation by instilling the harmonization of exogenous visions of development
with the voices of the people through democratic and political accountability. Therefore, policy
preferences will have to be questioned, and both the state and development technocrats in country
missions would have to justify and explain their decisions to comport with considerations of equity
or human well-being.
When seeking to direct, control, and own the development process, the imperative of local
thinking as one way of rejecting the global project, or top-down developmentalism, is achieved.218
The motivation of these local actions and thinking are to marginalize “economic thinking” and
replace it with ways of seeing the world that are rooted in the cultures of ordinary members of the
community.219 A true characteristic of counter-hegemonic agency and voices is to offer alternative
knowledge, “including critiques of the existing order, policy alternatives, strategies for change
and wider visions of future possibilities.”220 RTD accountability politics stands to gain positive
capacity from the recognition that when people present their own visions of development, they
would be seeking alternative visions of the universe predicated on creative local thinking as a sign
of rejecting external policy constraints. This would avail new spaces, for insistence, on
endogeneity to a world predominantly governed by (the exogenous) market principles as the sole
discourse of development. The post-development vision asserts that local thinking and action, as
opposed to liberal economic thinking, enable local communities to rediscover “their own definition
of needs” and to revamp and pursue their own “autonomous ways of living.”221 This thread should
run through the RTD discourse as one of the guiding values for the realization of SDGs. It would
highlight the consciousness that centralized economic planning obliterates the participation of
individuals and groups and obstructs their ability to determine a model and process of development
that suits their needs and conditions.

4.9

Responsiveness, Transparency, and Self-improvement of Institutions

As explained above, I do understand that mechanisms of accountability are varied (e.g.,
“monitoring, reporting, public debate, and greater citizen participation in public service
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delivery”).222 Mechanisms are so diverse that they cannot be tethered to legal conceptions only.223
They serve different objectives that can be realized through myriad processes. I recognize that the
answerability model cannot be adopted in all development relationships ranging from project
financing to development policy financing to negotiation of debt forgiveness or stabilization
financing, however, it has a further unique potential that can be harnessed. Participatory
accountability from below can stimulate the responsiveness of institutions, improve transparency
of processes, and possibly enhance the self-improvement of institutions in terms of development
decision-making.224 Participatory accountability from below goes beyond the traditional remedial
measures by securing these outcomes.225 For me, this is how the answerability dimension of
accountability can be relied upon to improve the transparency, responsiveness, effectiveness,
inclusivity, and democratic legitimacy of IFIs. In essence, this is how a larger reading of Article 1
of the Declaration reintroduces political economy questions into development accountability
politics.226

4.10

Potential Challenges to Participatory Accountability from Below

The impediments for this kind of social mobilization are legion including legitimacy concerns,
funding constraints, and the danger of cooptation or what Sapinski and Caroll call the NGOization
of social movements, a danger that “might confer upon them a ‘gatekeeping’ role that coopts
movements into dominant hegemonies and marginalizes their more radical elements.”227 These
concerns can be answered by the insight that Esteva and Prakash share that the documented
experiences of various social movements “does not mean that success always accompanies local
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struggles or that global forces are being dissolved by these initiatives. In many cases the results
are ambiguous.”228
For one, the problematic issue is the ways by which self-determination and peoples’ wishes
in development would be invoked and operationalized in multiple development arenas where aid,
debt relief, or financing programmes for poverty eradication or stabilization financing are debated
between states and development agencies. On this score, Mutua has lamented the marginal
presence of the RTD in international activist politics. He complains of the neglect of international
redistributive justice concerns that socio-economic rights speak to.229 The human rights NGOs and
states of the South, he explains, have always lacked the resources, intellectual clout, and skilled
participation to challenge the market principles and other liberal economic thoughts advocated by
the North.230
Nye Jr. offers a counter-insight to Mutua’s marginality dilemma, highlighting the
prominent role of NGOs, interest groups, and the media in enabling social dialogue of policies:
In addition to voting, people in democracies debate issues using a variety of means, from letters to
polls to protests. Interest groups and a free press play important roles in creating transparency in
domestic democratic politics and can do so at the international level as well. NGOs are selfselected, not democratically elected, but they too can play a positive role in increasing transparency.
They deserve a voice, but not a vote. For them to fill this role, they need information from and
dialogue with international institutions.231

Nye’s thoughts are key guidelines on how we may rethink firming up the backbone of the
RTD norm through alternatives to a totalizing order. His point seems to be that while peoples’
direct participation in the making of economic policies is a rare occurrence at the supranational
level, there is a possibility for this to gain salience in economic governance through alternative
approaches promised by dialogic engagements.
Where participatory processes would appear weak either due to legal or institutional
impediments, ways can be found for anchoring and securing participatory processes through
constitutional, legislative, or institutional amendments and reform to ensure peoples’ voice in
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economic governance. In Kenya, for example, the constitutional sanction of public participation
as a national value and principle of governance has made participation a prerequisite in all public
decision-making, including at subnational, legislative, and executive levels.232 Overall, the scope
of such participation should be wide enough, to include public matters in the realm of economic
governance, borrowing plans, budgetary financing, and other commitments governments forge
with international financial and donor institutions.233 In all these cases the standard of evaluation
must be universal human rights, of which the RTD avails a most appropriate yardstick.

5. CONCLUSION
To sum up, I have advanced a critical evaluation of the Western-derived regimes, invariably
predicated on, and constructed by, international law’s liberal traditions of constraining sovereignty
and of defining accountability restrictively as remedy of wrongfulness/violations. I have brought
into critical perspective the internal accountability of development institutions and the review,
follow-up and monitoring procedures of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. I also
critically examined internal institutional accountability rules as well as international doctrines of
accountability from the RTD perspective. I questioned their adaptability for materializing
development justice, one of the humanitarian projects into which international law has been
diversified. I probed whether extant regimes of accountability can be harnessed to confront
contemporary challenges of development injustices. I interrogated whether they need recalibration
in the face of endemic development injustices, or whether they should be abandoned altogether or
augmented by alternative approaches outside the domain of international law. I argued for a deeper
and nuanced understanding of principles and norms of legal accountability of international
financial institutions beyond interactional violations. I argued that conceptually bounded doctrines
and practices of accountability that liberal international law has so far produced and reproduced
are so woefully inadequate and ill-adapted to securing development justice for the Global South.
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Contemporary regimes of accountability are not able to confront some realities that undercut their
underpinning logic.
It is for this reason that I resort to the core element of the RTD to “participate in, and
contribute to, development” as a potent tool that can be relied upon by the people to clamour for
development justice. Participation avoids the consequential (ex-post) approach to violations. It
insists on vindication (ex-ante) at the primary stages of making the rules and policies that would
potentially engender and perpetuate those violations. It is contextually aware and draws from the
RTD key tenets. I conclude by making the justifications for participatory accountability from
below from an institutional cosmopolitan perspective. This theory focuses on the assignment of
human rights responsibilities within the institutional order for actions that render others more
vulnerable to domination and coercion. Participation as a bottom-up accountability, as ineffective
and inefficacious as it may be, has the potential and promise to augment and supplement, as may
be appropriate, though not necessarily in every given situation, legal and other approaches to
accountability. Admittedly therefore, participatory accountability from below is part of a whole
gamut of measures by social movements that seek to effect, implement, maintain, and regain
systemic change in the global institutional order. It is not new or radical. This dissertation endorses
what has been tested in different arenas, in diverse contexts, through various strategies, by various
social agents and movements. In making this admission, I am conscious that there is no common
ground on which a universal system of accountability can be conceived to respond to such complex
societal problems like development injustice, neither can we all agree on a monolithic method of
emancipatory resistance to the global policy system. Rather than seek a homogenizing approach,
I advocate an accountability mechanism that recognizes Third World agency and resistance in
international law, one that is founded on a root cause approach to structural injustices of the global
policy system. Through this Third World politics of resistance, we can suitably and adaptably
respond to international law’s rationalization and legitimization of the IFIs’ accountability
avoidance, obstruction and disconnection. This is how I propose that we rely on bottom-up agency
of the people to write resistance in international law and make it recognize Third World
emancipatory claims for development justice.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE CONCLUSION AND FINAL REFLECTIONS
In this dissertation, I set out to examine how international financial institutions’ (IFIs)
interventions in the global economy and the development realm can effectively be constrained by
accountability. Accountability is one of the paramount human rights standards that can be
deployed to realize development justice. Enhancing accountability in global development practices
emerged as the most crucial objective in the implementation of the United Nations 2030
Sustainable Development Agenda.1 But so far no detailed theoretical or policy debate has
examined how development justice can be realized through an international mechanism that
recognizes the persistence of structural injustice which demands the imperative of direct and
distinct accountability of IFIs in development practices. Blandly accepted from its inception, the
SDG framework for the accountability of actors, including private actors involved in the sphere of
development, has been touted as a fundamental principle guiding the implementation of the goals.2
And yet, so far, this policy commitment to deepen accountability has only been accompanied by
a rhetorical debate, and seemingly lacks any practical measures or comprehensive programme of
action to guide the implementation agenda. It was therefore the principal aim of this dissertation
to investigate ways through which these deficits and dysfunctions can be redressed, or at least
ameliorated. It was the purpose of this dissertation to explore ways of “firming up the backbone”
of the RTD regime through accountability praxis that can be deployed to protect those in the Global
South against harms causally linked to IFIs’ development-related interventions. Firming up the
backbone of the RTD regime is central to the post-2015 conceptions and practice of a rights-based
international order.3
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1. KEY FINDINGS OF THE DISSERTATION
This dissertation deployed TWAIL and institutional cosmopolitan, two theories that are
compatible with each other in their critique of the imperialist international law and its construction
of unfair and unjust schemes of arrangements.4 I relied on these theories to examine whether the
general principles of accountability born of counter-sovereignty dogmas of international law, those
rooted in contemporary human rights accountability practices, and the internal processes of
accountability of the Bank and the IMF are suitable and well-adapted to the securement of
development justice as it is envisaged by the Declaration on the RTD. I also examined whether the
existing regimes can be relied upon, or generically transplanted into contemporary development
practices to achieve the objective of development justice. I conducted this inquiry by relying on
the RTD as a discourse that questions the cherished beliefs and doctrines that international law
produces and reproduces in development accountability practices. This inquiry has made the
following findings:
One overarching finding of this dissertation is that the existing accountability regimes
(which are mostly “Western-derived” in their conceptions and configuration) are ill-adapted and
unsuitable for vindicating infringements of the RTD and therefore incapable of securing
development justice for people in the Global South. The other general finding is that the imperative
of direct and distinct accountability of IFIs has not been an essential part of the development of
the law of international organizations.
To be clear, though international law has always evolved doctrines that do not completely
ignore the imperative of accountability of IFIs, it has constructed and mobilized meanings that
qualify every doctrine of law and every practical measure aimed at the direct and distinct
accountability of IFIs in development. International law has therefore been instrumental in
facilitating the sustenance of the structural relationships of domination, subordination, and
marginalization of the Third World through obliteration and depletion of the direct and distinct
accountability of IFIs.

International law of development therefore lacks any emancipatory

4

For the argument that the true nature of international law varies across time and that the totalizing critique of
international law as imperialist and Western is not an appropriate account and therefore misplaced, see George
Cavallar, “Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel: Accomplices of European Colonialism and Exploitation or
True Cosmopolitans?” (2008) 10 Journal of the History of International Law 181.
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potential and cannot lay claim to any quality of securing development justice through holding
accountable the most influential actors in global development practices.
The other key finding which formed the central argument of this dissertation has come to
fundamentally alter the way we think about development accountability practice. I argued that
international law and development praxis sanction and legitimize the avoidance of, disconnection
from, and at times obstruction of the direct and distinct accountability of IFIs for their interventions
in the global economy and the development realm. To be sure, it is instructive to note that this
dissertation did not argue that international law sanctions absolute and complete accountability
avoidance by IFIs. Rather, it argued that international law institutionalizes highly qualified and
inadequate accountability mechanisms as part of the legacy of the hegemonization of development
and international law’s creation of subject peoples.
The accountability disconnects, dysfunctions, eclipses and disconnections in relation to
IFIs’ interventions reside in two sites in the international normative system. One site is the
specification of human rights duties and obligations (i.e., the applicability of primary rules), and
the second site is that of responsibility allocation (i.e., the legal process of the attribution of
wrongful conduct to an actor).
Through critical discourse analysis, I have shown how the phenomenon of accountability
avoidance, disconnection, and obstruction is discursively constructed (formulated, articulated,
rationalized, and legitimized) by international law discourses (the practice of language, doctrines,
and precepts of law). These discourses are then deployed (in practice) as devices for domination,
subjugation, hierarchization, legitimization of power, and accountability evasions and avoidance.
Indeed, there are a number of doctrines that international law has forged and relies on to perpetuate
accountability dysfunctions and deficits in development to further the legacy of domination,
inequality and marginalization. This legacy is to be seen in the fact that these very doctrines are
part and parcel of the organized strategy to shirk accountability for those most culpable for global
poverty, inequalities, and structural impediments to human-centred development. In this regard, I
analyzed the way the functionings of hegemony and power are exemplified within social
institutions as expressed in the constructed “meanings” of the idioms and languages of
international law.
Indeed, the doctrines and idioms that facilitate accountability avoidance, disconnection,
and obstruction are legion. I have described and analyzed in detail the deployment of the political
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prohibition doctrine, the dominant application of state responsibility doctrine, precepts of shared
responsibility, the notion of collective duties of states, the due diligence rule, the rationality of
global public goods, the logic of internal institutional accountability of the Bank and IMF, the
SDG language of follow-up and review, the development jargon of a human rights approach to
development (HRAD), among others. I demonstrated the implicit and explicit expressions of
power manifested in these idioms of law that facilitate accountability avoidance, disconnection,
and obstruction in the realm of development practice. In summary, even though development
accountability thought and practice is understood in diverse ways, the law remains beholden to
archaic and abstract concepts and rules that do not inspire, in any degree, the transformative
potential of the RTD.

2. KEY SUPPORTIVE ARGUMENTS
To make the above key findings and conclusions, I pursued in the different chapters some key
supportive arguments, claims, and positions. Foremost, I have been able to demonstrate in this
dissertation that international law and precepts of accountability that it has produced and
reproduced in the SDGs agenda, in the intellectual debates about the HRAD, and in the doctrines
of the law of international responsibility, indelibly embrace strong statist imprints. Bearing this
statist imprint, these regimes of accountability do not adequately provide for the direct and distinct
accountability of IFIs. I have further shown in chapter 4 that the adoption of internal institutional
accountability modes such as the normatively weak Inspection Panels of the World Bank and the
Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF—no matter their overarching goals and documented
successes—has not dislodged the unsatisfactory conceptions of accountability as redress or
prevention of breach.
The general shortcoming of all the regimes of accountability that I examined in this
dissertation is that they adopt the interactional and not the institutional standard of accountability.
The interactional approach to accountability ignores how development injustices are produced,
perpetuated, and sustained by such global structural constraints as the rules, policies, and
standardized norms of development lending, financial surveillance, technical assistance, and
knowledge generation. By such limitation, the existing regimes of accountability fall far short of
disaggregating and distinguishing actors for purposes of directly sanctioning their conduct or their
effects.
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I have established as well that despite the over-proliferation of the language of
accountability in international law in the last few years, the statist orientations of contemporary
accountability regimes have not quite sufficiently been interrogated. Not much interrogation has
focused on whether the existing regimes are compatible with the sui generis rights that do not
exclusively seek to constrain state sovereignty. I am referring to the RTD that speaks to
development justice by bringing into view the fact that causes of poverty and inequality are preeminently located in the supranational realm and in the asymmetries of international development
and financial governance. I notice that traditional black letter theories of accountability miss the
crucial insight that because supranational institutions are very much implicated in development
injustices, they ought to be directly and distinctly held accountable. Such oversight of international
lawyers has left intact the very basic pillars and premises of state-focused and state-based
accountability regimes.
One very good example of the replication of statist and interactional accountability
paradigms is found in the SDGs accountability agenda. The SDGs have become robust global
commitments anchored to the principle that human rights and development are mutually
reinforcing—functioning within the same contours, serving similar objective purposes, and
demanding the imperative of accountability of all actors.5 However, despite this transformative
sensibility, in the articulation of accountability, the question of the direct and distinct
accountability of IFIs—the determinants and manipulators of most global development policies—
has not been accorded even a cursory mention, let alone a part in the formation of the
implementation agenda. And yet, these are the most influential development actors; their
interventions greatly impact the redistributionist agenda (such as the SDG 17 aim of eliminating
structural obstacles to development).
Clearly, the silence on the imperative of the direct and distinct accountability of IFIs is one
of the challenges to the implementation of the SDGs 1, 10, and 17. It is this very legacy that also
undermines the growing practice of development as “normatively based on” and “operationally
directed” to the promotion of human rights. In its design, the SDGs accountability model of follow-

5

United Nations, A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies Through Sustainable
Development (New York: United Nations, 2013) at 22. See also Article 3 of Draft Convention on the Right to
Development, with commentaries A/HRC/WG.2/21/2/Add.1 online:
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/Session21/4_A_HRC_WG.2_21_2_Add.1_RegisteredVers
ion.pdf>.
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up and review is decidedly statist in policy outlook, specifically in its declared objective of holding
governments accountable in the implementation of the goals. The immediacy of the direct and
distinct accountability of IFIs stands out as prominently undermined by the repurposing of strongly
statist versions of law. Thus, in the strong push to integrate human rights into development, we
have ended up with the over-proliferation of the SDGs accountability agenda where the traditional
and mundane are neither interrogated nor questioned.
Whatever its merits, by its non-specification of the responsibility of private actors, this
policy schema has failed to inspire the transformative rights-based development agenda implied
in the SDGs agenda. Effectively, people in the Global South that have perennially faced
subjugation, inequities, and other forms of radical deprivation are furnished with accountability
regimes or policy discourses that can neither constrain hegemonic development models nor seek
redress for inegalitarian development outcomes. This leads us to the conclusion that the human
rights and development interface, in practice—even in its most counter-hegemonic sensibility,
infused by the RTD norm—cannot secure the ends of development justice. By leaving intact the
very basic pillars of the state-centric view of human rights justice in the international development
praxis, we continue to ignore the challenge posed by the structural contingency of development.
Such institutionalized weaknesses in the architecture of international development accountability
praxis is deliberate. It reflects a constructed realty that is constantly rationalized and legitimized
by international law’s discursive practices in development.
This shortcoming, of relying on specious and normatively weak discourses of
accountability extends to the inspection model of the Bank, the evaluation offices of the IMF and
even the very notion of a HRAD as a discourse of accountability. The intellectual debates about
these regimes, while novel, are unsatisfactory for they have not only relegated but delegitimized
both the political economy questions and the redistributive agenda that the RTD discourse of
accountability ought to focus on.
The point is that the human rights and development interface has enabled the intervention
of human rights debates from a development perspective, but with the sad result that structural
issues have taken a back seat in the accountability discourse. Lamentably, the erudition of such
prolific writers as Sengupta, Bradlow, Sovacool, Faurie, Sen, Twomey, Marks, Uvin, NyamuMusembi, and Cornwall, among others, have only served to obscure and render incoherent, rather
than clarify, the discourse of human rights accountability in the realm of development practice.
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This obscuration perfectly explains how language (HRAD or inspection logic) is deployed to shape
peoples’ interpretations of their own behavior, circumstances or relationships with global
development institutions. In this sense, the HRAD or the inspection model have been used to
express certain values, which values have been normalized and routinized and now inform the way
we understand human rights accountability in development, including the way such understanding
has relegated to the periphery structural issues and other grave deprivations and violence of the
development enterprise.
One such site of incoherence in the HRAD debate and in the notion of inspection is the
uncertainty of the scope of human rights duties and performance criteria in development. In
practice, the dialectic of disclaimer of human rights obligations permeates and persists even in the
very international community’s recognition of the close interface and mutual reinforcement of
human rights and development that (the SDGs putatively embody). This conservatism has often
invoked that familiar question of who the “addressees” are when human rights norms are invoked
in development practices. This contestation of the normative status of rights obligations is
rationalized and legitimized by idioms and meanings that international law produces and
reproduces. It is hidden in such vocabularies as the political prohibition doctrine, economic
rationalism, and other legal techniques of interpreting rights obligations in a state-centric fashion.
Such rejection begins with the persistent disavowal of human rights obligations for the non-state
actor, in both the human rights realm and development practices (development cooperation and
partnerships).6 Indeed, IFIs continue to disavow the relevance and applicability of human rights
even in the operations of their internal accountability mechanisms. They do so by ever retaining
pure economic outlooks and the governing logic of accountability to “own rules, operational
policies and directives.” This is a rationale that conveniently allows them to maintain a safe
distance from accountability when it comes to human rights violations caused by their projects,
programs, and policies.
This delegitimization of primary rules (human rights obligations) through international law
languages permeates even the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations
for Internationally Wrongful Acts (DARIO). DARIO is the proposed normative system of
accountability built on the assumption that international organizations are regulated by
international norms (primary rules), the breach of which triggers their responsibility. However, the
6

Chapter 3, section 4.2.1; and Chapter 4 section 3.3.
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paradox is that human rights do not as yet constitute legal obligations binding on international
organizations. This negates the reliability of DARIO as a suitable regime of international legal
accountability.
The ambiguity and contradiction regarding the normativity of rights for IFIs has often
tended to legitimize and facilitate accountability avoidance and disconnection for IFIs’
interventions.7 We see this articulation of IFIs’ safety from accountability in several instances in
contemporary discourses of human rights accountability that too often emphasize state
responsibility and human rights obligations tied to a conception of sovereignty in the Westphalian
sense. Even when it has been recognized that IFIs ought to be held accountable, human rights law
excessively bears the statist imprint.8 This is how we end up with adherence to the so-called
“derivative accountability”, a discursive construction which at the level of practice is grounded in
the principle that states have a duty to protect against human rights violations.
What is alarming is that despite international law having supplied adequately convincing
answers to this problem of the contestation of the normativity of rights by IFIs, there is as yet no
ending of the debate on the bindingness of human rights obligations in the realm of development
practice. One common response that has achieved a considerable degree of consensus relies on the
normative override of the UN Charter values and obligations. As Skogly argues, international
financial institutions are “legally obligated not to conduct actions contravening principles and
purposes of the UN Charter, and also to respect the Charter, including the human rights
provisions.”9 This legal proposition relies on the normative override principle enshrined in Article
103 which supposes that the UN Charter obligations take precedence and supersede any
contravening obligations in any other treaties that states have entered into.10 Accordingly therefore,
human rights norms have been said to apply to international institutions as part of the international

7

Chapter 4 section 4.2.2; chapter 5 section 4.1.
Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
9
Sirgun I Skogly, Human Rights Obligations of the World Bank and IMF ((London: Taylor & Francis, 2001) at 101102.
10
Article 103, has been said to establish the hierarchical supremacy of the United Nations objectives over other
obligations:
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present
Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present
Charter shall prevail.
See e.g., Obiora Chinedu Okafor, “The Status and Effect of the Right to Development in Contemporary International
Law: Towards a South-North Entente” (1995)7 Afr J Intl & Comp L at 872; Sanae Fujita, The World Bank, Asian
Development Bank and Human Rights (Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013) at 11.
8
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society bound by the Charter value system. The argument goes as follows: IFIs are organs of
society bound by the fundaments of an “international constitutional” system founded upon the UN
Charter,11 of which rights are the paramount values. It is argued, therefore, that IFIs have always
had a responsibility to respect human rights and promote the “conditions of economic and social
progress and development” enshrined in Article 55 of the UN Charter.
One such insight that has gained prominence in the context of the RTD is Okafor’s. He
observed that this riddle is resolved by Article 55 of the UN Charter, which imposes obligations
of “a constitutional” nature on all states, a duty to promote “higher standards of living, full
employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development.”12 By its call on
every individual and all organs of society to adhere to human rights commitments, the UDHR was
taken as an authoritative interpretation giving effect to Article 55 of the UN Charter command for
“a social and international order” based on universal respect and observance of human rights. 13 It
has been argued therefore that international organizations as organs of society have a duty to
respect human rights,14 including the RTD which is part of the international human rights corpus.

For a view that rights are the fundament of the international constitutional order, see, Nigel White, “The United
Nations System: Conference, Contract or Constitutional Order?” (2000) 4 Singapore Journal of Intl & Comp L at 291;
Erica de Wet, “The International Constitutional Order” (2006) 55 ICLQ at 57.
12
Okafor, supra note 10 at 872.
13
Article 55 of UN Charter reads: “With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and
development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and
educational cooperation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction
as to race, sex, language, or religion.”
See also Preamble and Article 28 of UDHR.
Scholars proposing this view are Bard Andreassen “Development and Human Rights Responsibilities of Non-State
Actors” in Bård A Andreassen & Stephen P Marks eds, Development as a Human Right: Legal, Political and
Economic Dimensions (Harvard School of Public Health & Francois-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human
Rights, 2006) at 129; Mac Darrow, Between Light and Shadow: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund
and International Human Rights Law (Oxford; Portland: Hart Publishing, 2003) at 10; Mac Darrow, “World Bank
and International Monetary Fund” in David Forsythe, Encyclopaedia of Human Rights Vol. 5 (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2009) at 378.
14
Olivier De Schutter, “Human Rights and the Rise of Organizations: The Logic of Sliding Scales in the Law of
International Responsibility” in Jan Wouters et al, Accountability for Human Rights Violations by International
Organization eds, (Antwerp; Portland: Intersentia, 2010) at 56, 69-72. For De Schutter, this interpretation is
appropriate but does not offer a convincing account of the foundation or premise of the conclusion that UDHR is
legally binding. His reflections revolve around the doctrine of sources, enunciated in Article 38(1) of ICJ Statute
which provides binding sources of international law such as jus cogens norms, treaties, custom, and general principles
of international law. He offers a baseline theory upon which human rights obligations may be exerted and recognized
as binding on international organizations and rejects the notion that human rights obligations of states are binding on
11

307

Similarly, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has
argued that “the right to development imposes duties on states and the international community,
as well as on all those whose actions and/or omissions have an impact on human rights and on the
environment in which these rights are to be fulfilled.”15 Others contend that international
institutions are bound to respect international law, including customary law.16 In particular, the
RTD terms are expressly addressed as obligations of the international community, which is
comprised of states, multilateral and bilateral institutions, individuals, and non-state actors.17 The
draft Declaration on the Right to Development clearly reaffirms the obligations of international
organizations.18 The international community as well as natural and legal persons are therefore
subjects of the RTD norms and obligations.
International law therefore has answers to the rejection of rights obligations by IFIs. Hence,
it is duplicitous for the spiral of human rights obligations disavowal to continue in vogue when
indeed IFIs have acknowledged the crucial roles they play in the implementation of the SDGs (a
transformative rights-based development agenda). The continuance of the spiral of disavowal of

international organizations merely on account of being constituted by member states. He posits that that international
organizations have their own legal personality and are thus distinct from their constitutive members, or that human
rights are custom, on grounds of indeterminacy of state practice. According to him, human rights norms are binding
on international organizations as a matter of general principles of international law. See also Bruno Simma and Philip
Alston, “The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principle” (1988-1989)12 Aust YB
Intl L 82.
15
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Frequently Asked Questions: Fact Sheet No. 37
(United Nations: New York and Geneva, 2016) at 3, 10, 13. According to OHCHR, article 2(2) of the Declaration that
places a duty on all persons to promote development implies that “such responsibilities are shared by all relevant
actors and organs of society, including the private sector and civil society.” Going by this assumption, it is contended
that the Declaration creates binding obligations on all persons, both natural and legal persons and the international
community comprised of states and the international institutions that they have created. The position taken by OHCHR
draws from a stance that the normative bindingness of the RTD in international law has been settled given that the
RTD “synthesizes” most norms that are contained in most human rights instruments and that the legal norms
constituting the RTD are binding on states when acting as members of international organizations.
16
For other arguments concerning the explicit mandate of international financial institutions in relation to obligations
imposed by the RTD, see Sirgun Skogly, “The Role of International Financial Institutions in a Rights-Based Approach
to the Process of Development” in Bård A Andreassen & Stephen P Marks eds, Development as a Human Right:
Legal, Political and Economic Dimensions (Harvard School of Public Health & Francois-Xavier Bagnoud Center for
Health and Human Rights, 2006) at 289; Sirgun Skogly, “The Position of the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund in the Human Rights Field” in Raija Hanski & Markku Suksi eds, An Introduction to the International
Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook 2nd rev ed (Turku/Abo: Institute for Human Rights, Abo Akademi
University, 1999) (that inter-governmental organizations comprised of states have express human rights precommitments which cannot be abnegated by “operating through an international organization” at 244); Daniel D
Bradlow, “Social Justice and Development: Critical Issues Facing the Bretton Woods System: The World Bank, the
IMF, and Human Rights” (1996) 6 Trans L & Contemp Probs 47 at 74.
17
OHCHR, Frequently Asked Questions supra note 15 at 3-4; Article 2(1) of the Declaration on the RTD.
18
Draft Convention on the Right to Development, supra note 5 Introduction, commentary 6, Articles 7 and 9.
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rights bindingness means that we are dealing with a contrived attempt to avoid and evade, at all
costs, the accountability of IFIs for adverse development outcomes that imperil human flourishing.
Aside from the obligations-addressee question, accountability evasions and avoidance are
constructed by the way international law conceptualizes the notion of responsibility for
wrongfulness. It is the tendency of international law to differentiate the state and the international
organization. It is by this differentiation that international law further entrenches a system of no
direct and distinct accountability of IFIs. This is particularly so within the DARIO regime. To
begin with, DARIO is itself a replication of the norms and principles of the law of state
responsibility, but without a deeper interrogation of the fundamental assumptions and premises of
that law and or even its applicability to international economic governance. One dynamic that
complicates DARIO’s approach to responsibility for wrongfulness is the notion of structural
contingency of development. In the globalized system of (allegedly) collective policy action, and
(admittedly) technocratic practices and parochial objectives of global bureaucracies, outcomes
tend to be contingent on the structural configurations and policy instruments of that system. This
is because supranational factors are more determinative, manipulative, and subordinating of
national policy infrastructures. Due to this structural contingency, there is a natural propensity for
causal links of harms to be indiscernible. This is mainly due to many entangling and mediating
forces at the national level, where supranational factors interact with national policy
infrastructures. Subsequently, the distributive consequences and spillovers of collective and
multilateral decisions may not effectively be attributed to differentiated responsible actors. 19 Thus,
the indiscernibility of causality, the unattributability of conduct, and the unknowability of the
extent of harms present a crisis for international legal accountability that relies on the international
law of responsibility for ascertaining wrongfulness. This dynamic, brought about by the RTD
discourse, shows that international law is yet to account for, or even articulate, the structural nature
of violations rooted in the system of economic organization.
I therefore contended in chapter 5 that the fundamental premises of the state responsibility
doctrine and its replica DARIO, as supported by a liberalist conception of rights, are woefully
inadequate and ill-suited to the conceptualization and formulation of accountability norms for the
actualization of development justice. The RTD and the vision of justice that it espouses reveals

Thomas Pogge, “Are We Violating the Human Rights of the World’s Poor?” in David Kinley, Wojciech Sadurski
& Kevin Walton eds, Human Rights: Old Problems, New Possibilities (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing; 2014).
19
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that fundamental precepts of DARIO, in their current formulation, and the accountability
principles that they produce and reproduce, are ineffective because they are based on a subjective
view of wrongfulness. By this subjective view, DARIO has a propensity to ignore the
institutionally embedded constraints of the global economy as forms of violation of the RTD. In
addition, a liberal conception of rights as constraints on sovereignty, so predominant in the human
rights accountability praxis, leads to an unhelpful account of the nature of rights violations of the
structural/institutional kinds. It generates an unsatisfactory approach to accountability that
attributes the effect of structural violations as state conduct or omission, without appreciating the
causal and contributory roles of global systemic determinants (rules and policies).
The foregoing far-reaching critiques of this dissertation were achieved by the application
of the RTD lens to examine the suitability and adaptability of existing accountability frameworks.
First, I showed in chapter 2 that the Third World counter-ideology expressed in the notion of the
RTD contests received international law traditions, including those in the realm of international
development. I showed that legal and historical foundations of the RTD norm seem to have been
forged outside the demarcated boundaries of the liberal theory of rights and traditional conceptions
of development. I showed that international law and development have not adequately grasped the
normative distinctiveness of the RTD when it comes to accountability thought and practice. In
international law of development, there is as yet no deep appreciation that because the Declaration
on the RTD has operational linkages with development practices by ordaining a particular model
of development, the kind of development that it ordains cannot be secured by the usual
accountability regimes. I demonstrated that there is therefore a need to rethink accountability when
the Declaration on the RTD is sought to be mainstreamed in international law and development
practice.
It was my emphasis that different methodologies that defy sovereigntist understandings of
accountability must be forged to support Third World claims for development justice. The RTD’s
espousal of peoples’ solidaristic claims for socio-economic emancipation avowedly contests
positivist international law conceptions of justice.20 By bringing a cosmopolitan view of justice,
as opposed to a statist understanding of rights, the Declaration on the RTD exposes the degree to
which contemporary global economic arrangements promote or undermine human flourishing. It

20

This is the gist of Chapter 2.
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does so in a completely new way not captured by standardized international law norms. 21 Its
accountability politics and practice, I argued, must therefore take account of how the global policy
system produces development injustices that constitute its derogation.
Second, by introducing the structural contingency dynamic into the development
accountability debate, the RTD discourse shows the hegemonic character of the interventions of
IFIs in international economic governance and development, and how these interventions
constitute a severe challenge to their accountability. It asserts that in structural violations, not one
agent is in control and therefore tracing causal chains of harms is an extremely indeterminate task.
Stated differently, in structural violations, we are not dealing with isolated-cause, single-effect and
isolated-outcomes. We are dealing with a complex dynamic with multiple causes, multiple
processes, and multidimensional outcomes. Exposing the multicausality and multidimensionality
of harms is one way in which the RTD discourse unravels the tendencies of the international
system, by revealing the inadequacies and conceptual limitations of international doctrines to
locate the causes of injustices against the Third World in the international system. The RTD
emphasizes development justice, drawing the nexus between the global institutional order and the
under-fulfilment of human rights commitments. This is something that is quite clearly not grasped
within the conventional human rights accountability praxis.
Third, I argued that the crucial insight brought by the institutional cosmopolitan
understanding of phenomena has not percolated through international law’s discourse of
accountability. It has also not permeated the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, where
accountability remains largely state-based and state-focused. By locating causes of poverty and
inequality within nation-states’ agencies, these praxes of accountability remain largely
interactional. Similarly, I argued that the current models of accountability, including the inspection
panels or remedial processes of accountability anchored to the law of international responsibility,
heavily incline toward notions of accountability as constraint on power and as redress of breach.
These approaches have proven incapable of preventing or mitigating institutional constraints
embedded in global economic arrangements and cannot be relied on to steer the implementation
of the SDGs, particularly goal 17.
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Throughout this dissertation, a TWAIL perspective made it possible to give a richer
explanation of the reality of the avoidance, disconnection, and obstruction of the accountability of
IFIs in development. I demonstrated that international law re-enacts frames of reference and
understandings that completely evade holding IFIs accountable in development. Simply, in the
quest for development justice, the direct and distinct accountability of IFIs has not been part of the
culture of integrating human rights into development to tackle structural injustice. This particular
bias is sanctioned and rationalized by international law and the institutional practice of
development through glib discourses that are framed as universal but whose praxis is to assure IFIs
some measure of safety from accountability politics and practice.
This international development accountability anomaly is legitimized through the practice
of such historically preconceived notions, legal precepts, languages, and conventions as “due
diligence,” “state responsibility,” “collective responsibility,” “global public goods,” “derivative
accountability,” “inspection procedures,” and “reporting, review, follow-up, and monitoring.”
More crucially, this generalization and standardization of norms and precepts of law to the
everyday practices of accountability often tend not to interrogate context and the nature of some
rights for which they are being deployed. For example, the law of international responsibility’s
capture of the way accountability is understood in international law is one clear case of the flaws
of standardization and universalization of norms. Its basic shortcoming is that it fails to recognize
wrongfulness beyond conduct and does not contemplate the direct and distinct accountability of
global actors where responsibility cannot be disaggregated to respective actors. International law
of responsibility is therefore deficient and has failed to avail an adequate frame for understanding
the supranational causes of poverty and inequality.
And yet, with these fundamental defects, the law of international responsibility has attained
heightening levels of universalism. It is therefore plausible to conclude that the orthodoxy of the
notions, legal precepts, languages, and conventions that legitimate the contemporary international
development accountability regime—like that of all other concepts and doctrines—is based on
specious claims of their legalistic universality. Their rationalization and legitimization is
vehement, even when they are patently ill-formulated to the challenges of the contemporary world
order.22 Indubitably, the orchestrations of doctrinaire precepts of law that have come to be clothed
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with universality and acceptance in international law discourses should not at all be surprising. As
Third World scholars suggest, the invocation of international rules serves, in certain cases, to foster
projects and, at worst, to advance the agenda of the most powerful states who benefit from
unaccountable international governance structures.23
Lastly, in pursuing the contention about the unsuitability and ill-adaptability of
contemporary regimes of accountability, I have proved a series of other related claims. Foremost,
I have shown that when looking at the global structural injustices through human rights lenses, the
monoculture of liberalism must, at the very least, be compensated for or altogether pluralized. Pure
liberalism should not be the only ideological prism through which we understand new genres of
rights such as the RTD. Moreover, human rights movements, human rights usefulness, and human
rights claims for emancipatory and egalitarian projects cannot any longer be understood within
totalizing liberal frames. A conception of development justice that relies on human rights theories,
I have argued, must be expanded. It must be enlarged, for instance, by engaging institutional
cosmopolitanism and TWAIL. These theories can re-tool the functional defects and conceptual
limitations of human rights theories that inform practices of accountability. Throughout this
dissertation these two lenses suggested that accountability frameworks fashioned within the strict
positivist tradition may need some conceptual reengineering to redress the contemporary realities
of the hegemonic international order.

3. THE CASE FOR A RETHINK AND REDESIGN OF THE EXISTNG
ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS
The case for a fundamental rethink of existing accountability mechanisms is necessitated by the
phenomenon of structural injustice prevalent in the development realm. The urgency of a rethink
and redesign arises from the institutional and normative inadequacies and unsuitability of the
existing regimes of accountability to the protection of the peoples of the Global South against the
institutional practices and rights violations linked to development interventions of the World Bank
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and the IMF. It is also partly informed by the dynamic that international law has not formulated a
mechanism for holding IFIs directly and distinctly accountable in their role in creating certain
barriers to the realization of the right to development (RTD). These barriers are presented by the
rules, policies, processes and institutional arrangements for the governance of international
economic activities.
I therefore call upon international lawyers to fundamentally rethink the relationship
between international law and development, particularly in relation to the way they forge norms
that facilitate accountability deficits and dysfunctions in the realm of IFIs’ interventions in the
global economy. As we do, there must be an awareness that we cannot fully rely on international
law, or its other iterations, as the sole discourse for the Third World emancipatory struggles against
structural injustice. In other words, international law and institutions of development lack any
emancipatory potential and cannot lay claim to such quality. That international law has proven
helplessly incapable of eliminating structural barriers to development and other paradigms that
perpetuate development injustices is without question. We see this in the logic of the provision of
global public goods.24 This rationality has enormously expanded the remit of IFIs, but without a
corresponding dispersal of obligations or reimagination of their accountability for structural
injustices. Of utmost concern is that as development injustices continue unabated, the glib
discourse of accountability seems to be deliberately tailored to turn a blind eye to the violence and
perversions of global development practices. Accountability is framed as outward-looking toward
the state but only inward-looking toward IFI’s compliance with their own rules and procedures.
Unless fundamentally rethought and reconstructed, international law norms of accountability offer
facile hope for the protection of the people in the Global South against the vagaries of the
neoliberal development enterprise. To stem this injustice, we must therefore fundamentally rethink
and redesign the institutions and norms of accountability to take account of the Third World
struggle against structural injustice that underlie the idea of a RTD.
The urge and immediacy for a rethink and redesign of mechanisms of accountability is more
acute in the intersecting arenas of human rights and development, particularly as envisaged by the
Declaration on the RTD. It is in the context of the convergence between the two that development
is constantly being reconceptualized more and more aggressively in the context of the
implementation of the 2030 SDGs agenda, a policy variant that complements the Declaration of
24
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the RTD. Indeed, the implementation of the RTD in the context of the SDGs agenda affirms the
linkage between external challenges, development policy practice, and the enjoyment of human
rights.
It is to be noted, quite unsurprisingly, that the commitment to respond to national and
international causes of indigence and widening inequalities has not been founded on a robust
interrogation of those international norms, conventions and practices that embed accountability
deficits in the global institutional order. If we are to pursue, henceforth, a genuine development
justice accountability agenda we must critically reflect on and give due weight to the RTD’s
predominant posture as an instrument of struggle against structural injustice.

4. THOUGHTS ON THE REFORM OF THE FRAGMENTED REGIMES OF
ACCOUNTABILITY
Yes, to accord the various international regimes of accountability the potential to secure
development justice, their normative and institutional limitations can be reformed, as fragmented
and ununiform as they are. They can be reformed so to be able to directly and distinctly hold
international and multilateral development actors accountable. They can be reformed to be more
effective in, and at best more adaptable to, the vindication of structural injustices of the
international institutional order. I would propose not that we completely abandon the regime of
international accountability, namely the law of international responsibility, internal institutional
accountability or the follow-up and review processes. No! Not even when confronted with such
extensive functional deficiencies. I believe we can recalibrate their fundamental precepts and
assumptions, where necessary and appropriate, so that we can best suit and adapt them to the
collective claims for development justice.
The suggestion that conceptual limitations and functional deficiencies of contemporary
accountability regimes are susceptible to reform if they can be rethought in the international
academic and policy discourse should not be taken lightly. As my discussion in chapter six of
socio-economic rights enforcement shows, there is so much to be gained from the recalibration of
our approaches to accountability where violations are structural in nature, demanding new and
novel remedial measures to vindicate those infringements. The experiences gained from the
judicialization socio-economic rights claims in countries such as Kenya, South Africa, and
Colombia suggest that in seeking to enforce or implement some sui generis rights, we must be
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aware of structural contexts of violations and the nature of the right in issue. This consciousness
should permeate, loud and clear, the ongoing debates on the implementation of the RTD and the
SDGs accountability policy. This key finding should permeate our understanding and practice of
accountability for different genres of rights norms, but more particularly must inform the future of
the RTD practice and politics of accountability in the context of the implementation of SDGs.
The task of this dissertation was to come up with new insights, nuances, aspects, and
concepts that the scholars, practitioners, policy think tanks at the UN, regional and domestic levels
can rely on to rethink and reform accountability of IFIs in development. I propose the following
thoughts.

4.1 Thoughts on Reform of the International Law of Responsibility
My proposition for the rehabilitation of different regimes of accountability from the way
international law has conceived their understandings first goes to the law of international
responsibility. One way is to recalibrate the basic precepts of the law of responsibility of
international organizations to recognize the structural contingency dynamic and the corresponding
intermingle effect. Simply, legal reform should be cognisant of structural nature of harms attendant
to the unique international economic relationships.
One precept deserving to be looked into is the definition of wrongful conduct DARIO and
ARSIWA. In calling for this redefinition, I suggest that conduct or omission in breach of primary
obligations should not be the only legal test of wrongfulness, but also the rules, policies, and
processes that shape such outcomes/conduct or omission. There is also the need to bring into the
definition of wrongfulness the effects of conduct or the consequential harm brought about by rules
and policies. The reason for this suggestion is that in structural violations, breach can be produced
not only by decipherable conduct but also by rules and policies that govern such conduct. This is
the exemplification of an institutional approach to accountability that avoids a linear and
straightforward approach of the interactional kind. Such a redefinition employs an institutional
understanding of global injustices, the much-needed crucial insight when it comes to structural
violations.
If DARIO’s precepts are reformed in line with this proposal, this would mean that for once
international law will have to treat international rules and policies in the same way as conduct,
taking account of how they intermingle with national policy infrastructure, consequent to which
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they are subjected to the determination of breach or wrongfulness.25 This is the institutional optic
which looks to multiple primary causal elements that are linked to the global institutional order.26
By recognizing the implication of global rules and policies in development injustices, it will be
possible to locate the causes of poverty, inequality (within and between states), and other structural
barriers in the international policy system. By this recalibration of DARIO, it will be possible to
attribute such multidimensional harms or engendered deprivations to responsible actors. The
institutional approach of this kind takes account of the determinative, manipulative, and
subordinating role of supranational actors. It has the potential to resolve the indiscernibility,
indeterminacy and unknowability of actors, their contribution and wrongfulness that arise as a
result of the intermingle effect.
The phenomenon of locating causal chains of harms in the global policy system and not in
the agency of the state in the traditional mechanisms of international law (i.e., through such idioms
as due diligence) has the potential to fundamentally alter the law of responsibility of international
organizations. DARIO’s precept that first comes to mind is the concept of “control”. By a rightspecific approach to accountability and context awareness, we will have to recognize that the RTD
is a right to a particular national and international order that is favourable to just and equitable,
human centred, and participatory development. By this appreciation, a general appraisal of the
nature of policies and rules governing economic relationship are brought into our legal
interpretation of DARIO’s precept of control. It can be said that the global system exerts a kind of
subtle “control” different from the command-and-control or factual control contemplated by
Article 7 of DARIO. It will be possible to appreciate, for once, that the covert control in the global
policy system is not discernible as direct and “effective control” in the traditional fashion of the
law of responsibility. In fact, for the RTD vision, there is an insistence that global and historical
forces be looked at in the determination of accountability for development injustices. By
dislodging the power-based and cause-and-effect understanding of control, we are being amenable
to accepting that control can take many forms. We are accepting that control can be woven into
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the idiosyncratic policy instruments and conditions governing the provision of global public goods.
This is how I propose reform of DARIO.
I am however apprehensive that even with an expanded meaning of wrongfulness and
control we may not be able to achieve the kind of distributive justice that structural violations
demand. The problem relates to the conceptualization of causality in the law of responsibility. The
intermingle effect dilemma would not have adequately been resolved by the causality approach to
structural violations. The problem is traceable to what Pogge calls the multiple entangling forces
that make it impossible to trace causal chains of harms.27 As I had argued, in the guise of collective
action, the structure of the global policy system unifies into an integrated and complex whole. Due
to this, actors become undifferentiated, actions become aggregated, causal links dissipate, and
distributional outcomes—where adverse—cannot effectively be linked to any specific agent in the
assignment of responsibility. Pogge’s institutionalism seems to emphasize how a development
justice perspective needs to understand accountability differently. He argues that when it comes to
poverty as a distributive deprivation, the interactional approach to responsibility cannot be
grounded in a causal account of outcomes. Rather, it requires an account of the patterns of
behaviour in relations between states and institutions, an account of the plurality of actors and the
intermingling of national and global policy regimes. His point seems to be that where there are
multiple interacting forces and factors, the causal approach to accountability seems inadequate and
ineffective. This is because the resultant injustices cannot be addressed by ex-post remedial
accountability approaches that are backwards-looking and fixated on breach. Pogge is acutely
aware that the global policy system is structurally implicated in the causal explanation of poverty,
though not in a unilinear fashion. This structural contingency calls forth a different
conceptualization of justice, one that recognizes the multiple causalities woven into the entangled
structural relationships across boundaries.28 Pogge recognizes the limitation of an ex-post that
cannot discern causality so as to be able to distinguish the responsibility of actors. If the causality
approach is unworkable and unreliable because it adopts an ex-post approach, perhaps we should
adopt an ex-ante approach that insists on accountability at the policymaking stage. An ex-ante
approach does not feature in the basic conceptions and assumptions of international law of
responsibility for wrongfulness. As I explained while propounding participation as accountability,
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an ex-ante, process-based accountability is what the answerability prong of accountability offers.
It is what I propose as the way forward in this dissertation.

4.2

Thoughts on Reform of the Inspection Panels and the Independent Evaluation
Office

At the level of internal institutional accountability praxis of the Bank and the IMF, several
recommendations may be proposed. First, I propose reforming the Independent Evaluation Office
of the Fund to take the model of the Inspection Panel, albeit with far reaching structural
modifications and expansion of remit. Giving the Evaluation Office a new architecture and
functional domains will shift its objective from changing the behaviour of the IMF to enforcing
independent accountability.
Insofar as the inspection model is concerned, far-reaching changes must be made. First,
there is need for reformulation of the Panel rules to instil compliance with universal rules and
standards such as human rights as the fundaments of the international society and the guiding value
for the realization of sustainable development goals. As I argued before, the paramountcy of human
rights obligations over other contravening international obligations flows from article 103 of the
UN Charter. Second, there is need to diminish the override role of the Board to avoid cases of
obstruction of accountability. Third, making the Panel recommendations binding on the Board and
the Bank will be revolutionary in instilling effective compliance and ensuring meaningful
accountability. Expanding the jurisdiction of the Panel to encompass effects of projects and
development policy financing (taking account of the intermingle effect) would be a sure way of
serving real justice to the victims who are always confronted with after-effects of projects and
programmes executed at the behest of global development institutions. Development institutions
will be directly and distinctly accountable for conduct related to projects or programmes as well
as for those long-term effects that may occur after completion of projects.

4.3

Thoughts on Reform of the SDGs Accountability Policy

Lastly, in relation to the SDG accountability regime, there must first be a new recognition that
development practices are now explicitly based on and operationally directed to the promotion of
human rights and human well-being. The permeation of this integration of development and human
rights (enshrined in the Declaration on the RTD) as the guiding value and legal commitment
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binding on all development actors will reform the obligation avoidance and circumspection toward
human rights norms by the Bank and the IMF. This will address the intractable question of whose
responsibility it is to respect rights in development. Direct and distinct human rights responsibility
of all development actors should be the aim of this endeavour. The legal approach to this quandary
already exists in international law. Probably a robust and clear-eyed judicial pronouncement on
this in municipal and international courts is warranted.
I conclude that for the SDGs policy schema of accountability to make development justice
a reality for peoples of the Global South, four things are key. First, I propose that the direct and
distinct accountability of all development actors in development cooperation and partnerships
needs to be accorded much more sustained introspection in the mainstreaming of the human rights
agenda into development practice. Second, we must rehabilitate the horizontal accountability logic
from its statist orientation and expand its dialect into the sphere of non-state development actors.
Third, we should focus on distinct and direct obligations, responsibilities, and accountability of
state and interstate actors, at the level of development relations. This should go as far as the arenas
of implementation of development policies (including financing agreements and global
partnerships). Fourth, we should include clear and explicit strategies for embedding a HRAD in
all programmes and policies of development agencies, with a targeted language on the RTD’s
focus on structural injustice and the imperative of distinct and direct accountability of all actors.
Such a discourse of accountability should focus on ensuring that rules, policies, structures, and
processes of development are compatible with the objectives of human wellbeing, equity and
social justice and participation in development. Fifth, the regime of follow-up and review should
be expansive enough to include the Bank and the IMF not only as stakeholders but as institutions
who will also file reports and be susceptible to answerability for the related outcomes of
development assistance and financing. There is also a need to enable robust civil society
participation in the work of the High-Level Political Forum that oversees and monitors progress
in the implementation of SDGs.

4.4

Embrace and Deepening of Participatory Accountability from Below

As we await these reforms, I make a bold invitation for international lawyers to be open to the
potential and promise of participatory accountability from below that the RTD’s participatory ethic
avails. This participatory ethic can be made to improve our understanding and practice of the
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answerability prong of accountability. In recommending participation as accountability, I do not
intend to propose a universal and standard approach, rather I propose a quality of accountability
that can be suited and adapted to different settings. The paramount reason is to ensure that we have
a workable mechanism that recognizes Third World agency and resistance in international law.
This is what I have called the “what works approach.” This proposed alternative approach
privileges subaltern resistance against international institutions, nationally, transnationally and
internationally. I argued that participatory accountability in international law from below has a
great deal to offer. The features that make participatory accountability seductive as an alternative
accountability and a form of international law from below is embodied in what Santos and
Rodriguez-Garavito refer to as “subaltern cosmopolitan legality.”29
In this dissertation, about six reasons explain why I broke ranks with international law to
propose a theory of participation from below as accountability. The first paramount reason for the
deviation is informed by TWAIL’s sensibility that if a viable model is to be configured or informed
by international law’s precepts, it must take account of Third World experiences and involve Third
World agency and resistance in protecting and promoting their own dignity, rights, and
development aspirations. I heeded TWAIL’s injunction that creating universal doctrines requires
a critique of dominant principles and practices from the perspectives of the “Others.”30 It requires
rooting new visions of legality and futures in the “historical, civilizational, development and
cultural struggles” of the Third World.31
Second, this participatory model recognizes that accountability for materializing
development justice must be contextual, taking account of the particularities of the genre of the
right in question and being aware of the nature of its potential violations.
Third, this model exalts the agency, autonomy, and counter-hegemonic knowledges of the
people in the development process. It vests the onus of instilling accountability in the people, not
institutions or the state.
Fourth, it expands accountability beyond the legal realm of sanctions and remedy to
encompass the political and democratic notions of accountability.
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Fifth, participation advents a viable recourse to process-based, decisional-level (ex-ante)
accountability as an alternative to ex-post models of remedial accountability.
Above all, participation as accountability has the potential to firm up the backbone of the
RTD regime, its aspirational politics of accountability, and the clamour for development justice in
ways that international law cannot guarantee. It promises overly politicized garbs as alternative
public spaces in which people can contest the dominant practices, rules, and policies of
development. Its praxis as oppositional politics seeks to alter dominant rationalities and
development paradigms. It has the potential to advance the answerability of institutions and make
them responsive to peoples’ voices and claims for egalitarian and emancipatory development. It
can deliver this potential by building potentially counter-hegemonic relations and projects in the
international development realm.
We can rely on this practice to formulate and evolve a non-Western practice of
accountability that distances itself from arcane anachronisms of the law of responsibility or
legalistic practices tied to a remedial conception of accountability (read the Inspection Panels). I
propose participatory accountability as part of going beyond legal conventions. It deviates from
the flawed and fundamentally unworkable international doctrines, regimes, and institutions of
accountability.
5. REFLECTIONS ON THE FUTURE OF “THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY” IN THE INTERNATIONAL PLANE
While this dissertation ultimately challenges us international lawyers to fundamentally reconceive
the practice and politics of accountability in both international law and development, the pertinent
question is, what is the way forward for the future of the RTD accountability debate? As we aim
to reform the international development regime of accountability, or think them anew in the face
of these fundamental flaws, what measures are the international community taking and how can
they be improved considering this dissertation’s findings?
I acknowledge that there is already tremendous progress, albeit slow and unsatisfactory, to
enlarge accountability in development practice and to make it focus on the activities of private
actors, IFIs, and other non-state actors. First and foremost in this progress is the Ruggie framework
for transnational corporations on human rights matters, which saw the UN Human Rights Council
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adopt certain guidelines on the “remedy” pillar of the framework.32 These developments are a sign
of positive steps, though their focus on domestic legal processes and policy infrastructure of states
render them inapplicable at the international level. Another latest attempt is the Intergovernmental
Working Group of the United Nations Human Rights Council, which has proposed a binding treaty
on human rights obligations of transnational corporations and international organizations. There is
also the latest development at the UN Human Rights Council, which is about to consider the zero
draft of the Convention of the Right to Development prepared by the Intergovernmental Working
Group on the Right to Development.33 The Human Rights Council has also come up with Expert
Mechanism on the RTD, perhaps in keeping with the tradition of special procedures of the UN
human rights systems that help in the promotion of human rights agenda.
No doubt, these measures are progressive and show a deep commitment to ensure that
among other objectives, the RTD can have bite in international development practice. However,
these measures have not sufficiently appreciated the dynamic of structural contingency which
dictates that development injustice needs to be tackled differently through a robust accountability
praxis and politics at the global level. Structural contingency dynamic infuses the perspective that
we ought to design accountability regimes that can confront structural injustices inherent in the
global policy system and in the model of global economic organization.
While I do not in any way advocate the repudiation of international law because of its
legacy of constructing rigid and limited doctrines of accountability, I propose that the recalibration
of standard doctrines and practices of accountability must tackle structural injustices of the global
policy system. This is something that the bland, the conventional and the traditional approaches,
as are ongoing at the Human Rights Council level, cannot accomplish. Contemporary approaches
to improve accountability in the realization of development justice must take account of and reflect
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upon how to devise a regime that regulates the way institutional schemes allocate structural
advantage and disadvantage.
I propose that future revision of the law and practice should aim to make them comport
with, and be alive to, the exigencies of structural injustice. This must particularly entail an
awareness of how the global policy system facilitates IFIs’ accountability avoidance,
disconnection and obstruction. This proposition addresses the question of how development justice
can be materialized through an international mechanism that recognizes the imperative of direct
and distinct accountability of IFIs in development practices. Our thoughts must first appreciate the
dynamic of the structural nature of violations otherwise we risk carrying on with the incomplete
and fundamentally unworkable regimes that are in use in international law.
A consciousness of the structural context of violations recognizes that in the guise of
economic interdependence, the structure of the global policy system unifies into an integrated and
complex whole, actors become undifferentiated, actions become aggregated, causal links dissipate,
and distributional outcomes cannot effectively be linked to any specific agent in the assignment of
responsibility for wrongfulness. In these complexes, supranational actors decisively take on more
determinative and manipulative roles in conditioning the national and international environment
of development, including shaping outcomes that constitute a derogation from the RTD. This
phenomenon makes it imperative that accountability ought to be assigned at the global level.
Second, if we are to craft an effective and efficacious accountability regime that is informed
by the core principles of the Declaration on the RTD, we must appreciate the sui generis character
of the RTD norm and the conception of justice that it envisions. By bringing into view the structural
contingency of development, or the idea that global factors and actors are more implicated in the
“engenderment” of harms at the domestic level, international debates must recognize that the RTD
questions the fundamental assumptions of the contemporary statist and interactional accountability
models prevalent in human rights and development practices. It would, for this reason, be
implausible to expect that a right of non-Western genesis as the RTD can be enforced by Westernderived regimes of accountability whose fundamental assumptions are as questionable as they are
ill-adapted to structural injustice.
Because of the ill-adaptability and ill-suitability of the models that are currently in use, this
dissertation therefore proposes the need to forge other ways of being and doing the act of
accountability. I propose the need to more deeply consider social movements perspectives in
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policy debates on the conceptualization and practice of accountability as a paramount standard in
the implementation of the RTD in the post-2015 development agenda. International legal thinking
should expand to recognize other conceptions of accountability that have worked, or proved
workable, in other realms of practice. Participatory ethic expands the roles of accountability,
transcending prevention, mitigation, and remedy of harms as the approved objects of
accountability in international law. In other arenas where social movements praxis has been
experimented with, it infuses other objectives of accountability such as responsiveness,
transparency, and self-improvement of institutions sought to account. Unlike power-based
accounts of justice predominant in international law and human rights practices of accountability,
participatory accountability from below focuses on actors, power, processes, rule and
policymaking, and structural issues in development. Its application also comes with the political
and democratic qualities and objectives of instilling inclusivity, representation, legitimacy, at least
when effected ex-ante, at the decision-making stages.

6. CONCLUSION
This dissertation concludes that in spite of the social transformation agenda—advanced by the
Declaration on the RTD (as a particular human rights framing of justice in the development realm),
the development’s embrace of human rights values continues to shape discourses of accountability
that: (i) neglect structural injustice of the global policy system; (ii) do not acknowledge the
normative character distinctiveness of rights; (iii) do not adequately address the differentiated
responsibilities of actors at the multilateral level; (iv) are effete in resolving the challenge of direct
and distinct accountability of IFIs; and (v) in fact assure IFIs safety from accountability in relation
to their interventions in the realm of development. This conclusion emerges from a critique of the
existing regimes of accountability as heavily interactional, neglecting the imperative of
institutional approach to accountability. Such accountability models that are mostly “Westernderived” in their configuration and functions, are ill-suited to aid the securement of the kind of
development justice ordained by the RTD norm.
As this dissertation has illustrated, historically, the evolution of international law of
accountability has deliberately neglected the imperative of the direct and distinct accountability of
IFIs in the development realm. International law, either because of its statist character, or in its
characteristic incompleteness and utopianism, falls far short of providing an adequate framework
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for addressing this issue. Take for example the responsibility dimension of accountability, which
invokes the following question: “to whom are the human rights responsibilities in development
addressed?” This prong of accountability remains in a flux, even in the very conceptualization and
practice of the SDGs agenda, in DARIO, and in the IFIs’ understanding of their own
accountability. Ultimately, the implementation of the Declaration of the RTD as the
(underpinning) normative framework for development justice and one of the instruments guiding
the achievement of the SDGs still stands greatly undermined by this doctrinal position. Another
way of expressing this is that even with the robust convergence and synergies of the international
community around SDGs agenda, foreseeably, no much is to be gained by the polemics of
accountability. Effectively, this prong of accountability being in a flux constitutes an institutional,
functional and normative impediment to the realization of development justice. It severely
undermines all international mechanisms that attempt to recognize the imperative of ensuring the
direct and distinct accountability of IFIs in development practices. I suggest that participatory
accountability from below can be relied on to develop a workable regime of accountability.
In sum, this dissertation seeks to contribute perspectives for enhancing the efficacy and
effectiveness of the accountability of IFIs in international financial governance and interventions
in development policymaking and practice. One key thing that the implementation of the RTD in
the context of SDGs agenda will contribute to the search for an effective accountability regime in
development is the praxis of participatory accountability from below in international law. This
dissertation concludes that the recalibration of international law norms and redesign of policies to
ensure the effective and efficacious accountability of IFIs in the implementation of sustainable
development agenda must take account of the imperative of Third World agency and resistance in
protecting and promoting their own dignity, rights, and development aspirations. Participatory
accountability from below promises and premises this cosmopolitan ideal. Given that IFIs still
reject binding human rights obligations in the realm of development practice, and since there is no
international institution that can enforce sanctions against IFIs for adverse distributive outcomes
of development, resort to the answerability prong of accountability is the next best thing to do.
This pragmatic approach to justice in the international plane “[signals] a move away from the legal
arena to the political and social as sites for justice” and shows that “ideas about justice are
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negotiated in everyday contexts, through contestation and debate.”34 This contestation and debate
makes law “[gain] strength from being woven with other strands to form a web of regulation that
can be animated by networks of actors, but by itself cannot redress injustices based on oppression
and domination.”35
Answerability instills process-based accountability that is essential to confronting, ex ante,
economic policies, rules, institutions, and processes of development that have the potential to
engender gross inequalities and inequities. This is how a development justice perspective
appreciates the institutional context of violations, by looking at the primary causal elements that
are linked to the globalized institutional framework, which it treats as questions warranting
accountability. In the context of the Declaration on the RTD, the answerability typology of
accountability relies on the right to participate in, and contribute to, development processes. Its
great attribute is that answerability entitles people, the subjects of development, to scrutinize policy
actions and to seek explanations and justification for, and information regarding such policies and
rules at the decision-making level (ex ante). It is through participation in decision-making that
people can demand, ex ante, fairness and equity in the rules, processes, institutional setup, and
outcomes of development. Participatory accountability from below can therefore be relied upon,
potentially, to achieve responsiveness, transparency and self-improvements of global development
institutions. This for me is a turn to pragmatism, a shift from blind faith in the juridical facets of
international justice to a pragmatic sense of resistance.

Hillary Charlesworth, “International Law and International Justice” in Chris Brown & Robin Eckersley eds, The
Oxford Handbook of International Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018)1 at 11.
35
Ibid.
34
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